Existence, Essence, and Time
Existence, Essence, and Time
The traditional view was that essence precedes existence: things have essences before they come to exist. This makes sense if the thing in question is designed: the designer has its essence in mind before he makes it, e.g., a carpenter making a table. It also makes sense if there is no human designer but a divine one: God had all the essences in his mind before he set about bringing the corresponding things into existence. But it is hard to make sense of if there is no designer, since there will be no mind in which the essence is, so to speak, warehoused. Where then is it? If the essence of water is H2O, did H2O precede water? That sounds decidedly peculiar, and H2O is water, so it can’t exist unless water does. Did the origin-essence of Queen Elizabeth II exist before she did: was she born of these particular parents before she was born? Granted the piece of wood that composes the table existed before the table did, but was the table composed of this piece of wood before it existed? Hardly. The whole doctrine looks radically misconceived for objects with essences that are not intelligently designed. Essence does not precede existence—though ideas of objects can precede their actual existence. Is it to be supposed that the essence of numbers preceded numbers? Does the essence of pain precede pain?
So, does existence precede essence, as Sartre famously claimed for human beings? Do things come into existence and only later acquire an essence? That is an even worse doctrine: how can a table exist and not be made of anything and have no nature? How could water acquire a chemical composition sometime after coming to exist? Things can acquire properties (“accidents”) after they come to exist, but not natures. Even human beings according to existentialism have an essence when they come to exist–their essence is unlimited freedom, absolute nothingness, pure potential. Things have to have some essence at the moment of their creation, even if they change over time; if they acquire a new essence, they also acquire a new identity. There is no such thing as having zero nature. If things have essences at all, they have them coevally with their coming to exist.
The indicated doctrine, then, is that existence and essence are simultaneous. A thing comes to have its essence at the precise moment it begins to exist, neither earlier nor later. If the coming into existence is gradual, spread out in time, so is the acquisition of essence. The table comes to exist over a few days, as the carpenter works on it, and so does its essence; it slowly gathers the essence that will define it. When the carpenter finishes making the table, he finishes giving it its essence; only then can we say that the table is essentially made of this piece of wood. If water took a while to come into existence, it also took a while to become H2O. But this sounds distinctly odd: the table comes to exist at a certain time, perhaps gradually, but it doesn’t come to have its essence at a certain time. We can’t sensibly say that things come to have an essence. We can say that they come to exist, slowly or quickly, and provide dates; but we can’t say that they come to have an essence this way. Tables exist in time, but essences don’t. It is a kind of category mistake to locate essences in time, so we can’t say that they precede or postdate or are simultaneous with existence. This is not the “logical grammar” of essence. It is not true that essence precedes existence, nor that existence precedes essence, nor that the two are simultaneous—because these are all nonsensical statements. It is perfectly true that ideas of things can precede the existence of those things, and also true that things can come to exist without yet being fully formed (e.g., human beings); but it is not true (because nonsensical) that existence and essence can precede each other or occur simultaneously. It is a conceptual blunder.[1]
[1] Some might see here a reason to deny essence altogether, since if there were such a thing it ought to make sense. I wish Kripke had written Timing and Necessity.

It’s confusing how Sartre’s idea of existence preceding essence in the case of human beings is supposed to work. Does he conceive of essence in the standard way, as consisting of properties that a thing can’t lose without destroying its identity? I don’t understand how the self-definition unfolding through the exercise of radical freedom could be a shaping of one’s essence, since any attribute thereby gained can be undone by a subsequent choice and is thus radically contingent.
You are right to be confused: it’s not the standard concept of essence. He means something like “nature”, construed psychologically. The concept of essence doesn’t even appear in Being and Nothingness.
I am very ignorant in philosophy, I missed my meeting wiht it when I was 16: my teatcher was a good man and a good teacher but very very Continental. Marx Freud, Marx Freud, that is all I remember( France in the 70s, you can imagine…). So I took an other way and I teatched Young children for 40 years.
But not I am retired and make a come back to philosophy, the concept of « essence » stays not understandable to me: how the existence of an object can be can be distinguished of the évents that happens to it? How can properties exist out of Time?
To hard for me…
It’s not so difficult to understand: God has been supposed to exist outside of space and time, also numbers, also propositions. Do space and time exist inside space and time? Essence is easy: you are necessarily human (not a fish) but you happen to have been born in France.
Thank you.
I don’t know how long Time Life will give to me (in France) to try to understand this.
Have a look at Kripke.
Thank you !
I found no translation but I will try.
To what extent have you engaged with Hegel? I’ve read several posts on this blog, and I think you repeatedly approach but never quite reach the conceptual road that he navigated (in my view, the singular pathway thru which thought triumphs).
I have not engaged at all with Hegel.
He was the smartest person who ever lived (by far, I think), and it’s a life-changing experience to read what he left us. I can’t recommend it more, especially to you, for reasons I’ve already explained. Thanks for the reply!
Which essays of mine did you think he is relevant to?
What you’ve concluded, I think, is what scholastics such as Avicenna concluded, too: if you reify essences, and take these to be ontologically distinct from the substances that have them, the essence itself is neither particular nor universal, mental nor material, temporal nor eternal, although the substances, of which these essences are metaphysical (rather than material) parts, are. To place the essence itself into any of these categories would be to commit a category mistake. If you reify essences, they must perhaps to a certain degree remain unintelligible, since they have no straightforward place in our natural substance/accident conceptual scheme.
Good points. Essences are neither substances nor accidents–so what are they exactly?