Gang Deportations

So far, the deportations to El Salvador have scooped up only Latino men (so far as we know). No women gang members or affiliates thereof have been similarly deported, or non-Latino gang members. But what about criminal gangs of other ethnicities and nationalities? Does the current administration intend to deport female (suspected) criminals to prisons in El Salvador, even mothers of young children? What about Italian gangs operating in the US, or Chinese or Russian or British? Is the plan to send them to El Salvador with the others? Or would they be sent back to their country of origin? Would those countries accept them? How much would they charge? Would there be any due process? If some pale sandy-haired Englishman were accused of gang membership, would he be deported to El Salvador or to the British home counties? Or is it that ethnicity makes a difference? And what counts as gang “membership”? What if a young woman had the job of negotiating with other gangs in order to stop inter-gang violence—is that a deportable offence? Come to think of it, what if some foreign country decides it has had enough of American criminals on its soil and wants to send them all back to America? Would we accept them? They would certainly be undesirables from our point of view. I would also like to know how long the current deported prisoners will stay in the prison they now occupy—a few years, twenty years, for life? Has this been decided? What happens if definitive proof is produced that exonerates many or most of them? Will they be released? I have the feeling that none of this has been thought out. Was the whole thing really a stunt for the cameras with no judicial questions raised? Was it endorsed by the Department of Justice? Just asking.

How to Study Philosophy

I have two proposals for the curriculum, which I believe would have salutary effects. The first is that philosophy should be studied only after studying a science, or concurrently with studying a science. Oxford has no pure philosophy degree; you have to study it with another subject, generally scientific—economics (also politics), psychology and physiology, mathematics. That is, an education in science is essential to a sound philosophical education. A scientific cast of mind is desirable in a philosopher. As things stand, you can study philosophy with classics at Oxford, but I don’t think this is ideal; science is, or has become, too important to ignore. Philosophers at Oxford who studied philosophy with classics have to spend a good deal of time boning up on science later if they are to be properly educated (Austin used to read a lot of mathematics). If you don’t know a science quite well, you are at a disadvantage. A great many of our most distinguished philosophers have a scientific background, or made every effort to acquire one. I don’t think it matters much what science it is, so long as you are immersed in some kind of scientific study. I also don’t think it’s a good idea to go straight from school into studying philosophy at university, unless you have studied a good amount of science at school, and even then your immersion will not be deep enough. English literature and history are not preparation enough.

The scientists among us will all be vigorously nodding their heads—those philosophers are all ignorant of science! But now I want to urge that they return the favor: they should all study philosophy. That is, they should follow their scientific studies with some serious immersion in philosophy, or concurrently with studying science. Because otherwise scientism will be their fate and folly. They will be intellectually cramped, narrow, prone to dogmatism and worse. I am talking about ideals here; of course, there are practical problems with adding some philosophy to the scientific curriculum. I am engaged in a Platonic enquiry into the ideal form of education. Properly educated people need to know philosophy and science—that is, people who study either should study both. What about the unwashed rest? What about the historians and literature professors? They too, ideally, should have some science and philosophy under their belts, though they need less than their scientific and philosophical colleagues. I myself think that philosophy is a science, and a lot of so-called science is philosophy, so it makes sense to study them together. The current curriculum is far too atomistic and segregated.

Table Tennis Reinvented

I am able to report on the results of changing the service rules. I drew chalk lines on a regular table tennis table, one line twelve inches from the end of the table, the other twenty-four inches. This produced two possible service areas, one smaller than the other. I played with two competent players to test the results. The larger area allowed for topspin serves of reasonable pace, while the smaller area virtually excluded such serves and allowed only backspin serves. Predictably, the latter modified the traditional game more than the former. It meant that the server had a considerably reduced advantage over the receiver; indeed, if anything, it gave the receiver the advantage. The important thing is that it prolonged the rallies, because the server couldn’t any longer determine the outcome of the point. The upshot: the game was more satisfying and varied—but slower. It became more tactical and skillful. You could still hit fast balls, only not in the serve. We also played with the intermediate size service area and found it an improvement over the traditional arrangement: you could still serve fast topspin balls but not as fast. It was the same game as before but with less dependence on the serve; good for more skilled players. It is true that you feel constrained in your service because you can’t unleash what you could before, but the benefits were considerable. What I also liked is that you can vary the game according to taste by switching from one demarcation line to another, so you can play several games on the same table. We also experimented with allowing for two attempts at serve, like regular tennis, instead of the traditional one. This was less satisfactory, but had its charms; we went back to the stricter rule. Other rules on service placement can be stipulated, each having its impact on the game. You can choose as you wish. No need to stick to the traditional configuration.

Causality and Perception

The causal theory of perception states that it is necessary condition of perceiving an object that the object causes the perception of it. The theory is very plausible, given the counterexamples to a theory without such a causal condition. If the object is causally cut off from the sense impression, we get only veridical hallucination not genuine perception—you don’t see the object. But there remains a nagging feeling that the causal theory isn’t quite right; it needs amendment. Let’s consider seeing a clock: the idea is that you can see the clock only if acts causally on your sense organs; if it doesn’t, you can’t. The clock must causally explain your visual impression. But is it true that the clock is the cause—isn’t it the surface of the clock that causes the impression? It reflects light into your eyes not the whole damn clock. And isn’t it really the atomic constituents of the surface that do the causal work not the clock as a whole? Causality is more localized in the clock than comprising the entire clock—yet you see the clock. Suppose the clock is yellow and you see it this way: does the color cause your impression? But colors don’t cause anything, being causally impotent. The physical properties of the surface do the causing: but you see the color. The color doesn’t have to cause the seeing in order to be seen. What about the space surrounding the clock—does it cause you to see it? But space doesn’t cause anything, yet you see space. What if causation is a myth, as has been held? What if there is no causation in the world? Does that mean you don’t (can’t) see anything? Hardly. What if God sets up a pre-established harmony with no causal linkages? Would that render you unable to see anything? That sounds wrong. Causality thus doesn’t seem like a conceptually necessary condition of seeing, merely what happens most of the time in the actual world. We see material objects, but only in a loose sense do we say that they cause sense impressions. Does the Sun cause you to see it? Isn’t it really the light rays emitted by the Sun that cause you to see the Sun? They are what make contact with your eyes, not the Sun itself—it is 93 million miles away. It isn’t really a necessary truth that perception depends on causation between object perceived and percept. We know we can apprehend objects that lack causal powers, such as propositions and numbers; and is it necessary for introspection that the introspected state causes the act of introspection? The concept of seeing isn’t causal. And what kind of causation do we mean? Must it be mechanical causation? But not all causation is mechanical. Could gravity act as the means of perception? If the force of gravity elicited a visual impression, would that act as the needed necessary condition? As far as I know, no such thing ever happens; but is it at least a conceptual possibility? The standard causal theory begins to seem parochial and obscure, not a self-evident conceptual truth. If you had no concept of causation, would you have no concept of perception? If you reject the former, do you thereby reject the latter? Add to this the fact that no one has been able to convert the causal necessary condition into a sufficient condition, so that no causal analysis of the concept of seeing has proved feasible. The concept of seeing is not inherently a causal concept, unlike say the concept of killing or torturing (causing to die, causing extreme pain). What kind of concept it is, is another question, to which I have no answer.[1]

[1] One might attempt a counterfactual analysis to this effect: for an impression to be a case of seeing it is necessary that if the object were not there the impression (probably) wouldn’t be either. But this is pretty pathetic stuff. What about the idea that perception has a demonstrative element, which doesn’t require a causal connection, as in “that clock”?