Knowing Other Minds

Knowing Other Minds

We are only too familiar with the other minds problem: from liars to bats, the inverted spectrum to total zombies. But all is not dark—we do sometimes know what is on, or in, another mind. In fact, we have a great deal of knowledge of this type, generally taken for granted. But how do we have it, and how real is the knowledge? We have it by means of imagination: we imagine what it is like for the other to be in his current situation, say eating an apple. Suppose I imagine this and suppose his mental state is just as I imagine it—the taste and texture of the apple for him are perfectly represented by my imaginative act. Then it seems entirely appropriate to say that I know what he is experiencing—I literally know the other’s mind (his state of consciousness). My imaginative act is veridical and it provides a basis for a claim of knowledge. I know what it is like to eat an apple (I have eaten thousands) and I know that this person is having just such an experience—as it might be, a Fuji apple. I don’t know this fact by perceiving it—seeing it with my own eyes—but by imagining it. If I couldn’t imagine it, it is doubtful that I could know it—for what other handle do I have on the fact? Perhaps I could infer it, but I couldn’t know it as I do know—I would just have ersatz knowledge.[1]Consider a blind person with a lively imagination: such a person might be able to conjure up images to fit his physical environment, thereby coming to have knowledge about it—he knows just what is involved in two red cubes next to a yellow sphere, say. He doesn’t perceive this fact but he has a veridical image of it, possibly very vivid and detailed (it might even be caused by the fact in question). It would appear churlish to deny this person knowledge of the fact in question. That is essentially my position with respect to the apple eater. Should we then say that we have two different types of knowledge—knowledge by perception and knowledge by imagination? Does knowledge bifurcate in this way?

If it does, the term “know” is fundamentally ambiguous: do you mean it in the perception sense or the imagination sense? It also suggests that the perceptual model of knowledge is limited, since knowledge of other minds is non-perceptual. However, there is a way to unify the two types of knowledge, or rather not accept that we have two types to begin with, namely to regard the imagination as itself a type of seeing. All knowledge is seeing knowledge, and imagining is seeing—just not seeing with the eyes. It is seeing with the mind—what I have called “mindsight”.[2] Imagining is seeing with the mind’s eye, as we say. It is visual. Then we can say that I can see the other person’s state of mind—not by using my two physical eyes to scan his mind, but by using my mental faculty of imaginative seeing. We have here two species of seeing, not seeing versus imagining. I see with my mind what the other is experiencing by imagining it. We might even say that I am acquainted with it, apprehending it with sensory immediacy (I might even salivate in response to my imaginative act). I don’t just know “by description” what the other is experiencing; I have an immediate awareness of it—I know just what he feels like as he munches away. I don’t have second-rate knowledge, phony knowledge; I have excellent top-notch knowledge. I can say “I know exactly how you feel” or “I know that taste so well”, referring to his gustatory sensation. I don’t suppose that I am actually seeing his inner sensation with my two eyes, so that it would vanish if I closed them; I know perfectly well that my imagination is doing the work of knowledge production. I am seeing (mind) without seeing (eyes).

And there is a further point: there is such a thing as imaginative ocular seeing of other people’s mental states (also animals’). In Wittgenstein’s sense, we can see others as having certain states of mind: for example, we can see a person as suffering or as happy. He or she looks to be suffering or happy—that is, one’s eyes register this fact. Visual input is supplemented by the imagination to produce a specific type of visual state: seeing imaginatively. You can see the duck-rabbit drawing as a duck and you can see another person as happy; a fusion of perception and imagination takes place. On this basis it is possible to acquire knowledge—sense-based knowledge. Thus, we can maintain the perceptual model of knowledge across the board, even taking in knowledge of other minds: we literally experience the other’s mental state. This is the basis of empathy—putting oneself in the other person’s place. You sense the other’s suffering; you don’t just conjecture it or have an opinion about it. The seeing-imagining is a seeing which is a knowing. This is a primitive type of knowledge not like inductive or abductive knowledge (so-called). I think that animals have it too. Knowledge of other minds is not some kind of hugely theoretical effort or achievement. It is, in a sense, pre-rational, not a result of an exercise of Reason, as distinct from perception and imagination. It is nothing like scientific knowledge in the sense in which people mean this phrase (elaborately inferential, not yet falsified, highly fallible). It is primitive animalistic awareness of one’s environment, including the psychological environment. It is not a counterexample to the perceptual view of (genuine) knowledge. Of course, it can be conjectural and inferential, as when we are merely guessing what someone thinks or feels; but it need not be this way, and can therefore count as basic knowledge. There is a problem of other minds, but other minds are not normally epistemologically problematic; people have their secrets, but not everything is secret. The mind can be open to view or closed to view, visible or invisible. That is plain common sense; it isn’t always a philosophical problem (short of radical skepticism). Pain can be perfectly perceptible—though pains cannot be seen purely with the eyes (you need an injection of imagination). It is perceptible by means of the sympathetic imagination, perhaps coupled with perception of behavior: seeing your behavior, I imagine your pain and thereby come to be acquainted with your state of mind. What is invisible to the naked eye need not be invisible to the mind’s eye. The concept of the visible is capacious, elastic. It basically means being an object of a visual phenomenology, perceptual or imagistic. Some things are unimaginable, though possible, as some things are imperceptible, though thinkable. Other minds are imaginable—in some cases though not in all. Some of the bat’s mind I can imagine, but some I can’t. In the former case, I have knowledge; in the latter, I don’t. It is actually quite easy for me to imagine the states of millions of minds of many types, some quite different from mine; though many elude my imaginative powers. I have a lot of knowledge of minds other than my own, real honest-to-goodness knowledge.[3]

[1] See my papers “Perceptual Knowledge” and “Non-Perceptual Knowledge” for the background epistemology.

[2] See my Mindsight (2004).

[3] It is good to think of imagination as an extension of perception, a variation on it. There is what we perceive and there is what we can imagine given what we can perceive; the former constrains the latter and determines its character. We imagine by means of what we already perceptually know. We can imagine things that go beyond what we can directly perceive; and this can form the basis of knowledge, as when I imagine the future in order to plan the best course of action. Similarly, I imagine what your state of mind is in order to respond better to your actions—I may do this by imagining myself in your place. Our knowledge would be greatly limited if we lacked our imaginative capacities. Imagining is not opposed to knowing but a way of knowing.