Ethics and Other Minds

Ethics and Other Minds

There is a close connection between ethics and the problem of other minds, which I have not seen remarked (though it is obvious). Belief in the latter supports commitment to the former; skepticism undermines it. If you don’t believe in other minds at all, you can have no morality worthy of the name (except self-directed duties). An obligation to someone is an obligation to them qua mental entity—person, sentient being. One is not morally concerned about zombies. Contrariwise, if you feel a strong commitment to ethics, you will have a firm belief in other minds—this might even override philosophical skepticism. Ethics might be so important to you that you dismiss such skepticism without a second thought. If you were born with morality in your genes, you would be born with belief in other minds in your genes. This reason is independent of the explanatory uses of this kind of belief system (“theory of mind”). But of course, other minds are not a given, not like your own mind; there is no Cogito for other minds. Suppose there were: then morality would have a firm foothold in your mind, other things being equal. It would be as solid as prudence, epistemically. If, per impossibile, these were inverted, then prudence would be as vulnerable to skepticism as other minds are now, and morality would be as firm epistemically as prudence. That is, one’s own self would be as epistemically remote as other selves, and others would be epistemically close. As it is, however, the problem of other minds hovers over the authority of morality, so that it faces an uphill battle. Any reason to doubt other minds is a reason to doubt morality.

We humans do not have a solid general grasp of other minds, some of us less than others. Some people, apparently, don’t really believe in other minds as they believe in their own. They are called narcissists or psychopaths or autistic. None of us grasps animal minds as well as we grasp human minds. We tend to grasp the minds of those close to us better than the strange and distant. There is a pronounced proximity effect or similarity variable. This weakens our sense of moral obligation, empathy, concern for others. The more remote or alien a mind seems to us the less we feel moral sentiments regarding its possessor. And any cognitive deficiency in our conception of other minds will affect our moral attitudes. A consequence is that intelligence will tend to be correlated with moral attitudes and actions: the greater the intelligence, the greater the virtue (ceteris paribus). Very dumb people will not be morally responsible. Any culture that underplays the reality of other minds will weaken moral rectitude. Thus, we need education in the existence of other minds if we are to secure a sound morality. De-personalizing others must be discouraged and deterred. An anti-realist behaviorism about other minds must be strongly resisted. Tendencies towards solipsism must be fought against. T-shirts saying “Other Minds are Real” should be commonplace. Remedial therapy should be state-sponsored. It doesn’t much matter if people doubt the external world, because inanimate objects don’t suffer, but doubting other minds can easily lead to barbaric behavior. This is why political persecution is always accompanied by claims of psychological inferiority or attenuation (“They can’t suffer like us”). We need to be firmly convinced that other people have souls just like us (animals too). A political party should have in its manifesto the principle that other minds are real—“We are the party of other-minds realism”. Its platform is that other people (and animals) are not just bodies or numbers or behavers. They pullulate within.[1]

But it is a good question what the right conception of other minds should be in order for morality to be best served. What is the best way of thinking of other minds such that morality naturally follows? How do we make the best fit between the two? What is the best theory of other minds from a moral point of view? A natural first thought is that we must think of other minds as literally our own mind in someone else’s body; then we will pay it the proper respect. One can appreciate the motivation here, but it is surely misconceived: it is quite impossible to believe that your mind is literally possessed by everybody (unless we go for some kind of universal-mind view of reality). So, let’s relax this to require only similarity between one’s own mind and other minds. That’s better but is also far too strong: we don’t want to rule out moral concern for beings quite different from us psychologically (animals, children, aliens). This is why theorists retreat to such universal features as sentience or the capacity to suffer; but these tend to be too weak and don’t allow for gradations. I think we are in the presence of inherent vagueness, multi-dimensionality, borderline cases. Pragmatically, I think the best formula is something like this: regard others as reacting as you would react to what affects them (shades of the golden rule). If a certain kind of treatment would lead to pain and suffering in you, take seriously the possibility (or obvious actuality) that they will react in the same way and act accordingly. View them as reactively similar to you. If it would hurt you to have your foot stepped on, assume that it would hurt a dog or monkey to be similarly stepped on. Don’t think it’s just reflex behavior in them if it is more than that in you. The reason this is the best fit morally is simply that morality is largely about how others should be treated, so focus on reactions to treatment. Conceive other minds as centers of psychological reaction. Consider how they are affected by things. Not how they behave, save as signs of what goes on inside them. Consider the stimulus not the behavioral response. Think: “That would hurt!” And don’t underestimate the amount of hurt or its quality. Be a realist about psychological reaction: pain, trauma, sadness, depression, grief, suicidal tendencies—as well as pleasure, joy, and happiness. Morally speaking, the mind of the other is a center of value-laden reaction—affective effects. What are the effects of your actions on the affective life of others? This is what morality is all about, fundamentally. So, your conception of other minds needs to incorporate that dimension if it is to serve the purposes of morality. And the belief must be strong, unqualified, unbiased—you must really believe in the existence of other minds. You can ponder the other minds problem in your epistemology class, but don’t carry it into the market place—act promptly and decisively. Act as if there is no skeptical problem about other minds; for morality depends on it. We may regard this epistemic predicament as unfortunate—sometimes veryunfortunate (what kind of God would allow it?)—but that is the way it is, and the stakes are high. You don’t want to end up making a mistake about it and other minds are as real as your own. Think of it as a matter of faith if that helps. True, there is the risk that solipsism is true and all your moral sacrifices have been pointless (they were all zombies after all); but it is a much greater risk that other minds are real and you have spent your life doubting it and acting unethically. In practice this never happens, fortunately, but it’s good to be aware of the possibility. It does seem likely that many people are semi-skeptical (or ignorant) about other minds (or act that way), and not just the psychopathic narcissists; it takes a vivid imagination to recognize the full reality of minds other than one’s own. It would be salutary periodically to ask yourself, “Be honest now, do I really believe that other minds are as real as my own?” It can be convenient to underestimate this and act callously or insensitively, so it is wise (ethical) to be vigilant about it. When was the last time you treated someone as if he or she approximated to a zombie? Look deep into their eyes, feel their interiority—I guarantee you will be a better person for it.[2]

[1] Doesn’t it sometimes seem as if the human belief in other minds is only just strong enough to sustain a tolerable morality? If we believed it only a little less, morality would be in big trouble. After all, it is not as if the existence of other minds is easily demonstrable; and we all know how easy it is to make mistakes. You can’t tell simply by looking. Perhaps we are lucky we do as well as we do in forming this belief. Morality hangs by an epistemic thread.

[2] Do animals and young children have a properly formed sense of the existence of other minds, and hence satisfy a necessary condition for possessing a moral sense? Do adolescents? I rather doubt it: they just go by behavior without any thought of interior realities. Does the lion have any idea of what it is like for its prey to be held by its throat in the lion’s jaws? I doubt it. It probably never gives a thought to other minds and the impact of its actions. I suspect, too, that the individualistic self-advancement gung-ho culture of the United States erodes the natural human sense of the reality of other minds; but that is another story. It is why Americans are so easily taken in by simplistic psychological theories. Then there was slavery, a massive denial of the reality of other minds.