Introspection

Introspection

Some remarks on introspection in the light of recent papers. Is introspection a source of knowledge about the mind? On the one hand, it qualifies as a perceptual faculty, since it provides direct consciousness of the mind; and this means it is a source of genuine knowledge. We “see” what is currently in our mind. On the other hand, what is seen is quite unlike what is seen by the visual system: that system provides representations of substances in space, but the mind is not characterizable in that way—it is a substance-free zone. So, introspection differs markedly from ordinary perception; it isn’t squarely perceptual. It is like seeing without substantial things seen. This is hard to get one’s mind around. But that is exactly what introspection is—hard to get one’s mind around. It is a cognitive faculty like no other—perception without perceived objects. Its intentionality is like no other intentionality—objectless seeing. We look within but there is no terrain, no substance-accident structure, a kind of featureless jelly (only more so). For one thing, it never allows us to get different perspectives on what is introspected: it is two-dimensional, or zero-dimensional. It is very peculiar indeed. Yet it works smoothly, delivering reliable results. It is both all-seeing and totally blind.