A Paradox of Objectivity and Subjectivity

A Paradox of Objectivity and Subjectivity

We normally suppose that our thoughts concern an objective world. We are capable of thinking about things outside the mind. There is a mind-independent world and we can make cognitive contact with that world by deploying our concepts. I can form conceptions of things that exist outside my mind. Any argument that contests this assumption would be rightly deemed paradoxical. I am going to develop such an argument. I cannot cite a source for the argument to be presented, though hints of it exist in the philosophical tradition. It concerns objectivity and subjectivity. I don’t think it is obvious, though once grasped it has a kind of ineluctable logic, a disturbing inevitability. It can elicit the “Oh-my-god!” response.

I will state the argument initially in its bare bones, so that its anatomy is clear from the start. Either we conceive of the external world objectively or subjectively. If the former, we have to explain how this is possible: how do we form objective conceptions? Such a conception would have to be independent of the conceiving mind’s nature, or else it would be subjective. But this is impossible: concepts cannot be independent of the conceiving mind. So, the conception would have to be a subjective conception, i.e., dependent on the nature of the subject—his perceptions, cognitive processes, memory, rational faculties. But then, it could not concern anything outside the mind: purely subjective representations can’t be about anything objective—they can only be about the mind itself. Therefore, there cannot be a conception, objective or subjective, with an objective reference (content, subject matter). Objective conceptions are impossible, and subjective conceptions must be subjective; but these are the only two possibilities, so objective thought is impossible.

Let’s spell this out a bit. A purely objective thought would be an instance of the “absolute conception”, i.e., a conception available to any intelligent being regardless of sensory equipment or other peculiarities. It would not depend on any peculiarities of the thinker but be universal. But how is such a thing possible, given that every thinker has a specific nature? Surely, there cannot be a thinker without a cognitive structure—a way of forming concepts. The idea of a featureless bare intellect is a myth, as empty as the idea of the bare particular. Every mind has an innate structure and a course of experience; these constitute its ability to form thoughts. It cannot form thoughts from nothing. The mind evolved and obeys the rules of all biological organs: capacities constrained by internal structure. The only way the mind could achieve total objectivity would be by incorporating the objective world, letting facts act as concepts; but that is a nonsensical idea. Concepts are in the head (brain) and reflect the biological structures therein; they are not antecedent realities hovering out there somewhere. The subject is always present in his thoughts, it might be said; his thoughts cannot be separate from his nature. So, objective thoughts cannot be obtained by making certain thoughts “absolute”, since there can be no such thing. My concepts are my concepts, not the world’s.

This point may be readily conceded but insisted that it was always a misguided conceit; of course all thought is subjectively constituted. Why should that prohibit the formation of thoughts about the objective world? Why can’t we have subjective mental representations of objective facts? Here things turn subtle. The problem is that such thoughts will either contain a hidden objective component or will fail to get the mind beyond itself. I can illustrate the point by reference to Russell’s preferred account of “knowledge by description”. His idea is that the mind achieves a degree of objectivity by employing descriptions of the form “the cause of these sense-data”. The reference to sense-data gives us subjectivity, while the reference to external causation brings in the non-mental world. Isn’t this a subjective representation of an objective fact? Well, no, because of that little word “cause”: either it is intended objectively or subjectively, but the dilemma just rehearsed ruins the operative idea. If objective, then the description is not entirely subjective and raises the question of how we have a purely objective notion of cause, which runs up against the argument against objective conceptions. But—and this is the crucial point—if the word is taken subjectively, we don’t have an ingredient that takes us outside the mind. All we have is reference to “ideas”. We must be careful here: it might well be that there is an objective cause out there, and it may be that it operates as a kind of de re object of thought, but it doesn’t follow that we have a de dicto objective content (a genuine concept). So, the account either presupposes what it sets out to explain (objective content) or it fails to deliver the kind of objectivity we normally take for granted. In a slogan: no objective reference without objective content. It follows that there cannot be a purely subjective conception that achieves objective reference (intentionality). In short, all concepts are tinged with subjectivity, but subjective concepts cannot deliver objective reference. So, objective thought is impossible. That is the paradox.

It may be protested that weaker notions of objectivity can be invoked; we need not abandon the idea of objective thought completely. This would be tantamount to a skeptical solution to the paradox; and indeed, such a view is possible. We might, for example, introduce a social notion of objectivity, in which interpersonal correction takes up the burden of delivering objectivity. I won’t go into this, familiar as it is; the point I want to make is that this is a skeptical solution, since we naively suppose that our thoughts can achieve objective reference without the aid of other people. Can’t a solitary animal manage to think objective thoughts irrespective of belonging to any community? What we have discovered is that the objective-subjective polarity does in this natural naïve idea (or purports to). That is surprising: other considerations have been invoked to undermine the idea of objective reference to the external world (from Berkeley to Quine), but not the objective-subjective distinction. But these notions wreak havoc on the idea of objective thought by presenting a nasty dilemma. Either the myth of the absolute conception (never fully explained) or the impotence of the purely subjective to reach out to objective reality. The resulting position is like Kant’s: a noumenal world that exists but cannot be made an object of thought in any meaningful sense. We are confined to representing a phenomenal world shaped by our own minds.

Let’s take a step back. I believe the nub of the argument is that (fully) objective thought is impossible—that is, there can be no absolute conception. Whatever thought is, it must be something; it can’t proceed from a blank slate (whether genetic or environmental). Concepts have to consist of something in the subject (images, words in the language of thought, dispositions to behavior, etc.). In the end, the brain fixes the parameters of thought. There is no “view from nowhere”. Once this point has been absorbed, the gap between thought and reality stands forth: we always see things from our own given point of view, i.e., our cognitive psychology. We can never really bridge this gap. We function well enough in a world existing outside us, but we can’t really obtain an unvarnished picture of the world, a purely objective conception. Maybe we can approximate to it, find a workable substitute for it, but we can’t get outside our own minds completely. We can’t know world as it is in itself and only as it is in itself. We can’t see it from its point of view (the “view from elsewhere”). All living creatures are in the same boat—from vermin to Vulcans. This doesn’t mean we can’t see, know, remember, etc.; but it does mean that a certain picture we are apt to have of our cognitive powers is at best exaggerated. We don’t live in a glass house. We are not made of mirrors (except the distorting kind). The basic paradox is that objective thought is a fundamentally incoherent idea.[1]

[1] Not true thought or justified thought, but thought that is about reality as it exists in itself independently of our own constitution. We can conceive our peculiar perspective but not what it is a perspective on. That remains elusive, partly or wholly.