Elicitism
Elicitism
I will state what I think is the correct account of knowledge, to be set beside empiricism and rationalism. All concepts and perceptual impressions are innately based; what is not innate is their combinations. It is like language: the basic lexicon is innate, as are the basic rules of grammar; what is not innate are the specific combinations that are constructed over time. These elements are not derived or copied from external objects; neither are concepts mere copies of sense impressions. Empirical knowledge, so called, arises from causal interactions between the innate cognitive system and objective states of affairs. A priori knowledge does not arise in this way, but in some way difficult to understand. The relation between constituents of knowledge and external objects is one of elicitation not similarity (“faint copies”). The external stimulus elicits the innately determined scheme so as to direct action. Effective action does not require an identity of nature between inner and outer but only a kind of abstract isomorphism. We can compare the internal scheme with overt behavior in that both are innately based and not derived by copying from outer stimuli. Reflex behavior is innately determined, elicited by external stimuli, and not structurally or qualitatively similar to the eliciting stimulus; rather, there is a kind of isomorphism between the two—a lawful connection. Evolution requires no more. It would be attractive to suppose that the internal representations result from the internalization of ancient behavioral responses, but such a theory seems hard to maintain. Still, the parallel exists: innate reactions triggered by external stimuli in the absence of any copying relation. The knowledge system is thus a mixture of rationalist elements (innate mental representations) and knowledge-producing interactions with the external world (plus whatever process leads to a priori knowledge). The constituents of knowledge are not “derived” from the objects of knowledge but original elements of the mind: their nature is not fixed by the nature of the objects that elicit them. I call this theory (really, statement of fact) “elicitism”, because it stresses that the relation between knowledge and its objects is that of elicitation not duplication, much like the relation between stimulus and behavioral response. In fact, there is nothing to stop us from speaking of psychological responses as a type of behavior, viz. mental behavior (or action). Whatever truth there is in classical empiricism (not much) is contained in this theory (statement of fact). In short: knowledge is the result of an innate cognitive system plus a relation of elicitation.[1]
[1] If this sounds like a truism, it is intended to be.
Before you get inundated with your peer colleagues’ replies, counter theories, rebuttals and the like:
I had to go to the OED for some of the terminology here (thankfully it is still freely accessible through the public library system here). I found no entry there under ‘Elicitism’ so assume it’s your own coinage? Seriously though, for me this needed more than a few reads. I’m not yet sure I fully understand what ‘faint copies” might be?
Also in order to simplify and aid my grasp of the concepts outlined, could I paraphrase your ‘abstract isomorphism’ as a kind of ‘alchemical’ action or process, if you will, that mediates and modifies a flow of sense information in some unknown way through a ‘crucible’ of innate impressed mental properties to produce what we experience as reality?
I add: This is yet another excellent addition to the recent run of exceptionally insightful essays and posts appearing on this blog. The ‘Peoples’ Philosopher’ I thank you.
I think it would have been more accurate to have said what we experience as the stuff of thought rather than reality, per se.
I’m not following you.
My own coinage and probably my own theory, though with some familiar elements. See Hume on faint copies (images as faint copies of sense impressions). The abstract isomorphism is structural similarity but no intrinsic qualitative similarity. I’m glad you are seeing my efforts that way; no professional philosopher in America would dare admit it.