Perception De Dicto and De Re

Perception De Dicto and De Re

Locke held that all we ever perceive of external objects is their powers and not their intrinsic qualities: we do perceive their powers to produce sensations in us, and we don’t perceive the basis of these powers in the object. This seems doubly wrong: we don’t perceive powers and we do perceive qualities (non-powers). For we don’t and can’t perceive powers as powers, and we do perceive qualities as qualities. The power is a mere potential, a disposition, and we can’t see those; while the qualities we do see (shape, color) are real qualities not mere potentials or dispositions. I see the object before me as having the quality of being red, but I don’t see it as having the potential to produce experiences of red in me. I don’t see what could or might be (I might think this). So, is Locke simply mistaken? I think not; in fact, I think he is basically right. But to see this we have to introduce a familiar distinction: the de dicto-de re distinction. What we see de re are powers; what we see de dicto are qualities. It is true of powers that we see them, but it is not true that we see powers as powers—we don’t see that an object has certain powers. It is true of a spy that I see him as a patriot, but it is not true that I believe that a spy is a patriot. It is a matter of different logical scopes. Thus, it is consistent to hold that all I see (de re) are powers and that I never see (de dicto) powers—instead seeing qualities. For example, I see objects as red (de dicto) and I also see (de re) powers to produce experiences of red. This means that I never see the properties that things actually have de dicto, but I do see properties that things don’t have, since objects don’t really have the qualities that I attribute to them (or my eyes attribute). I do see properties that things really have de re, but I never see them de dicto. In effect, my purported perceptions of things are hallucinations, but they are still perceptions of something real, viz. powers. The de re object is painted in colors it doesn’t really have, but it is still there as a real thing. The de re objects of vision (etc.) are nothing but powers; the de dictoobjects of vison are qualities not powers. There is no overlap or coincidence between the de re objects of perception and the de dicto objects of perception. What I see in one sense I don’t see in the other sense. I see colors de dicto but not de re (since they do not exist in objects), and I see powers de re but not de dicto (since powers can’t be seen). I project the colors onto the object falsely, but the powers are already present as relations between the object and my mind. In other words, I don’t de dicto see the real objective world, though I do de re see it. The de dicto content of my perceptual experience is cut off from the de re referent of it. I represent the object as having certain qualities that it doesn’t have, and I fail to represent it as having properties (powers) it does have—though my perceptual experience is of those properties. The powers cause my perceptions, but they are not represented in those perceptions; the perceptions are merely signs of the powers. The qualities represented in my perceptions are not the cause of my perceptions—they are by way of being figments of my imagination. I imagine the quality of being red (it comes from inside me), but the power to produce sensations of red is constituted by something outside of me—I don’t imagine the powers. Perception is thus de re realist and de dicto fabulist (projectivist, fictionalist). The powers exist in reality but the qualities don’t (save as intentional objects). Logically, the case is like seeing a bull as a unicorn: the bull is the existing de re object, while the de dicto unicorn is an imagined intentional object that doesn’t objectively exist. All perception is of bulls as unicorns—bulls de re and unicorns de dicto. It is powers illusorily seen as qualities. This is essentially Locke’s position. The phenomenal unicorn qualities are triggered by external bull powers. Locke thought that the external object is not properly known by us, so the power is not intelligible to us; while the perceived quality is not an external objective fact. The power is thus an actually existing mystery, while the quality is a fictional non-mystery. This is his basic epistemology and ontology. He didn’t have the de re-de dictodistinction, but it serves to articulate what he was driving at (correctly, in my view). Perception is of the unknown but as of the known: the former is objectively real, though mysterious, while the latter is really fictional (mind-created), though transparent. We perceive physical things de re but not de dicto; we perceive mental things de dicto but not de re (since the qualities perceived have no existence in reality outside the mind). Perception thus has a complex mixed structure.[1]

[1] Notice how this position fails to correspond with the standard philosophies of perception, viz. direct realism and the sense-datum theory. It captures what is right about both of them without the usual faults. It might be called “realist fabulism” or “fabulist realism”.