Causal and Logical Relations

Causal and Logical Relations

Is this an untenable dualism? Are the two relations really that distinct? Isn’t one a special case of the other? The OED defines “cause” as “a person or thing that gives rise to an action, phenomenon, or condition” and “reasonable grounds for a belief or action” (notice it doesn’t say “event”). The operative notions are “gives rise to” and “grounds”—what gives rise to or grounds what is left open. We might paraphrase this using the concept of a reason: a cause is a reason for something. We could say a cause is what leads to something, has it as a consequence, entrains it. Thus, causal relations are ubiquitous and topic-neutral: where there are reasons there are causes. Consider the classic syllogism about Socrates and mortality: we can paraphrase it as “the cause of Socrates’ being mortal is that Socrates is a man and all men are mortal”. That’s the reason he is mortal, what brings it about, makes it the case. We could equally say, “Socrates will die because he is a biological being and all biological beings die”. Similarly, we can say that the cause of Socrates’ death was that he drank hemlock and any man dies who drinks hemlock. The cause is a combination of a general law and a particular fact. The logical syllogism is a way of stating a causal relation. The corresponding causal statement “the cause of Socrates’ being mortal is his being a man and the law that all men are mortal” could be formulated in the classic syllogistic style. There is nothing mutually exclusive here. Premises give rise to or ground conclusions, and causes give rise or ground things of various categories. Causes have consequences and so do premises.

You might object that logical arguments give rise to propositions as conclusions whereas causes are events that have events as effects. This is wrong on both counts. Logical arguments connect facts (states of affairs, situations) expressed by propositions (sentences, statements); and causation connects facts too, viz. general and particular facts (laws and individuals). Facts give rise to other facts, so they cause them (are the reason for them). We have been taught to have an overly propositional view of logical relations, as if they are somehow about language; and we have also been taught to have an overly simple “event” conception of causal relations, as if the causal relation locally links isolated events in time. But logical relations are not fundamentally about propositions or language but about objects and properties; and causal relations centrally involve general causal laws as instantiated by particular objects. We must not confuse epistemology with metaphysics: maybe it’s true that we manipulate propositions in our thought when thinking logically, and maybe all we perceive of causation are particular events separated in time; but these are epistemological points, not points about what constitutes logical and causal consequence—the metaphysics of logic and causation.

The practical syllogism is instructive here: the conclusion of such a piece of logical reasoning is an action not a proposition about an action. It is desirable to eat when hungry; I am hungry; therefore, I eat. This is pure causality: the general law combines with the particular fact to cause the act of eating. Not all logical reasoning issues in belief in a proposition; some issues in actual action, a type of occurrence. Indeed, we can generalize the practical syllogism to include what might be called the causal syllogism: immersing sugar in water dissolves it; this piece of sugar is immersed in water; therefore, it dissolves. The conclusion logically follows from the premises. Logic is a lot more far-reaching, capacious, than the standard logic textbooks would lead you to believe. There is such a thing as causal logic. Thus, logical consequence is a species of causal consequence, and causal consequence is logically structured. Logic isn’t about language-dependent non-worldly things divorced from the causal order; and causation isn’t about brute causal relations between isolated events (like beads on a string or successive flashes of light). Logic relates general and particular facts, and causation likewise relates general and particular facts. Logic and causation are identical! This is an identity theory couched at the level of underlying metaphysics. It isn’t that logical relations are abstract and other-worldly (think Platonic heaven); and it isn’t that causation is grubbily this-worldly (think Aristotelian form and matter). Causation is logical and logic is causal. The old dichotomy is a dogma of empiricism andrationalism—for both were wedded to a logic-causation dualism. The reason for insisting on the dichotomy was that epistemology was being confused with metaphysics—too much stress on what is revealed to the senses, or not revealed to them. In their nature they are closely entwined. Logic is closer to causation that we recognized, and causation is closer to logic than we recognized. Both involve an injection of necessity and the necessity is essentially the same—the necessity of “giving rise to” and “grounding”. It always felt uncomfortable to sharply separate the two given their intuitive affinity, and now we see that it was wrong to do so. Logic is woven into causality and causality is woven into logic. Logical relations are causal relations and causal relations are logical relations.

I am well aware of how radical this proposal will sound, but the novelty is largely a verbal matter. We must not use “logic” and “cause” in the narrow senses that have become customary in academic philosophy, especially post-positivist analytical philosophy. These uses accentuate a divide that is unreal from a loftier perspective; they have become tendentious technical uses. That is why I started with the dictionary, so that we could regain a sense of their ordinary meaning. Logic is about reasoning and rational connections; causation is about dependence and reasons for things: these concepts are broad enough to encompass each other, to make room for each other. Thus, the position is really quite untheoretical and commonsense.[1]

[1] The legal sense of “cause” nicely combines the logical and triggering connotations of the term: you can only arrest someone “for cause”, i.e., if there are grounds to arrest them—then an arrest can be triggered. It is the same with the locution “a good cause”: this suggests a justifying ground as well as something that can elicit action (“something deserving of support”, as the OED says). The word “reason” comes closest to “cause” as ordinarily understood. Causation is certainly not restricted to events of hitting or bridges collapsing or short circuits; it isn’t always about striking happenings, more or less spectacular. In the proper wide sense of the word, it becomes trivial that reasons cause actions, since they are precisely reasons for actions. The words “cause” and “because” are virtual synonyms.