Solipsistic Realism

Solipsistic Realism

Berkeley had a metaphysics and epistemology that dispensed with matter; he thought this gave us a better theory of the nature of objects and also delivered us from the skepticism generated by the idea of matter. But he was not a solipsist, not by any means: he believed in multiple “finite spirits” and one “infinite spirit”. He was a many-minds idealist. But this left him with problems that didn’t trouble him or that never occurred to him. First, he needed God to keep the system up and running, so his idealism couldn’t be converted to a secular idealism. He also needed God to provide a measure of reality, given that mortal minds contain partial and contradictory representations of reality. Second, he has a problem of individuation: how are spirits to be counted and distinguished from each other, given that they are not spatial substances? But he did have an answer to the acute problem posed by matter, namely forming a proper conception of what this kind of reality might be. He was onto something with regard to knowledge of reality and the threat of ignorance and skepticism. Locke had this problem in spades, as did Hume. Another solution would be to deny the plurality of minds and accept solipsism; then there is no God to deal with and the problem of plurality disappears (there is only one mind to constitute the real world, namely mine).[1] We thus avoid skepticism, theism, and ontological pluralism (too many worlds). Solipsism gives us ontological unity plus an answer to the skeptic (of one kind anyway)—for I know my world very well, unlike that mysterious world of matter postulated by the corpuscular mechanist materialists.

It might be thought that the solipsist cannot be a realist but must be an idealist, but this is not so. To be a solipsist is to believe that only one self exists, viz. one’s own; it is not to believe that nothing else exists but one’s own self. Nor does it prevent objects from existing unperceived: it is part of my world that objects can depart my awareness; this isn’t some sort of philosophical or scientific speculation (unlike classical Cartesian matter). Solipsism is not the view that only I exist and everything depends on me; it just says no selves exist other than my self. So, there is no violation of common sense in this respect. Whether it violates common sense in respect of other minds is another question, depending on whether we are firmly committed to the existence of other minds, and in what way committed (rationally or emotionally). In any case, solipsism is consistent with external world realism (or indeed Platonism and ethical realism). It thus scores well in the philosophical sweepstakes: it preserves worldly unity, it answers skepticism, it avoids strange alien conceptions of objective reality, and it is consistent with realism. There is such a thing as solipsistic realism and it does well on theoretical grounds; it just dispenses with an ontology of other minds. It may not need to dispense with other experiences or mental states, because it is not clear that experiences have “worlds” in the way minds or selves do; intuitively, they do not. I have a world, but my individual experiences don’t. Hence, I can function as the center of the world while other free-floating experiences cannot. On the other hand, if experiences require selves, then there cannot be other experiences either, since those selves will have their own worlds competing with mine. I think the stronger sort of solipsism is preferable, theoretically, but the weaker kind is worth considering. All in all, solipsistic realism should be added to the range of available options and does well on theoretical grounds. We get a single recognizable world without any funny business. Solipsism makes monistic realism possible.[2]

[1] See my “A Disproof of Other Minds”.

[2] Solipsism has always been viewed as something to avoid, but it can also be used to solve philosophical problems raised by other views. We may be lonely, but we are not perplexed.