Entries by Colin McGinn

Our Knowledge of Other Minds

                                        Our Knowledge of Other Minds       How do we know the contents of other people’s minds? By what method do we know about other minds? The options are the following: by sense perception, by inference, by introspection, and by a priori reasoning (I exclude telepathy, at least as the standard […]

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Nothing

    Do we really have a concept of nothing? It may appear obvious that we do, but I am not so sure. We have the concept of non-existence, but it doesn’t follow that we have the concept of nothing—that is, the concept of nothing at all. When an object goes out of existence it […]

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Mysticism and Matter

                                                  Mysticism and Matter     Consider a community of disembodied minds cut off from material reality. Not only are they immaterial themselves, they have no contact with matter, not even space. Their perceptions are purely abstract and psychological. They communicate with each other about things that interest them, but there is no talk […]

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Metaphysics and Philosophy

    In the Epilogue to my book The Character of Mind (1982), entitled “The Place of the Philosophy of Mind”, I wrote: “It would be misguided to infer from the points we have been making that the philosophy of mind is the most basic area of philosophy: probably no part of philosophy can claim […]

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Knowledge of One’s Own Existence

                                                 Knowledge of One’s Own Existence     Alice dropped the fan “just in time to avoid shrinking away altogether. ‘That was a narrow escape!’ said Alice, a good deal frightened at the sudden change, but very glad to find herself still in existence”(Alice in Wonderland, p. 23). There is […]

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Knowing that I Think

                                    Knowing That I Think     What is it that I know when I know that I think? One view is that I know of myself that I have the attribute of thinking: I recognize that I (a self) instantiate a certain property. This requires that I must know of my existence in order […]

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The Word “Is”

    The Word “Is”     The standard view is that “is” is ambiguous between the “is” of predication and the “is” of identity (we might also add the “is” of composition, as in “this statue is bronze”). Thus we have, “the cup is red” and “Hesperus is Phosphorus”, where the two occurrences of […]

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Is Language Necessarily Fregean?

                                    Is Language Necessarily Fregean?       Frege’s distinction between sense and reference gains much of its intuitive plausibility from certain often-rehearsed examples. Thus we have the cases of Hesperus and Phosphorus (the planet), Afla and Ateb (the mountain), Superman and Clark Kent (the person). Citing this type of example Frege invokes the notion […]

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