Skill: A Practical Philosophy

The following is a summary of a book I intend to write. I would be interested in any comments readers might have about what might be included in addition to what is described here.

 

Skill: A Practical Philosophy

Introduction: James Bond and Me

Friends sometimes compare me to James Bond because of my range of skills (“skillset”). Our skills don’t overlap much, though more than you might think (we both do knife throwing and are extremely suave) because we have different occupations, but the range is impressive in both cases. I think he has a slight edge on me, but then he is a fictional character and I am not. My skills include tennis, table tennis, squash, billiards, kayak surfing, windsurfing, skim boarding, skiing, gymnastics, pole vault, trampoline, discus, football, cricket, skateboarding, mountain biking, bowling, swimming, diving, Frisby, drumming, guitar, harmonica, singing, motorcycling, and the aforementioned knife throwing. This is not to mention my intellectual and writing skills or acting and comedic. But my purpose is not to boast (or not much) but to establish my credentials: I am not your typical clumsy ill-coordinated awkward egghead. I have a lot of physical (and other) skills. I also teach many of these skills and love to talk about them. So, this a good book for me to write. I will be mentioning my forays into skill a good deal in what follows.

Chapter 1: What is a Skill?

Here I will define the concept of a skill, so that we know what we are talking about. A skill is a learned ability to perform an activity, job, or task well through training, practice, and experience. It is primarily physical not mental, though it involves the mental. It takes place largely in the brain, though the muscles are crucial (“muscle memory”). It is not just any old ability.  A skill is always an achievement, generally hard-won, a feather in one’s cap.

Chapter 2: The Scope of Skill

Skill is ubiquitous in human life; almost everything we do involves skill. Work, play, sex, art, music, science, hobbies, socializing, cooking, etc. But not everything we do can be called a skill: digest, excrete, breathe, blink, sit down, fall over, jump up and down, and so on. There is unskilled manual labor and expertly playing the violin for a living. Material objects have no skills, nor do plants. Many animals have some skills, but some do not (e.g., jellyfish), and what they do have is nothing like human skill. We are the skilled species. Economies are built on skill, as are cities and countries. Our culture is saturated in skill. You can’t live a normal human life and have no skills–the more the better, and the better the better. We are always exercising our skills in one way or another.

Chapter 3: The Origin of Skill

Our skills go back a long way into pre-history, when we were still up there in the trees, brachiating away to our heart’s content. When we came down to earth, we had free hands and we made good use of them in developing skills, mainly involving tools. Skills saved us from extinction. They gave us purpose. They made us hunters and fighters. The development of civilization was the development of skills, mainly manual skills. Architecture, art, sculpture, heavy machinery—all require sophisticated skills. Brain, mind, body, and skilled behavior all developed together to generate the human package. Skill paved the way. It was one of evolution’s greatest discoveries. Eventually language skills evolved. Our distinctive intelligence is a skilled intelligence not a form of disembodied logical reason–the skilled deed not just the deed or the thought.

Chapter 4: How to Acquire a Skill

This is what you have been waiting for—skills are wonderful, but how do you get them? Not much expertise is innate, so they must be laboriously learned, and it isn’t instantaneous or easy. It takes work. This is where I excel: I’m willing to put in the work, and I enjoy it. You must be patient, disciplined, methodical—no lazing around boozing. A lot of repetition, analysis, focus, commitment. You can do it! Tennis takes a good three years to get even basically competent, even for the most talented players in the world (they are always going on about how much hard work they put in). I believe them; I do too. I favor an incremental method mixed with a more holistic approach. Break the skill down into smaller units; don’t just bash away at the fast forehand. You can practice in your living room—every day if possible. Every now and then try a full stroke and analyze what happens. Learn from your mistakes. Study and copy. Keep at it. I found that knife throwing took me over a year of daily practice, gradually stepping further back from the target. I can now stick it reliably from ten feet away, left-handed, no spin. I never thought that was even possible. Notice your improvement. The same for learning to sing: practice every day, pay attention to detail, don’t give up. Use your head as well as your lungs.

Chater 5: Physical and Mental Skills

We speak as if there are mental skills as well as bodily skills, but it is not clear whether this is metaphorical or not. Is acquiring knowledge a skilled activity? Not always—it just happens when you open your eyes. There is nothing skillful about dreaming or desiring or fantasizing. Mental abilities are not generally skilled performances. The concept of skill is primarily physical with mental performances so described by analogy. True, all skilled abilities have a mental component—they are sensorimotor—but mental actions and states are not generally skilled. When did you ever practice them or study the techniques involved? They are no more skilled than digestion or blood flow or respiration. You don’t learn these things by diligent practice. I don’t think I’m being particularly skillful when I think about philosophy or how to get somewhere. Skill arises mainly in the hands not in the brain alone. The brain houses the machinery of skill, but it itself has no skills to speak of.

Chapter 6: The Value of Skill

But why does skill matter? What makes it good? Two answers suggest themselves: they are useful for survival or obtaining pleasure, and they are intrinsically valuable—good in themselves. Both these things can be true, and I think both are. For sure, skills can get you the good things in life—money, mates, status, admiration. But they are also valuable because they expand the self (the soul); they add to what you are. They promote what psychologists call self-realization—I would prefer to say self-augmentation. A human being with no skills is a paltry being, an object of pity, not envy. But a skilled individual is viewed as well-rounded, impressive, special. Skill is an occasion for pride. Also, it is enjoyable to exercise a skill—to stick a knife in a target, to hit a tennis ball just so. Skills are like knowledge—the more the merrier. Your life is more meaningful the more skilled you are. I have never regretted acquiring a new skill (I took up skateboarding at 74). Skills are fun! They produce self-esteem as well as admiration by others. Dare I say that they make us more godlike? Jesus had a worthy skill, carpentry, and his heavenly father had every skill known to man or God—omni-skillfulness. They make us whole, divine, splendid (I wax poetic, but that’s how I feel). A skill is definitely something worth possessing.

Chapter 7: Capitalism and Skill

Work has always involved skill–economies run on it. It was Adam Smith who extolled the virtues of the division of skilled labor, and capitalism grew from this economic insight. But there is a downside, which we might call skill-starvation: people are condemned to a single limited skill for the whole of their working life (nail sharpener in Smith’s famous example). They used to have a full set of skills adequate to a human life (to human nature), but under capitalism they become one-trick ponies—bored ponies, stilted and stifled ponies. They fall on a single stool. Thus, capitalism fails to respect a central fact of human nature—the fact of poly-skillfulness. True, we can be more productive economically this way, but we become stunted and dissatisfied. I would view my own life as impoverished (poorer) if I were deprived of my range of skills and allowed to practice only one (say, bowling). As an athlete, I like to do many sports. As a musician and singer, I like to play more than one instrument and sing different kinds of song. Capitalism makes us richer but also poorer (did Karl Marx ever make this argument?). Skill starvation is a real thing. You might die of it, spiritually.

Chapter 8: Philosophy of Skill

How should philosophy respond to the centrality of skill in human life? Two areas stand out: philosophy of action and epistemology. We need to distinguish action generally from skilled action: non-skilled action is subject to simple belief-desire psychology, but skilled action also involves the presence of a skill. I eat an apple because I’m hungry and I believe an apple will relieve my hunger, but I hit a tennis ball in a certain way because I am a skilled player—the skill plays an explanatory role (among other things). So, action theory needs to recognize the importance of skill as a determinant of action, not just belief and desire. I hit the ball that way because I am a skilled player—skills explain skilled action. In regard to epistemology, it is generally accepted that there is knowing-how as well as knowing-that; and the former is another way of talking about skilled action. Thus, there is skilled practical knowledge and unskilled factual knowledge. Indeed, this kind of skilled knowledge is arguably the basic kind—knowing how to throw and catch a ball, say. It precedes and underpins theoretical understanding of ball dynamics. Philosophy of skill needs to be added to the curriculum (Wittgenstein got close to this in his emphasis on rule-following ability).

Chapter 9: Happiness and Skill

Here is my considered opinion: a happy life is a life of skills—many of them. In my case intellectual skills (if we allow these to be skills in good standing), athletic skills, and musical skills. Secret agent 007 apparently prefers skills of fighting, driving fast cars, seduction, and martini drinking (he is a skilled shaker). To each his own. But he has a wide range of them, and they make him what he is. Skilled action contributes to human flourishing more than unskilled action, or no action at all, like eating and lying in bed. Bond clearly gets a kick out of his advanced espionage skills, as I get a kick out of my more pacific skills. It’s about doing, and doing it well, not passively feeling pleasure. It’s about having a license to skill. We need to cultivate our skills. Education must inculcate skills in students as well as facts and theories. It already does so in PE, art class, and music class; but I would like there to be an explicit emphasis on skills—they are good preparation for a normal productive life. There is nothing I like better than seeing a young boy or girl hitting a tennis ball skillfully.

Chapter 10: The End of Skill?

Is there a danger that skill may wither and die? Capitalism has caused some withering, along with opportunities for developing other skills, but AI contains a more potent danger, especially in the form of robots. For it threatens to make human skilled behavior redundant: robot doctors, teachers, and lawyers (not to mention bricklayers) are apt to steal jobs from human agents. Why do we need to learn skills if machines can do all the skilled work? We can just lounge around the place instead of acquiring new skills (loafing not learning). This has already happened to some extent with the industrial revolution, but it may become even more pervasive: robot actors, athletes, comedians, hostesses, masseurs, sex partners—these devices might become more skillful than their human counterparts. Then what? Well, life would lose a lot of spice and zing, because we admire and enjoy skill in others and ourselves. It would all be rather mechanical. My own view is that we will come to accept a kind of dual economy—powered by AI skill and HI skill (“H” for “human”). Maybe we will fulfill our skill needs in leisure not work, in games not labor. The future of skill may be very different from hitherto: in some respects worse, in others better. Maybe we will develop our skills for fun not profit.

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Marathon Interview

Marathon Interview

I have just completed approximately 80 hours of interviews with my Turkish associates (now friends) Ugur and Burcu Polat. The interviews take the form of detailed written questions, submitted in advance, and presented to me by Burcu (who is a neurologist) while Ugur listens. They cover all aspects of my life and work and are very thorough. The plan is to convert them into a book, to be published in Turkish. The video interviews themselves may also be published in due course. I talk about everything under the sun philosophically, and sometimes other subjects of interest to me. The interviews are one of a kind and took an immense amount of work on the interviewers’ part. I do not discuss my personal life. I am grateful for their efforts, intelligence, and good humor.

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Inconsistent Perception

Inconsistent Perception

There are two aspects to our concept of perception and hence to perception: an intentional object aspect and a causal object aspect. There has to be an object you directly perceive and an object that causes your act of perceiving. To see (say) an object x is for x to be both the immediate object of your seeing and the cause of your seeing it. To see a red patch is to have an experience as of a red patch and for a red patch to cause that experience—and these must be the same red patch. If you have the experience of a red patch but no red patch causes it, then you don’t see a red patch; and if a red patch causes you to have an experience as of a blue ball, then you don’t see the red patch. Seeing is both a causal concept and a phenomenological concept. The sense-datum theory of perception supposes that you see internal mental objects, irrespective of causal history; the causal theory of perception supposes that you see external causes of perceptual states. Neither of these theories is plausible, because sense-data are not causes of perceptual states and external material objects are not intentional objects of perception. Causal objects are not intentional objects because we don’t see them as they objectively are in experiencing perceptual intentional objects. The objects we directly see are not identical to the remote causes of our acts of seeing, any more than stages in the causal chain are. And yet both objects are essential to seeing: the intentional object and the causal object must coincide. The former objects play a psychological role in determining the direction of the mind’s processes (belief formation etc.); the latter objects exist outside this nexus and serve only to trigger the organism’s inner states. These are evidently not the same objects. The proximal phenomenal object is not the distal physical object.

What should we conclude from these familiar points? The only conclusion we can draw is that we don’t see anything: in experiencing an intentional object we don’t see a causal object, and in being caused to have an inner perceptual state (with an intentional object) we don’t see a remote causal object (a bunch of atoms). Seeing requires that we see both, but we see neither. We would only see an object if it were both a direct object of seeing and the cause of the seeing, but that is false. We no more see the remote object than we see the intermediate stages that lead to the percept; and intentional direct objects of seeing are not causes of seeing. The concept of perception imposes impossible demands on perception, rendering it impossible in principle. A distal cause cannot be a proximal intentional object. The ordinary concept of perception lumps these indiscriminately together, thereby hoping to create a coherent story of perception—viz. that we see remote causes in conscious acts of seeing. The causal theory of perception tries to inject the remote cause into the perceiving mind, while the sense-datum theory must claim that immediate objects of seeing cause episodes of seeing. We don’t see the intentional object (a sense-datum) and we don’t see the causal object; we see nothing. The intentional object must be the causal object in order for seeing to occur: this object must be identical to that object. But it isn’t. Perception is therefore impossible. The concept places impossible demands on visual systems. True, we can apprehend intentional objects, like hallucinated red patches, but we can’t literally see them, because they aren’t the cause of our seeing. And true, physical objects can cause us to have visual experiences of various kinds, but we don’t strictly see them either, because they are not immediate intentional objects. We don’t see either, for the familiar reasons given. No single object can occupy both roles, so perception is impossible. The concept of perception tries to pack two jobs into one object, but that cannot be done.[1]

[1] This has really been evident for a long time. According to classical empiricism, we perceive ideas in the mind, while material objects act as unperceived causes. But ideas can’t be external causes of perceptions, as our ordinary concept of perception requires; so, we don’t see them. On the other hand, the true causes of perception in the external material world are removed from the mind and not directly apprehended by it; so, they cannot act as direct objects of perception. But these are the only candidates for the status of perceptual object, so perception is a myth as we naively conceive it. Of course, we can talk this way as a matter of convenience (cf. “the Sun rises in the east”), but as a matter of hard fact there is no seeing going on in “seeing”. There may be a whole lot of shaking going on, but there is zero seeing going on. I can be said to “see” a tree because I have a sense-datum as of a tree and this sense-datum is caused by an actual tree (a certain configuration of atoms); but I see neither thing. The actual physical tree is too far removed, while the phenomenal object of my seeing is too close to be identifiable with the cause. Sense-data are not identical to distal causes of sense-data, and neither is an object of sense perception in the ordinary sense.

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Certainty, Causality, and Knowledge

Certainty, Causality, and Knowledge

I am going to argue that our concept of knowledge is essentially contradictory. This fact is written into the history of epistemology. It lurks just below the surface. It is both surprising and predictable, given how we use the concept. Arguably, knowledge is logically impossible–conceptually, by definition. We can still usefully employ the concept, but don’t expect it to make sense. I am well aware that this will strike the reader as wildly paradoxical: how can the concept of knowledge (knowledge itself) be contradictory? It’s not that hard, as we shall see, though certainly contrary to long-held assumptions. A cursory analysis of the concept will reveal its contradictory nature.

Let’s get right to the point: knowledge is conceived as involving both certainty and causality, but these are in tension with each other. There are two components to the concept, but they cannot coexist—they pull in different directions. I am talking about ideal grade-one knowledge itself not what we are prepared to say for pragmatic reasons—the essence not the extraneous.[1] Consider what we normally take to be the paradigm of knowledge, before philosophy has got to work on it, viz. perceptual knowledge, particularly visual knowledge. I see a red bird perched on my car and I have the corresponding impression that there is a red bird there. I am quite sure there is a red bird on my car and the bird itself causes me to have this certain knowledge: I have inward certainty and external causality—what more could you ask? I am not in doubt (there is no reason to be) and my visual state is not caused by anything other than a bird on a car. The world causes certainty in my mind by impinging on my mind; it doesn’t come from my own malfunctioning brain, and it doesn’t consist in a state of doubt. Knowledge at its finest is certainty plus causation (by the object of knowledge). We can argue details and subtle points, but that’s the essence of the matter.

But these two conditions do not exist in harmony: if there is causality, there can’t be certainty; and if there is certainty, there can’t be causality. For consider: causality implies contingency, but contingency is not compatible with certainty. If there is a causal connection between world and mind, then it might break down—I might be hallucinating or be a brain in a vat. Then I cannot be certain. If I am (justifiably) certain, there cannot be causality; so, if there is, I can’t be certain. But then, I don’t know. On the other hand, in cases where there is no causality, I can be certain—as in knowledge of mathematics, logic, ethics, and analytic truth. But then, there is no causality, and knowledge requires causality; hence the nagging suspicion that these cases are not really cases of knowledge—for they lack an essential feature. We thus have doctrines of mere empty tautology, conventionalism, non-cognitivism, formalism, pragmatism, and the like. In this way we retain certainty, but at the cost of departing from the paradigm of perceptual knowledge; at best this “knowledge” is second-rate, dubiously so-called, just a manner of speaking. The reason there is certainty is precisely that there is no contingent causality; but if there is causality, there can’t be certainty. Hence, there is no knowledge proper. Causality lets in skepticism, which is incompatible with knowledge; while certainty undermines causality—how you be certain of something only contingently connected to your state of certainty? Thus, certainty precludes causality and causality precludes certainty; so, knowledge is impossible. It requires both, by definition, but they are not compatible. If knowledge is an effect, it can’t be certain; but if it is not an effect, it can’t be causally dependent on reality. There cannot, then, be knowledge of the external material world, and there cannot be knowledge of the abstract world of mathematics, logic, and ethics. Not in the classic ordinary sense anyway; we have to water it down at best.

It might be protested that there are exceptions to this sweeping conclusion, namely self-knowledge and knowledge of other minds. Don’t these harmoniously combine certainty and causality, thus producing knowledge in the fullest sense? No, they don’t, because we don’t have certainty about other minds, notoriously so; and self-knowledge is not based on any recognizable causal mechanism. Thus, it is doubtful that we have knowledge of other minds at all, or if we do it is substandard; and causal self-knowledge is problematic at best, and dubiously compatible with introspective certainty. How do mental states cause beliefs about themselves, or perceptions of themselves? How can we have certainty about our own mind if the causal relation is contingent? This is why some philosophers have denied that we have self-knowledge at all. And it is hardly a central case of knowledge, following the pattern of the perceptual case. The problem is that the paradigm cases of knowledge fail the test of combining certainty and causality in equal measure. The two attributes pull apart instead of happily coexisting together. The epistemic necessity of certainty is not compatible with the metaphysical contingency of causality. Something has to give: certainty in the case of the material world, and causality in the case of the abstract and mental worlds. Our ordinary concept of knowledge tells us that knowledge is both certain and causally dependent on the object of knowledge; but these are contradictory requirements, since causal contingency is incompatible with the necessity implied by certainty (epistemic necessity). Causal connections are never certain, so knowledge can’t be a causal connection that is simultaneously certain. Knowledge is therefore impossible au fond. We can manufacture weaker notions of knowledge (“knowledge”), but we can’t get the real thing as we naively think of it. The two concepts, certainty and causality, just don’t make compatible bedfellows—each wants to kick the other out of bed. You can have one or the other, but you can’t have both joined in a single concept. We should really have two concepts not one: certainty, on the one hand, and causal epistemic dependence, on the other. We are certain about some things (e.g., mathematics), but not causally dependent on them; and we are causally dependent on some, but not certain (e.g., the material world). These are not two types of a single category of knowledge, construed as an epistemic natural kind, but different concepts altogether; the concept we have is an unholy alliance. There is no such fact in the world, though the word has its uses. The concept of knowledge is really a mind-fuck (in the technical sense).[2]

[1] See my “Perceptual Knowledge” and “Non-Perceptual Knowledge” among other works. It is important not to be taken in by the promiscuous use we make of the word “know” in ordinary language. Look at the facts not the speech acts. Speech follows its own rules, which are not the rules of reality. Analytical epistemology has been far too obsessed with what we say.

[2] See my learned treatise Mindfucking (2008) for an elaboration. Yes, I know I will be accused of doing just that in this incendiary little essay, but I think mature reflection will incline the reader to see the point of my indictment of the concept of knowledge. The concept is trying to do two jobs at the same time, but they are not unified; they answer to different authorities—Cartesian and naturalistic, you might say. Knowledge is conceived as both a causal relation in nature and an inner state of the soul (somewhat spiritual). It has religious connotations as well as naturalistic affinities. Like a tree falling on a church: the inner sanctum in a world of impinging crashes and bangs. The two don’t happily combine, still less coalesce. Colorless green ideas and all that. (Meaning is not dissimilar.) Concepts evolve for practical purposes, and they are not always as logical as one might wish. To know is to be inwardly certain and subject to causal contingency: but these are inconsistent conditions.   

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Stereotypes

Stereotypes

We are all too familiar with stereotypes of other people—people of other races, people of other sexes, people with other accents. We are less familiar with stereotypes of other animals, but we don’t need much persuading that they exist—say, rats. But I want to ask a stranger question: do we harbor stereotypes of ourselves? We each belong to certain general categories, say white European male, and we know it—do we stereotype ourselves according to such stereotypes? It might seem that we don’t and couldn’t, because we have direct access to our own personality and proclivities; but that is superficial, since we really don’t have full knowledge of our nature—we can be wrong about it. People don’t have infallible access to their own character and motivations; self-deception is common. We evidently need a self-conception, but it may not come, wholly or partly, from the faculty of introspection. Where does it come from? The OED gives us for “stereotype”: “an image or idea of a particular type of person or thing that has become fixed through being widely held”. Stereotypes are social constructs, often fictional, that are picked up from others, sometimes positive, more often negative. They become “fixed”—rigid, unquestioned. They don’t come from actual acquaintance with the category of person to which they become attached; they come from representations by other people of that category, verbal or pictorial. They are essentially descriptions—typically, brief and pungent. They purport to be true universally and hence preceded by “all”. They are believed by dint of repetition, prejudice (pro or con), and insistence; the move from “some” to “all” is characteristic. They indicate intellectual ineptitude, oversimplification, and bias.

Given all this, it would not be surprising if members of a certain group found themselves believing the general stereotype associated by others with that group, by virtue of elementary conformity. This would be especially true if the stereotype were positive: “My group is generally good at X, so I am good at X”. That belief might then lead to futile attempts to do X, or to motivation that actually produces some ability at X even though the individual’s talent at X is rather minimal. In either case the person’s self-conception is driven by an inaccurate stereotype absorbed from the surrounding culture: for example, “Ukrainians are naturally good pole vaulters; I am a Ukrainian; therefore, I am a naturally good pole vaulter”. We learn by imitation and testimony, as well as by direct perception. And other minds are not perceivable anyway, leaving a gap easily filled by verbal means. Stereotypes thrive in a state of ignorance.

The interesting case is the negative socially inculcated stereotype that is absorbed by those to whom it is applied. Here an internal battle is going on: on the one hand, the person has personal evidence that the stereotype is untrue and so rejects it; on the other hand, the stereotype is so entrenched that it is accepted as true even by those to whom it is applied. This might even lead to the stereotype becoming true, or somewhat true. I won’t give any examples, but the idea is not psychologically unrealistic: if people keep telling you that you are X, Y, and Z, you might become X, Y, and Z. At the same time, you might know quite well that you are not X, Y, and Z, thus producing cognitive dissonance, which will in turn lead to attempts at dissonance reduction. The evil of negative stereotyping is thus not confined to mistreatment by others but extends to a person’s self-image. How many potentially great composers have not gone into music because of the stereotype associated with them, which they have absorbed and accepted as true, maybe even shunning music altogether? Even if the stereotype is broadly true of their group, they may be an exception to it; that use of “all” discourages them. The trouble is that the weak-minded are too easily led by stereotypes; they seem unable to function without them. There should be anti-stereotype lessons in schools. We might say, charitably, that stereotypes result from the economy of thought and we all need to economize on our intellectual resources; but even still, we should be trained to exercise a little more discretion in our mental economies. In truth, it is sheer laziness backed by a tendency towards prejudice—and the cause of much evil in the world. It should be regarded as more shameful than it actually is. Anyway, I suggest, as an exercise, that you ask yourself whether you stereotype yourself in any way. You might be holding yourself back.[1]

[1] It is an interesting question what social relations would be like without stereotypes, so that we had to fall back on individual direct evidence. It might seem like a kind of heaven, but maybe things would be more chaotic and nebulous without firm stereotypes to go by (and rebel against).

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Possible Worlds (Again)

Possible Worlds (Again)

There are many worlds: the human world, the chimp world, the dance world, the philosophical world, etc. We can quantify over them.[1] There are also possible such worlds, such as non-actual human worlds or Martian dance worlds. There is the actual human world and various possible human worlds, e.g., worlds in which physics developed earlier or later than it actually did; and there could be Martians who love to dance. But are there any whole worlds—the actual whole world, or various possible whole worlds? Can we quantify over them? We can form the phrase, but does it denote anything—do we denote anything by it? There are planets, galaxies, cultures, and countries—but are there such things as entire worlds? What would they include—do they include fictional objects? Are they mental or physical or both? Are they themselves fictional? How many are there? I include the so-called actual world here: does it really exist? What kind of thing is it? If another world is just like it except in some minute respect, is that a different world, or the actual world differing slightly? If the actual world is a concrete particular of some sort, how can it lose its identity by changing in some tiny contingent respect? Can there be two worlds that are qualitatively the same and yet numerically different? Are such worlds in space and time? Are they sets of facts? If so, they are not concrete particulars. Are they fictions, like unicorns, whose identity conditions are ill-defined? Possibilities are real enough, but possible (entire) worlds? It isn’t that the actual world exists, but merely possible worlds don’t; the actual world doesn’t exist either (like Meinong’s objects). The phrase is a piece of runaway philosophical language rooted in the perfectly acceptable phrase “the human world” and the like. The phrase only seems to have meaning because we already believe in possible worlds, but it has no meaning outside of that context. It is a term of art not a piece of ordinary language; we need to be told what it signifies. It trips off the tongue, but is it a trip into Wonderland? What would Alice say? Is the actual world like the Cheshire cat?[2]

Logically, the situation is like the concept of God. People used to believe in many gods with one of them placed at the top of the pile. But how well defined is the concept—does it allow for counting? Isn’t it really derived from the concept of ordinary human beings but stripped of what gives that concept sense? This is why we have such trouble answering the question of whether two tribes worship the same god. What is the criterion of identity for gods? Is there a determinate number of gods independent of language and thought? Are there ever twin gods existing outside of space? Then what individuates them?  Suppose I said that there is one actual god but many other similar possible gods: would those other gods really not be the original god with different attributes? It would be different if anyone had ever seen a possible world, but no one has. Is it true that I see and touch the actual world? I can see and touch a part of it perhaps, but can I be said to see an entire possible world if that world is actual? If I cannot, the reason isn’t that it’s too large, but that it isn’t an existing object at all. The concept of a whole world, actual or possible, is deeply problematic, not to say nonsensical. This is one of those rare cases in which a philosophical theory literally doesn’t make any sense—which is not to say it has no heuristic uses. But we must not elevate these uses into robust ontology.[3]

[1] For background see my “Against Possible Worlds” and “Counting Worlds”. Also: Logical Properties, chapter 4, and other works of mine on necessity.

[2] Was Davd Lewis a clever mad hatter? Was Saul Kripke an ingenious sorcerer?

[3] In this short paper I am trying to pithily recover a sense of absurdity about a putative concept we have been brainwashed into accepting. We know how to talk the possible worlds talk, but do we know what it means? Isn’t it a rampant case of hypostatization? The whole idea apparently began in the seventeenth century with Leibniz, possibly prompted by discoveries of foreign lands. Does it have a solid foundation? One wants to say bunkum and skip all the scholasticism. It isn’t so much the incredulous stare as the outraged eyebrow-raise. What the devil are you talking about—literally?! That is the honest reaction.

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Bowling

Bowling

It is 64 years since I first went bowling, in Gillingham, Kent, at the age of 12. It was my first exposure to the American lifestyle and I loved it: the high-gloss high-tech world of expensive leisure; the heavy shiny bowling balls; the long gleaming lanes and big solid pins. The sound of ball-pin collisions! The strike. I took to it immediately and was obsessed with doing it. Why the company decided to build a bowling alley in Gillingham I have no idea—it’s a small nothing town (though quite nice). The only problem was the expense—where is a twelve-year-old boy to get the cash? So, I could only progress so much. Soon after that we moved to Blackpool and before long it had a bowling alley too; my parents started playing in a league and I managed to get in some bowling time. I got pretty good, though again the expense was prohibitive; if not, I would have been there all the time. In later years I bowled infrequently, either in England or America. My skills faded. Bowling was no longer part of my life. I did, however, go to a bowling alley at Chelsea piers in New York a few times and even bought my own ball and shoes. In Miami I’ve been once or twice, but not for the last decade or more. I became an ex-bowler.

Then, last Saturday, a friend of mine, Sebastian (tall, young, works out), suggested we go bowling. I dug out my old ball and shoes, and we repaired to Dolphin mall, a cavernous mega-mall in which thousands of people thronged (not many gringos). The bowling alley was large and loud (25 lanes, all full). It took me back. But things did not go well from the start: the soles came off my shoes (age and humidity) and I had to get house shoes; also, my bowling was rubbish. I guttered quite a few balls, which was not my thing at all. The scores were abysmal (Sebastian is a beginner). No strikes in three games (ouch). Didn’t even break a hundred. And yet I felt it coming back—that feeling of cool control. I got re-hooked. It was like the early days back in Gillingham sixty-four years ago as a twelve-year-old boy. Excitement, frustration, determination. Back home I went to YouTube to see how to hook the ball and quickly gained valuable information. Turns out I was doing it all wrong. I realized I could practice in my living room if I kept it gentle and soon felt an improvement. I ordered new bowling shoes and a bowling glove (I like to be well-equipped). I look forward to hitting the lanes again before long (fra poco). I’m a bowler again. I’ll be practicing at home again today—why not do it now?

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Political Philosophy

Political Philosophy

Politics is largely philosophical, but is philosophy largely political?[1] Is the practice of philosophy governed partly (mainly?) by political forces? Most people would agree that science and mathematics are not seriously political subjects, being governed by scientific norms, but is philosophy as a discipline strongly influenced by political considerations? Is it more political than, say, biology and psychology, or economics and anthropology? This is not a pleasant thought; it undermines the objectivity of the subject. Political forces are not always rational or impartial or creditable. They are all too human. I will explore this question, adopting a lofty perspective and some poetic license.

We can observe right away that both philosophy and politics deal with difficult problems for the solution of which there is no standard rigorous method. We can’t use mathematics and empirical observation to solve these problems; measurement and calculation are no help. In this sense, they are not scientific. There is no physics of philosophy or politics—no mechanics. Nor is there a chemistry of these subjects. What the correct method is no one can confidently say; there is no consensus on this. One might suggest that philosophy employs conceptual analysis while politics employs social analysis; not far off, but not exactly pellucid. What is clear is that the two subjects engage in a lot of discussion, argument, rhetoric, persuasion, and browbeating; not so much, discoveries and data. Verbal dexterity is much in evidence and greatly prized. You need the gift of the gab or some equivalent (impressive eloquence will do nicely). Talk is of the essence. And this can cover a multitude of sins–tendentious speechifying, irresponsible rabble-rousing, sheer bullshitting. There is a large amount of criticizing of others, not always scrupulously fair criticizing. The ad hominem style is widely practiced. Wit can be used as a sharp weapon—the cutting remark, the merciless evisceration. Intellectual integrity is a value not always adhered to. Participants don’t just roll out hard facts and then proceed to suggest cogent solutions to pressing problems to everyone’s satisfaction. Sometimes things get heated and occasionally nasty. Thus it is in philosophy and politics; both are arts of the adversarial. Cults thrive and heroes are anointed, fashions come and go, there are victories and losses. It isn’t all steady progress and warm fellow-feeling—not by a long chalk.

But what about the content of philosophy—is it anything like political content? Are there analogues in philosophy of political categories and positions? Here is where the fun starts, because there are striking parallels between the two domains, if you are willing to use your imagination—homologues, we might say. Don’t Plato’s Forms look an awful lot like his Guardians—superior beings, rarified, sublime, pure, perfect, incorruptible? Isn’t Plato’s cave reminiscent of a dismal hovel occupied by deprived peasants and slaves, deceived about their station in life? Aren’t Plato’s crowds of particulars like citizens of a democracy, rather sordid little beings, imperfect soiled things, far from ideal, not to be counted on to achieve the Good?  Plato depicts an ontological hierarchy with impeccable rulers at the top and a compromised proletariat swirling beneath them. Ontology recapitulates polity. Metaphysical monism resembles monarchy: only one thing governs the operations of the universe—be it God, matter, or mind. All power is concentrated into one entity. Pluralism by contrast resembles political anarchism—a bunch of separate autonomous units doing their own thing. It is a kind of hippy ontology, or distinct warring warlords. Then we have dualism, suggesting two great powers locked in mortal combat, or pleasantly at peace with each other (despite the tenuousness of the pineal gland). Isn’t the divide between analytical philosophers and Continental philosophers redolent of the divide between political technocrats and spiritualistic humanists? Is it all about the right economic numbers or should we be focused on the immortal souls of the populace? Then we have traditionalists and progressives: those who think we should cleave to the philosophy of the past and those who seek a brand-new revolutionary philosophy. Logical positivism was a shockingly radical revolutionary philosophy, setting itself against an antiquated dead-end philosophy—or it advertised itself that way. Ordinary language philosophy mirrors political movements that elevate the working man and his practical workmanlike ways. Common sense is what the common people have. Pragmatism is a philosophy of action not contemplation, the kind of thing the regular guy gets up to as he makes and mends. Feminism is a nakedly political philosophy, expressly designed to advance the cause of women. Western philosophy was created by privileged white males (some of whom had slaves!). Philosophy is as political as the society that surrounds it.

At a more general level, we have philosophical and political extremism, exaggeration, dogmatism, optimism and pessimism, highs and lows, coups and counterrevolutions, fads and fashions, depression and inspiration, virtues and vices. We get different meta-philosophies and different theories of society (meta-politics), according to taste and wider intellectual developments, e.g., theories in biology. Darwin has his influence on both. Materialism in philosophy and politics march together, encouraged by the success of physics. Above all, the difficulty of both subjects will always shape their form: both struggle against the odds, grappling with mystery and methodological uncertainty. They each have their intractable problems, the problems that never seem to go away. In the case of philosophy, the current uncrackable problem is consciousness; in the case of politics, it is…what? You might say the problem of political freedom—how much freedom should people be given by the state? That is certainly a big issue, because we need people to be able to live harmoniously together at close quarters; but probably the biggest problem is an old one—from whence does political authority derive? What grounds it? The difficulty is that nothing seems up to the task—not a monarch, not the population in toto, not an elite class of experts. Yet someone has to have it, and for some good reason. How does it emerge and from what? Is it essentially arbitrary? Philosophy is like politics in that both tackle imponderable questions, lack well-delineated methods, and deal in deep humanly interesting issues. Philosophy is a kind of conceptual politics.[2]

[1] Political philosophy is a branch of philosophy, and not the most central branch; but if philosophy is inescapably political, perhaps it should be. Meta-philosophically, political philosophy is basic to philosophy in general.

[2] Not only that, to be sure, but to some incalculable degree—not everything in philosophy is a deep mystery. But politics too is not entirely riddled with profound difficulty, because it must also deal with concrete practical problems (e.g., rules of the road). I find it interesting that consensus plays the role in philosophy that voting does in politics; it substitutes for proof of correctness. The winner is the most popular not the most veracious.

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