Gods

Gods

Let’s imagine a theological dispute of a different color: the question is which of two possible Gods, called Yum and Yam, exist. Yum and Yam are very similar—they are standard-issue Gods—but they do differ in certain particulars. Yum’s chosen people are the Dutch while Yam favors the Armenians, Yum’s day of rest is Saturday while Yam’s is Sunday, and they differ with respect to their minions. There is enough difference for theologians to get their teeth into and for different traditions to be formed. We can suppose there is a lively debate about which one is real and which a fake. Maybe there are extreme sects that impose punishments on people who make the wrong choice. Possibly there are some people who stop believing in one and go over to the other (much frowned upon by those attached to the God who has been spurned). This dispute has been going on for centuries, sometimes coolly and sometimes heating up. There might be subdivisions within the two religions, centering on the day of rest, or the roster of minions. Imagine you grew up in this religious atmosphere—how would you choose? There doesn’t seem to be any solid evidence favoring one God over the other, just a lot of rhetoric and appeals to family loyalty. It seems arbitrary which one you choose—a matter of “personal preference”, as they say. What you do know is that you are required to make a choice. You can’t be an agnostic, or believe in both, or neither, or some third God (Yom). You feel flummoxed.

Obviously, this is absurd. You have no basis to decide; it would be irrational to choose one over the other (though it might be pragmatically sensible to go one way rather than the other). You might be forgiven for agnosticism, or deplored for atheism, or tolerated for bi-theism, or cheered for neo-theism; but it would be bonkers to believe that one of these Gods is real and the other unreal. That is just not an epistemic option. The case has been set up so that nothing can decide the question. Indeed, we might suppose that this is literally true: the whole thing is a massive psychology experiment designed to study irrationality! We are subjects in this experiment, which has been devised by advanced aliens from another galaxy; the experimenters are interested in how irrational the human species can be. They set things up in such a way that the subjects are asked to choose between options between which it is impossible rationally to choose. They have even provided rival bibles, rival churches, rival preachers. It is a long-term experiment and has already been going on for over two thousand years. A high point, scientifically, was that period when the two religions began persecuting each other to the death—it being deemed heresy to proclaim the day of rest falsely. The correct opinion, by stipulation, is that neither Yum nor Yam exist—they were made up by the experimenters and then foisted on the human population. Atheism with respect to Yum and Yam is true (whatever may be the case for other putative Gods, e.g., Yahweh).

Amusing, you might say, possibly instructive—but what does this have to do with us as we actually are, historically? The answer is obvious: we are in essentially the same boat. Which God exists—the God of the Old Testament or the God of New Testament (the old religious text or the new one)? They are clearly not the same (jealous and vengeful versus emotionally mature and gentle). Is it the God of the Roman Catholic Church or the God of the Protestant Church—again, quite different Gods. What about Allah—should we believe in him or the God we call “God”? Also, we have Gods drawn from non-Jewish traditions and accepted in other parts of the world. The criteria of identity for Gods are clear enough to declare that not all these Gods are identical. I just sharpened the issue with my imaginary thought experiment. But even if you think there is a rational basis for believing in one God rather than another, it is surely disturbing to acknowledge that such a case is possible—and that it would be preposterous to insist that one theistic belief had to be true rather and the other false. The obvious fact is that neither of these beliefs is true—Yum and Yam are fictions, fakes. The theology in my imaginary scenario is a theology about nothing. That is exactly what atheists say about our actual theology—polytheism versus monism, the holy trinity, etc. These are all debates about chimera.[1]

[1] I wonder whether, in the age of polytheism (still not dead), there were people who believed firmly in some gods and just as stoutly denied the existence of others—the Sun god yes, the Moon god no; the weather god yes, the sea god no. The impression one gets, say with respect to the Greek gods, is that the believers were all in. If one god exists, then all do. Curious, no? It seems unduly credulous.

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Shortest Books in the World

Shortest Books in the World

You will be familiar with this genre of humor. Well-known examples include: Italian War Heroes, Polish Wit and Wisdom. Here are my inventions (they are not intended to be fair or accurate—that’s the whole point).

Triumphs of British Dentistry

Irish Teetotalers I have Known

Scottish Hospitality

Welsh Wineries

Nations of the United Kingdom

The Open-Minded English

Armenian Etiquette

Industries of Greece

Affordable French Restaurants

Ballroom Dancing on the African Subcontinent

Mexican Fine Dining

A History of Human Civilization

Eskimo Architecture

South American Democracy

North American Democracy

Non-Violent Policing in the USA

Great Americans

Palestinian Mardi Gras

Arab Diplomacy

Nigerian Classical Music Conductors

Hotspots of Yorkshire

Swiss Culture

Australian Decorum

Cuban Capitalism

Intellectual Monarchs Through the Ages

The Evolution of Intelligence

Hispanic Meditation Practices

English Cuisine

Alcoholics Anonymous in Finland

Divas of Sweden

The Dutch Mafia

The Swinging Forties

Vacation Spots of Siberia

Israeli Disco

The Glories of Estonia

Beautiful Women I have Known from Birmingham

Virtuous Saints of the Catholic Church

Sexy Sushi Chefs

Great Entrepreneurs of Iceland

Comedians of Pakistan

The Vibrant Lifestyle of Luxembourg

Danish Drag Queens

The Well-Spoken New Yorker

How to Keep Your Feet Dry in Venice

Art Galleries of Botswana

Philanthropists of Turkey

Famous Norwegians

Great Living Artists

Distinguished Men of Bulgarian Science

Great Rock Bands of China

Japanese Humor

Coal mining Songs

The Iranian Karma Sutra

Unorthodox Jews

Logic in the Middle East

Indian Contraceptives

Decent Republicans I Have Heard Of

The Non-Lunatic Left

Animal Rights in Afghanistan

Moral Progress Through the Ages

The Better Angels of Our Nature

Wealthy Table Tennis Players

Modest Stars of the NBA

Nineteenth Century Yacht Owners of Color

Nice British Aristocrats

The Working Class of Monte Carlo

Black Residents of St Barts

Wall Street Geniuses

Businessmen With Whom I Would Like to Have Lunch

Feminist Ethics

Brave Men of the Academic World

A Dictionary of Rare Sins

The Longshoreman’s Thesaurus

An Encyclopedia of Celtic Ideas

Brain Science for Beginners

Insights of Contemporary Psychology

Integrity in the Modern University

Common Sense

AI

Now you can make up your own.

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Dreams and Religion

Dreams and Religion

There is a peculiarity of religion that is not often (if ever) remarked: its combination of the serious and the silly. I might even say commingling: the way the serious and the silly are interwoven, inextricably joined. Serious themes run through religion—life and death, right and wrong, cosmology. But at the same time, we find superstition, fantasy, fairy tales, risible rituals, preposterous costumes, and a general sense of absurdity. To an outsider much of religion seems silly, childish, hard to take seriously. The Catholic Church is a prime example, prompting attempts at silliness reduction over the centuries. One might even say that the serious-silly nexus is the essence of religion. I am not against silliness, still less seriousness, but the combination strikes me as anthropologically interesting; it bears examination. So, let’s take a scientific naturalistic attitude towards it—what is its psychological meaning? What does it tell us about the human mind? Can we explain it?

It is hard to find any convincing parallels to it. Plenty of things are serious, and plenty of things are silly—but the combination? One might think of pantomime and fairy tales—rich in silliness, yes, but rather lacking in seriousness (psychoanalysis notwithstanding). Still, worth keeping in mind; there is a kinship here. The closest cultural parallel I can think of is opera: the gaudiness, the costumes, the absurdities—yet the depth of the themes, their resonance. But the parallel is not close, or particularly illuminating. Opera shows that the human mind can tolerate, even welcome, the serious-silly nexus, but it would be pressing a point to suggest that opera is the model for religion (or religion the model for opera). Perhaps comedy could be adduced, its jokiness combined with (sometimes) serious themes: think of Monty Python’s The Life of Brian, some of Charlie Chaplin, or Shakespeare’s comedies (e.g., A Midsummer Night’s Dream). But here too the parallel is not that close—laughing in church is really not on. Religion is characteristically humorless: priests are not comedians (God is not the funniest man ever). Is there anything in the human psyche that could be regarded as a precursor to religion, its psychological precondition? My title suggests an answer—dreams are the clearest analogue to religion. For they too combine the serious and the silly—stirring themes, preposterous performances. Wacky stuff occurs, nonsense obtrudes, yet there is an atmosphere of seriousness—there isn’t much laughter in the church of dreams. Nor is there much skepticism. Miracles occur, natural laws get flouted, people fly about, evil lurks, nonsense is rampant (verbal and physical)—not unlike religion. Fear and exhilaration coexist. There is the giddy feeling of being in contact with another world. In religious ceremonies people can go into a trance, as if possessed or hypnotized, but the same is true of dreams—a trancelike state in which the usual rules are suspended. A church is a dreamy place, full of other-worldly icons, spectacle, strange adventures. Dreams are vivid, but so are biblical stories, with all the illogic of dreams. And the Bible is full of dreams and dreamlike happenings. In dreams we take the silliness in our stride, not separating it from the seriousness; we don’t wonder how the two things can go together. In fact, they harmonize seamlessly. Thus, dreaming prepares us for religion; it provides the psychological foundation. It makes the religious experience possible. We already know how to combine the serious and the silly, because we are born dreamers. That is the hypothesis.

But there is another aspect of dreaming that really drives the analogy home. This is that the dream state is the primary arena for what might be called credulity enhancement. In dreams we don’t question what we experience—what the dream tells us. We just accept it, absurdity and all. In the waking state we would take ourselves to be hallucinating or undergoing an imagination malfunction, but in dreams we are utterly credulous—the dreamer is no skeptic. Sheer silliness is no impediment to abject credulity. We believe whatever is dished up to us, no questions asked. Isn’t this just like religious belief? People believe what they are told, or what is vividly depicted, or what is performed in front of them (miracle healings and the like). They might be more skeptical outside of the trance-inducing place of worship, but their critical faculties go into abeyance when the chanting starts, the stained-glass windows dazzle, and the lure of the fantatic beckons. They enter a kind of dream state in which the silly is transmuted (miraculously!) into conviction—what is called religious belief. We have faith in our dreams, as we have faith in our religious instruction. We don’t have evidence for rational belief in our dreams, and nor do we in the religious case—we are primed to believe, set up for it. Even hardboiled scientists have faith in their dreams. Thus, the religious state of mind resembles the dreaming state of mind in its susceptibility to belief formation. Dreaming is a pre-religious state of silliness acceptance: miracles occur in dreams and the dreamer blithely accepts them as real; ditto for the religious believer (note the term). In dreams we are all true believers, easily taken in; in religious contexts we are likewise highly susceptible to invitations to believe. And the silly stuff mingles with the serious to add weight to the pressure to believe; it isn’t just silly (though it can be very silly). This is where the power to persuade comes from in religious contexts—it mimics the dream state. Children, of course, are particularly susceptible to the persuasive power of dreams, having little in the way of critical faculties. But the same is notoriously true in the case of religion—which is why we get them when they are young. Imagine if the adults around you as a child were to reinforce the messages (as they might call them) contained in your dreams—about bogey men, ghosts, lurking killers. You would end up completely in the sway of your dreams. As it is, we say “It was only a dream”. But we don’t say “It was only religion” in order to temper the child’s natural credulity. Religion is like a socially sanctified dream, driving home the silliness. The reason the silliness is accepted is that dreams are full of it yet excite belief. Of course, believers don’t think it is silly, or at least they strive to overcome that feeling; and the reason for this is that they are psychologically primed to overlook silliness in dreams. Note that many cultures have believed that dreams are to be taken seriously, as containing important information about reality; they might be said to have a dream-based religion. They have achieved a total merger of the two. Silliness generally promotes skepticism, but not in certain areas of psychic activity. The person who was once religious and now rejects religion is like someone emerging from a dream: what once seemed real is now seen as so much fantasy. He might wonder at his prior state of mind, shaking his head in disbelief; it might comfort him to be told that he was living in a dream. Are deeply religious people unusually prone to vivid and compelling dreams? Are natural atheists lacking in dream experience? Do people who never dream (if there are such) put up more resistance to religious indoctrination? Is religion more likely to gain control of a person during a period of life in which dreams are particularly powerfui? These are all empirical questions, capable of investigation. In any case, dreams provide a prelude to religious conversion, or a platform from which to launch religious belief. Dreams provide a precursor of that ability to combine the serious and the silly that is so characteristic of religion as we know it.[1]

[1] Do we need religion? Do we have an appetite for it, possibly innately given? Can we be happy without religion? There is some evidence to suggest that this is so. If it is, the dream hypothesis explains it: for we do need to dream. Studies have shown that people deprived of dreaming become disconsolate and depressed. Why this should be so is not clear, but it seems to be a fact. We might try to fulfill the need by adopting some other equivalent activity—say, science. We make a religion out of science (including philosophy). We will need to ensure that we supply the silliness quotient as well as the seriousness quotient. Quantum mechanics might come in handy, or the big bang, or panpsychism, or possible world semantics—something seemingly preposterous. It will help to have scientific churches and a priestlike brotherhood (professors in universities). The need for religion might thus be met by something other than religion. However, it is not at all clear that the need to dream could be met by anything else (movies comes closest). Religious psychology is an underdeveloped branch of the science of psychology. We could call it the “religious faculty” and undertake an investigation of it analogous to our study of the language faculty: where does it come from, is it modular, what kind of pathologies beset it, what is its neural basis? It is clearly an aspect of the human mind (and brain), so it ought to have a psychology. I can imagine a book entitled The Religion Instinct, or a journal called The Journal of Experimental Religious Psychology, or a society of “Rel-Sci” devotees. There could be a natural science of supernatural belief.

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Theism and Moral Anti-Realism

Theism and Moral Anti-Realism

What are the logical relations between theism and moral anti-realism?[1] First, we must define our terms (tedious work but it has to be done). Let theism be the doctrine that something like the Judeo-Christian God exists (not just any old type of God): not only morally perfect but also the very foundation of human morality. This God makes right and wrong; he doesn’t just accept morality for what it already and independently is. And let moral anti-realism be the doctrine that morality (moral truth) depends on the states of mind and action of suitable agents—it is an agent-centered theory of morality. This type of metaethics comes in two types and a variety of forms: divine and human; and invoking the concepts of commandment, law, approval, belief, and desire. Thus, we have divine and human commandment theories, or divine and human law theories, or divine and human approval theories, or divine and human belief theories, or divine and human desire theories—depending on what, specifically, morality is supposed to depend on. For example, we might have the theory that the goodness of keeping promises depends on the fact that God believes that keeping promises is good—or that humans have that belief. The most familiar anti-realist theory of this type is that morality consists of a set of divine commandments—God commands us not to break our promises, say. We could also have a secular version of this type of theory: people command us not to break our promises—this is one of our laws.Such theories are aptly described as anti-realist because they insist that moral truth does not exist independently of states of mind and action—it isn’t just “out there” waiting to be discovered. It depends on what selected agents deem to be moral—constitute as moral. States of affairs are not good or bad in themselves but relative to a mind that evaluates them. In this sense, values are “in the head” (the mind, the soul, the heart) not “in the world”. They are subjective not objective. So, our question becomes: What is the logical relation between theism in the sense defined and moral anti-realism in the sense defined? In particular, does one doctrine entail the other?

Some things are clear. In the first place, theism implies moral anti-realism, because the God we are talking about is taken to have a nature that operates to determine the content of morality. This God fixes what is right and wrong—he creates them, provides their foundation. If he didn’t, he would be that (type of) God. And so, morality depends for its existence and content on God’s will—as in the divine commandment theory. The pointof God (or one of his principal points) is to sow the seeds of morality, not just witness it as already formed—he is the architect of morality not merely an observer of it. Thus, if there is a God, we know that morality must take the form specified—the divine commandment theory must be true. Accordingly, moral truths must be analyzable as commands of some type; they must have an imperatival structure. They must logically be in the nature of laws: originating from a legislator, a controlling agent, an author. We can therefore infer the metaphysical character of moral truth from the truth of theism. Theism entails a moral metaphysics (meaning, logical form). A moral truth says that certain actions are commanded by a (divine) agent—“God commands us to keep our promises”. The converse entailment is more complex. It is not difficult to see that a divine commandment theory entails theism: if moral truths are divine commandments, then there has to be a divine commander. The commands have to issue from a suitable being, divine in nature—God, in a word. But what about a human commandment theory? Suppose we were convinced that moral propositions have a command-like structure—semantically, logically. It wouldn’t follow that the commands in question issue from God, so theism would not be entailed. It might be the case that the commands issue from humans—say, humans in one’s own society (parents, priests, the police). The commandment theory doesn’t entail theism taken by itself. But it can be tweaked to enable the inference in question: for human commandments are local, fallible, and relative—while moral truths are universal. Given that moral truths are absolute and universal—promise-keeping is right for anyone anywhere—we know that they cannot be constituted by the actions or attitudes of one set of humans or another, because these vary. If moral rules are not relative, then the commandments that ground them cannot be particular groups of people, because they can vary in their opinions and consequent rulings; the rules have to come from an agent that is not fallible and variable. So, given that morality is absolute not relative, and given that it has a command-like structure, it must issue from something like a commanding God, not from human beings (or other fallible and variable creatures). Thus, theism must be true: the existence of a universal morality founded on commandments implies that God is the author of the commandments that constitute it. We can deduce the existence of God from this kind of moral anti-realism plus an injection of universality. Of course, we can’t make this deduction if relativism is actually true; then we are left with a morality varying according to the attitudes of particular groups of people. But it is still a substantive result that theism follows from moral anti-realism plus universality. Contraposing, if theism is nottrue, then nor is the conjunction of moral anti-realism and universality. The atheist moral realist will contend that the fault lies in the assumption of anti-realism, i.e., the commandment theory of moral truth. Universality is fine, but morality does not depend on anyone’s commandments, human or divine. It depends only on itself—on whether moral properties are instantiated or not. Promise-keeping is good no matter what anyone thinks about it, or legislates, or advocates.

One sees here an opening for the theist moralist: if he can establish that moral propositions are command-like (prescriptive, law-like), then he can proceed to argue that morality needs a divine commander, since humans won’t do on account of their fallibility and variability. And some have thought to discern just such an analysis of moral language: moral utterances are demonstrably imperatival in form and function—they have commanding built into them. Now we see that a lot hangs on this: for if they are imperatival in nature, then we have the beginnings of an argument for theism and a God-based moral metaphysics. The atheist moralist had better deny this in no uncertain terms; he had better be a “descriptivist” about moral discourse. It had better state facts, make truth-evaluable assertions, correspond to reality, etc. For, just as moral realism leads to atheism, so moral anti-realism leads to theism. Mind-dependence raises the question of whose mind, and human minds are not cut out for the job of grounding universal morality, thus leading inexorably to God. My own preference is for atheism and moral realism, since I don’t believe in God (for reasons I could go into) and I don’t believe that moral language is semantically imperatival or command-like (also for reasons I could go into). What I am doing now is sketching the logical lie of the land—what implies what. The logical links exist and pull us in different directions depending on our assumptions. What emerges is that atheism and moral realism go together, while theism and moral anti-realism go together—not exactly what the tradition would lead us to expect (the exact opposite, in fact). The moral realist is an implicit non-believer; the moral anti-realist is in danger of falling into religious belief. The only way out is to deny universality while claiming mind-dependence: morality is relative, subjective, and variable (over time and place). That is the price of rejecting moral realism while sticking with atheism—you end up denying morality in the form in which it presents itself, i.e., as a set of universal normative principles. I myself believe that this is a hopeless position, theoretically and practically—the worst combination of views possible (though widely maintained). I think even theistic anti-realism is preferable (though also repugnant). The clear winner is atheistic moral realism: morality is universal, autonomous (not mind-dependent), and incompatible with God as God is normally understood. We live in a Godless world of universal mind-independent moral truths. Promise-keeping is good always and everywhere; it is good independently of what anyone thinks or commands, human or divine; and the nature of this goodness rules out the existence of God as traditionally conceived (since divine commandment theories are inherently anti-realist and there is no point in a God that has nothing to do with creating morality). You may not love this picture, for one reason or another, but take comfort in the fact that the other possible positions are even worse. Philosophy is hard in more ways than one. The problem of morality is that it forces us into positions we might find uncomfortable.[2]

[1] This paper is a companion to my “Atheism and Moral Realism”.

[2] I actually don’t find the recommended position uncomfortable, but I know that many people do. Perhaps I am hardened to it after years of cohabitation. I like the idea of a morality that exists outside of us and is indifferent to the will of a supposed God. It has its own existence and doesn’t need God to shore it up. I think God takes the same view (or would if he existed). Morality is neither divine nor human—not in God and not in us. Morality is. It is what it is and not some other thing. That idea doesn’t bother me. It doesn’t make me shake or shiver or feel funny inside. It seems…sensible. What is peculiar and perturbing is trying to think of morality either in terms of theism or human construction—as supernatural or psychologically reducible. Morality is made neither by God nor man. Things are good or bad in themselves not in virtue of something existing outside of them.

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Table Tennis (and the Meaning of Life)

Table Tennis (and the Meaning of Life)

I was watching the Olympics a few months ago and made a point of checking out the table tennis. I used to play a lot as a teenager—we had a table at home and my brother also played. Naturally, I was pretty good at it (the best in the school anyway). I thought: “Damn it, Colin, get a table! You love the game and used to be good at it—why hesitate?” The reason I hesitated was that I had no one to play with, or no one available and good. But, I reasoned, once you get the table you will find partners—just go for it! So, I went for it: I bought a table and installed it on my front porch. Of course, I bought new bats (rackets, paddles) and a high-quality net (very important), as well as dozens of balls (now hundreds). I found a couple of friends to hit with, though not of the most expert level, and it turned out my handy man and a construction manager I know were pretty good players (but not very available). I was still not supplied with enough partners to fulfil my needs, however. So, what did I do? First, I bought what is called a rebound board—a mounted plank with a rubber surface that sends the ball back to you when you hit it. This was okay, but you need to be a skilled player to keep the rally going. I decided to buy a table tennis ball machine that would spit balls at me for practice. It came with a net to fit over the other end of the table to catch the balls. This was a step up, because it simulates real play, though not perfectly. But you can’t serve to it, so I needed to work on my serve separately. This was about three weeks ago: I undertook rigorous serving practice.

The thing is, you don’t normally practice your serve, because you are always playing other people. But that was not my situation, so I practiced my serve a lot. And I did it thoroughly, systematically, diligently. Let’s talk about the serve, because it’s a fascinating topic. There are basically three kinds of table tennis serve: topspin, backspin, and sidespin. These can be executed either by forehand or backhand, so there are quite a few possibilities; and that’s not counting variations (e.g., backspin with sidespin), as well as bat trajectories. I invented a couple of new types of serve that I have never seen used and are perfectly good ways to serve (hard to explain without being able to provide a demonstration). I have hit thousands of serves over the last three weeks. For me, the easiest is backhand topspin, a fast serve with a lot of action on the ball (it flies up in the air when you try to return it). I improved this tremendously. I also figured out the best way to hold the bat for forehand topspin serves—in tennis lingo, use a western not a continental grip, which requires moving the forefinger across the back face of the bat (again, I would need to show you). Now, when you put in this amount of work, you develop a wide range of serves that go in and are difficult to return. You also get much more consistent, rarely missing. The time came to play with my handy man partner Michael and I was interested to learn what all that practice had done for my game (it’s hard to judge without a partner). This was yesterday. He is a very decent player with a fast forehand serve and mastery of spin (though somewhat out of practice). I killed him. Previously, he was holding his own, but not anymore. Oh no. My point is that in table tennis you can dominate just by serving well—particularly because most amateurs never practice their serve. They just play and hope their serve improves. This is emphatically not good enough. Mark my words: YOU HAVE TO PRACTICE YOUR SERVE. It’s the same in regular tennis, but in table tennis it’s crucial. Most players simply cannot return a well-trained serve, but it isn’t that hard to develop such a serve (unlike tennis). And I wasn’t even using my fancy serves! I am a decent human being, after all. Poor Michael, standing there, befuddled, defeated—I felt for him, I really did. I told him about the previous three weeks and encouraged him to work on his serve, or serves (you do need several). I gave him some tips. I analyzed his serve for him (it was illegal by the way). I thought: “All that solitary practice paid off”. My game had been transformed. As a bonus, my other shots were considerably improved because of all the bat discipline I had instilled in myself. It was hard work, but it paid off (and not that hard).

How does this bear on the meaning of life? Well, table tennis is the meaning of life for serious players, but for us amateurs the parallels are obvious. Chiefly: Put in the less glamorous and less fun work; be patient; analyze what you are trying to achieve; turn deficits into opportunities; spend time alone; focus. I had never thought of practicing my serve this way as a teenager—I just wanted to play. But it would have improved my game massively: a good serve kills. It defeats, destroys, humiliates. Of course, expert players would have no problem returning serves at the level I am talking about—they would kill my serve. It would come back at me unreturnably—smash! During this period of table tennis dedication (madness?), I watched a video on YouTube of Roger Federer playing table tennis with an eight-year-old Chinese girl (name of Pineapple). I knew Roger could play, but I was impressed with his level of ability—he has clearly played a lot of table tennis. She destroyed him. He asked her how long she had been playing; she said since she was five, so three years. He said he had been playing thirty years, giggling the while. That’s table tennis for you. He looked like a klutz next to her. Anyway, my life advice to you is this: Practice your serve.[1]

[1] I would actually like to teach the game—particularly to young children and old codgers,

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Atheism and Moral Realism

Atheism and Moral Realism

So-called moral realism is the doctrine that morality is mind-independent. In particular, it is independent of judgments, attitudes, legislative acts, or emotions. It is therefore incompatible with divine command theories or human approval theories: the good is not what God commands and not what humans approve of. Moore’s theory of the good is a realist theory: goodness is a simple unanalyzable property, and therefore not the complex property of being commanded by God or approved by humans. Goodness is conceived as objective in the way shape has been thought to be objective—things are good or square irrespective of how they are perceived or evaluated. Things are good (or bad) in themselves, not relative to the minds of observers or legislators. Minds are not necessary for moral properties to be instantiated.[1] A theist who accepts the divine command theory cannot therefore be a moral realist, any more than the most extreme moral relativist can be; indeed, he is a kind of relativist, with God being the thing to which moral truth is relative. Theistic morality is a kind of anti-realism about morality. Moral realism dispenses with God as the foundation of morality, so that theistic morality comes out as anti-realist. Divine command theory doesn’t make morality independent of God’s commands! Moral realism makes morality independent of God’s edicts, nature, and even existence. It is a morality suitable for atheists, but not for traditional theists. The two are not logically incompatible: you could be a theist and a moral realist—you simply reject the divine command theory. But that would not suit the traditional theist, because he places great stock in the idea that God is the metaphysical basis of morality; viewing morality as existing independently of God’s will is anathema (blasphemy). God and morality are supposed inseparable, but moral realism takes morality to be separate from God’s will and nature. In fact, there is a danger that God will be deemed redundant if he isn’t the foundation of right and wrong—for didn’t he create everything, including morality? If the authority of morality is split off from God, then God isn’t needed to get morality going. Not only is moral realism available to atheists; it is arguably not available to theists. Theists really need the divine command theory to be true, on pain of excluding God from a constitutive role in the formation of moral truth. It may be that only atheists can be moral realists in the sense defined.

Of course, atheists need not be moral realists—they could hold a variety of human-centered views of morality. For reasons I won’t go into, I find this position unsatisfactory, because no defensible view of moral truth can be constructed on such a basis. Essentially, a secular version of the Euthyphro argument applies to all such positions: moral propositions are not true because people accept them; they accept them because they are true. Human command theories are as defective as divine command theories—the good isn’t what the gods love, and it isn’t what the people love either. The point I am making here is that moral realism is an unattractive position for theists, given their general theology; and an atheistic morality had better choose moral realism over anti-realism on pain of losing morality altogether. We can’t preserve objectivity by going theist, and the atheist does better to endorse moral realism. Really, atheism and moral realism are the only acceptable positions to adopt if you want a good account of moral truth.  Atheism plus moral anti-realism produces an unacceptable morality (subjectivist, relativist, arbitrary), while theism plus moral realism is inconsistent, unless we deny that God plays a constitutive role in fixing morality. Atheism and moral realism are fully consistent with each other and don’t lead to moral collapse; but every other combination is ruled out–in particular, theism and moral realism. The only way to avoid moral collapse is to accept atheistic moral realism. Theistic moral realism is not an available position, because divine command theory is not a form of moral realism, and rejecting it leaves the theist in a perilous theological position. It is like trying to be a theist while rejecting the claim that God created the universe—that is a requirement on God not a theoretical option. Likewise, if God isn’t needed to explain morality, but just exists idly alongside it, then his rationale is undermined—he becomes a useless cog where morality is concerned. The only stable position is atheistic moral realism—it leads to no intolerable consequences. We get to keep morality in a robust form (by virtue of moral realism) while not courting the intellectual tensions inherent in theistic moral realism; in particular, we don’t have the problem of explaining how God (the God of the Bible) can coexist with a God-independent morality. The anti-realism inherent in divine command theories disqualifies them from forming the basis of morality (by the Euthyphro argument), but combining theism with abandoning that theory of morality is hard to sustain. The divine command theory is not a dispensable feature of theism in any recognizable sense of that term. We must be moral realists in order to preserve morality in a robust form, but only atheism allows for moral realism to be true. In sum: morality disproves theism. Given that morality exists as a set of objective mind-independent truths, God cannot exist (and be the basis of morality). He can’t be the basis because of the Euthyphro argument, but he can’t survive shedding his morally constitutive role—for then he loses his raison d’etre. God is either the basis of morality or he is nothing. Strangely enough, religion implies moral anti-realism. Religion thus refutes itself. For we have an axiological disproof of God’s existence. If morality is real, then God is not. The only way to keep God in the picture is to make him the basis of morality, but that invites the Socratic retort to Euthyphro. Atheism has no such problem; it is not refuted by the existence of objective morality (nor does it refute objective morality). Thus, atheistic moral realism is the indicated position.[2]

[1] We could put it by saying that it is not in the nature of moral properties to be linked necessarily to psychological facts; this is not internal to them. The opposite view is sometimes called moral projectivism (analogous to projectivism about color), and the divine command theory is a form of projectivism in this sense. Right and wrong are imposed on mind-independent facts from outside, not intrinsic to them. There is no difference in this respect between divine command theories and human command theories. (I should note that moral realism comes in a variety of forms, reductive and non-reductive, not just the Moorean form.)

[2] My sense is that atheistic moral realism is a commonly accepted position these days among enlightened thinkers. What I have done here is give an argument showing that it is the only possible position, because theistic moral realism is not an option. I have only sketched the arguments for moral realism, but that is a topic amply covered elsewhere. The novel point is that moral realism refutes theism. The theist cannot regard moral truth as autonomous and self-sustaining, which it must be if the Euthyphro argument is to be avoided.

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The Lord’s Prayer

The Lord’s Prayer

 

Our Father, who art in heaven,

Hallowed be thy name;

Thy kingdom come;

Thy will be done,

On earth as it is in heaven.

Give us this day our daily bread.

And forgive us our trespasses;

As we forgive those who trespass against us.

And lead us not into temptation,

but deliver us from evil.

For thine is the kingdom,

The power and the glory,

For ever and ever.

Amen

 

Here is a modern paraphrase, which I think is true to the content of the above words.

Big Daddy, up there in heaven (but you knew that),

I hope you are being flattered a lot.

Let’s also hope your monarchical lifestyle gets widely adopted;

And people do what you tell them,

Where we live just like where you live.

Please give us something to eat today (but not only bread).

And don’t blame us for our bad behavior;

Like we shouldn’t blame other people for their bad behavior towards us;

Even when their bad behavior (and ours) is really bad and blameworthy.

And also, please don’t tempt us to commit horrible acts (why would you do that?),

But prevent bad things happening to us (this part is particularly important).

Because you are the boss of everything,

You have all the power and celebrity.

And you always will.

That’s the way it goes.

We were required to intone the Lord’s Prayer (isn’t every prayer a prayer to the Lord?) every day at school from the age of five onwards. I didn’t have much idea what the words really meant but they seemed vaguely serious. I can still remember it, though I haven’t recited the prayer in over fifty years. As an exercise, I decided to make a paraphrase. I don’t think the prayer emerges all that well, either in what it includes or what it leaves out. I don’t know why we were asking God to feed us every day when the school cafeteria was doing a perfectly good job. And what kind of temptations were we talking about (we were too young for sex and alcohol)? Did God do the tempting? How were we to avoid blaming anyone for bad behavior when we were blamed for bad behavior every day in school (I was caned on a number of occasions, as was everyone else)? Did it mean we could skip homework and get away with it? It all seems pretty bizarre stuff. And why all the shameless sucking up to Our Father? And why “hallow” his name (what name?) instead of him? Use-mention confusion? It just doesn’t seem very well thought out.

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God: A Dialogue

God: A Dialogue

A: There’s this guy I read about: he’s like really big, much bigger than anyone else, and he’s incredibly knowledgeable, much more than any Jeopardy player you’ve ever seen, and he’s also extremely powerful, more than all the world leaders put together.

B: Really, is he a good guy?

A: Oh yes, super good. He’s like the best, better than all the rest.

B: Wow, I’d like to meet him.

A: Yeah, and he created the whole universe—only took him a week to do it. Did a good job too. He’s really a master builder.

B: That’s pretty impressive. Family man?

A: Er, that too—very successful son. Major philanthropist. Sweet-natured, yet tough. Also, quite handsome.

B: And the Big Guy, what does he feel about the rest of us? He must be a busy dude.

A: Oh, he loves us! He’s very generous like that. Always giving us stuff, door always open, a total mensch.

B: He sounds fantastic. Must be real popular. Where does he live?

A: Well, he doesn’t live anywhere, that’s the thing. He doesn’t own a house; sort of homeless, you might say.

B: Really? What does he do for a living?

A: He doesn’t do anything for a living—doesn’t need to. He’s unemployed, technically.

B: Jeez, unemployed but rich!

A: Not exactly, he hasn’t got any money—he doesn’t need money. He lives of the fat of the land, so to speak.

B: I wish I could do that. My job sucks.

A: Mine too, but c’est la vie, like they say.

B: Funny I’ve never heard of him before. When is his next appearance?

A: Actually, he doesn’t do appearances. In fact, he’s invisible.

B: Amazing—so smart and strong and nice and he’s invisible. You’d think he’d want to flaunt it.

A: He’s modest that way—doesn’t like to show off and whatnot. Keeps to himself. No press conferences, interviews, shit like that.

B: So, what does he do with this time? Does he have hobbies? Music lover?

A: Nobody really knows, bit of a mystery in fact. Since creating the universe, he has been on extended sabbatical, holed up somewhere. Apparently, he just sits and thinks, keeps an eye on things, occasionally puts the odd thing right. But he’s actually pretty laissez faire. Let’s you do you.

B: Interesting. So, he sits, does he?

A: Not in the literal sense. Reports are vague on this point. No body, you see. Nothing to sit with.

B: That’s fortunate, because too much sitting can play hell with your back–I know. Does he follow sports?

A: Oh, he’s a big fan of sports, all sports. Supports all the teams, picks no favorites. Particularly enjoys women’s gymnastics, I believe.

B: Who doesn’t, eh? Well, he sounds like a well-rounded type of fella, someone you could have a beer with, shoot the breeze.

A: I don’t think he drinks. Teetotaler and all. Drug-free. He has a healthy lifestyle.

B: I would too in his position—no job to go to and everything. Well, I gotta go, bus to catch, good talking to you.

A: Yeah, take care now. See you tomorrow. You’re a good listener.

B: I try. Oh, and what’s his name, this guy you read about?

A: He has no name, no birth certificate, no country of origin, no mom and dad, nothing.

B: Thought so. Have a good day!

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