Universities

Universities

I am reading Mary McCarthy’s 1951 novel The Groves of Academe. It is a marvelous satire on university politics and pretensions, centering on one Henry Mulcahy, unjustly fired from his post. What is astonishing is how little things have changed in the interim, except for the worse. There is the rogues’ gallery of credulous clowns (her phrase), arid deceptive administrators, callow students, creepy careerists, the constitutionally corrupt, nasty pieces of work, bookish buffoons, and ideological idiots. Mulcahy has done nothing wrong, but that makes very little difference once doubts have been sown. Friends flee, students turn, presidents politicize—the usual parade of human viciousness. No one seems immune from hysteria and dubitation (a word the author introduced me to). The book is startlingly well written, funny, gimlet-eyed, and generally spot on. There is even some philosophy in it. I haven’t reached the end yet, but I will be interested to hear the fate of this hapless and well-meaning (if eccentric) man. Of course, the story is steeped in American psychopathologies. A book for our time—perhaps for all time.

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Index

Index

I thought it might be useful to provide a list of words that could be searched on this blog, in case people wanted to look up specific subject areas.

Analysis, a priori, truth, meaning, knowledge, skepticism, reality, names, reference, fact, necessity, biology, psychology, physics, astronomy, science, philosophy, identity, existence, freedom, self, person, consciousness, intentionality, causation, subjective, objective, good, ethics, value, mathematics, logic, literature, Plato, Wittgenstein, Hume, Descartes, Berkeley, Locke, Kant, Strawson, Chomsky, Kripke, Quine, Davidson, predication, innateness, color, shape, space, time, animals, God, the big bang, life, language, thought, belief, desire, concepts, pain, evolution, music, sport, art, games, matter, mind, body, brain, food, disgust, hand, sex, vision, world, economics, metaphysics, linguistics, politics, mystery.

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Trumperica

Trumperica

I claim no originality in asserting Trump’s abysmal character; it stares us in the face every day. Nasty, stupid, witless, bigoted—you name it, he has it.  But, as is also ruefully noted, at least a third of the country thinks he is just fine. The point that is not observed, however, is that it can hardly be an accident that he is so widely approved. He is the average American writ large and ugly. Can it be that the non-Trump supporters are totally different from him and his followers? He is an amoral idiot, but he is not alone in that distinction. I have to admit that since his improbable (?) ascent I have been assailed by the thought that he is America’s not-so-hidden id: there is a bit of Trump in a lot of people. I won’t venture a percentage, but I swear I have glimpsed it in many people, some working in universities. Nasty, stupid, vindictive, amoral, humorless, uncompassionate, unthinking—you know the type. It’s the combination of the puerile and the violent that really sticks out. Their idea of virtue is destroying the people deemed “bad”, without worrying too much about fairness, due process, careful evaluation. Shoot first and don’t ask any questions later. Trump embodies all the pathologies of the American psyche. It really isn’t all that surprising that he is not summarily dismissed from civilized society; he is that society as it has come to exist. Where did he come from, this monster of the deep? He came from these United States, of course. There is nothing singular about him.

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Retirement

Retirement

I once heard Michael Dummett remark that he was looking forward to retirement so that he could get some work done. My sentiments exactly: work has never been so sweet as it has been post-employment. You work on what you want to work on and you don’t have to break off to fulfill your teaching (etc.) “duties”. I never retired from philosophy; I retired from teaching it (and allied occupations). I simply carried on doing what I’d been doing for forty years but without the bad bits. I don’t mean I hated teaching philosophy; on the contrary, I enjoyed it. But I didn’t enjoy the institutional framework of teaching: the formalization of it, the grading, the evaluating. Still less did I enjoy the hiring, promoting, letter writing, placement, recruitment, etc. I didn’t retire; I simply transitioned to the good stuff. I feel sorry for all the poor saps still chained to the industry we call education. I imagine Plato’s Academy was a pretty nice place to work, but the university as it has become is a miserable decline. Who does not hate university administrators these days? Who does not find half their colleagues a pain in the butt? Who loves every last one of their students? Who looks forward to a morning of writing letters of recommendation? No wonder most of the great philosophers didn’t work in universities—you can’t get any work done. Retirement (re-employment) is just a better state of mind to be in. But don’t leave it too late—don’t wait till you have nothing left to give. Retire while you can still work!

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Is Water Disgusting?

Is Water Disgusting?

Wet feces are more disgusting than dry ones. Suppurating wounds are more disgusting than non-suppurating wounds. Blood is disgusting, so is urine, so is saliva. The waterier something is the more disgusting it becomes. It is hard to think of dry things that are disgusting. Liquidity makes for disgustingness. One would think, then, that water is a disgust trigger, since it contributes to disgust. But it isn’t. True, stagnant or polluted water is disgusting, as is peculiar-tasting water, or muddy water; but water itself, pure water, is not generally found disgusting. Odd: oughtn’t it to be a potent source of disgust? Isn’t it the salient ingredient of objects of disgust? Remove water from the world and disgust is abolished, pretty much (even dry corpses are much less disgusting than moist ones). The slug, the fish, the slimy, the clammy—these are the animals most disgusting to us (not so the dry cat or elephant). Aren’t these things disgusting in virtue (partly) of their wateriness? And yet water itself is strangely non-disgusting—we even drink it! If water were not something we drink and bathe in, would we find it as non-disgusting as we do? Are we just habituated to its disgustingness? Compare fear: many people are aquaphobic and everyone knows the dangers of water. Hence, we are ambivalent about water: we like it and we are afraid of it (with good reason). Water can contain invisible microbes dangerous to health, so why don’t we exhibit a healthy ambivalence towards it—why isn’t it regarded as a potential disgust object? Disgust is close to fear (though not the same), but we don’t seem to have any disgust reaction to water as such. We fear rivers, lakes, and oceans, but we are not disgusted by them, even though the presence of water in other things occasions extreme disgust reactions (most liquids are made of water). A bowl of spit is regarded as highly disgusting, yet it is made mostly of water; if the water was distilled out, you could drink it (so long as you don’t know its salivary history). Dirty water is repellent; not so much the water in it, or even the dirt when dried out. This is puzzling, like so much about the emotion of disgust. What is going on?

As I say, habituation may be a factor, but it is hard to believe it is the whole truth. After all, we are intimately acquainted with feces, but their disgust value doesn’t diminish; we are not habituated to shit. The truth, I suspect, is that we are more disgusted by water than we think, but we need it to live, so we accept the bargain. Notice how temperature makes a difference: lukewarm water is often perceived as mildly disgusting, to drink or bathe in. Cold water is “refreshing”, while hot water is “cleansing”; body-temperature water is too close to blood and spit and urine. People don’t thirst for a nice glass of lukewarm water, or look forward to a tepid bath. If you are not thirsty at all, drinking lukewarm water is pretty unpleasant; in fact, it is rather disgusting. Apparently, pregnant women often develop a distaste for water, especially at body temperature. Children often hate pure water, craving more taste in their liquid intake. It wouldn’t take much conditioning to get people to be repelled by water—just dwell on microbes and dirty pipes and suchlike. Even bottled water could be propagandized: all the bacteria in the earth, recycled plastic bottles, etc. We are not far from a general repulsion towards water; many people already can’t drink it at room temperature, and an outbreak of water-borne disease could turn people against water (suppose no such disease could be carried by Coca Cola). We think water is good for us in its pure flavorless form, so we force it down, but we could become persuaded that it is somehow contaminated and not good for us, triggering widespread revulsion. Can’t we imagine aliens who find water repulsive to drink and won’t go near it? Disgustingness is in the eye of the beholder to some extent, so we could become more disgusted by water than we are now. In future centuries we might wonder how our primitive ancestors could bear to drink it or wash with the stuff. Even today no one really likes water—the taste, the texture; it is a cheap thirst quencher not something to enjoy for its own sake. It would not be difficult to develop an aversion to water, say by a near drowning or being waterboarded. Our attitudes towards water are complicated and ambivalent; the balance could easily be tipped against water. People today don’t want to drink blood, finding the very idea repellent, even though their ancestors did it from necessity, and even relished it. The seeds of disgust might already be present in water. It certainly has one property closely interwoven into human disgust reactions: it straddles the life and death divide.[1] Water is essential to life, manifest in living things; but it is in itself lifeless, a mere chemical combination found in places unconnected to life (e.g., asteroids). Water is intrinsically lifeless and yet integral to life; thus, it partakes of both, like the corpse or excrement or spilt blood or toenails. Warm water is especially close to life while being intrinsically dead, because of the temperature of the body, so it can occasion thoughts of creaturely mortality. The vampire drinks warm blood and absorbs life; we drink warm water and feel our own organic warmth. We are 60% warm water, so drinking the stuff is uncomfortably close to our mortal nature. Water stirs deep (if suppressed) emotions of a discomforting kind. So, is water disgusting? A little bit, a little bit. It is more disgusting than diamonds, say, or empty space. It has its own quantum of disgust.[2]

[1] I discuss this in The Meaning of Disgust (2011).

[2] Water is essential to life, but it has no nutritional value: it is not a result of photosynthesis, like food in general. Can you think of anything else of which this is true that you willingly consume? Not pills or medicines (salt, perhaps, but not in large quantities). It is tasteless in pure form, so does nothing for the taste buds, and tasteless food is generally found inedible. It is surprising that we don’t jib at it more. The whole bottled water industry is an attempt to reconcile us to water consumption. We keep ourselves “hydrated”, but we don’t really enjoy the experience. We need water, but we don’t really desire it. We are reconciled to water, but we don’t love it. It’s like air except that we have to take it into our stomach. And it makes us into chronic urinators, which has its own disgust profile.

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Action as Selection

Action as Selection

The causal theory of action maintains that reasons cause actions, reasons being combinations of beliefs and desires. This doctrine is supposed to provide a uniform account of the “because” relation: action is produced in the same way any event is produced—by means of causation. Cars cause bridges to collapse; reasons cause actions—it is all one. I think this misses an important distinction: actions are selections among alternatives, but regular causation is not. The agent envisages several possible courses of action and then selects one, e.g., he wonders what to have for dinner, reviews the possibilities, selects one of them, and acts on it. He choosesfrom among a set of options. But ordinary non-mental causation is not like that: there is no selection, no choice, no contemplation of alternatives. Causation is operative but it is not selective. When the agent chooses what to eat for dinner, he rejects all but one of the alternatives that occur to him: he chooses not to eat those things. So, his final desire has a negative component: in choosing to eat sushi, say, he chooses to reject pizza or curry or bananas. The intentionality of desire is complex: I want to do X and not Y or Z. It is this selective desire that causes the eventual action. Ordinary causes are not like that: they have no intentionality, let alone this kind of negative intentionality. But rational causes (reasons) have this kind of selectiveness built into them.

This has a bearing on the question of freedom. For an action to be free it must be the result of choice, but choice is only possible if there are alternatives to choose from, known to the agent. If reasons did not have the intentional structure I just specified, acting on them could not be considered free. The compatibilist says that an action is free if and only if it is caused by the agent’s desires, but that formulation doesn’t yet introduce the idea of alternatives. If the operative desire were not embedded in an array of alternatives, it could not count as generating a free action. But upon analysis we see that desire is always constituted by such an array, considered by the agent, so the compatibilist theory has what is needed to account for free action. It is in the nature of desire to be selective (accepting and rejecting); acting on a desire will thus always involve an array of alternatives. However, we need to make this explicit: free action is acting on one’s desires, viewed as selecting from among alternatives. It isn’t enough just to act so as to satisfy a desire for a certain thing; that thing has to be selected from an array of possible alternatives. Our agent selects sushi instead of pizza etc.: his desire includes rejecting the alternatives—he desires not to have those other things. Free action results only when this condition is satisfied. Reflex actions thus don’t count as free, since no alternative was considered and rejected. The causal theory of action thus needs to be supplemented and refined in order to make room for compatibilist freedom, but that seems perfectly feasible given the nature of desire. Desire is multi-pronged.[1]

[1] Is this a kind of holism? It does discern complex structure in human desire, but this is not a structure of separate desires. The desire for sushi for dinner is the desire not to have alternative things for dinner: the intentionality of the desire includes rejecting alternatives. This is not the same as having many desires operating together. That may or may not be true, but it is not the point I am making; I am making a point about the structure of each desire.

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Can the Universities Survive?

Can the Universities Survive?

There is a crisis at American universities: a crisis of stupidity. It has been brewing for a while, but it intensified beginning around 2012. How much stupidity can a university take before it ceases to be a university, before it collapses under the weight of its own stupidity? The DEI craze was stupid, but so is the backlash against it. Title IX became stupid. The whole thing about Israel is stupid—the protests and the response to them. The students are stupid, so are the administrators, so are the professors. People talk rubbish constantly. I no longer work at a university. I haven’t been on a university campus for over ten years (I’m banned from the one I used to work at and I haven’t been invited to any others), but I can see from the outside that things have gotten, well, stupid. Universities used to be places of intelligence—that was the whole point—but now they are places of politics (the art of the stupid). Why is this? I don’t know, except that intelligence is hard and stupidity is easy; it will grow if given the chance. Philosophy, in particular, has succumbed to stupidity. Philosophers nowadays seem to revel in it. Just look at the blogs. I can’t tell you the levels of stupidity I have had to put up with over the last few years, and from people I thought quite intelligent. We know that people are a pretty bad lot, but at least they weren’t completely stupid. Now stupidity is thought admirable, virtuous. It’s an epidemic, a Covid of the mind. I wonder how long the universities can survive in their traditional form.

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Free Mind

Free Mind

Philosophers of free will usually focus on bodily action. Does anything change if we switch to purely mental actions such as thinking and imagining? Suppose a man is imprisoned: we would normally say that he is not free to do what he wants as far as his body is concerned, but he is free so far as his mind is concerned. He is not free to go to the corner store, but he is free to imagine doing that. He can think whatever he likes, but he can’t move his body in whatever way he likes; he is physically coerced or controlled, but not mentally. The compatibilist says he is mentally free but not physically free. That seems like an eminently reasonable thing to say—simple common sense. It would sound paradoxical to say that he was equally unfree both physically and mentally. If we add that the prisoner’s mental acts are determined by his desires, we seem not to detract from his freedom.[1] The reason he imagines as he does is that he has certain mental states, variously called desires, wants, wishes, inclinations, feelings, likes, and attitudes, which lead him to act as he does mentally; that is precisely why he acts freely. So the compatibilist maintains, and he seems right on the money—free action is doing what one likes because one likes to do it. It is going to take philosophical work to dislodge the compatibilist from this commonsense position. Notice that no reference to the body is made in this telling of things: the action takes place wholly within the mind; the body doesn’t move. Intuitively, the action was as free as any action could be—what more could possibly be wanted of freedom? This kind of action is a paradigm of free action: how can there be a problem of whether free will exists with regard to such actions? Free action is acting on one’s desires (etc.) and that is what we do when performing purely mental actions. A shade more theoretically, free action is action caused by desires (using the term in the broadest sense), and we do that all the time; therefore, we are free. If an action is not caused by one’s desires, then it is not free—say, it is caused by someone else’s desires or some sort of brain defect. An action is free if, but only if, it is (appropriately) caused by one’s desires.[2] It is harder for other people to influence your ability to think or imagine what you like than to control your bodily movements, so you are freer in the former area than the latter. But in both cases, you can act according to your desires, so you can be free to act with your body as well as your mind. All this seems pretty straightforward.

But things get more complicated for the compatibilist when we consider bodily action. In that case, the action involves movements of the body, and these are caused by internal states of the agent’s nervous system. This may also be true of purely mental acts, but it is not so obviously true—we can ignore it in the case of mental acts. But in the case of bodily actions there is now a clear rival to the explanation in terms of desires and other mental states, viz. internal states of the body. Indeed, such internal states look like the correct explanation of the movement in question, since physical events have physical causes. When the effect is mental, however, we have no such compelling reason to wheel in extra-mental causes. That is, bodily action involves us in the idea that actions have physical causes; maybe mental actions do too, but this is not something pressed upon us by the phenomena. And now we start to see a threat to freedom of action: for the physical causes of bodily movements are not desires, and freedom exists only when the action is caused by a desire. It isn’t determinism that undermines freedom; it is determinism by non-mental causes. Freedom actually requires determination by mental causes, chiefly desire, but it is ruled out by the existence of non-mental (i.e., physical) causes. Free action must (according to the compatibilist conception) be caused by desires, but bodily movements are not so caused, so they are not free. There is no such argument against the freedom of mental actions, since they are not bodily and hence don’t cry out for physical explanation. In other words, the incompatibilist position is more compelling for bodily action than mental action. Determinism is not the issue; the issue is what kind determinism, mental or physical. Physical determinism rules out freedom even if you are a compatibilist, because it invokes non-mental causation in the explanation of action. An action is free only if it is caused by desire, not by brain states. If epiphenomenalism were true, desires would not cause actions, only brain states would, so action would not be free according to the compatibilist credo. Desires have to be the reason people act as they do, or else they are effectively coerced by something other than their desires, something non-mental. So it is natural to suppose.

There is an obvious way out: identify desires with brain states. Then causation by suitable brain states iscausation by desires. But this involves taking a controversial stand on the mind-body problem: we are free only if the mind-brain identity theory is true, i.e., freedom requires physical reductionism. We might have hoped not to be saddled with such a heavy metaphysical commitment in our efforts to save freedom. We could try claiming that bodily movements are not caused by brain states, but only by desires, but that is a hard pill to swallow. Or we could go for a more complicated position (supervenience, token identity without type identity, functionalism, etc.); but now we are up to our neck in the mind-body problem. The lesson is that the free will problem is deeply connected to the mind-body problem: we won’t know whether we are free until we have solved the mind-body problem. That is, we won’t know whether we are free in the way required by the (plausible) compatibilist definition of freedom until we are clear about how, if at all, the mind acts causally, i.e., how it relates to the causal machinery of the brain. If the mind really does cause movements of the body, and nothing else does, then we have freedom in the defined sense; but if the brain, as distinct from the mind, carries the causal burden, then we are not free, because then desire isn’t the cause of bodily action. The question of freedom must remain murky so long as these questions are not resolved. We may be free, if desires cause actions in the required way, but we may not be, if they don’t. To put it intuitively, desire must cause action directly and intimately in order that action be free, but we don’t really know whether this is true or not, because we don’t understand the mind-brain nexus. This is why freedom comes under threat: not from determinism as such but from the involvement of the physical world in the causation of action. If anything otherthan desire is responsible for the production of action, then the compatibilist conception of free action is undermined: but that is something far from clear, pending a resolution of the mind-body problem. Of course, this means that if the mind-body problem cannot be solved, neither can the free will problem be solved. We know what it would be to be free, but we don’t know whether those conditions are in fact satisfied in the real world. The incompatibilist thinks he knows we are not free (because of the truth of determinism); the typical compatibilist thinks he knows we are free (given the correct definition of freedom): but really, we only know that we may be free (but may not be), given the uncertainty about the relation of mind and brain. My own feeling is that desire really does cause and explain action, both mental and bodily, so that the compatibilist position is correct: but I acknowledge that this is not demonstrably true. It feels like desire causes action, but that may be illusory, or partly illusory. I think mind and brain are inextricably connected, so that the causal story will inevitably award desire a central role in action causation, in which case it will be true that we are free in the required sense—desire will be the reason we act as we do. If so, bodily action will fall into line with mental action: both will involve causation by desire and only by desire (no intrusion of causes that can act as alternatives to the agent’s desires).

Perhaps ironically, it is dualism that acts as the greatest threat to freedom, because it suggests that action has a causal history that excludes desire, and hence it takes freedom away from the agent. The causation of action could become detached from the agent’s psychology, thus undermining the idea of doing what one likes as definitive of freedom. The identity theory, on the other hand, keeps desire in the center of free action by assimilating it to brain states, which cause bodily movements; but that theory is deeply controversial (perhaps not even intelligible in its classic formulations). We need a theory of mind and body that makes desire the true cause of action but doesn’t sideline the brain completely. This is none too easy a thing to do. Thus, the difficulty of the free will problem owes a lot to the difficulty of the mind-body problem. Still, the bogeyman of determinism is beside the point: freedom entails determination, though it must be determination of a specific kind, viz. desire-based determination. What is incompatible with freedom is the idea that our actions are notcaused by our desires, because then we are not doing what we would like to do (what we like could easily include what we think is morally right). True, freedom consists in acting from one’s desires, but do we really act from our desires, as opposed to physical states of the brain? That is the question.[3]

[1] In this paper I presuppose the compatibilist position; the problem I discuss arises from within this tradition. I have defended compatibilism elsewhere.

[2] I put aside the deviant causal chains problem.

[3] If you take a moment and review the possibility that your actions stem from deep within your brain, instead of from your manifest desires, you will feel your sense of your own freedom evaporate; you will start to feel like a puppet. You will not feel like the master of your own destiny.

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