Baby Finger

Baby Finger

All guitarists struggle with their smallest fretting finger: it just isn’t very strong or agile. You have to work on it. Recently I decided to go all-out on it. I began playing all my familiar licks with only that finger: Day Tripper, Wipe Out, Pretty Woman, I’ll Take You There, Walk This Way, Satisfaction, and more. It was hard. Before I describe the results, a terminological point—what to call that feeble excuse for a finger. In the UK it is called the little finger; in the US the pinkie (ugh). I feel for it; it don’t get no respect. It needs a linguistic makeover. We could call it, unambitiously, the small finger or the edge finger or the runt finger or the refinement finger, but none of these really do the trick. So, I have decided to call it the baby finger; this is affectionate and not dismissive. We all love babies, especially the adults we call baby (as in “Baby, I Love You”). I want you all to join me in re-christening this delightful digit, this neglected prehensile gem, your baby finger. Now, doesn’t that feel better? Anyway, where was I going with fretting with the baby finger? The amazing thing is that, though difficult at first, it trains up remarkably well if you give it a chance; you soon find it confidently knocking out a fast complex lick all by itself. Respect! The baby matures quickly. This really helps with your four-fingered playing because there is no weak link anymore; your whole hand comes alive. Readers know how much I value the hand and the things it can do (tasks, jobs)[1]; well, this proves the point. And there is a final bonus: just by practicing with my baby finger this way I found that I had learned how to play slide guitar! Because the glass tube fits over that finger and requires it to become unusually dexterous. So, guitarist to guitarist, give your baby a chance to shine, to demonstrate its worth. You may come to love it.[2]

[1] Please, no adolescent sniggering at that mild piece of verbal humor. It’s time to grow up.

[2] I have become hyper-aware of that finger, solicitous for its well-being. I gaze at it in wonder. It has joined my other fingers in a happy brotherhood—a band of equals.

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Earth Philosophy

Earth Philosophy

The planet we call Earth has specific properties, physically and geologically. It is reasonable to suppose that all of life reflects these properties—physiologically and psychologically. It is also reasonable to suppose that human science is imbued with these properties; on other planets with intelligent life forms the science may be quite different. A totally liquid or gaseous planet might produce a different sort of science, there being no solid objects there (the scientists have liquid or gaseous brains).[1] There may be overlap with our science, but there won’t be identity. If these beings have evolved very differently, owing to the environmental difference, the departures from human science may be quite marked. Call this “planet-relativity” (it doesn’t imply relativism about scientific truth). The content of science is environment-dependent. But is the same thing true of philosophy? At first, I think the inclination is to say yes: philosophy too is planet-relative. Aliens will or may do philosophy differently from us. They have different problems and entertain different answers to those problems. They may not be so hung up on substance ontology and more receptive to ontological variety (their paradigm of the physical may be a volume of gas or a force field). But on reflection I think this is not so: philosophy will have a certain universality. For the problems of philosophy transcend environmental particularity. There will be an external world problem and a free will problem and a mind-body problem and an ethical realism problem. These problems employ highly abstract concepts that generalize across planets and habitats—mind-independence, determinism, subjective and objective, ethical variation across space and time. Philosophy is not concerned with this planet, or even this universe, in the way science is (“earth science”). Biology wants to know how life evolved here, but philosophy wants to know if free will is possible anywhere. It is concerned with possible worlds not local planets (or even galaxies). Philosophy is planet-independent. Thus, science is empirical in this sense, since it focuses on what is observable in this universe; but philosophy is super-empirical in that it tries to get beyond local phenomena. This is why it is so concerned with necessary truth—the kind that is not planet-relative (or even universe-relative). It seeks absolute generality; not just an absolute conception of this universe but of any universe. If philosophy were ever to solve the problem of mathematical truth, the solution would hold for all possible thinking beings in all possible worlds, no matter what planet these thinkers are from (it isn’t about the nature of mathematical truth here). The laws of gravitation may not hold in all sectors of our universe, still less all possible universes, but the laws of arithmetic do; they don’t vary with the physical environment. Nor is it possible for freedom to be compatible with determinism here but not elsewhere, or for the mind to be the body in Alpha Centauri but not in the Milky Way. Ethics is not objective on Earth but subjective on Mars. Philosophy is then different from the other sciences: it isn’t variable across planets and intelligent beings. Philosophical interests may vary, but not philosophical problems and truths. This makes it special. I don’t mean superior, though that may be argued; I just mean sui generis. It is a different kind of subject. A university science curriculum may be very different in another galaxy or possible world, but the philosophy curriculum will be much the same. You could get a job there in philosophy, but the science departments will never hire you (“All he knows is earth chemistry”).[2]

[1] You can find this question entertainingly discussed in Do Aliens Speak Physics? by Daniel Whiteson and Andy Warner (2025). I appear cartoon-like on page 228.

[2] I think this explains a lot about the experience of doing philosophy as opposed to science; it feels capacious, transcendent, nonlocal. It feels BIG.

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A Letter from Concerned Philosophers

A Letter from Concerned Philosophers

Twelve years ago, a slew of philosophy professors was persuaded to sign a letter denouncing me for alleged “retaliation”. I am offering a cash prize for anyone of this crowd to write to me and give me their reasons for so signing. I predict there will be no takers, but I will be delighted to be proved wrong. Note that “I wanted to show that I am a virtuous person” does not earn the prize.

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Is Necessity Good?

Is Necessity Good?

Is there any sense in the idea that necessity is good and contingency bad? Is it somehow better to be necessary than contingent? I think there is a feeling that this is so, but it is hard to articulate. We know that many contingent truths or facts are bad, but are any necessary truths bad? Is it bad for bachelors to be unmarried or 3 + 5 to equal 8 or this table to be made of wood? No, but it is bad for bachelors to be unhappy or for there to be only 3 tigers left or for this table to land on my foot. Some contingent truths are good, but some are not, whereas all necessary truths are, if not good, at least not bad. If we thought that God created necessary truths, while Satan had a hand in some of the contingent truths, then we would suppose the necessary to be better than the contingent. And isn’t contingency more chaotic than necessity, less written into the nature of things? Moreover, moral truth is surely necessary not contingent, so the two are joined at that point. Still, it is hard to see how necessity could be intrinsically good and contingency intrinsically bad: why is a world of necessary truths better than a world of contingent truths? Is it more intelligible, or more beautiful? Is the association between necessity and intellect what makes it better than contingency, which is associated with the senses? Is necessity more reliable? Plato would surely prefer it to contingency, being so close to universals and hence the Good; but independent of his theory is there any deep connection? Is it perhaps that when we know a necessary truth we know about all possible worlds, while knowledge of contingent truth concerns just this world—and knowledge is a good thing? That sounds on the right lines, but it is hard to express the point rigorously. It is true that some of us enjoy necessary truth more than contingent truth, but is that just an idiosyncrasy of some minds? Is it just nice to think that some things couldn’t have been otherwise, thus sparing us of any responsibility for changing them? The question needs further thought.

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Logic of the Mind

Logic of the Mind

Modern logic employs an apparatus of quantifiers and variables. The variables are assigned a domain consisting of discrete individual objects such as dogs and houses—substances, in traditional terminology. Logical laws are formulated against the backdrop of this conception—an ontological conception. Logic is thus tied to an ontology of substances, in particular material substances. Logical necessity is defined by reference to such an ontology. What else could constitute the domain over which we quantify? We need an ontology to form the domain of quantification. No ontology, no logic. But does this ontology apply to the mind? What domain are we quantifying over? As I have argued elsewhere, there is no substance-accident ontology of the mind, or even event ontology.[1] There is no mental counterpart to the ontology of material objects in space. So, we cannot define logical truth with respect to the mind by reference to such an ontology. That would be fine if logical truth did not apply to the mind, but it does. We can use “all” and “some” about the mind and state logical truths, but there is no domain of quantification of the kind commonly presupposed. The situation is analogous to the logic of stuffs: we can speak of “some milk” and “all coal” and say “no milk is coal”, but it is doubtful that such locutions can be paraphrased by reference to glasses of milk and pieces of coal. A fortioriwe can’t paraphrase quantified statements about consciousness by reference to chunks of consciousness or lumps of experience. For example, you can say “All pain is worse than any pleasure” without supposing that pain and pleasure form a domain of objects: there need not be a value of a variable that ranges over a set of objects. Nor do we have to suppose a well-defined domain of selves or persons to accommodate “I am not you” or “Everyone is someone”. Logic as such is not committed to a specific type of ontology—essentially an ontology of substances. Modern logic was formulated with such an ontology in mind, forgetting that not all logical truths concern such an ontology. It follows that this formulation is inadequate to capture the full range of cases. The syntax and semantics of modern logical symbolism is too narrow to do justice to logic in general. The very idea of a variable comes under suspicion of ontological bias. It is typically explained by reference to ordinary material objects without a thought to other sorts of ontology or the lack thereof.[2] The operative notion of a domain is too restricted. Modern logic does not apply to the logic of mind, as mereological logic does not.

[1] See my “Ontology of Mind”.

[2] Another problem case is truths about fictional objects: such objects don’t exist to form a domain. And this is the very reason that many logicians don’t like quantifying over properties. If all quantification is “objectual”, how do we explain quantifying over non-objectual things?

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Assemblages of Mind

Assemblages of Mind

Every substance that we are aware of is an assemblage of smaller objects. Everything perceptible is a coming-together of parts. This includes human bodies and brains. We apprehend these things as assemblages. They are essentially assemblages. But the same is not true of the mind or person or self: we don’t apprehend ourselves as made up of smaller cohering parts. Some have inferred that we must be simple substances—the I is a simple indivisible object. But a better conclusion is that mereology doesn’t apply to selves; they are not part-whole entities, or part-less simples. There is no mereology of the mental. This means that the mind can’t be the body or brain. It also implies that the mind (or self) cannot be a substance, given that substances necessarily have mereological structure. We don’t experience ourselves as compounds of immaterial parts either.

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On Being Cool

On Being Cool

The concept is ubiquitous without being properly defined.[1] Yet we all know what it is (well, not all of us). John Lennon was cool, Paul McCartney not so much. Steve McQueen was cool, but not Sylvester Stallone. Brando, Newman, Redford, Jagger, Presley—all cool. For me, it starts with the hair and the clothes; then the voice, the attitude, the stance. But the concept expands out from there and cries out for abstract definition. A marked feature is what we call independence, autonomy, detachment, lack of conformity. Integrity is central. Humor matters. Originality too. Intelligence is indispensable. Accomplishment is required. James Bond is one salient model: handsome, well-dressed, beautifully spoken, imperturbable, perfect taste, can do everything. Plus, the women love him (this is cool 1950s style). Bond doesn’t go around like he owns the place; he doesn’t care whoowns it. The cool customer is all these things, with the perfect footwear of course.

But are these people really that cool? Bond doesn’t even exist. And nor do the actors: they play cool characters. They are not so impressive off-screen (inarticulate, ill-educated, inept). Rock stars are none too brilliant and can’t even hit a tennis ball. So, who is really cool? It is necessary to be widely accomplished, a cut above the herd. Ideally, a person should be adept in the mental, the physical, and the artistic. Like a musician who is also a writer and skier. Or a baseball player who is also a classical pianist. Or a fashion designer with an advanced degree in physics. Best of all a rock star who writes acclaimed philosophy books and pole vaults—as well as wears the right shoes and makes you laugh. Now that would be cool. But there is no such person; actual people tend to be disappointingly limited. No one is an athlete, a musician, and an intellectual—and looks like Paul Newman. So, is it that people are only relatively cool compared to others? Only fantasy figures are truly cool—or gods. Of actual people, who comes closest to the ideally cool individual? Barak Obama comes close, you say. I see your point—he is a pretty cool dude. I have heard Tom Brady suggested. I am sympathetic to Jamie Foxx and Richard Feynman. But no one seems to me to have the requisite range—the missing Bond factor. No one is really cool. Certainly, no one in philosophy is.

Or am I forgetting someone: what about that philosopher who plays drums and guitar and sings, and also does many sports (tennis, table tennis, kayak surfing, knife throwing, skateboarding, trampoline, mountain-biking, etc.)? Also, motorcycling. And I hear he is a cool dresser with a nice collection of sneakers and an excellent sense of humor. I forget his name at the moment, but you know the guy I mean. Didn’t something funny happen to him a few years ago?[2]

[1] I have written about this subject before: see my “Being Cool”.

[2] I have confined myself to cool men here, but if I include women, I have an immediate nominee: Abby Phillip. However, I don’t know enough about her athletic and musical coolness to be definitive.

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Comment from Rebecca Goldstein

As you say, Colin, “so many things to choose from, so many traits to cultivate and exploit!” What we want, in identifying our human essence, is something broad enough to take in the multiplicity of the radically different forms of human life—something that covers the “manual workers, artists, scientists, priests, musicians, entrepreneurs,” not to speak of the autocrats, saints, body builders, and pickup artists. What is the thing we have in common that motivates the “too-many” forms of human life? I suggest that it’s the human longing to justify, for ourselves, the self-mattering that Spinoza called conatus and that’s the organizing principle of all the instincts, baked into all of of life, biology’s answer to the entropy of physics, as Schrodinger taught us. Because we’re the creatures who can’t passively accept biology’s answer, at least in our own case—which is the only case we’re typically exercised over—we produce a cascade of behaviors that can’t be explained using the usual Darwinian mechanisms. 

 
 


Rebecca 

In other words, the book you know so well that I’ve been working on is soon to be published.
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