Are We Blind?

Are We Blind?

I can state the argument of this paper very succinctly: we don’t see matter and we don’t see mind; therefore, we don’t see anything; therefore, we are blind. I think this argument is sound. Moreover, it generalizes: we don’t hear or touch or smell or taste anything; therefore, we are deaf, etc. I would like to end the paper here, confident that my reader is nodding in quiet assent. But in philosophy we always have to put in more work, explain ourselves, answer objections; and especially in the philosophy of perception, a notoriously tricky subject. Still, I intend to keep it short and sweet, leaving it to the reader to fill in any perceived gaps (there is really no need to add to my initial formulation, but I will do it anyway). First, material objects: why don’t see them? There has always been doubt about the proposition that we do, backed up by various arguments, strong and weak (science, the argument from illusion). I think the most compelling consideration is that we don’t see material objects as material objects—as collocations of atoms (or fancier entities of physics). We don’t visually represent the objects of vision as they are described in physical science; we represent them according to our given sensory faculties, with their limitations and blind spots and peculiarities. We see them as colored, from a perspective, with highlights, smooth, solid, etc. We don’t see objects from an objective absolute standpoint. Naïve realism is therefore naïve; it recognizes no distinctive contribution from the human visual system, as if we simply mirror external reality. We can’t see matter as matter; we can only infer it, think about it. Perhaps it could be said that we see matter de re but not de dicto: it is true of a material thing, as described by physics, that it is seen by a perceiver; but it is not true that we see it de dicto thusly. Well and good, but then we don’t see it in the way we naively suppose, i.e., by simple mirroring. We see it only in the sense that you can see a tree at night as a monster. We don’t want to say that all visual perception is misperception (here I am in danger of undue expatiation). So, let’s agree that we don’t strictly see material objects; we are blind with respect to those things—they are not possible objects of visual perception for us. We are as blind to them as we are to individual atoms or remote galaxies.

This is all very familiar stuff, wearyingly so. The standard response to it is to find some other object to be the object of sight—hence sense-data. If we can’t see distal material objects, we can see proximal items in our mind. Sense-data are remarkably slippery entities, ranging from surfaces to sensations, but it is fair to say that they are generally conceived as mental. But this produces a problem: it is not possible to see the mind. You can’t see your visual impressions, sensations, qualia, subjective states—any more than you can see your thoughts, emotions, volitions, or mental images. The mind is not a possible object of visual perception: what would that even be like? In fact, the sense-datum theorist is really supposing that you can see a seeing—a certain kind of experience. But experiences cannot be perceived. Your eyes cannot respond to an episode of seeing—it can’t stimulate the retina. So, it is really not true that you see sense-data, though you may apprehend or introspect them. Just as matter can’t be seen, so mind can’t be seen. It certainly does not follow from the fact that we can’t see matter that we must see mind. The truth is we can’t see either: but these exhaust the possibilities, so we see nothing, i.e., we are blind.

That result might seem startling: surely, we are not blind! I agree that our eyes and brain function normally and unlike those of a regular blind person, but if we define “blind” as “an inability see anything” then we are blind in the sense defined. We have the sense of sight, but we are blind in the stipulated sense. But we have not yet exhausted the theoretical possibilities: perhaps there are other candidates for being the objects of vision. Here’s one: the light emanating from the object. The trouble with this is that we don’t see light either, for essentially the same reason we don’t see matter—we don’t see light as light, i.e., as the physicist describes it. We don’t see streams of photons heading for our eyeballs. Hence (it may be said) we must be seeing sense-data of light not light itself (that physical phenomenon). But now we are back with seeing the mind, which just ain’t possible. So, light won’t cut it as the proper object of sight. What about properties—perhaps we see neither matter nor mind but abstract entities? The suggestion is not absurd: for we do speak as if we are seeing properties—I am seeing the pen as blue and cylindrical. But this won’t serve the turn, because properties are universals not particulars—and objects of perception have to be particulars. We can intellectually apprehend properties, but we can’t see them with our eyes. Again, this line can be developed and debated, but I think that it will not work in the end—which leaves us with precious little to offer. Are the objects of sight localized spirits, or ideas in the mind of God, or specks of ether? No, the proper conclusion is that we don’t see anything—we are (technically) blind.

How bad is this conclusion so far as “common sense” is concerned? Not as bad as you might think when seen aright. Logically, the case is like knowledge and skepticism: we bandy the word “know” about, but the skeptic contends that we don’t strictly know anything. Likewise, we bandy the word “see” about, but we don’t strictly see anything. Does this mean we have false epistemic and perceptual beliefs? Not necessarily, because we might not believe what we say. Speech serves all sorts of pragmatic purposes, and people don’t generally think about philosophical questions; so, they might not believe what their words logically imply. If so, people don’t as a rule believe anything about vision that my argument contradicts. If you question them about vision, they might quickly agree that of course we don’t really see anything—as we don’t really know anything (given the skeptic’s rather obvious arguments). It’s just a useful way to talk, a facon de parler. Compare this: we don’t really hear material objects like trains, instead hearing only the sounds they make–does this contradict anything in “common sense”? Not really, because the former kind of talk is not to be taken as the measure of the folks’ considered (philosophical) beliefs about the proper objects of hearing. The case of seeing is just one of those cases in which a word used in ordinary speech is not to be taken as the last word on what is believed to be real. Basically, it’s a “sunrise” and “sunset” kind of case. After all, we can easily make room for the conclusion I am urging by distinguishing two types of blindness: the kind that actually afflicts certain people and the philosophical kind that “afflicts” everyone. The question, as they say, is purely verbal.

Does it seem to us that we are not blind? Does it seem to us that we see objects of some sort or other? We could ask whether it seems to us that we see material objects or sense-data. I don’t think perceptual seeming leans either way; it is compatible with either theory. The senses are not philosophers! But does it seem as if some sort of object is seen? Even if things did seem that way, that would not settle the question of universal blindness; it might be that how things seem is misleading us. However, the question is of independent interest: does visual experience as such posit an object? The question isn’t easy to answer: how could it posit an object but not be committed on whether the object is physical or mental? And yet it does seem as if it is object-directed—don’t we seem to see cups and cats whatever the nature of these objects may turn out to be? But does it really seem as if we see them? That is the difficult question: is vision that phenomenologically committed? Granted, we may believe we are seeing some sort of object, but this may not be internal to the experience as such. I am inclined to think that experience is neutral on the question of whether it seems to us that we are seeing an object, as opposed to standing in some other intentional relation to it (apprehension, presentation). For If not, it would appear that visual experience is massively in error about itself, supposing itself to be committed to the visibility of material objects or mental objects. If it is true that neither matter nor mind is visible, it would be strange if visual experience were committed otherwise: why would it seem to us that visual experience has an object if it simply doesn’t, as a matter of rather elementary reasoning? Still, the matter is puzzling and I leave it open for now.[1]

[1] This paper is an exercise in stating the obvious so as to derive the unobvious, a genre of which philosophers are particularly fond. Isn’t it obvious that we (and other animals) can’t perceive the objects of physics by our five senses, and also obvious that we can’t perceive our own minds that way? But then we can’t perceive the only reasonable candidates for being perceptual objects. Ergo, we perceive nothing and are accordingly (technically) blind. The concept seeing does not apply to our sensory experience: we can’t see what is remote from us in the physical world, and we can’t see what is close to us in the mental world—so there isn’t anything we can be said to see. This does not preclude being able to think about and even experience both physical and mental objects; my point applies specifically to the concept of seeing (hearing etc.). Has the whole dispute between naïve realists and sense-datum theorists depended on not seeing this possibility (this truth)? Certainly, physical objects lie at the far end of a causal chain leading up to sense experiences, and certainly we are aware of our sense experiences—but neither of these things is seen. That is the simple truth of the matter.