Coach Colin Redux

Coach Colin Redux

I had an interesting experience yesterday. I arrived at the Biltmore tennis center for my daily practice and was confronted by a mob of high school students—not dressed in tennis gear. My first concern was whether this would interfere with my hitting session. As I parked my bicycle one of them, a boy, asked me if I was going to play tennis. Yes, I said. He then said he wanted to learn to play and would I help him. Sure, I replied, a little annoyed at having my own tennis interfered with. Instantly, a small crowd gathered, boys and girls, all eager to watch and be taught, about fifteen of them. Suddenly, I was placed in the teacher role. First, I gave them some verbal pointers, mainly about keeping the ball down; then I demonstrated, hitting the ball softly against the wall. They watched carefully, silently, then applauded, I’m not sure why. I commented on what they had seen and how I executed the stroke. Much bright-eyed nodding. Then I demonstrated some harder hitting to give them a sense of the real game—more applause (well-deserved, I thought). Then things got interesting: I asked for volunteers. First, a boy had a go—“Not terrible”, I remarked. They could all see how difficult it is to hit a tennis ball well, him especially. I coached him a bit. Then I took a second volunteer, making sure it was a girl (no sexist, me). She responded well to coaching and managed to hit the ball straight and fairly hard a couple of times—she was clearly thrilled. Then another girl stepped up, brimming with enthusiasm; but she kept missing the ball altogether and could hardly make it hit the wall when she did make contact. The kids were sympathetic and supportive. Suddenly, they announced they had to leave; their teacher beckoned. They were all smiles and thankyous. It was a thoroughly enjoyable experience. I felt the joy of teaching again. I reflected: they knew nothing of me beyond what they picked up in those few minutes. Quite unlike what I would expect of a bunch of students being taught philosophy by me now. It was how things used to be. I carried on hitting.

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David Lewis

David Lewis

I have in my possession a long letter from David Lewis replying to my paper “Modal Reality” (1981). Several years ago, I was contacted about this letter because no copy of it existed in Lewis’s files, but at that time I didn’t know where it was or even if it had survived. I came across it recently when I sorted through my old correspondence. If the executors still want it, I have it now. It is very characteristic. I had little contact with Lewis during his lifetime, though I read a fair amount of his stuff and treated him with respect when I saw him. I can’t say I was much impressed. He didn’t strike me as the epitome of intellectual honesty or personal warmth, and was quite careerist. He was never particularly friendly to me. More important, I never found him very persuasive, especially in metaphysics and philosophy of mind. He was clever but misguided. I remember liking his earlier work more, especially Convention and “General Semantics”. I just never got much out of his later stuff. I didn’t even read A Plurality of Worlds—far too doctrinaire. I find his current exalted status rather surprising (I wouldn’t say this about Saul Kripke). I think he answers to a certain image of what a successful American philosopher should look like.

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Romantic Harassment

Romantic Harassment

We hear a lot about sexual harassment these days, but not much about romantic harassment. Indeed, I just invented the phrase (and perhaps the concept). What is it? Suppose A falls in love with B and wants B to fall in love with him. He begins a series of efforts to secure this result—flowers, invitations to dinner, declarations of love. Trouble is, B doesn’t feel the same way. She feels uncomfortable about the whole thing, and wishes it would stop. Eventually A resorts to more aggressive measures: he starts threatening B with loss of job opportunities, online defamation. She feels harassed, stressed, and angry. That’s romantic harassment. Her harasser doesn’t want sex (he is insecure in that area), but he does want candlelit dinners, love letters, and affectionate gazes. He is behaving badly, all because of his love for B. You know, love can make people do crazy things, shameful things. It’s bad, definitely, but it doesn’t quite have the punch carried by the phrase “sexual harassment”. It doesn’t come with the counterpart phrase “romantic assault” (what would that be?), and we don’t hear talk of the “romantic predator”. It doesn’t sound as bad, and it doesn’t introduce the topic of sex. But it has the same structure as sexual harassment and can have the same consequences. It comes in degrees, clearly, and it is hard to imagine it as a criminal offense, or as career-ending; it is doubtful the newspapers would be much interested in covering it. The phrase “romantic misconduct” doesn’t have the same salacious zing as “sexual misconduct”—it’s not as juicy and titillating. You see, it isn’t sexual—and we know how people are about that.

Are there other forms of harassment that follow the same pattern? What about friendship harassment?  You badly want X to be your friend, but he doesn’t seem interested. You do everything you can to make X like you: you compliment him, give him presents, invite him for drinks. Trouble is, he’s just not that keen. He already has a lot of friends and he finds you, well, a bit boring. He finds your attentions annoying and wishes you would leave him alone. He even tells you he doesn’t want to be your friend, but you persist, hoping to win him over. You might even threaten him with a loss of professional assignments (you have that kind of power). None of this is good, though your motives are pure—you are sure (perhaps correctly) that you and X would be great friends. Again, it is hard to see how this kind of thing could excite much of a frenzy. It shouldn’t be illegal or career-ending; it should be handled in the usual quiet ways (see TV sit-coms that deal with the topic). If it escalates, sterner measures might become necessary, but in the normal course of events it isn’t likely to require the full weight of the law, or total ostracism. Why? Because there is no sexual element—and we know how people feel about that. The same goes for “chess harassment” or “table tennis harassment”: trying to find partners to engage with you in these activities. It would be possible to become quite harassing about these things—persistent, annoying, even threatening. People might start saying you are a serial chess harasser, a menace to society, and excluding you from social gatherings and paid employment—all very hysterical, but justified by your proclivity to pester people to play chess with you. You might even be accused of “grooming” people to play chess with you (giving them beautiful chess sets, etc.). The point is that this kind of unwanted interpersonal behavior is structurally just like sexual harassment and may have the same kinds of consequences, but it doesn’t excite the same kinds of censure and antipathy (“His unhealthy need for chess was his undoing”). One might begin to wonder if too much emphasis is being placed on the sexual in sexual harassment and not enough on the harassment part. That’s what’s really bad, not the fact that sex is the harasser’s aim. And what is the sex that is aimed for—does light kissing count? Many distinctions need to be made, not just brandishing the phrase “sexual harassment” like an all-purpose bludgeon. The question of degree of severity must not be ignored.

There is another area in which sex plays a considerable part—consensual sexual relations in work contexts. These are supposed not to occur, or if they do remedial measures must be adopted. People are required to report sexual relations to the authorities, and the same goes for romantic relations. The latter are generally understood to involve sex, or else the rule becomes far too inclusive (what is to count as “romantic”?). But this is not the only kind of relationship that raises analogous questions—friendship does too, or family connections. The purpose of such rules is to exclude bias in treatment and evaluation—for example, giving your lover an A he or she doesn’t deserve. That can certainly happen in such cases, though it is not a necessary truth; but it can also happen in other kinds of case too. You can be biased in favor of your friend or your niece—say, if they are a member of your class in animal husbandry. In fact, you can be biased in all sorts of ways, depending on your dispositions—by religion, nationality, clothing style, looks, eye color. The human mind is full of prejudices, stereotypes, likes and dislikes. Romantic entanglement is just one of these, and may not be the most powerful or insidious. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that sex is figuring too prominently in attempts to enforce impartiality. It is attitudes specifically to sex that underlie the policies adopted by various institutions. People can be fired from their jobs if they are found guilty of failing to report their romantic or sexual feelings in an instructional context, but when did you hear of this happening in the case of feelings of friendship or family connections? What is the missing ingredient? Sex, of course.

Here is a final case to consider: what we might call “negative sexual harassment” for want of a better term. Suppose a professor finds a particular student extremely repellent sexually: he just can’t bear the sight of her. Nevertheless, he has to deal with her: she sits in his class, comes to his office hours, chats with him in the hallway. Let’s suppose our professor is a happily married man who just happens for deep psychological reasons to experience extreme sexual negativity in certain cases (something to do with his mother, say). He just can’t help it. When this student accosts him (as he might say) he has to stand at least ten feet away from her, cannot look directly at her, and keeps the interaction as brief as possible. All this is obvious to her, and very distressing. She worries the professor is biased against her and will not give her fair grades. Actually, he is perfectly fair, but the appearances are certainly not encouraging. Should she complain? Should he be reprimanded, or even fired? He is guilty of harassment by sexual negativity, it may be said. The situation is delicate and needs to be handled carefully, but I doubt it would rise to the level of administrative discipline, dismissal, or the attention of the press. Why? Because it involves the marked absence of sex as a motive for the behavior that is causing the trouble—the professor is the opposite of sexually attracted to the student. Yet his behavior may occasion the very types of reaction occasioned by overt attraction—discomfort, anxiety, fear, etc. These are the things that really matter, not the psychological cause of the problematic behavior. We need to be less obsessed with the sexual motive and more concerned with the effects of the behavior. And the language in which we talk of these things matters, especially if it is incendiary and triggering to the contemporary psyche.[1]

[1] In case of any misunderstanding, let me make clear that I have no wish to underplay the seriousness of sexual harassment. It is obviously a very bad thing to do. Cases do vary, however.

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Trumps

Trumps

How should we cope with Trump’s looming presidency? I think we need a conceptual switch: stop thinking of Trump as a man and start thinking of him instead as a disease. Trump is an epidemic that is sweeping the land. This disease has infected the minds of a great many people: they are suffering from trumps (like mumps). There is no vaccine for it; it spreads through the air (and airwaves); there is no known cure. It is borne by memes—all those tics and slogans emanating from the engorged Trump virus. The Republican party is completely sick with it. Ordinary people are coughing and sneezing with it. The media are awash in it, staggering along, bedridden with the disease. It affects every demographic, not just old people. So far children are immune, but doctors are warning of the spread to them too. The disease is fatal to good sense and decent morals—they wither in its onslaught. Women are as vulnerable as men. Bodies are snatched by it, minds captured. Even those not infected are afflicted with the disease: they see it all around them and wonder what damage it will wreak. It evokes fear as well as insanity. They could make a horror movie out of this malady. Covid has nothing on Trump. Variants are springing up already, mutations, new pathogens. The disease is on the march. Modern medicine is no match for it. Politics as we used to know it is the wrong model; this is politics by disease transmission not persuasion. It turns out that the human immune system cannot handle Trumps. We can only hope that we develop a natural resistance to it in time. Scientists are working feverishly to produce an effective antibiotic. So far, only humor and ridicule have shown any clinical promise. Some researchers are recommending a change of diet—no more bingeing on social media and cable news junk food.  Maybe the whole educational system has to be reinvented.

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Academic Freedom and Sex

Academic Freedom and Sex

I apologize for discussing such a sordid subject. I don’t mean the subject of sex; I mean the threats to academic freedom this subject invites—from the right and the left. Nominally, we are all in favor of academic freedom, but that tolerance is apt to waver when sex is the topic. Let’s consider a hypothetical case. A professor finds himself interested in the relationship between sexual fantasy and creativity: he wonders whether there might be a correlation, even a causal connection. Sexual fantasy can be creative and this might be connected to non-sexual creativity—might it be the origin of creativity in humans? He needs data. He convenes a seminar in which the participants keep a diary of their sexual fantasies to be rated for creativity; then he tries to correlate this with other measures of creativity, say poetic inventiveness. It doesn’t matter for our purposes whether this is a wacky idea; suppose it isn’t—suppose it has some truth to it. Accordingly, members of the seminar, male and female, present their sexual fantasies for group discussion and evaluation. This is all voluntary; everyone is over the age of twenty-one; nothing untoward happens. Data is gathered; the hypothesis is tested; it turns out there is a strong correlation. Do you think the university administration is going to be happy with all this? Do you think the local feminists, hot for cases of “sexual harassment” etc., will raise no objection? I doubt it. The press will be eager to cover it, questions will be asked, fingers will be pointed. The professor might find himself in a heap of trouble. But isn’t this a classic case of infringement of academic freedom? What if a participant complains to the chairman, upset that her fantasies have been deemed uncreative? She feels humiliated and put down. She doesn’t feel “safe”. What should we say about all this?

The point I want to make is that the seminar needs a special kind of protection, because it is a special kind of proceeding. It is an academic proceeding. It requires a specific kind of mind-set, which we might describe as disinterested, detached, scientific, objective, unemotional, impersonal, pure, intellectual. This mind-set views sex and sexual fantasy as a natural fact like any other natural fact. It seeks to understand that fact–its structure, its causes and effects. It is the opposite of the pornographic mind-set. It may be a mind-set quite alien to the majority of people—those who are not academics. These people may therefore not understand it, suspect it, seek to curtail it. Thus, it needs to be protected—because it can easily come under threat. The atmosphere in a room like my hypothetical seminar room is unusual; it tends to be dry, analytical, humorless, serious. If you read a transcript of it, you might come away wondering what the hell these people were up to, the professor in particular. It would read a lot like literary porn, especially when taken out of context. The words alone might condemn it in your eyes. But you would be wrong: it is an academic exercise, a scientific inquiry. It needs special protection because it is easily misunderstood, unfamiliar to many people. It isn’t barroom chatter, or therapy speak, or outrageous speech for its own sake. It is a unique kind of discourse, calling for a distinctive type of mental attitude. It isn’t for everyone. The context and purpose make all the difference in the world. It can’t be judged by snippets of dialogue, words employed, acts described. Academic freedom is the freedom to engage in this kind of mind-set with other consenting adults.[1]

[1] I have some personal experience of the phenomenon described here, having written Mindfucking (2008), a book on disgust (The Meaning of Disgust, 2011), a treatise on the hand (Prehension, 2017) in which sex is briefly mentioned, and a pair of novels with sex scenes in them (not easy to write). It’s amazing the reaction such works can evoke. And let’s not forget famous novels by James Joyce, D.H. Lawrence, and Vladimir Nabokov (not to mention Sigmund Freud, Bertrand Russell, Masters and Johnson, et al).

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Does Ethics Have a History?

Does Ethics Have a History?

It might be thought obvious that it does: hasn’t ethical thought changed over time? What we used to find morally acceptable we now find abhorrent. But be careful: are you distinguishing right and wrong from our thought about right and wrong? Ethical thought certainly has a history, but does it follow that ethical truthdoes? A great many things have a history—the things themselves not just our knowledge of them: human beings, animal species, planets, stars, galaxies, towns, countries, etc. Thought about these things has a history, and so do the things thought about: they came into existence at a certain time, and changed over time, sometimes perishing in due course. They were caught up in the causal web we call history. But is that true of everything—what about logic, mathematics, natural laws, space, time, the empty set, Platonic universals (if there are any)? Apparently not. Does the law of noncontradiction have a history, or the law of gravity, or the number 2, or time itself? If they did have a history, it would be sensible to ask when they came to exist, how they have changed, when they might perish, what caused them—but it doesn’t. They have no history—how could time have come into existence at a particular time? They are ahistorical.[1] Thought about them has a history, but they don’t have a history. Evidently, we can have historically situated knowledge about ahistorical things, as well as historical things. Might the same be true of ethics?

We think it is true that happiness is better than misery, that we should keep our promises, that murder is wrong, that pain is undesirable; but when did these things become true? Not when we discovered them to be true, or accepted them as true, because we were recognizing an antecedent fact. It would be absurd to say that promise-keeping became obligatory on a certain date; that would preclude us from saying that an earlier act of promise-breaking was morally wrong. Nor would it be appropriate to ask what caused promise-keeping to become obligatory, as we might ask what caused a certain war. Did pain become undesirable only when people first formulated that thought? Pain has always been undesirable, a bad thing, something to avoid causing if at all possible. It would be absurd to ask whether pain became bad gradually or suddenly, before the holidays or after. Justice was always good; it didn’t become good at a certain period of history—though it may well have been recognized as good at a certain period. Ethical truth, like logical truth, has no history: there was no time at which the law of noncontradiction didn’t hold, only to come to hold later; and there was no time at which murder was not wrong, only later coming to be wrong. Wrongness is not something that can come and go with the vicissitudes of history, like prosperity and the plague. In a slogan: moral values have no history. We can be wrong about them, to be sure, but that doesn’t imply that they change with our attitudes; there is no alteration in their nature. They don’t grow old or fall apart or get bigger. They are not subject to the law of causation. So, ethics has no history, if we mean ethical value itself; of course, ethical thought and practice have a history, a checkered one. Logic has no history either, if by logic we mean logical laws themselves; of course, logical thought has a history, part of the history of the human species. When people write books called things like A History of Ethics, we must bear in mind that the title is misleading; the author means A History of Ethical Thought. The word “ethics” is systematically ambiguous. Keeping the two meanings apart aids clarity.[2]

[1] Suppose we ask whether identity has a history—that relation in which Leibniz was so interested. The question is bizarre: are we eager to be told where it lived and when? Do we expect to learn the date on which identity became subject to Leibniz’s law (sometime in the seventeenth century, or possibly at the time of Plato?). Identity undergoes no maturation process, suffers no setbacks, finally asserting its dominion over all of reality. There cannot be a history of identity. But there can be a history of human thought about identity, taking in Leibniz, Frege, and Kripke. I am asking whether goodness is similar to identity: are the truths about goodness and identity truths of history or are they essentially ahistorical?

[2] If you are one of those benighted souls who thinks it’s smart to define right and wrong in terms of beliefs about right and wrong, then it will follow trivially that ethics (the subject-matter) has a history—at which point you might want to consider contraposing. This paper is intended for those who see the distinction and are confused by the phrase “history of ethics”. Ethical reality itself has no history; it undergoes no change. To put it differently, the only history that ethical values have is a history of human (possibly also animal) psychology—when and where ethical truths came to be perceived, accepted, and taught.

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Confidence

Confidence

I came to America with a very positive attitude towards its people (naively optimistic, you might say). It wasn’t long before that confidence was shaken by personal experience. My confidence steadily eroded over the years (I name no names) with professional philosophers the main culprits. It culminated in my experiences of a decade ago. I watched American philosophy try to destroy itself, and do a pretty good job. The first election of Trump dealt it (my confidence) a severe further blow. His recent triumph has dented it beyond repair. To me it has been a growing disillusionment. I see it all as a pattern, a predictable decline, enthusiastically executed. All that remains is for me to watch from afar as America proceeds to destroy itself—for no reason whatever. I will gain grim satisfaction from this, and some gallows amusement. This is one immigrant’s story.

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Consciousness and Logical Form

Consciousness and Logical Form

Consider the sentence “It is a necessary truth that for all conscious beings there is something it is like to be that being”. If we render this in standard logical notation, we have two quantifiers and a modal operator. These generate scope distinctions and hence alternative readings of the sentence—nine in all. I will be concerned mainly with two of these, corresponding to the quantifiers: we can put the universal quantifier before the existential quantifier or vice versa. We thus obtain quantified sentences analogous to “Everyone loves someone” and “Someone is loved by everyone”: the former allows for different people to be loved, while the latter asserts that a single person is uniquely lucky in love. In the case of my sentence of interest, we might be saying either that every conscious being has some type of what-it’s-likeness (not necessarily the same type) or that there is one type of what-it’s-likeness that every conscious being has. Does the “likeness” property vary from case to case or is it constant? As commonly interpreted, the sentence is taken to mean the former thing: bats and humans have different ways that it’s like for them. That’s why we don’t know what it’s like to be a bat—because bats are different from us in this respect. Consciousness varies in its form from case to case, and what is true is that every such form exemplifies a variation in the likeness property. There is nothing in common between all the different forms of consciousness, except that there is something it is like to be conscious—not necessarily the same thing. It might indeed be maintained that there is nothing it is like that is shared by all forms of consciousness. In the jargon, there is no universally shared qualia (or quale), though there are many types of qualia. The situation, it may be said, resembles the concept of a game—there is a family resemblance between the two cases of family resemblance. Just as there is no one thing that all games have in common, so there is no one thing that all beings there is something it is like to be have in common—save that they are all games or all cases of what-it’s-likeness (in effect, this makes the concept of consciousness itself a family resemblance concept). There are many ways of being conscious but no single property common to them all—no single property that they all share. That is, there is no single feature of what-it’s-likeness that all conscious beings possess—no single subjective fact, just a motley of different types of subjective fact. There is, for example, no subjective fact in common between bat echolocation experience and human visual experience—compare chess and rugby.  More generally, there is no property of consciousness that applies universally to all cases of consciousness and that constitutes what it is like to have consciousness in all cases. There is just an irreducible plurality of ways of being conscious.

Is this true? I doubt it. Certainly, many philosophers have supposed otherwise: Brentano, Husserl, and Sartre to name three. It has been supposed that intentionality is the common thread, or subject-dependence (all consciousness has a subject of consciousness), or nothingness. These properties are held to be phenomenological properties and they are supposed necessary and sufficient for consciousness. There is something it is like to possess intentionality, or to have a subject, or to be nothingness—something that all conscious beings share. The property is introspectable, evident from inside. So it is thought. I think there is something to each of these views, but I don’t think they capture the full reality. There is a common something that all cases of what-it’s-likeness share—sentience as such—but it is markedly elusive. If we acquired bat experience, we would notice it immediately—we would not hesitate to call the new experience a form of consciousness. We would notice the intentionality, to be sure, and the involvement of the subject (“this is mine”), and maybe the nothingness; but we would also recognize a shared dimension of phenomenological reality that is not quite captured by these descriptions. It wouldn’t be like seeing a game of chess one day while hitherto only seeing rugby and football. It would strike us that this is the same as what we have experienced before (though also different). But what is the name of this common factor? That’s where the question becomes difficult: we just want to blurt out, “But can’t you see, it’s the same!”—not alien, not unrecognizable, not belonging to another family of things altogether. We might want to call it this-ness or feeling-ness or my-ness or in-me-ness—while acknowledging the inadequacy of these terms. There issomething it is like to be any subject of what-it’s-likeness: there is something it’s like for there to be something (or other) it’s like. It’s like…this. It is as if we have only demonstrative knowledge but not descriptive knowledge—acquaintance not description. Feeling pain is like seeing red, smelling vinegar is like hearing a symphony—though the experiences are also extremely different. They are all readily classifiable as falling under the same concept by noticing a shared feature; though that feature is hard to pin down, like a fast-flitting butterfly that refuses to be caught. I know that all of my consciousness belongs together under that concept, despite its enormous variety, and I know it by being aware of a common feature. However, I find it difficult to say what that feature is—though I could show you by letting you into my consciousness. It isn’t cognitively closed to me—far from it—but it does resist descriptive encapsulation. It is obvious but inarticulable. It has no name like “seeing red” or “feeling pain”; it hovers at the edge of consciousness, just out of verbal reach. It can’t even be called “nothingness”.[1]

I think, then, that there are two things it is like to have any particular conscious experience: the specific nature of that experience (e.g., seeing red) and the general property common to all conscious experience (the qualia with no name). So, both orderings of the quantifiers yield a truth—a necessary truth indeed. Every possible experience has a specific what-it’s-likeness and a general what-it’s-likeness. Both problematically relate to the brain. Both are phenomenological. Both are essential properties of any given experience. That is the architecture of consciousness as such—the specific intertwined with the general. We do know what it is like for the bat to have the general property (for we have it too), though we don’t know the specific property. We know the general nature of any form of consciousness, no matter how alien, though not the nature of specific variations on it. We know what it is like to be a bat—it’s like this (pointing to my own consciousness)—but we also don’t know (because we have no specific form of consciousness that resembles the bat’s echolocation experience). What-it’s-likeness is a two-level affair (somewhat like species and genus). The logical form of consciousness is the specific subsumed under the general. Both are given, but one is more cognitively accessible than the other.[2]

[1] An idea it might be worth trying to develop is that consciousness is always attributive. This notion is akin to intentionality but it emphasizes the property of attributing qualities to things; consciousness isn’t just of things but also ascriptive to things. Pain is ascribed to a part of the body; color experience ascribes color qualities to external objects; thought ascribes properties to individuated objects. Consciousness is ceaselessly ascribing things to things. The bat’s echolocation experience attributes spatial properties to identified particulars, as our auditory experience attributes sounds to objects located in the surrounding world. Modes of attribution are the what-it’s-like features of conscious experience. And we are aware that this is what is going on whenever we are conscious—we are consciously attributive beings.

[2] If we assume that cognitive and linguistic capacities exist only when it is useful to them to exist, it becomes intelligible that we have no concept or word for the general property, but an ample supply of concepts and words for the specific properties. For there isn’t much point in a concept or word that represents a feature of consciousness that has no use in communication or thought: how would we set about using a word for the general property in question? It is useful to tell someone you are in pain, but not to express that abstract property instantiated by all conscious states—the higher-order property of what-it’s-likeness. That property exists at a level of generality that transcends our practical purposes, even our scientific purposes. We know it, but it’s not something we are naturally equipped to talk about.

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