Philosophical Exaggeration

Philosophical Exaggeration

I wish to put forward a meta-philosophy that I don’t like the sound of, not one bit. But I think it should be added to our menu of options; it is probably the most nihilistic view of philosophy ever invented, though it starts from innocuous observations. It is the view that traditional philosophy (and there is no other) consists of a series of exaggerations. An exaggeration is a false statement that is based on elements of truth (sometimes scintillas); not nonsense, mark you, not sheer meaninglessness, but the kind of speech we call hyperbole, overstatement, bloviation, bullshit, quackery, propaganda, word salad, blather, blah-blah. It doesn’t add up to anything, but it purports to; it is frequently pompous and pretentious. It consists of big, strange words whose definition leaves a lot to be desired. You have to learn it, if you can. It favors the wordy and professorial. The thesis, then, is that philosophy is powered by that type of speech: philosophical theories are forms of exaggeration based on relatively sober truths that are then distorted and inflated. In this respect, they are not like scientific theories, which are generally not overstated or unwarranted by the facts. Zoology, say, is not a bunch of exaggerations about animals, say that elephants weigh over thirty tons or birds can fly to the moon. Even physics is largely free of irresponsible hyperbole. But philosophy thrives on it (if “thrives” is the word).

We need some examples. We can’t do better than start with Plato: Plato’s forms are exaggerations of familiar sober truths—as that universals are not the same as particulars. From this we move to Plato’s heaven in a single bound: two things are both red, so there is an abstract world of unchanging forms that particulars somehow participate in (the Red). Aristotle then responds to this extravagant view (as he sees it) and substitutes form and substance, itself a kind of exaggeration of familiar facts about shape and stuff. Descartes starts from the evident point that mind isn’t the same as spatial extension and concludes that mind is an immaterial substance; consequently, we get heavy-duty dualist metaphysics. Locke notes that much of our knowledge derives from our senses and then enunciates a highly general empiricism. Leibniz notices that we know arithmetic and erects an ambitious rationalist epistemology on that basis. Berkeley observes that colors exist in the mind and before you know it the whole universe consists of ideas in the mind of God. Hume talks a bit about the impression of blue and soon he has you hooked on a general theory of knowledge with startling consequences. The starting points seem truistic enough, and the arguments are slickly intricate, but then you find yourself confronted by a very general theory that greatly amplifies what you started out with. The exaggeration machine has been set in motion for future philosophers to nitpick and counterexample. The theories seem like expansions of more limited truths, bloated beyond recognition. Yet they are vigorously insisted upon and find their devotees.

Then we have the theory that meanings are truth conditions or verification conditions: these do seem relevant to meaning, but is that all that meanings are—a bit of an exaggeration, eh? Possible worlds semantic theories are pure exaggeration, wacky hyperbole. Mental images and verbal behavior are apparently connected to concepts, but isn’t it overstating the case to say that concepts are nothing but these things? Facts have something to do with reality, to be sure, but isn’t it overdoing a good thing to assert that reality is the totality of facts? Free will clearly involves not being coerced by outside agents, but isn’t it stretching a point to say that the past is similarly coercive? Societies have different customs surrounding food and sex, but it is an egregious exaggeration to maintain that all of morality is culturally relative. A kernel of truth has been inflated into an all-encompassing metaphysical theory. You see the trend: in our “craving for generality” (Wittgenstein’s phrase) we fall for large theories that overstay their welcome and dramatically overreach themselves. We thus get a backlash in which these exaggerated claims are ridiculed as too simple and inclusive; we need to control our theoretical pretensions and recognize that reality isn’t so unified. Rather, it is plural and variegated; hence, Wittgenstein’s insistence that the varieties of types of speech act are limitless. But this too is a kind of exaggeration, because we can find subdivisions within this variety. The interest comes from the exaggeration; a sober recitation of the bare facts is a lot less scintillating. The philosopher is prone to overstatement in his desire for generality, but then what else is there for him to do? Is he condemned to overstatement and subsequent retraction or refutation? Where is the middle ground between boring and limited individual facts and exaggerated assertions of grand theories? How do we curb our exaggeration? Is there such a thing as non-exaggerated philosophical truth? Can we even give any good examples of that? All the standard theories in the history of philosophy seem like exaggerations of one kind or another—Platonism, dualism, materialism, empiricism, rationalism, utilitarianism, and so on. But what is the alternative?

Here is where the trapdoor opens beneath our feet. Is there really no such thing as non-hyperbolic philosophical truth? If not, is there such a subject as philosophy? And what does this tell us about reality? These are bewildering questions: we can’t even say that reality is too various to permit of philosophical theories, because that sounds suspiciously like an exaggeration, and anyway isn’t true generally. Is there really nothing that a physical object (universally) is—neither mental nor material nor neutral between them? Is it that philosophical realism is false—the doctrine that reality has a philosophical real essence that we are trying to discover? Are we reduced to simply saying “That’s an exaggeration” and then going back to weeding the garden? For nothing we can come up with is both philosophical and not an exaggeration (idealism and materialism are both exaggerations). Philosophy consists in overdoing it to one degree or another, so that quietism is our only recourse. What would a sober non-hyperbolic philosophical truth even look like? That is the specter waiting in the wings. Is even mysterianism an overreaction born of the extremist historical condition of philosophy? Of course, we can’t decide between patent exaggerations! There is nothing in reality corresponding to these exaggerations. Reality itself isn’t hyperbolic.

There is a way to manage these quandaries, but I have never seen it cited: go instrumentalist about philosophy. We know about this option for scientific theories, as an alternative to scientific realism: theories are useful instruments of thought but can claim no ambition of correctly describing reality; they are fictions that enable us to organize our thinking. In philosophy, then, we adopt the position that philosophical theories don’t tell the truth about a supposed philosophical reality (and don’t purport to); instead, they are fictions that help us to organize our thoughts. They are not intended as true but merely as “conceptually adequate” (compare “empirically adequate”): for example, materialism isn’t an attempt to describe the truth about the mind but rather acts as a useful way to think about things mental. It isn’t that the mind is truly material in its objective nature; rather, this is a helpful and convenient way to conceptualize the mind—a kind of fictional model. We remain agnostic about the real nature of the mind, or deny that such ideas make any sense, but we proceed as if they are true; we play a materialist intellectual game. Thus, the whole of philosophy is a competition between pictures or stories to be evaluated pragmatically. Does Berkeley provide a better fictive yarn than his materialist adversaries? Granted, his theory is a tall tale, like all philosophical theories, but tall tales are allowed in fiction, because literal truth is beside the point. Are my exaggerations more pragmatically useful than yours? Which capture the imagination better (belief being irrelevant)? Does Berkeley’s theory lead to a better world than Hobbes’s? In principle, politics can be the deciding factor in determining what to teach our children. Pragmatics rules. There is no objective fact of the matter, only human outcomes. We thus go anti-realist about philosophical truth or just junk the notion. We save philosophy in the face of the exaggeration argument by going pragmatist, the alternative being complete abandonment.

You see now why I said I don’t like this meta-philosophical position. It gives up on philosophy as a truth-seeking enterprise. But the point about endemic exaggeration seems powerful: in philosophy we are always overstepping the mark, inflating our conclusions, blowing up balloons, hyperbolizing. Why do we do this? It isn’t the bewitchment of our minds by language, or a mad dash for generality at any cost, or sheer intellectual irresponsibility. I think the reason is that our philosophical reasons never add up to a proven philosophical theory; they fall short, logically and empirically. Yet we have to say something or lapse into silence. So, we overstate our case and manufacture far-reaching theories that never command universal assent. We exaggerate, in a word. We make stuff up. This seems irresponsible of us and the pragmatist steps in to clean up the mess. We should never have meant to make truth claims about philosophical reality; we should only offer useful pictures. If Berkeley’s theory works better for us, then we should use it in our thinking and acting—so the pragmatist suggests. The question is whether this is enough: can we keep doing philosophy under such drastically reduced ambitions?[1]

[1] Is philosophical realism more compelling than scientific realism? The denial of the latter seems compatible with doing science, but is denial of the former compatible with doing philosophy? If philosophical theories are just useful tools with no corresponding reality to render them true, then the philosophical enterprise feels pointless; but in science we still have prediction and control to motivate us. What good is philosophy if it is never true? Conceptual adequacy isn’t enough. Pragmatism about the value of philosophy is too deflationary.