De Re Consciousness of the Brain

De Re Consciousness of the Brain

Do I have de re consciousness of my brain when I have de dicto consciousness of my mind? I speak of de reconsciousness not of de re belief or perception: the locution “conscious of” admits of a de re-de dicto ambiguity—does it mean a relation or a content? Suppose I am conscious of my left hand: does that mean I am conscious of it as my left hand or just that my left hand is something I am conscious of, though not necessarily under that description? There is a scope distinction to be made, according to whether the description falls within the scope of “conscious of” or outside its scope (as in “concerning my left hand, I am conscious of it”). In the former case, the description occupies a referentially opaque position; in the latter, a referentially transparent position. Clearly, both readings are possible, as with belief and perception. Now suppose I am conscious of a pain in my hand: we can say that I am conscious of my pain as an instance of pain—I would describe it thus—but can we say I am conscious of the correlated C-fiber firing? We certainly can’t say that I am conscious of the C-fiber firing as C-fiber firing: no such content enters my mind—I might never even have heard of C-fiber firing. But that doesn’t settle the question of whether I am conscious de re of the C-fiber firing: is it true of the C-fiber firing that I am conscious of it? Can we say “Concerning the C-fiber firing, I am conscious of that state”? Am I aware of my brain de re when I am aware of my mind de dicto? I am not aware of my brain de dicto when I am aware of my mind, but that is logically compatible with being aware of my brain de re. Is the case like beliefs about Hesperus and Phosphorus? I can have a belief about Hesperus quaHesperus (de dicto) and also have a belief about Phosphorus (de re) that contradicts the first belief, not realizing that Phosphorus is Hesperus. Following that case, we could try saying that I have a de re belief about my brain when I have a de dicto belief about my mind just in case my mental state is identical to a brain state. De dicto belief plus identity gives de re belief. Thus, I am conscious de re of my C-fibers firing if and only if I am conscious de dicto of my pain and the pain is identical to the C-fiber firing. I am conscious de re of anything that is identical to what I am conscious of de dicto. That is, the identity theory of mind and brain entails that I have de re attitudes towards my brain, including the “conscious of” attitude. It is true of my brain that I am conscious of it whenever I am conscious of my mind—though I am never conscious of my brain de dicto (as a content of my consciousness). In other words, I am relationally conscious of my brain but not propositionally conscious of it (conscious that my brain is thus and so). My brain is not a content of my consciousness, but it is an object of it, by virtue of psychophysical identity.

At this point we might spot a vulnerability in the identity theory: can’t we contrapose and deduce the falsity of that theory? For (we might contend) it is not true that I have de re attitudes towards my brain—I am not aware of my brain whenever I am aware of my mind. I am no more aware of my brain in such cases than I am aware of the non-conscious parts of my brain. I can become conscious of my brain by looking at it in a mirror—then I have both de dicto and de re consciousness of it; but I don’t become aware of it just by being conscious of my mind. That would be a theoretically juicy argument: we can derive the falsity of materialism from the non-existence of de re attitudes towards the brain! If the two were identical, then we would have to say that de reattitudes towards the brain follow from de dicto attitudes towards the mind; but that is not plausible; therefore, they are not identical. The intuitive data are more compatible with dualism, since then there is no possibility of deriving de re attitudes towards the brain (there being no identity). It would be like inferring that we have de rebeliefs about planets by introspection given that mental states are identical to states of planets—better to give up the identity theory. However, it is not so easy to refute the identity theory, because the intuition of no de reconsciousness of the brain is not so firm as to ground such an inference. Is it really self-evident that I don’t have de re attitudes towards my brain? Is the case really different from theoretical identifications common in science—water with H2O, heat with molecular motion, etc.? We can truly say, “Concerning H2O, John believes it is good to drink”, even though this may sound strange in the early stages of scientific discovery (most people would never have heard of “H2O”). How can we refute this position for mind and brain? Certainly, mental states and brain states have a lot to do with each other, unlike planets and mental states. If we are to refute the identity theory, we need a stronger argument, e.g., Kripke’s modal argument or the knowledge argument. Conjoining such an argument with the argument from de re consciousness would be an attractive package, but the latter argument alone is pretty weak. What is the right thing to say?

Compare the following case: fictional characters and the real people they may be based on. Suppose I have a belief about a fictional character that is derived from a certain real individual X: can we infer that I thereby have a de re belief about X? Intuitions waver: the two are not identical, so we get no easy derivation; yet there is some inclination to be less strict. If I have a belief about a statue, do I thereby have a de re belief about the piece of bronze it is made from, even though the two are not strictly identical? We might feel inclined to say yes. If the relation between two things is sufficiently close, sufficiently formative, we might stretch a point and allow for the inference to a de re attitude. Similarly, if the mental state and the brain state are intimately joined, though not strictly identical, we might feel some pressure to allow a de re ascription—we have an approximation to an identity-based de re attitude. Thus, a semi-materialist position is consistent with our shaky intuitions about the de re ascription. The fact that we feel agnostic about it would suggest a degree of materialism, if not the simple identity theory. A double aspect theory, for example, would be consistent with our uncertainty. It doesn’t matter if the believer disbelieves any such materialist position—the truth of an identity claim always allows for a deduction of a de re attribution. The facts determine what objects you have de rebeliefs about not your beliefs about the facts. I find myself genuinely unsure whether I have de re beliefs about my brain when I have de dicto beliefs about my mind—I could go either way. Of course, the mind-brain connection is deeply mysterious, so we shouldn’t be surprised at this kind of uncertainty; the question of whether we do have such de re attitudes is one way to approach the problem. If we do, the case for materialism is strengthened; if not, not. In any case, it is an interesting puzzle to think about: “A Puzzle About De Re Belief (About the Brain)”.[1]

[1] We can also formulate the converse question: if I have a de dicto attitude towards my brain, say by perceiving it, do I thereby have a de re attitude towards the correlated mental state? According to the identity theory I do, since the two states are one: if I see my C-fibers firing, I also see (de re) the pain with which my brain state is identical. Does that seem plausible? It’s not an easy question: we feel pulled in two directions. It all depends on whether we accept the identity: yes, if we do; no, if we don’t. I think our first inclination is to say that I don’t have that belief, but then we wonder if that is just a prejudice born of a lack of knowledge. It would be interesting to do a survey. I have to confess that I like the idea that we have such odd de re beliefs, perhaps because it underscores the aporias of the mind-body problem. I am always thinking about my brain but don’t know it! My brain is an object of my consciousness though a fugitive object! It brings my mind closer to my body, especially the part most responsible for me. Much the same is true of external objects: I may not apprehend them as they are de dicto, but I apprehend them de re just as they are. I see (de re) the objects of physics: I am in the perception relation to them as they objectively are, in addition to seeing them as they are subjectively to me. Likewise, whatever mental states are in themselves (their real essence), I have consciousness of these things—I am not cognitively cut off from them. De reattitudes allow for contact with an unknown reality. Even the skeptic cannot deny that I stand in these relations (this is not to say that I can establish that I do). Attitudes de re are compatible with deep ignorance of their objects.