June, 2021 - Colin McGinn

Puzzling Pimples

June 2, 2021/0 Comments/in Uncategorized/by Colin McGinn

Puzzling Pimples

The philosophy of pimples is an underdeveloped subject. Why do we react to them with such revulsion? The other night I was watching TV (Jimmy Kimmel Live, 14 August, 2018) and was treated to some footage of assorted people looking at film of pimples being burst. My philosophical antennae twitched (I have written a book on disgust). [1]The reactions were striking: turning of the head, averting of the eyes, grimaces, expressions of nausea, protests at having to watch this stuff. Why the extreme reaction? It would be hard to maintain that fear of contamination lay behind it, since these were just computer images they were looking at–and why would pimples be carriers of disease? Nor did anyone complain that they might catch something by looking at these images. Yet the reaction of disgust was intense and uniform. So what exactly was their psychological state? Presumably there was some property P such that the subjects of the experiment judged that pimples have P, where P is marked as disgusting: but what is this property P? It can’t just be the whiteness of pimples or their hilly shape or the fact that they can burst and discharge their contents—lots of things are like that and cause no revulsion at all. If plants had pimples, would we be quite so disgusted by them? The physical properties of pimples don’t constitute P; nor does their purely sensory appearance. Occurring on a human body, particularly the face, seems to make all the difference: but why? Why pimples and not freckles?

Theories have been proposed (being out of place, being a reminder of our animal nature, genital connotations, signs of ill-health, tokens of death, unruly life, and so on), but what is striking is that none of this is evident to the subject of the experience. It is not as if the subject responds by citing these theories when asked what he or she finds so disgusting. Instead subjects become strangely inarticulate when asked to explain their disgust reactions, even perplexed. And the theories do not command general assent, as well as being vague and poorly formulated. It is quite a mystery why we find certain stimuli disgusting and not others. So (a) people reliably have disgust reactions to pimples (inter alia) and (b) they don’t know what it is that so disgusts them. Indeed they are certain that pimples are disgusting (especially when squeezed) but they are ignorant about the source of the disgust: they can’t say what it is that triggers their visceral reaction. In the case of fear people can specify why the object produces the reaction of fear, because of the dangers presented by the object, but the objective properties that elicit the disgust reaction are elusive and inscrutable. The puzzle is how this is possible—what the explanation of the ignorance is. Why can’t we say what bothers us so? People are apt to resort to asking, “Can’t you just see that bursting pimples are disgusting?” When pressed to justify their reaction they fall silent, perhaps admitting that they don’t know what to say. [2]

The Freudian will insist that the reasons for disgust are unconscious, so it is not surprising if the subject can’t access them—as with revulsion at snakes (phallic symbols etc.). But this is not a credible explanation in the case of many disgust objects, including pimples—do we really have repressed sexual emotions surrounding pimples? It is not that we have repressed knowledge of the significance of pimples and that’s why we can’t articulate our revulsion. Nor would it be plausible to assimilate the case to cases of tacit knowledge, holding that we have tacit knowledge of what P is but we don’t have explicit knowledge of it (compare our tacit knowledge of the definition of knowledge, say). This does not explain why it is so difficult to excavate the grounds of disgust—why we can’t complete “x is disgusting if and only if…” Is it perhaps a cognitively unmediated reflex that has no articulation, like the patellar reflex? Does the stimulus just tap into brain circuits that initiate a reaction of nausea without any conceptual mediation? That too seems implausible: why is the reaction found only in mature humans, and why is it accompanied by a judgment of disgust? So the puzzle remains: not just the puzzle of what prompts disgust, but also the puzzle why we don’t know what prompts disgust. Why are we so baffled by our own reactions? It can hardly be that disgustingness is just a primitive property that resists all attempts at articulation—a perceptual simple. Pimples don’t have ordinary perceptible properties and in addition a further simple property of being disgusting. Compare beauty and ugliness: here we can make a shot at saying why we find things beautiful or ugly, but we are not similarly able to spell out our judgments of disgust. Thus we are liable to accusations of irrationality in the disgust case (why do we find mucus and ear wax disgusting but not tears?). Freckles we are fine with for some reason, but pimples powerfully repel us—why? Are we just arbitrarily sounding off?

Here is one thing that seems right to say: when a person is disgusted by something he or she seeks to avoid sensory contact with it. We don’t want to look at or touch or smell or taste the disgusting thing. Again, disgust differs from fear in this respect: we want to flee the fearful object yet we don’t mind observing it from a safe distance, but the disgusting object we want out of our sight whether it is close or distant. The mark of disgust is averting the gaze, as with those pimple viewers I mentioned. And it goes beyond that: we don’t even want to hearabout disgusting things. Embedded in the disgust reaction is a desire not to know—we don’t want to be acquainted with, or cognitively linked to, the disgusting stimulus. We would be happier never to have encountered a disgusting object. It is torture to be subjected to unremitting perception of disgusting objects—feces being the obvious example. Fear is not like this: we don’t desire not to know fearful objects, only not to be exposed to their dangerous tendencies. We don’t find lions disgusting—we are quite happy to gaze at them—but we don’t want to be caged up with a hungry or aggressive lion. So we can say that disgust is anti-epistemic—it is a positive wish not to know. If we are unfortunate enough to witness a pimple burst on someone’s face, we want to forget the experience as soon as possible—we want our memory to fail us. We are against having this type of knowledge. If the inanimate material world produced strong disgust reactions in us, we might not want to know about it (at least we would be ambivalent about physical knowledge); in the case of the organic world, we definitely want to avoid certain kinds of knowledge about it, and might need to be trained to overcome our natural disgust reactions (as with medical training and cadavers). [3] The central message of disgust is: “I don’t want to know!” This again is rather puzzling: why are there things that we don’t want to know about? Isn’t knowledge generally a good thing? Don’t we want to add to our stock of knowledge? But the thirst for knowledge runs up against an obstacle in the shape of disgust—there are some things we prefer not to know about, especially if the knowledge is by acquaintance.

So there are two epistemological puzzles about disgust: the puzzle of why we can’t formulate what disgusts us, though we make confident judgments about it; and the puzzle of why we prefer to limit knowledge in the way we do. These are to be added to the puzzle of what makes something disgusting, i.e. what its necessary and sufficient conditions are. Pimples are a problem.

Colin

[1] Colin McGinn: The Meaning of Disgust (OUP, 2011). In this book I defend a general theory of what makes an object disgusting, emphasizing death-in-life and life-in-death; in the present essay I take up some ancillary puzzles.

[2] People can certainly say that slimy things are generally disgusting and that gleaming things are not disgusting, but they can give no general characterization of the class of disgusting objects. They tend merely to list the things that particularly revolt them. By contrast, they have no difficulty saying what scares them, namely dangerous things.

[3] It is fortunate that our disgust reactions are confined in the way they are: just think how difficult science would be if its subject matter made us want to vomit! What if psychological states elicited disgust reactions? Numbers? It would all be like studying pimples.

Proprioception and Naive Realism

June 2, 2021/0 Comments/in Uncategorized/by Colin McGinn

Proprioception and Naïve Realism

Philosophical discussions of sense perception seldom address proprioception, but it is a question whether theories that hold for the other senses, particularly vision, hold for proprioception. The objects of proprioception are generally taken to be the muscles and joints, possibly also the skin; they do not include all bodily organs. We do not sense our bones in this way or our internal organs (with the exception of the heart and gut, which are muscular). [1] It might be said that we can perceive our bones (their size and position) indirectly via our perception of the muscles surrounding them, but the skeleton itself contains no proprioceptors. So the bones are not direct objects of internal perception; similarly for the brain, liver, and blood—or the fingernails, hair, and teeth. We know the properties of these things by means of the senses, but we don’t sense them by proprioception; they are not elements in our “proprioceptive field” (compare the visual field). Simplifying, let us restrict proprioception to the muscles: we sense our muscles this way but nothing else—not other people’s bodies or external material objects. The muscles are the proper objects of proprioception; and this is a sense like no other, a sense in its own right. It makes us acquainted with things in a unique way.

Various questions can be asked about this sense. Is there something distinctive it is like to deploy the proprioceptive sense? Are there proprioceptive qualia? Is it a type of feeling, analogous to touch? Do we sense events in our muscles as well as the muscles themselves (contractions, relaxations)? What properties of our muscles do we sense? Are the muscles perceived to have both primary and secondary qualities? What kinds of perceptual illusions is proprioception subject to? Is it possible to be a skeptic about proprioception? What is the relationship between proprioception and introspection? Do we sense the mind as we sense the body? How is our body image related to our self-image? Does proprioception provide the most basic kind of knowledge of our body? What would happen if we lost all proprioception? Is our conception of our body mainly determined by proprioceptive sensation? To what degree do we model the external world on the body as proprioceptively perceived?

These are all good questions, but I intend to focus on a different question: Is naïve realism true of proprioception? I hold that the other senses do not satisfy naïve realism in the following sense: their direct objects are not external distal material things but proximate arrays of energy or materiality. [2] We do not, strictly speaking, see, hear, smell, taste or touch external objects like tables and chairs, or stars and bananas. We see impinging light, hear ambient sounds, smell the chemicals that emanate from objects, taste the chemicals that stimulate our taste buds, and touch the force fields emitted by things (none of these objects is a sense-datum in the traditional sense, not being mental in nature). I will not defend this view here; my concern is to suggest that we dodirectly sense our muscles. Thus there is a fundamental asymmetry between proprioception and the other senses: naïve realism is true of this sense but not the other senses. If I look at my biceps muscle, I directly see the light packet reflected off it and I indirectly see the muscle itself; but when I sense my biceps muscle by proprioception I sense the muscle directly not some sort of energy emanating from it. There is no perceptual intermediary that is the immediate object of my perception. I am acquainted with the muscle itself not merely with the effects it has on my senses. Proprioception is logically unlike hearing (the paradigm sense in my view): we hear the sound an object produces not the object itself (save indirectly), but we don’t feel the “sounds” produced by the muscles—we feel the muscles themselves. When I apprehend my body I really do apprehend my body. There is nothing mediated or remote here, no dependence of one kind of perception on another; I don’t indirectly perceive my muscles in virtue of perceiving something else. In fact, there is nothing else that I perceive when I perceive my muscles—no analogue of light or sound or chemical impingements. It is the muscle itself that falls within my proprioceptive field not some sort of emissary or intermediary of it.

It is hard to argue for this position except by pointing to the absence of anything that could play the role of intermediary, and also perhaps its phenomenological verisimilitude. What could we proprioceptively perceive butthe muscles of the body? The case is rather like our “perception” of our own mind: we “sense” our thoughts and sensations directly not via some sort of intermediary. Mental states don’t reflect light or emit sounds or send out mental chemicals that enter a mental nose or mouth. Similarly our muscles don’t have these kinds of effects on our internal sense: their properties are immediately given in proprioception. We perceive our muscles somewhat as we perceive light or sound—that is, directly and immediately. But our muscles are solid objects like external objects, so these are the only such objects that we sense directly. I sense your body indirectly via my external senses, but I sense my own body directly (as well as indirectly through my other senses). Proprioception is unique in giving us access to physical objects directly. Thus there is nothing about such objects intrinsically that precludes them from being directly perceived; it is just that objects can reach our minds in different ways, some direct, some indirect. Mostly we sense the physical world indirectly, but in the case of proprioception we are granted a direct route.

This is not to say that perceptual illusion is impossible in proprioception, or that skepticism doesn’t apply; and indeed both are possible. We have the phantom limb phenomenon as well as the standard brain in a vat scenario. So we don’t know with certainty that we have muscles. The point is rather that the structure of our perceptual relation to the body in proprioception is unlike our other forms of perceptual relation to things: if we perceive our body (pace skepticism), we do so without perceptual mediation—without sensing something else first. It is not that we perceive our muscles by perceiving our skin or something of the sort (as we do when seeing our muscles). In this sense, then, we can be naïve realists about proprioception: we really do directly perceive the physical things called muscles. Of course, we have proprioceptive experiences that are distinct from muscles, but these are not perceptual intermediaries, since we don’t perceive them (we have them). The experiences make it as if we are sensing our muscles directly, and indeed that is true as a point of logical analysis: we literally experience our muscles.

It is an interesting fact that this asymmetry exists: instead of naïve realism being true or false of perception in general, we have the result that it is mainly false but not universally so. Different philosophical theories of perception apply in different cases. Interesting, too, that our own body should be the object that engages our perceptual apparatus most directly, so that our body becomes the thing most intimately experienced (not counting the mind itself—though the mind isn’t experienced). “Know thyself!” takes on a new meaning. And is it possible that we tend to model external perception on proprioception, regarding it as more intimate than it really is? In fact, there is a sharp logical discontinuity between perception of the body and perception of other physical objects, animate and inanimate. Other bodies resemble our bones in contrast to our muscles. [3]

Colin McGinn

[1] We can sense pain in internal organs that contain no muscle, and this might be regarded as a form of perception; but that is not the same as proprioception, which has to do with the perception of position, size, and movement. Thus sensory physiologists distinguish proprioceptors from nociceptors.

[2] See my “Seeing the Light” in Philosophical Provocations (MIT Press, 2017).

[3] Don’t our bones seem more alien to us than our muscles, as if they aren’t quite ours? Ditto for our internal organs (most of them). We are fonder of our muscles because we know them better. The skeleton is not an object of affection.

Problems of Other Minds

June 2, 2021/0 Comments/in Uncategorized/by Colin McGinn

Problems of Other Minds

We speak of the problem of other minds, in the singular, but it is instructive to disentangle different strands in what is so described. Does the difficulty of knowing other minds stem from the nature of mind or from the contingent limits of our faculties of knowing other minds? We humans know other minds (insofar as we do) by the observation of external behavior by means of our senses, particularly vision. We train our eyes on other people from some distance and see their facial expressions and bodily movements, as we hear sounds emanating from their oral cavity. If we are far away our eyes and ears register very little of the behavior that (we think) gives rise to knowledge of other minds, and even at close quarters our senses fail to register minute bodily changes. The human senses can only take in so much of what happens to the body. And they are quite blind to other facts that might provide evidence of the other’s state of mind: chemical events in the interior of the body, invisible brain alterations. All this could be observed by an observer with suitable senses, but we humans gain our knowledge of other minds through a limited subset of the available evidence—we just look and listen from a certain distance, in a certain light, etc. Our knowledge has a slender perceptual basis, determined by the character of our senses. Many animals drink more deeply of the workings of the body and therefore have access to evidence for mind that is denied to us. Smell is the obvious route to knowledge of other minds for a dog or cat; and perhaps such animals feel less removed from other minds than we do. The dog can “smell fear” and detect mood by responding to subtle (for us) biochemical markers. A possible being could taste our hormones and arrive at conclusions about our mental state. The human way of knowing other minds is just one way of knowing them, based on a particular set of perceptual capacities.

Let us call this the perceptual problem of other minds: it arises from the contingent circumstances of our actual perceptual faculties used for knowing other minds. And the skeptical thought will be that these faculties are inadequate for affording genuine knowledge of other minds. Seeing a person’s face from six feet away, say, is just not an adequate basis for knowledge of what is in that person’s mind at the time. Superior perceptual access (think dogs) would be adequate, but the actual perceptual access we have to other people’s bodies is insufficient to ground a claim to knowledge. It is as if we perceive just a few traces of what is going on inside, so that our normal dealings with people don’t afford what is needed for knowledge—it’s all just guessing. Maybe the problem doesn’t apply to dogs (or Martians), but with humans the normal perceptual basis is just too exiguous. But this problem is not the only problem faced by our claim to know other minds: there is also what might be called the logicalproblem of other minds. This is the problem that no matter how much perceptual access we might have to a person’s body—his internal organs, biochemistry, neural activity—such facts could never, as a matter of principle, afford an adequate basis for knowledge of other minds. For there is a logical gap between the physical manifestations or accompaniments of mental states and mental states themselves. The former are public and objective while the latter of private and subjective. We are thus faced by a deep inferential chasm that cannot in principle be crossed. So even if the perceptual problem could be solved the logical problem would remain.

Now some may pooh-pooh the logical problem, finding it overly fastidious epistemologically; they find this an uninteresting form of skepticism. But even if that were so there would still be the perceptual problem, and that problem looks much closer to common sense. It is really not clear (it will be said) that our ordinary modes of perceptual access to people can warrant the kind of confidence we typically repose in our claims about other minds (though we often readily admit deep ignorance about such matters). At any rate, there are two problems here, requiring different kinds of answer. I think most philosophers have had in mind the logical problem when considering the problem of other minds, but the perceptual problem needs to be treated in its own right; there is something specially worrying about our claims to knowledge of other minds that doesn’t apply to the problem of the external world (say). There is no problem about our knowledge of the external world that might be resolved by extra perceptual faculties or an enhancement in acuity. It is not that dogs know the external world better than humans! The problem of other minds is not a skeptical problem like any other—a reflection of the logical gap between evidence and conclusion—but has a distinctly human aspect: it results from our actual modes of perceptual access. We know just from our daily dealings with people that we are vastly ignorant of what is going on inside them—their thoughts, motivations, and emotions. That is why it is so easy to evoke skepticism about other minds in people: even children can see that it is abominably difficult to know whether others see the world in the same colors they do, for example. This is not a matter of some abstract epistemological principle about the logical gap between evidence and conclusion; it results from awareness that we perceive little of decisive relevance to psychological attributions. We are accordingly natural skeptics about other minds. We wouldn’t be if we had greater perceptual access to relevant facts, such as what is happening in the gut and brain; then we would be at most philosophical skeptics about other minds.

And there is another problem I shall call the phenomenological problem: we just don’t have any experiences of the presence of other minds—it doesn’t seem to us perceptually that there are other minds. It seems to us that there are external objects, including human bodies, but we don’t likewise have experiences in which it seems to us that we are seeing a mind (pace Wittgenstein). The phenomenology of our knowledge of other minds does not include perceptual appearances of those minds. By contrast, we do have our own minds before our minds when we introspect, so it really does seem to us that we have a mind: but it doesn’t likewise seem to us that other people have minds. And if there is no such phenomenology, then nothing forces on us a belief that we tend to hold, namely that there are other minds. So we can’t cite this phenomenology as a defense of our ordinary beliefs. We have these beliefs based on shaky inference from scant perceptual clues. The skeptic will say that without an appearance of other minds we are manufacturing a belief to which we are not entitled. The belief is not grounded in our primitive awareness of the world but arises from something like custom or habit: it is more like religious belief than belief in natural facts. And indeed who can say that their beliefs about other minds are grounded in incontestable facts of experience? We are really just making the best of a bad epistemological job in forming our beliefs about other minds as we do, making the most of whatever clues come our way. It is not that vision (or hearing) is somehow well suited to discovering truths about other minds; it is ill suited to that task but we have nothing else to rely on. We can see a person’s face and we can search there for indications of inner realities, but it is not that other minds chose this method as the most revealing way of making themselves known. It is really a miracle that we can know anything about other minds this way at all. If people had no faces, we would be much more skeptical about other minds than we already are. We rely on scraps and hints, and we know it. [1]

[1] The problem of the external world has neither a perceptual nor a phenomenological component: it is not that we only have access to a worryingly limited subset of perceptual data in forming our ordinary beliefs about things, and it is not that there is no phenomenological datum of external objects. The problem is purely an abstract logical problem about evidence and belief, namely that perceptual data don’t logically entail material-object beliefs (the same holds for the problem of induction). The problem of other minds is in a class by itself.

Pointless Knowledge

June 2, 2021/0 Comments/in Uncategorized/by Colin McGinn

Pointless Knowledge

God is said to be omniscient: he knows everything. There is nothing he doesn’t know, no matter how minor or inconsequential. I think this poses a problem for God’s existence, because some knowledge is pointless—and nothing about God should be pointless. It is sometimes noted that God knows about little things as well as big things—a daisy in a field as well as a king on his throne. This little knowledge may not be useful to God, but it shows his tender regard for all of creation and his attention to detail. Still, it cries out for explanation: why bother to know every last thing just for the sake of it? None of us would find that a worthwhile project, even if it came easily. What’s the point of knowing every single detail of the universe?

Consider the position of particles within planets. There are true propositions stating the relative positions of particles within different planets: a certain particle inside Mars is so many millions of miles from a certain particle inside Earth. There will be many billions of propositions like that. God knows all of them, just as he knows the moral condition of your soul. Presumably all these propositions are at the forefront of his consciousness, since there is no back of it. What is the point of having such knowledge? These propositions are neither useful not interesting; they record utterly mundane facts. You would kill yourself rather than memorize even a tiny proportion of them. So why does God take the trouble to know them all? There is no point to it—except to live up to his reputation as omniscient. He could delete this knowledge from his data banks and sacrifice nothing of value. It is a waste of divine resources as well as a blot on God’s sublimity—like hearing that he has a billion hands he never uses. If God is truly omniscient, then he has a huge amount of pointless knowledge. [1]

In the human case we have no time for pointless knowledge; it is certainly not thought to be valuable. Knowledge must either be useful or inherently interesting, but not every fact about the universe is useful or interesting—some things are just not worth knowing. If the bore is someone who insists on telling you things that are not worth knowing, then God is primed to be the supreme bore (though I imagine he would refrain from unloading all his pointless knowledge on you). Rummaging through God’s mind in search of epistemic nuggets would yield an awful lot of junk. Omniscience guarantees the possession of junk information. But this is not how we like to think of God: we like to think of him as discerning, discriminating, superbly intellectually equipped, and interesting to know. He is not the repository of vast quantities of dullness. He is not the Encyclopedia Britannica of pointless epistemic clutter. Someone who has memorized the phone book is not an ideal of epistemic virtue, but God has memorized every phone book in the universe (and everyone’s gas bill and tax return too). Literal omniscience just isn’t anything to write home about. It isn’t cool.

When you think of God’s omniscience you think of his complete knowledge of yourself and that strikes you as interesting (other people, not so much). There is a point to it, a very personal one. But you forget about all the boring pointless knowledge God is condemned to contain by dint of his omniscience. This doesn’t fit your image of God as glorious and scintillating. He begins to seem like a weirdly obsessive accountant. This is why omniscience puts pressure on the traditional concept of God when pushed to the limit. There is a tension in God’s being—between his splendor and sublimity, on the one hand, and his undiscriminating appetite for information, on the other. He is like the greatest mind in the world obsessed with TV trivia. Vast tracts of God’s mind are of no interest whatsoever. Nor can any rationale be given for this compulsive recording of banality, except that if it were not so God would not live up to his reputation as omniscient. What would be lost of God’s essential being if we stipulated that he falls short of complete omniscience, limiting his knowledge to the interesting and worthwhile? Would we think less of him if he failed to know about one daisy or the position of a single atom? I don’t think so—I would prefer God to be less than omniscient. Surely he cannot be interested in everything he knows. But then I don’t believe in God as traditionally conceived.

The concept of pointless knowledge is also relevant to the question of the value of knowledge. I submit that pointless knowledge has no value, in which case knowledge as such is not a basic good. Useful and interesting knowledge has value, to be sure, but some knowledge is utterly pointless—just not worth having. We are better off without it given that all knowledge requires the use of scarce resources. It is knowledge it would be good to destroy, so as not to use up cognitive space. To put it differently, many facts are not worth the time of day. Some knowledge adds to the value of the mind that possesses it, but there is a lot of potential knowledge that adds nothing of value—that may as well remain unknown. Someone who searches for knowledge indiscriminately is doing nothing worthwhile; and someone who stores all knowledge without regard for its value is equally misguided. This is why God cannot really be omniscient—because he is not misguided. He sees no point in pointless knowledge.

Col

[1] The idea of an omniscient God was crafted when the true extent of the universe was not known. At that time it was reasonable to suppose that everything in nature had some human relevance, but this kind of anthropocentrism is no longer viable. Now we are invited to accept that God possesses a huge amount of humanly irrelevant knowledge. I doubt that if we were devising a concept of God today we would sign on to total universal omniscience, but we are saddled with the idea by earlier conceptions. We should reject the idea, which shows that the earlier definition of God is no longer defensible. That is, there is no God as traditionally conceived.

Plurality and the Big Bang

June 2, 2021/0 Comments/in Uncategorized/by Colin McGinn

Plurality and the Big Bang

It is said that the big bang created space and time—they did not exist beforehand. Thus something existed (a “singularity”) before space and time existed; and it was some sort of empirical particular not an abstract entity. It is generally conceived as superhot plasma not yet differentiated into elementary particles. Now adjoin that idea to the Kantian principle that space and time are the basis of individuation for empirical particulars: there can only be a well-defined plurality of particulars if there is a spatiotemporal manifold in which these particulars are arrayed. Then we get the result that the universe at the time of the big bang was a singularity in this strong sense: it was, and could only be, a single unified entity. The conditions for plurality were not met in that early state of things: metaphysical monism prevailed of necessity. The big bang fragmented reality, taking it from unity to multiplicity, by dint of space and time. It created division. It gave the world parts. It allowed particulars to exist apart from each other.

So one thing we know about the universe before the big bang is that it was devoid of plurality. It was as the metaphysical monists conceive of reality today: a seamless whole. Some philosophers have thought that Kant’s noumenal world must be a unitary world, given that it is not subject to the categories of space and time (the conditions for plurality not being met in that world). Others have speculated that all minds must be fundamentally identical given that the mind is not a spatial entity (for what could their distinctness consist in but spatial separation?). Well, if the universe issued from a big bang that created space and time, then it too must have existed in a unitary form—as a single undifferentiated entity. We can therefore deduce that there had to be a singlesingularity: there could not have been a plurality of singularities each spawning a totality of discrete particulars. For these would have to exist separately in space and time, given that spatiotemporal separation is the ultimate basis for individual distinctness, and space and time did not exist until the big bang wrought them. The universe could not have resulted from a pair of singularities—no universe could, by Kant’s principle. They would have to be separated in space (if simultaneous) but there was no space at the onset of the big bang. Accordingly, there was just one big bang, and there had to be: the singularity was necessarily singular. [1]

This is a substantive piece of knowledge—a significant cosmological theorem. We know very little about the state of the universe before the big bang, but we do know that it was unitary in a very strong sense—there was no existing plurality of empirically particulars. Metaphysically, the universe was one. Plurality was a later offshoot of this underlying oneness—an emergent property rooted in a more basic reality. We might even say that reality is fundamentally singular, cosmologically speaking. Maybe the singularity comprised a unified field of force lacking particulate structure—not even consisting of matter in the sense we now conceive of it. Material plurality is a late development, a contingent offshoot: au fond the universe is undivided power (energy, oomph). This is a fact worth knowing, providing an insight into the nature of the universe before it was fragmented by that early explosion. There was an abrupt transition from the One to the Many—plurality emanating from unity. An undifferentiated whole shattered into pieces as space and time took shape. The old cosmic unity was gone: now the universe was a collection of separate particulars existing at a distance from each other. Before the big bang there was no room (literally) in the universe for distinct particulars–everything had to be jammed inextricably together as a single seamless entity. It is doubtful that we can even conceive of this reality, except in the most abstract and metaphorical terms, given that our minds have evolved to cope with a world of spatiotemporal plurality: but its general structure follows from basic cosmological principles. In creating space and time the universe brought forth plurality from unity. It broke the bonds of being. It changed the metaphysical structure of reality.

[1] Of course, nobody doubts that there was just one big bang as a matter of empirical fact; but what we have here is a proof that this had to be so.

Platonic Pragmatism

June 1, 2021/0 Comments/in Uncategorized/by Colin McGinn

Platonic Pragmatism

The pragmatic theory of truth has this going for it: it recognizes that truth is something with value. Truth is something we ought to pursue and hence has a normative aspect. It is good to believe what is true and bad to believe what is false. Truth is a desirable property of belief. As William James says, “The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief” (1907). It is contradictory to say, “We ought to believe what is true but truth is not a good thing”. Any theory of truth that fails to acknowledge the normative character of truth is defective or at least incomplete. Thus the classic correspondence theory fails to meet this condition: for what is so good about correspondence? If correspondence is a type of isomorphism, what is desirable about isomorphism? Sameness of form is not ipso facto a good thing: objects can share their form without this being something they ought to do (crystals, mice). If truth were just correspondence, it would be normatively neutral, not the desirable trait we take it to be (much the same can be said about coherence). Truth cannot reduce to a property or relation that bears no trace of the normative; it must have some type of goodness built into it. This seems like a solid insight on the part of the pragmatist and a cogent criticism of other theories. Call it “Convention G”: any adequate theory of truth must reveal truth as an inherently normative property, i.e. an instance of the Good. It must be something about which we (rightly) care.

The pragmatist, having identified this requirement, goes on to give an account of what the goodness in question consists in; and it is an account both natural and dubious. The goodness of truth is simply the way it conduces to human flourishing—the way it leads to a satisfying life. Truth is what contributes to human happiness: believing what is true will make us happy not sad. This is because true beliefs enable us to satisfy our desires more successfully than false beliefs. The farmer with true agricultural beliefs will reap a better harvest than one who has false agricultural beliefs. We will dress more comfortably for the weather if we have true beliefs about the state of the weather. A stockbroker with true beliefs about the market will make more money than one who has false beliefs. We can express these facts by saying that true beliefs have good utilitarian consequences; indeed, we could call this type of pragmatism “the utilitarian theory of truth”. [1] The truth is what maximizes utility (so it has a lot in common with the right as a utilitarian conceives it). Truth is good because self-gratification is good—good food, nice home, stimulating company. Truth is good for the same reason other things are good: it leads to pleasure, satisfaction, happiness. We can all agree that these things are good; well, truth is just one among the engines of human gratification. The pragmatist thus invokes ordinary human goods and identifies the goodness of truth with these goods.

And this is a very natural move: what else could constitute the goodness of truth? But it is also a move that has generated criticism: for surely not all true beliefs maximize utility—for example, grief will be the result of believing truly that a loved one has just died. Sometimes truth requires us to face harsh realities; the happiness-producing belief may be the false belief. And what about true belief in a society ruled by propaganda, as in George Orwell’s 1984? In Orwell’s dystopia true belief leads inevitably to Room 101 (and we know what happens to you there). Isn’t the pragmatic theory a recipe for wishful thinking, conformity, and slavery to the passions? We want to protest: you could believe the truth and it lead to absolute disaster—it would still be the truth! Sure, truth often leads to utility, but not as a matter of definition, not as a matter of essence. A belief can be true even though it fails to maximize utility. Additionally, a belief can be true though it has nothing to do with desire satisfaction, as with abstract theoretical beliefs. The pragmatist has therefore failed to explain the nature of truth in terms of human goods of the standard sort. Is it then an incorrect theory?

But didn’t it seem to rest on an important insight—the normative nature of truth? Here we need to separate two things: (a) truth as a type of good and (b) the utilitarian theory of goodness. We can have (a) without (b). Consider Plato’s account of truth in which truth is essentially connected to goodness and beauty: for Plato, believing the truth is contemplating the sublime world of forms, chief among them the form of the Good. This makes for an elevation of the soul: communion with the perfect and eternal. This is not a matter of appetites and bodily needs, quite the contrary. Plato accepts that truth is a type of good but he doesn’t identify the good with desire satisfaction. For him, the good is contemplating the forms, and that is what true belief enables one to do. This will lead to a special higher form of happiness—the happiness of rational contemplation, roughly. There is thus room for a Platonic form of pragmatism: true belief is belief that leads to rational happiness, i.e. contemplation of the forms. This kind of happiness (soul elevation) is consistent with many kinds of ordinary unhappiness. A person may be destitute and yet in rational contact with a higher reality (Diogenes, for example): his believing is good even though it does not mitigate his material deprivations. If there are goods beyond the basic goods, then a Platonic pragmatist can appeal to these goods to explain the nature of truth. [2] We ought to pursue truth because of thesegoods not those identified by your typical American pragmatist, focused as he is on creaturely wellbeing. Truth is essentially connected to the Good and the Beautiful, according to Plato; so these notions can be invoked to inject a normative element into truth. We can thus be Platonic pragmatists not American-style pragmatists. At any rate, such a combination of views is logically consistent and not unattractive.

We need not agree with Plato’s view of truth in order to appreciate the architecture of his position. Truth is a good thing, but its goodness does not consist in desire satisfaction but in something more rarified—the “good of the intellect”. Truth is an intellectual good not an appetitive good; it is superior to falsehood as a condition of the intellectual faculties. It may not be easy to specify the nature of this kind of goodness, though it commands intuitive acceptance, but it offers a way to agree with the basic insight of pragmatism while avoiding the standard objections to it. There is something “pragmatic” about truth in the sense that it conduces to a human good—an intellectual good—but it is not a matter of maximizing non-intellectual wellbeing. The good of truth is not the good of satiety, safety, and prosperity; it is the good of understanding, insight, and judgment. More grandly, it is the good of intellectual receptivity to reality—a kind of self-transcendence. It is the very opposite of slavery to the passions, subjection to our own needy animal nature; it opens the self to what lies beyond it. Classic pragmatism puts the human self at the center of the search for truth, identifying truth with the satisfaction of basic human needs; Platonic pragmatism puts the aim of self-transcendence at the center of the search for truth, identifying truth with the intellectual good of apprehending reality impersonally, without regard to its ability to satisfy our needs. It is both the opposite of classic pragmatism and yet a version of its basic insight, viz. that truth must be connected to goodness in order to be what we intuitively take it to be. Platonic pragmatism thus has the virtues but not the vices of classic pragmatism.

[1] Pragmatism is a consequentialist theory of truth that emphasizes human happiness. Formally, it resembles utilitarianism with respect to moral rightness: the right act is the one with the best utilitarian consequences. Thus utilitarianism might be characterized as “moral pragmatism”. The two doctrines have a similar form, though one concerns rightness of action and the other concerns truth of belief. Were the pragmatists influenced by the utilitarians?

[2] Another traditional conception of truth provides a direct link between truth and goodness, namely the idea that in knowing the truth about the world we come to know God’s mind. If God created the world according to his own nature, then insight into the world is insight into God’s nature, and that is in itself deemed good. Thus truth is valuable because knowledge of God is valuable; such knowledge may even enable to live better lives by God’s standards. Again, this is a kind of “pragmatism” that does not appeal to the idea of human desire as the good that truth serves, instead invoking a “higher” type of good.

Physics and the Physical

June 1, 2021/0 Comments/in Uncategorized/by Colin McGinn

Physics and the Physical

It sounds reasonable—indeed tautological–to say that physics is about the physical, as psychology is about the psychological. But that is not clearly true. Consider Newton’s physics: it includes not only physical things in the ordinary sense but also space and time—as well as gravitational force. That last item raised eyebrows at the time owing to its “occult” nature (it wasn’t “mechanical”), but the first two items also raise questions. Are space and time physical? Intuitively they are not, but the question is clouded by lack of clarity about the meaning of the term “physical”. They certainly contrast with chunks of matter in a number of respects, according to Newton: they lack mass, they are not solid and impenetrable, they don’t move around, they can’t be sensed, they are not made of atoms, they have no shape, and they are infinite and eternal. Space and time contrast rather sharply with matter—they are, if anything, immaterial. Yet they are essential to the way physics understands the world; in particular, they are how motion is defined, i.e. translation of place over time. Newton was not himself a materialist, believing both in the soul and in God, so he had no materialist scruples about accepting this capacious ontology: he had no wish to keep physics physical. He was not a physicalist about physics. Someone claiming to reduce the mind to physics, say, would not be a physicalist under this conception of physics, i.e. someone who believes only in physical things. In physics we have material bodies as well as space and time (and force), the latter not being physical in the sense applicable to material bodies (mass, solidity, motion, etc.) We could say that, for Newton, the world of physical things exists within a larger world of non-physical things. And these things are not just trivially non-physical (as radiation may be said to be), but fundamentally different in nature from what is physical. The physical thus exists against a background of completely non-physical things. If anything, space and time belong on the side of God, not on the side of matter (consider their infinity and eternality)—at least as Newton sees things.

It is understandable that a physicist with empiricist and physicalist tendencies will balk at Newton’s ontology, because he includes realities that are non-physical and imperceptible. A positivist will be suspicious of such things (see Mach), especially one who wants physics not to stray from the physical. Einstein was just such a physicist: he had decided positivist sympathies and he wanted to find a “physical meaning” (his phrase) for such terms as “time” and “space”. Accordingly, in the special theory of relativity he replaced talk of time with talk of clocks—physical objects in space. No more superordinate time dimension marching on in splendid isolation from the physical world; instead there are just physical clocks and their readings. He physicalizes time; or he eliminates it in favor of clocks. As a result we get the familiar but still startling “discoveries” of special relativity, such as the relativity of simultaneity and “time dilation”. These claims are all really about the behavior of clocks in various conditions of motion. Clocks are finite, perishable, mutable, physical things, unlike the Newtonian time dimension. Motion is understood as change of position correlated with different clock readings, with each object assigned its own clock in Einstein’s thought experiment. There are thus as many “times” as there are assigned clocks, and hence “time” has not the absoluteness we might expect—or better, there are just clocks in this model with time itself eliminated from consideration.

What about space? What “physical meaning” can we give to space? The first thing is to do is make motion relative: objects only move relative to other objects not in relation to absolute space. Thus we replace the impalpable Newtonian spatial dimension with perceptible physical objects—nothing non-physical in the picture. Movement through space becomes change of position relative to a chosen physical object, as time becomes the changing behavior of clocks. Time and space, as Newton understands them, drop out, to be replaced by relations among physical objects. Hence we have physicalism about physics. Moreover, in general relativity space comes to have some of the characteristics of matter: instead of being fixed and unchangeable, it acquires the ability to bend, as steel rods may bend. Note that space doesn’t bend in space, as if there is some extra spatial dimension behind the curvature of space; rather, space simply is the collection of all such curves. Just as what we call “time” is regarded as a collection of clocks, so space is regarded as a collection of (gravity-induced) bends—which brings space much closer to matter than it was under the Newtonian conception. Only something physical in nature can literally bend, so we have brought space into the physical arena. The old Newtonian dualism of space and matter has been replaced by a quasi-monism of bendable being. Indeed, one might wonder how space can be curved, with corresponding causal powers, unless it is a form of matter (of an etiolated kind, to be sure). Thus Einstein physicalizes space in the general theory as he physicalized time in the special theory. Now physics has become comprehensively physical under the new dispensation. All this might sound counterintuitive and confused, but it is the result of ruthlessly physicalizing the Newtonian system. To put it differently, this is what you get if you insist on finding “physical meaning” for the terms of standard pre-Einsteinian physics–you distort their meaning beyond recognition. What implications there might be, or not be, for the nature of matter, motion, space, and time, as they exist in nature, is very much left an open question; one might suppose, none. We have simply stopped talking about one thing (motion through space over time) and started talking about something quite different (clock readings of events in varying relative positions). Likewise, instead of referring to gravitational effects in space, we describe space as itself curved: light rays bend in space near massive bodies because space itself curves like a physical thing; it isn’t that space remains unchanged while things move differently through it. These are all physicalizing tendencies designed to free physics from the ontological heterogeneity of classical Newtonian physics. They result from adopting physicalism about physics. No doubt this tendency reflects empiricist assumptions, given that the physical is deemed perceptible; so Einstein’s style of physics results from Newton’s physics put through the sieve of empiricism. Otherwise put, it changes the subject. [1]

Can we conclude from this that physics would look very different if it was never subjected to the physicalizing tendencies in question, themselves an offshoot of empiricist epistemology? It appears that we can. Let us imagine a world like the world Newton describes except that we stipulate that there are no physical objects in this world, i.e. no objects with mass, solidity, or perceptibility. There are, however, things that move through space over time—a bit like neutrinos, perhaps. Compared to our weighty solidities these hypothetical things are not material at all—they are wispy penetrable things. They exist in a universe of absolute space and time, which themselves are not physical. There are no sentient beings in this universe, and there are no clocks or observers of any kind. Nevertheless, there are laws of motion, mathematically expressed—let’s say Newton’s laws. Then there is in principle a physics of this world, with forces and equations governing these forces. In this world physics is entirely, not merely partially, non-physical (whatever quite the notion of the physical comes to—I have stipulated possessing mass and solidity for present purposes). That is, there is a science of motion for this world, tailored to the entities it contains; whether there is anything physical is beside the point. So physics is not essentially about the physical as such; it is about motion in space over time. [2] The label “physics” is therefore misleading in that it suggests that the science in question deals essentially with what is physical (compare “psychology”). We might want to rename it “motion science” or some such. Indeed, our actual physics contains entities often deemed non-physical (in some sense) such as fields of force and certain massless particles. Newton’s physics dealt with the motions of material bodies, but his general framework is not necessarily tied to that ontology. By contrast, Einstein’s conception of physics ties it firmly to the physical, even to the point of physicalizing time and space—or, more accurately, replacing them with surrogates deemed more “meaningful”. I think this was a mistake, but I haven’t attempted to argue that here; my aim has been rather to set out the underlying methodological and metaphysical issues more perspicuously than is usual. The relationship between physics and the physical is actually quite contentious; certainly, we must not assume that what physics deals with is ipso facto physical in any well-defined sense. [3]

Colin McGinn

[1] Here I am influenced by some unpublished work of Randolph Lundberg, though I don’t attribute my conclusions to him.

[2] If we borrowed from Descartes the notion of an immaterial substance, we could specify a world that contains such entities in a state of motion governed by laws. The science of these motions would still be physics.

[3] We may note that, according to the OED, the word “physic” was used in the Middle Ages and later to refer to medicine, and that it comes from the Greek phusis meaning “nature”. Thus it did not originally connote the idea of corporeal matter. It is certainly not analytic that physics is the study of corporeal matter, which is why it can include what is not material. It was Einstein who edged physics towards the physical, in our modern sense, with his insistence that we find “physical meaning” for terms like “space” and “time”. Under “physical” in the OED we find “relating to things perceived through the senses as opposed to the mind; tangible or concrete”. This is the sense that Einstein surely intended, though he says little to clarify his meaning. Very likely he was just taking over Mach’s positivist critique of Newton.

Philosophy Defined

June 1, 2021/0 Comments/in Uncategorized/by Colin McGinn

Philosophy Defined

It is an embarrassment to philosophers that they cannot define their discipline. It makes them look like shady operators. I propose to alleviate their embarrassment by offering a succinct definition of philosophy.

If you ask a physicist what physics is about, he will say that it is about physical reality, and you will learn what physics is. If you ask a psychologist what psychology is about, she will say that it is about the mind, and you will learn what psychology is. Similarly for geography, astronomy, botany, history, etc. But if you ask a philosopher what philosophy is about, you will not get such a straightforward answer—instead you will be subjected to vague mutterings about our conceptual scheme or incipient science or language or Being. You will rightly protest: “But what is it about?” The other disciplines can tell you what sector of reality they concern, but philosophy seems not have a specific sector to call its own—it seems to include both everything and nothing. This is theoretically unsatisfactory and bad PR. Every discipline is defined by the properties and relations that constitute its subject matter, but philosophy seems like the odd man out—the exception to the rule. What sector of reality does it take as its own? Don’t say “all sectors” because that is merely mystifying, and makes it look like it is all the disciplines added up, which it certainly is not.

It used to be said, perhaps a touch defensively, that philosophy is about concepts (or possibly the language in which concepts are expressed): it deals with the property of having a concept and with relations between concepts. The trouble with this answer is that it makes philosophy sound like psychology, and as a consequence not about the world beyond the mind. We need to say what it is about concepts that renders them of philosophical relevance. The answer might be returned: the analysis of concepts. Again, that is not entirely on the wrong track, but what kind of analysis? Isn’t analyzing psychological entities just more psychology (compare psychoanalysis). Similarly if we prefer to talk about language: what then makes philosophy differ from linguistics? What kind of analysis characterizes philosophy? The obvious answer is logical analysis. But this formulation describes the method of philosophy not its subject matter (imagine a physicist saying “physics is about the analysis of matter”). I propose that we make the obvious amendment: philosophy is about logical reality—as physics is about physical reality. That is the sector of reality with which philosophy is essentially concerned—the logical sector. The use of the word “reality” in this style of answer is intended to contrast the concern of the practitioner with such things as the concerns of a fiction writer: the scientist is concerned with reality not fantasy (like the science fiction writer). So the philosopher, being a sober factual type, is concerned with a certain part of reality—the part I am calling “logical”. Thus when asked what philosophy is about the philosopher can answer simply, “Philosophy is about logical reality”—as physics is about physical reality, psychology is about mental reality, history is about historical reality, etc.

Of course this short answer will not put an end to all questions, just as the comparable answer for other disciplines may well prompt further questions. We will need to say what we mean by “logical”, as the physicist needs to say what he means by “physical”. The correct answer, though not perhaps the best pedagogically, is that logical reality consists of all the relations of entailment, consistency, and inconsistency that exist. An example might help: the philosophical problem of free will concerns whether free will logically implies determinism or indeterminism. Thus we have compatibilists and incompatibilists debating the logical relations between free will and these other concepts. Some say free will rules out determinism, some say the two are compatible, and some say that free will logically implies determinism. Philosophy therefore differs from psychology and physiology when it comes to acts of will, being concerned with a logical question. Here are some other examples chosen more or less at random. Does the mind entail the body or are the two logically separable? How are sense experience and material objects logically related? Is knowledge logically compatible with non-conclusive evidence? How are mind and behavior logically related? Are truth and meaning logically connected? Do descriptive propositions ever entail ethical propositions? Does identity of reference entail identity of sense? Do modal propositions entail the existence of possible worlds? Do general terms logically imply abstract universals? Does death entail the end of the soul? Does survival of persons require identity through time? Are causation and constant conjunction mutually entailing? These questions are the stuff of philosophy and they all concern what I am calling logical reality; so our definition of philosophy looks to be on the right lines.

There can be different theories of logical reality: some say it involves concepts, some say it is a matter of words, others say that it is about reality itself (this is my position). Never mind: philosophy is about whatever logic is about. Note that I am adopting a very broad notion of logic here—certainly not restricted to standard propositional and predicate calculus. Logic in the broad sense includes any type of consequence relation—entailment in the most capacious sense (but it has to involve necessity). What is important is that this sector of reality exists and can be studied. In addition to physical objects, psychological subjects, biological forms, historical epochs, and geological strata, there is a realm of logical relations along with their relata (whatever we determine these to be). Let’s adopt for the nonce full-blooded realism about this sector: there is an objective mind-independent logical reality into which we can inquire. Like other regions of reality it can be difficult to penetrate, presenting puzzles and mysteries, and be capable of leading us up the wrong track (some have said that our ordinary language distracts us from its actual nature). So we might want to preface our answer to the question of what philosophy is by remarking, “Well, there is something called logical reality, which is a genuine part of what there is, though there are debates about its nature…and philosophy studies that”. It might help to soften the inquirer up by saying a few words about mathematics or even logic itself (i.e. the subject of a typical logic course). But don’t spend too long on these preliminaries, just blurt it out without hesitation and in a confident no-nonsense voice: “Philosophy is the study of logical reality”. This should obviate the shady operator suspicion and pave the way for a healthy and fruitful discussion. It is also entirely accurate.

One nice feature of this definition is that it does justice to the breadth of philosophy: philosophers talk about everything, though from a specific point of view. For everything has entailments, logic being universal. For instance, if you are investigating the logic of identity, you will be dealing with everything that exists, since everything is self-identical. This gets philosophy a reputation for being “abstract”, dubiously airy-fairy: but you should resist this idea. Philosophy has a perfectly solid subject matter, given that logical reality is real: entailment is as real as the things it relates. We investigate it by employing the faculty of reason, not the sense organs, but that doesn’t detract from its reality (compare mathematics). Reasoning is the method whereby logical relations are exposed. There is thus no objection to rephrasing our definition as follows: “Philosophy is the study of rational structure”. Logic deals with what is rational, so philosophy is concerned with the domain over which rationality operates. I prefer the blunter “logical reality” for reasons of rhetoric, but “rational structure” can be offered as a useful gloss (but beware of its psychologistic connotations). In any case, the general conception is consonant with the generality of philosophy. But this is not an indication that philosophy has no subject matter to call its own, only that its specific subject matter extends over all of reality (in this sense philosophy is a “higher-order” discipline). We might picture philosophy as lying alongside the other sectors of reality studied by the various disciplines, so that we have such philosophical topics as philosophy of history, philosophy of mind, philosophy of physics, philosophy of knowledge, etc. It is not that philosophy somehow includes these other subjects (it is not history, psychology, physics, etc.); rather, it studies the logical relations into which these various subject matters enter. It studies, for example, the logical relations between physics and biology or history and psychology (as well as logical relations existing within those disciplines).

What are the paradigms of philosophy as so conceived? I hesitate to single certain philosophers out because that may suggest a tendentious picture of the discipline, but Frege and the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus make good examples. Consider Frege’s apparatus of sense and reference, of objects and functions, and Wittgenstein’s vision of reality as a logical space fixed by logical language. The world is depicted as a logical structure into which we may inquire. At the other extreme we have Hegel’s dialectical theory of the logic of history, or Sartre’s investigation of being and nothingness (consciousness entails a “nothingness at the heart of being”). Husserl’s Logical Investigations deals with the logical structure of mental acts. Grice’s work tells us that conversational implicature does not entail logical implication. Quine assures us that a behaviorist view of meaning entails indeterminacy. Kripke contends that names don’t imply descriptions. Rawls argues that justice entails fairness. And so on. A philosopher is always concerned with what follows from what, and what does not follow. Problems arise when reflecting on our knowledge of the world—logical problems—and we strive to solve these problems by reasoning. We try to get a clear view of logical reality (whether bewitched by language or not).

Philosophy so understood is not confined to mere description. It can be revisionary, even radically so. There may be hidden implications that undermine parts of common sense or even science. There may be lurking paradoxes that call whole areas of thought into question. Such is the way of skepticism: if we examine the logical nature of knowledge we see that it is inconsistent with many of our knowledge claims—it implies certainty where none is to be had. Truth may turn out to entail its own negation, as in the semantic paradoxes. Modality may imply an unacceptable metaphysics. So logical reality may diverge from the way it seems to us in common sense, requiring revisions in our conceptual scheme (maybe free will turns out to be impossible given its entailments). Logical reality may be difficult to discern, and not what we expect: so there is nothing quietist about this conception of philosophy.

If philosophy is about logical reality, it is centrally about linkages—its focus is on connection. It wants to know how things hang together, or fail to. It is always interested in how things are related, joined or disjoined. But it is not concerned with physical or psychological linkages, but with logical linkages. In the philosophy of free will, for example, the concern is less on free will itself as on how it is related to determinism (or indeterminism)—how are these things linked? Likewise we want to know about the linkage between mind and body—whether the mind logically precludes emergence from the body or not. So philosophical acumen largely consists in the detection and articulation of such logical linkages—in seeing what follows and does not follow. That’s what you’ve got to get good at. That’s what you’ve got to be interested in. The philosopher is a linkage enthusiast, an artist of logical connection (scientist too).

It is tediously repeated that philosophy used to include the sciences till they found their independence, and that the rest of philosophy will eventually go that way, disappearing up its own success. But if what I have said here is correct, this will not happen; and it betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of the subject to think that it will. For philosophy is concerned with the linkages that constitute logical reality, and no other discipline is so concerned. Just as logical reality will never collapse into other areas of reality, so philosophy will never be replaced by the disciplines that study those other areas. [1]

[1] This essay is meant to complement my Truth By Analysis: Games, Names, and Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 2012).