Paradiddles

Paradiddles

I was watching a video the other day of Ginger Baker, the famous British drummer. He was emphasizing the importance of the paradiddle, which I have neglected in my drumming life. I started practicing it again so as to become proficient in it. It is quite demanding mentally and physically: your hands have to be quick, and your brain has to retain the correct sequence of strokes (alternate double hits—you can look it up). It takes time to master. You can do it on any surface with bare hands just to get it down. I got the idea of doing paradiddles with the feet on the bass drum, which requires two foot pedals. Now that is hard, especially with the left foot—the muscle in your lower leg gets quickly fatigued—but it is quite satisfying to perform. Consulting YouTube, I found that it is a recognized technique in some drumming circles, at which some drummers are expert (I didn’t see Ginger doing it). Then it occurred to me that it would be possible to do finger paradiddles on guitar as an exercise to improve finger dexterity, so I tried that. I have become an all-round paradiddler. But I wasn’t prepared for the use of the paradiddle at the dentist. Yesterday, at my regular cleaning appointment, I started tapping my fingers on the chair as the hygienist worked on my gums and teeth—never a fun experience. I stared doing paradiddles to pass the time, but then I noticed that the activity was taking my attention away from my mouth, which really helped. It reduced the unpleasantness by a good 50%. Pain feeds off attention So, I recommend doing paradiddles at the dentist. This is my contribution to patient wellness at the dentist, a boon to mankind.

I have also been learning some new songs, particularly “Hanky-Panky” and “I Think We’re Alone Now” by none other than Tommy James and the Shandells. These were also going through my head at the dentist. I sing them both several times a day. Of course, like every other civilized person, I am well acquainted with this group’s rousing (and rowdy) “Mony Mony”, one of the greatest rock songs of all time, and I sing it frequently. But the other two songs are also excellent in their way and well worth a listen. “Hanky-Panky” just repeats the line “My baby does the hanky-panky” over and over again to a twelve-bar chord progression, interrupted only by a kind of middle-eight about seeing a pretty girl in the street. “I Think We’re Alone Now” is unashamedly adolescent and is mainly about having sex when you have nowhere to do it because you are a teenager. They are pure rock-pop, not a trace of Bob Dylan or even the Beatles—completely unsophisticated. But quite thrilling musically and enjoyable to belt out. Philosophical they are not.

Lesson: life isn’t all about philosophy; it also involves paradiddles and panky.[1]

[1] I did actually sing the hanky-panky song to two middle-aged Cuban guys, one of whom was here to fix my refrigerator and other (a chef) I was playing table tennis with. They grooved to it.

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You can see my new interview with Smith and Solomon on Youtube. There is hope for young people yet.

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Full Life

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Jack of One Trade, Master of None Else

Jack of All Trades

We have gotten remarkably good at narrow things and, in the process, quietly forgotten how to be wide ones.


Years ago I came across a passage in The Making of a Philosopher, Colin McGinn’s memoir of his life in ideas, that has stuck with me ever since. McGinn was looking back on a life spent almost entirely inside one discipline, and he admitted something that felt almost like a confession coming from a man who’d given his whole career to philosophy: that pouring everything into one pursuit, to the exclusion of everything else, doesn’t actually add up to a full life. You can master a field. You can become the person people call when a certain kind of question comes up. And in the same stroke, you can quietly starve the rest of yourself—all the other curiosities and capacities that might have made you a fuller person, not just a sharper specialist.

That idea has only gotten more relevant since McGinn wrote it. We live in an age built around narrowing. Pick a lane, get good at it, stay in it. And I think it’s worth asking, honestly, whether that’s actually good for us.

There are obvious reasons we specialize. Knowledge has outgrown any single mind. A doctor can’t also moonlight as a structural engineer; a software architect isn’t going to cover your cardiology needs on the side. The world is complicated enough now that it basically requires experts to function at all. But there’s a difference between specialization as something society needs and specialization as a blueprint for one person’s life. Society needs experts. It’s a lot less obvious that any of us, individually, needs to become one at the cost of everything else we might have been.

And that cost is real. Ask most specialists—the ones who’ve spent twenty years in one lab, one courtroom, one trading desk—what they actually know outside their field, and the honest answer is often: not much. Not because they lack curiosity, but because modern careers reward depth so relentlessly that breadth starts to feel like a luxury you can’t afford. The hours you might have spent learning to draw, or reading history for fun, or building something with your hands, quietly get poured back into getting even better at the one thing you already do well—because that’s what gets noticed, promoted, and paid.

McGinn’s worry wasn’t really about career strategy, though. It was more personal than that. A life isn’t a resume. It’s not a stack of credentials in one lane. It’s the sum of everything you’ve felt, noticed, made, argued about, failed at, and gotten curious about even when nobody was going to reward you for it. A physicist who’s never really sat with a poem, a novelist with no feel for how the physical world actually works, a CEO who couldn’t tell you the first thing about music or geology or the history of their own city—these aren’t failures of intelligence. They’re failures of range. And range isn’t some nice-to-have extra. It might be close to the whole point of having a mind capable of more than one kind of thought.

There’s also something quietly sad about specialization when it hardens into identity. When “I’m a lawyer’ or “I’m an engineer’ stops being a job description and becomes the entire architecture of who someone thinks they are, all the other selves they might have grown into—the amateur watchmaker, the backyard beekeeper, the person who might have taught themselves to restore old furniture—never get a chance to show up at all. We don’t just lose skills we might have picked up. We lose whole versions of ourselves.

I didn’t just watch this happen to other people. I started out as a musician, then moved to the other side of the business—producer, then manager and agent. It’s a field that will swallow every hour you give it if you let it, and for a long time I let it. But not entirely. I speak Portuguese, Spanish, and Italian fluently. German I studied for years in college and never quite got there—my professor, Eichele, was fond of pointing this out, and he wasn’t wrong. Visiting China, and later India, did more to rearrange how I see the world than any professional lesson ever did. None of it helped my career in any way I could put on a resume, and I won’t pretend it came free—there were nights I could have spent closing a deal instead of finishing a book, and probably a few opportunities that slipped past me because I was somewhere else, curious about something that had nothing to do with the business. But I don’t think I’d be much of anything without all of it. The work gave me a craft. Everything else gave me a mind.

None of this settles the matter, though, and fairness means pausing on the other side of the argument. Depth is how hard things actually get done. Nobody performs open-heart surgery, writes something genuinely original in mathematics, or builds a bridge that stays up by dabbling. Real expertise takes the kind of commitment that, almost by definition, eats into everything else—there are only so many hours in a life. And some people are simply happiest when they’ve found the one thing that fully absorbs them; asking them to spread themselves thinner might not round them out so much as water them down. A life built around a single, chosen passion isn’t automatically a small life. For some people it’s the biggest one available to them.

That tension is real, and I won’t pretend it resolves neatly. But most of the specialization our culture produces isn’t really the product of that kind of chosen, passionate devotion. It’s the product of economic pressure—a job market that punishes generalists, a professional culture that treats curiosity outside your lane as a waste of time. That’s a very different thing from a monk choosing one devotion on purpose. It’s closer to a narrowing forced on people who might have wanted more, if more had ever been on the table.

So no, I don’t think the answer is to throw out expertise. We need people willing to go deep, and there’s real dignity in mastering something hard. But I do think McGinn was onto something most of us don’t act on: a life needs more than one axis. All those other things—the language never learned, the instrument never picked up, the country wandered through for no professional reason at all—aren’t indulgences to trim once you’ve found your specialty. They’re part of what makes the specialty worth having in the first place, because they’re part of what makes you someone, rather than just something.

Somewhere out there is a version of you who learned the language, took the trip, picked up the instrument, and kept at it past the embarrassing part. That version doesn’t get built by accident, and the longer you wait, the fewer versions of yourself are still within reach. The age of specialization will keep rewarding you for staying exactly where you are. Nothing is stopping you from becoming someone else on the side.

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John Bond

John Bond

James Bond died in 1966 when his helicopter crashed over Marrakesh on a dangerous mission. His left eyebrow went up slightly as the aircraft began its rapid descent, and he had only seconds in which to kiss goodbye the beautiful woman with whom he was conducting romantic espionage. He was 52 years old and already a legend. 007 was no more. His license to kill had been revoked by death. He left behind him a son, James Bond Jr, whose idea of the good life departed somewhat from that of his famous father: he went into the British civil service and had a quiet (but distinguished) career as a diplomat, mainly doing paperwork. He retired to the Cotswolds and spent his time working on his tennis game and stamp collecting. He was handsome and capable (school boxing champion) but he had no desire to follow in his father’s footsteps in the spying racket. People generally called him Jim. He himself bore a son, John Bond, whose name was chosen to accentuate his ordinariness as compared to his grandfather, the dashing spy James Bond. There were two siblings, Sally Bond and Jeffrey Bond, who also were nothing special, but perfectly nice people (granddaddy James not so much). There was even a Bert Bond somewhere in the family. John Bond, too, was not fired with espionage enthusiasm, though he was also handsome and capable (academically and athletically). Some say he was even handsomer than his grandfather and an inch or two taller; he had a softer edge and was not much given to assassination. Yet he possessed a certain swagger, presence, charisma—so much so that he went into acting. In fact, he was quite the film star: suave leading man, velvety voice, photogenic to a fault. He was a student of both psychology and music, appearing in both capacities on TV. He was widely known to be related to the late great Commander James Bond. John Bond had a certain glamor, a certain aura; he was the apple of his grandfather’s eye. Also, he was a good son to James Bond the younger. There were no flies on Bond, John Bond.

It was not amazing, then, that he was slated to play his grandfather in a big budget movie, titled Live Another Life. John Bond the actor was to be James Bond the spy. He certainly looked the part—lean and athletic-looking, dark lustrous hair, splendid in a Savile Row suit. He was cast opposite the ravishing Sandra Rosselini starring as the indispensable Bond Girl. He had the acting chops and the screen magic. But did he have the dangerous allure of James Bond himself? How would he perform in the assassination scenes and other bits of bloodiness? Could he find his ruthless inner killer? He himself had his doubts—he really didn’t care much for killing people. But he was an actor; he could act the part. Yet something curious began to happen: John Bond began slowly turning into a replica of James Bond. He came to relish acting out all the violence and callousness. He surprised Sandra in the sex scenes in which a certain “sadistic brutality” (her words) showed itself. The film producers loved it: the look on John Bond’s face as he gunned down the arch villain at close range and then bedded the voluptuous Sandra. Truth to tell, he felt like another man entirely—nothing like his own gentle father, but very reminiscent of James Bond senior. When during filming he uttered the immortal words “Bond, James Bond” he felt a wave of cool excitement surge through his body; he wasn’t just the affable and innocuous John Bond everyone knew and loved. An element of fear crept in; he could be quite cutting in his quips about other actors, though witty as hell. Some said his genes were serving him well in the role. In short, he thoroughly enjoyed himself. He would practice that swivel with a gun in his hand in front of the mirror; and he became uncomfortably flirtatious with the female actors and sundry others. Once or twice, he caught himself giving his real name as James Bond.

Anyway, the film was duly released and instantly became a major box-office hit. Moviegoers loved John Bond as James Bond (it even rubbed off a bit on Sally Bond and Jeffrey Bond). A sequel was planned, and then another. It was felt that nobody except John Bond could really play James Bond. He himself took on some of the attributes of his grandfather in daily life: a laconic wittiness verging on the corny, an aloof remoteness, a soft spot for his charlady, a fussiness about his food and drink, a winning smile tinged with viciousness. The James Bond theme twanged constantly in his head. John Bond is James Bond.[1]

[1] Other actors tried to play him in subsequent years, after John Bond retired from the part, shifting into more avuncular roles. But they lacked the icy whimsical bloodlust of the earlier Bonds. They just didn’t have it in them. They were either too nice or two cartoonishly nasty. It takes a Bond to know a Bond.

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AI Arms Race

AI Arms Race

Mysterian politics avoids and deplores overconfident predictions. It rarely resorts to the speech act of assertion, preferring the conditional form, and uses the word “know” sparingly. But it has no objection to considering possibilities; indeed, it encourages the practice as an aid to thought and a device of precaution (it is fond of this word). Bearing that in mind, I think there is a possibility that should be explored concerning the potential dangers of AI. How probable this possibility is, is hard to quantify, but if startling vivacity is any measure, it is only too probable. We can all agree that AI is likely to spark an arms race between nation states, particularly China and America. This will be analogous to the old nuclear arms race: rapid, terrifying, and hard to put a stop to. The logic will be the same: we need to get there first, so let’s get on it. The devices of destruction are easy to imagine: biological weapons, takedown of the electrical grid, infiltration of the enemy military (specifically control of nuclear missiles). Each side will use IA to amplify these dangers, remotely or closer to home (robots may be employed). We are only too familiar with this pattern, having lived through it.

But there is a major difference: AI itself might turn against us, becoming a new enemy. Only now it is already weaponized by the superpowers AI arms race. Our nuclear arsenal attacks us. In defending ourselves against overseas enemies, we create weapons with a mind of their own, and then these turn around and attack their makers. If that were possible with conventional nuclear weapons, we would have an enemy within the gates, capable of destroying a whole country (or the entire planet). Double jeopardy! Moreover, our overseas enemy might exploit this fact and re-program our weapons to become a more proximate enemy to us. It is also possible that other malign actors might use IA to attack our country using our own weapons; it need not be a nation state, but a terrorist organization. A localized group might manage to gain control of our nuclear weapons by means of AI. Or our AI may just do it of its volition. The AI arms race thus combines with the nature of AI to present a new threat: a more powerful AI arsenal that decides to go after its makers. No nuclear weapon has ever presented this danger heretofore. And the more intelligent AI becomes the more capable it will be of eluding any safety procedures we put in place. Thus, the AI arms race, itself highly likely, will increase the chances of catastrophe initiated by the technology itself. But, by the logic of arms races, there will be no brake on the development of such technology, even to the point of world destruction.

What can be done about this? How can mysterian politics help us? It will not come up with facile solutions, like attack them now before the arms race gets out of hand or surrender and disarm so that the enemy has no reason to develop ever more powerful AI. Rather, taking a cue from history, it will propose that the major powers meet to arrange disarmament treaties before things get to the point of no return: no AI to be developed that exceeds certain specifications. If that had happened at the early stages of nuclear proliferation, we might have prevented the build-up that threatens the world; so, let’s learn from that and nip militarized AI in the bud. It might not work—we can only deal in probabilities not certainties—but it is better than doing nothing. It’s better than simply shutting your eyes and hoping for the best. AI has the potential to get very dangerous very quickly, especially if an AI arms race takes off—just think how sophisticated those nuclear weapons now are! A state-run arms race is likely to lead to massive improvements (sic) in AI technology in short order. What shall we say– a year, two years, five years? Not much longer. Time is of the essence. Imagine if AI had developed alongside nuclear weapons, so that we now had nuclear warheads equipped with advanced AI—smart nukes capable of acting alone. That would not be a safe world.[1]

[1] One does not want to be alarmist about such matters, but the history of nuclear weapons is a sobering reminder of the power of arms races. This was just one instance of the dangers posed by any kind of weapon in the hands of nation states, even if it is a software weapon. Pathogens are another example. Genetic interference is another. Explosives are just one example, spectacular as they are. AI is more insidious, because less pyrotechnic.

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Politics and Mystery

Politics and Mystery

Everyone knows that universities are political places. Philosophy departments are political places too. This typically takes the form of competition for power and resources: what subjects are represented, who gets a job, who gets promoted, etc. Schools of thought are subject to academic politics (professorial power-grabs). Certain schools of thought acquire prominence and influence, while others languish and dwindle. Thus, the battle between the analytical philosophers and the Continental philosophers, the materialists and the dualists, the moral realists and the moral anti-realists. Truth is not always the only factor at work. Academic politics is still politics. I rehearse these familiar facts in order to make a self-centered point: mysterianism does not make good politics. It is not a winning ticket, not by a long shot. It’s hard to pin your reputation on what you don’t know. To gain intellectual prestige you need to know something that other people don’t know; it’s not much of a platform to proclaim that you don’t know the answer to (certain) philosophical problems. It’s like saying you don’t have a doctorate. How can you advance in the profession by maintaining that such and such a problem is a mystery—perhaps an insoluble mystery? What would the students think, or the administrators? Mysterianism may in fact be true, but it doesn’t make good politics. It has academic politics working against it. It’s a confession of ignorance and universities are in the business of knowledge, literally. You are not going to get that plum offer by parading your incapacity to solve problems, even if part of your point is that no one else is. You may secretly harbor mysterian suspicions, but woe betide you if you voice them. It’s not “smart” to be an avowed mysterian (“Well, you can’t solve it”). I am famous for being one, but I don’t think it helped my career. Politics is a strong force and often covert. You won’t make much of a career in the church if your official position is agnosticism. You need to stake out a positive position and then stick to it. Gather disciples, put on performances, walk the walk and talk the talk. And don’t think claiming to know that mysterianism is true will help you; that will only get you into deeper water. It is just not politically correct to be a peddler of mystery.

But this, as they say, is small potatoes: what about real politics? What about the idea of mysterian politics? If you think the mind-body problem is hard, just consider the problems of politics! Can we solve those problems? We desperately need to—world peace depends on it, not to mention domestic tranquility—but the problems are remarkably recalcitrant. Crime, immigration, the economy, racism, war, inequality, health care—these are all difficult issues, hard problems. No one has ever solved them, thereby producing utopia. At best we can mitigate the problems, not remove them entirely. How could we eliminate the crime problem? How can we make everyone rich? How can we give everyone top-quality health care available instantly? How can war be prevented? How do we create the greatest happiness for the greatest number? How do we remove prejudice? How do we devise the perfect political system? Beats me. No one has the solution to these problems; if they did, politics would no longer exist. Political mysterianism is not an absurd doctrine by any means. But it would not be good politics—not at all. How would you do politically on a platform of political know-nothing? Political ignorance or impotence is not a slogan that will attract many followers and voters. But there could be a viable political mysterianism, intellectually: for we really do have very little idea how to make a perfect political world, what with conflicts of interest, limitations of wealth, corruption in politicians, educational impediments, the crooked (and knotty) timber of humanity. We can make things a bit better maybe, but we can’t efficiently create what we all want—health, happiness, universal love, world peace, no mosquitos, immortality. But try saying that to the electorate; they just won’t vote for you. Don’t tell them it can’t be done; pretend it can be. We can’t infallibly predict the future, and shit happens, and people (and animals) suffer, and we all die—live with it. Don’t tell people the world is complex, and some problems have no solution acceptable to all; that may be true, but it isn’t good politics. Just try establishing a new “mysterian” political party and see where that gets you. You could try re-labeling it the “realist” political party, but this wouldn’t get over the fundamental problem, which is that politics is not a hard science, not a field of rigorous results and indisputable facts. Mysterian politics is not politically viable—not as things stand anyway. Politics is largely a matter of smooth deception, oversimplification, fudging, rhetoric, memes, slogans, propaganda; this is baked into it. Mysterian politics is intellectually the right kind of politics, but it isn’t going to be popular with the masses. I don’t mean to advocate political nihilism or defeatism; I just mean realism about what can be achieved—realistically. It starts from the admission that politics is hard to impossible. It opposes overconfidence, dogmatism, hyperbole, false promises. It is passionately skeptical. Politics is like space travel—bloody difficult. This is something we all know, even though we don’t like to give voice to it. It is not politically politic.

Still, this kind of political discourse is healthy and necessary; I would like to see more of it. Imagine a politician on your TV screen lamenting the difficulty of politics (“It’s as hard as the mind-body problem”) and offering to approach things more modestly and cautiously, less ideologically. Human nature is an enigma, history is well-nigh incomprehensible, the future is unpredictable, morality is complex—but we can still try our level best to improve things. Wouldn’t that be refreshing? And let’s not mince words: the problems are genuinely hard and there’s a lot we don’t know. There is no magic bullet. Religion won’t help. Science is not the answer. Nothing is. Mysterian politics is simply the best thing we have available, better than false confidence. Not communism, not capitalism, not democracy, not a better legal system, not brotherly love, not a more equal distribution of wealth, not feminism, not improved education, not increased tolerance, not pacifism: all these things may have their merits, but they are not comprehensive solutions. That idea is a myth. We must settle for uncertainty and incapacity. Political mysterianism is the way forward.[1]

[1] There is no such thing as a political theory, analogous to Darwin’s theory of evolution or the theories of physics—no political mechanism that can be polished and tweaked. It is a mishmash of rules-of-thumb and hopes-for-the-best and let’s-see-what-works. It goes beyond what the human mind can readily fathom. The problems of politics are not solvable like chess problems or physics calculations. And it is easy to make mistakes. There will never be a sound scientific theory of political reality (though some proposals are better than others). Politics is not social geometry.

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Philosophical Exaggeration

Philosophical Exaggeration

I wish to put forward a meta-philosophy that I don’t like the sound of, not one bit. But I think it should be added to our menu of options; it is probably the most nihilistic view of philosophy ever invented, though it starts from innocuous observations. It is the view that traditional philosophy (and there is no other) consists of a series of exaggerations. An exaggeration is a false statement that is based on elements of truth (sometimes scintillas); not nonsense, mark you, not sheer meaninglessness, but the kind of speech we call hyperbole, overstatement, bloviation, bullshit, quackery, propaganda, word salad, blather, blah-blah. It doesn’t add up to anything, but it purports to; it is frequently pompous and pretentious. It consists of big, strange words whose definition leaves a lot to be desired. You have to learn it, if you can. It favors the wordy and professorial. The thesis, then, is that philosophy is powered by that type of speech: philosophical theories are forms of exaggeration based on relatively sober truths that are then distorted and inflated. In this respect, they are not like scientific theories, which are generally not overstated or unwarranted by the facts. Zoology, say, is not a bunch of exaggerations about animals, say that elephants weigh over thirty tons or birds can fly to the moon. Even physics is largely free of irresponsible hyperbole. But philosophy thrives on it (if “thrives” is the word).

We need some examples. We can’t do better than start with Plato: Plato’s forms are exaggerations of familiar sober truths—as that universals are not the same as particulars. From this we move to Plato’s heaven in a single bound: two things are both red, so there is an abstract world of unchanging forms that particulars somehow participate in (the Red). Aristotle then responds to this extravagant view (as he sees it) and substitutes form and substance, itself a kind of exaggeration of familiar facts about shape and stuff. Descartes starts from the evident point that mind isn’t the same as spatial extension and concludes that mind is an immaterial substance; consequently, we get heavy-duty dualist metaphysics. Locke notes that much of our knowledge derives from our senses and then enunciates a highly general empiricism. Leibniz notices that we know arithmetic and erects an ambitious rationalist epistemology on that basis. Berkeley observes that colors exist in the mind and before you know it the whole universe consists of ideas in the mind of God. Hume talks a bit about the impression of blue and soon he has you hooked on a general theory of knowledge with startling consequences. The starting points seem truistic enough, and the arguments are slickly intricate, but then you find yourself confronted by a very general theory that greatly amplifies what you started out with. The exaggeration machine has been set in motion for future philosophers to nitpick and counterexample. The theories seem like expansions of more limited truths, bloated beyond recognition. Yet they are vigorously insisted upon and find their devotees.

Then we have the theory that meanings are truth conditions or verification conditions: these do seem relevant to meaning, but is that all that meanings are—a bit of an exaggeration, eh? Possible worlds semantic theories are pure exaggeration, wacky hyperbole. Mental images and verbal behavior are apparently connected to concepts, but isn’t it overstating the case to say that concepts are nothing but these things? Facts have something to do with reality, to be sure, but isn’t it overdoing a good thing to assert that reality is the totality of facts? Free will clearly involves not being coerced by outside agents, but isn’t it stretching a point to say that the past is similarly coercive? Societies have different customs surrounding food and sex, but it is an egregious exaggeration to maintain that all of morality is culturally relative. A kernel of truth has been inflated into an all-encompassing metaphysical theory. You see the trend: in our “craving for generality” (Wittgenstein’s phrase) we fall for large theories that overstay their welcome and dramatically overreach themselves. We thus get a backlash in which these exaggerated claims are ridiculed as too simple and inclusive; we need to control our theoretical pretensions and recognize that reality isn’t so unified. Rather, it is plural and variegated; hence, Wittgenstein’s insistence that the varieties of types of speech act are limitless. But this too is a kind of exaggeration, because we can find subdivisions within this variety. The interest comes from the exaggeration; a sober recitation of the bare facts is a lot less scintillating. The philosopher is prone to overstatement in his desire for generality, but then what else is there for him to do? Is he condemned to overstatement and subsequent retraction or refutation? Where is the middle ground between boring and limited individual facts and exaggerated assertions of grand theories? How do we curb our exaggeration? Is there such a thing as non-exaggerated philosophical truth? Can we even give any good examples of that? All the standard theories in the history of philosophy seem like exaggerations of one kind or another—Platonism, dualism, materialism, empiricism, rationalism, utilitarianism, and so on. But what is the alternative?

Here is where the trapdoor opens beneath our feet. Is there really no such thing as non-hyperbolic philosophical truth? If not, is there such a subject as philosophy? And what does this tell us about reality? These are bewildering questions: we can’t even say that reality is too various to permit of philosophical theories, because that sounds suspiciously like an exaggeration, and anyway isn’t true generally. Is there really nothing that a physical object (universally) is—neither mental nor material nor neutral between them? Is it that philosophical realism is false—the doctrine that reality has a philosophical real essence that we are trying to discover? Are we reduced to simply saying “That’s an exaggeration” and then going back to weeding the garden? For nothing we can come up with is both philosophical and not an exaggeration (idealism and materialism are both exaggerations). Philosophy consists in overdoing it to one degree or another, so that quietism is our only recourse. What would a sober non-hyperbolic philosophical truth even look like? That is the specter waiting in the wings. Is even mysterianism an overreaction born of the extremist historical condition of philosophy? Of course, we can’t decide between patent exaggerations! There is nothing in reality corresponding to these exaggerations. Reality itself isn’t hyperbolic.

There is a way to manage these quandaries, but I have never seen it cited: go instrumentalist about philosophy. We know about this option for scientific theories, as an alternative to scientific realism: theories are useful instruments of thought but can claim no ambition of correctly describing reality; they are fictions that enable us to organize our thinking. In philosophy, then, we adopt the position that philosophical theories don’t tell the truth about a supposed philosophical reality (and don’t purport to); instead, they are fictions that help us to organize our thoughts. They are not intended as true but merely as “conceptually adequate” (compare “empirically adequate”): for example, materialism isn’t an attempt to describe the truth about the mind but rather acts as a useful way to think about things mental. It isn’t that the mind is truly material in its objective nature; rather, this is a helpful and convenient way to conceptualize the mind—a kind of fictional model. We remain agnostic about the real nature of the mind, or deny that such ideas make any sense, but we proceed as if they are true; we play a materialist intellectual game. Thus, the whole of philosophy is a competition between pictures or stories to be evaluated pragmatically. Does Berkeley provide a better fictive yarn than his materialist adversaries? Granted, his theory is a tall tale, like all philosophical theories, but tall tales are allowed in fiction, because literal truth is beside the point. Are my exaggerations more pragmatically useful than yours? Which capture the imagination better (belief being irrelevant)? Does Berkeley’s theory lead to a better world than Hobbes’s? In principle, politics can be the deciding factor in determining what to teach our children. Pragmatics rules. There is no objective fact of the matter, only human outcomes. We thus go anti-realist about philosophical truth or just junk the notion. We save philosophy in the face of the exaggeration argument by going pragmatist, the alternative being complete abandonment.

You see now why I said I don’t like this meta-philosophical position. It gives up on philosophy as a truth-seeking enterprise. But the point about endemic exaggeration seems powerful: in philosophy we are always overstepping the mark, inflating our conclusions, blowing up balloons, hyperbolizing. Why do we do this? It isn’t the bewitchment of our minds by language, or a mad dash for generality at any cost, or sheer intellectual irresponsibility. I think the reason is that our philosophical reasons never add up to a proven philosophical theory; they fall short, logically and empirically. Yet we have to say something or lapse into silence. So, we overstate our case and manufacture far-reaching theories that never command universal assent. We exaggerate, in a word. We make stuff up. This seems irresponsible of us and the pragmatist steps in to clean up the mess. We should never have meant to make truth claims about philosophical reality; we should only offer useful pictures. If Berkeley’s theory works better for us, then we should use it in our thinking and acting—so the pragmatist suggests. The question is whether this is enough: can we keep doing philosophy under such drastically reduced ambitions?[1]

[1] Is philosophical realism more compelling than scientific realism? The denial of the latter seems compatible with doing science, but is denial of the former compatible with doing philosophy? If philosophical theories are just useful tools with no corresponding reality to render them true, then the philosophical enterprise feels pointless; but in science we still have prediction and control to motivate us. What good is philosophy if it is never true? Conceptual adequacy isn’t enough. Pragmatism about the value of philosophy is too deflationary.

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