Deciding Not to Hate

Deciding Not to Hate

What is forgiveness? According to a popular conception, it is deciding not to hate someone having once hated them. Is this possible? It is possible to decide not to act in a certain way towards the person in question, because actions are voluntary; but is it possible to decide not to feel a certain emotion? You may well come to the view that it would be better for you not to hate X, and you may be right, but that doesn’t mean you are free to stop hating X. You don’t decide to start hating someone, so why should you be able freely to stop? It is not a matter of will. You can’t stop believing something by an act of will, or desiring something, or fearing something, or loving someone, or grieving—though these states may change over time. The Christian idea of forgiveness, so understood, is not psychologically feasible, however desirable it may be: you can’t decide not to hate, though you can decide not to express the hatred or act on it. You can decide not to persecute or punish someone you hate, but you can’t decide to cease feeling hatred, any more than you can decide not to feel pain. Hatred is not an action. You can hope it goes away or lessens with the passage of time or the arrival of new information, but you can’t wish or will the hate away, especially when it is entirely justified. You can be condemned to hatred for life with not a damn thing you can do about it. This is an inevitable consequence of evil in the world—seriously bad people cause undying hatred. It is an evil aspect of evil. Will anyone in receipt of the facts ever come to the conclusion that Hitler wasn’t such a bad chap after all and promptly stop hating him? Hatefulness entails hate. Forgiveness is often just not psychologically possible.

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True Identity

True Identity

The classic identity theory was advertised as an empirical (“contingent”) theory not an a priori truth. That means it could turn out to be empirically false. I will argue that it is, but another identity theory could take its place. It was always sketchy about what states of the brain are identical to mental states and very few examples were given—in fact one, the identity of pain with C-fiber firing. It wasn’t claimed that pain is identical to some fiber (axon) firing, but specifically C-fibers. The former would be no good because all mental states would then be identical to the same physical state (neural firing), and hence identical to each other (pain would be identical to pleasure). No, it had to be C-fiber firing: that physical type of fiber must be the one with which pain is identical. So, it had better not be true that C-fiber firing is correlated with some other mental state too—pleasure also being correlated with C-fiber firing. Pleasure needs to be correlated with D-fiber firing. But what are these physical types of fiber? Are they of different lengths or diameters or degrees of myelination? There is no evidence of that, and it seems highly unlikely given what we know of the brain; in fact, it appears empirically false. What is necessary is that for each type of mental state there is a distinctive physical type of fiber correlated with it. But that is surely empirically false. The case isn’t like heat and light, say, in which the two natural kinds are correlated with distinctive physical correlates, viz. molecular motion and streams of photons, respectively. We don’t offer some woolly statement like “heat is some property of molecules” or “light is the behavior of tiny particles of some sort”; we need to be told specifically and distinctively what heat and light are to have an empirically viable identity theory. We likewise need to be told what it is about C-fibers that makes them uniquely what pain is–and similarly for every other mental state. Or else we are just saying that pain is some property or other of nerve fibers; and it certainly isn’t just their firing because all nerve fibers do that. The theory, as it stands, is hopelessly inadequate empirically. This identity theory is empirically false or incomplete or unexplanatory. We don’t have good empirical grounds for believing it.

But that doesn’t mean that no identity theory can be empirically true. And I for one think that some sort of identity theory must be true; the question is what kind of identity theory. It seems obvious that no current theory has what it takes, since we don’t have the kind of specific information about the brain that would satisfy reasonable conditions of empirical adequacy, i.e., a one-one mapping between mental types and brain types. What we know now is far too general, unspecific, lacking in detail. What precisely is it about the physical correlates of pain, in particular, that suits them to be pain and not some other sensation? Molecular motion won’t give you light and streams of photons won’t give you heat; where is the analogue for pain and pleasure? This is what is lacking, and we seem far from filling the gap. But I don’t doubt that something does, because the brain is clearly integral to the mind—there is nothing else in there. I would think some sort of conceptual revolution is going to be required in order to identify the right properties of the brain, but once this is achieved, we can imagine slotting the right term into an identity statement and getting an empirically adequate result. That is, the solution to the mind-body problem will take the form of an identity statement (assuming we don’t have to jettison the concept of identity!). The classic identity theorists were right that the mind is the brain (dualism is false), but they were wrong about the terms of the identity, i.e., the concepts and properties that need to be invoked. Whether this identity statement is discoverable by the human mind is another matter. There must be correlates in the brain that map systematically and beautifully onto states of mind, and these must be what states of mind are—given that dualism has been ruled out. But the candidates for identity currently available are far from empirically adequate. The statement “pain is C-fiber firing” is at the level of “heat is something to do with what objects are made of” or “light is some sort of impalpable stream”. Pain is indeed something to do with the properties of nerves in the brain, but that is far from being an empirically adequate identity theory of pain, true though it may be.[1]

[1] If the neural properties turn out to be anything close to what the panpsychists suggest, then the identity statement would be of the form “pain is identical to micro-psychological properties x, y, and z” or some such thing. It might also be necessary to find further properties of pain that can be paired with properties of the brain, as it might be phenomenological structural properties. The question is wide open and extremely confusing (as someone once said).

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Basic Particulars and the Mind

Basic Particulars and the Mind

In Individuals (1959) Peter Strawson argued that material bodies are the basic particulars from the point of view of reference. Space (or our conception of it) plays a crucial role in making determinate reference possible. Other, non-basic particulars can only be referred to derivatively upon basic particulars: for example, actions can only be referred to via reference to the agents (objects) engaging in them. I want to consider this doctrine in relation to reference to the mind—what does it tell us about mental reference? On the face of it, reference to the mind should not be possible, given that the mind is not located in space—it isn’t a type of material body. But we may relax the doctrine to allow that reference to mind is parasitic on reference to body: we can, for example, refer to someone’s pain as “the pain occurring in this body (or body part)”. Or we could bite the bullet and declare that no such reference is possible, because the doctrine is so compelling. Or we could aim for an intermediate position: reference to bodies is primary, but there can also be secondary reference. The picture is that basic or primary reference is made to material objects in space (“substances”) and any other reference is dependent on, or reducible to, this primary mode of reference—to actions, events, processes, sensations, beliefs, numbers, ethical values, theoretical posits, fictional entities, etc. If the dependence can’t be articulated, the secondary modes of reference are in peril of disappearance. That would mean that we don’t refer to mental particulars at all; some other account of mental language would be required, say expressivism. Of course, the underlying doctrine might be questioned by contending that mental reference is basic and physical reference derivative or impossible, as with idealism or complete skepticism about the whole notion of reference (Quine etc.) I will not be concerned with such debates; I want to explore the relevance of the Strawsonian (Kantian) doctrine to materialism and the identity theory. I will also make some remarks about the semantics of proper names.

Does the doctrine refute the identity theory? The argument goes as follows: brain states are basic particulars, but mental states are non-basic particulars, so they can’t be identical. More fully, reference to brains and brain states is a type of primary reference (spatially guided), but reference to minds and mental states is (at best) a type of secondary reference; therefore, minds can’t be brains and mental states can’t be brain states, by Leibniz’s law. The two have different referential properties or profiles. We refer to brain states via physical brains in space, but we don’t refer to mental states that way, so they can’t be identical. Pain can’t be C-fiber firing because C-fiber firing is directly connected to our spatial conceptual scheme in our modes of reference, while pain is not so connected; it is referred to in some other mode or not referred to at all (but rather expressed, say). You have heard of the modal argument and the knowledge argument; well, this is the reference argument. It uses the Strawsonian apparatus of basic particulars and reference to them to refute the identity theory. We can reformulate it using the apparatus of the knowledge argument: Mary is in her isolated room, knowing nothing of the brain, but referring to her mental states, say the sensation of red; then she is released from this room and introduced to the brain, which she learns to refer to in the standard way. Wouldn’t we say that she acquired a new ability not possessed before her release? But then, the sensation and the brain state can’t be identical; she didn’t already possess the ability to refer to brain states while stuck in her room. She lacked the primary space-based ability to refer to her brain, though she had the ability to refer to her sensations, so the latter can’t be the former. These are distinct abilities, so by Leibniz’s law sensations are not identical to brain states. We could run the argument the other way too, though we would have to suppose that she could have sensations with no ability to refer to them, so that she could acquire that ability subsequently to having the ability to refer to her brain states. But this is messy. We can mount the argument simply by noting that Mary has one kind of referential ability but not the other and then apply Leibniz’s law. The basic point of both styles of argument is that accomplishing reference via direct use of the spatial conceptual scheme is not the same as reference not so accomplished; primary reference and secondary reference are not the same. There is a dualism in our methods of reference, and this dualism trickles down to the level of ontology. We are not talking about the same thing, because the aboutness of language (or thought) works differently in the two cases. We could similarly argue that actions can’t be body parts because actions are referred to derivatively on reference to body parts, whereas reference to body parts is not—they are referred to non-derivatively. And this is just what we would expect, given that actions of bodies are clearly not parts of bodies. Likewise, pains are intuitively not brain states, and the reference argument serves to reinforce that intuition (as do the modal argument and the knowledge argument). To put it simply, you can see and point to brain states (they exist in space), but you can’t see and point to pains, so reference to pains cannot be grounded in seeing and pointing—but then they can’t be identical to brain states.

How does the distinction between basic and non-basic reference apply to personal proper names? As follows: bodies are referentially basic particulars and persons are referentially non-basic particulars. We refer to persons via prior reference to their bodies, i.e., spatially. So, names of persons are secondary referring terms, if they refer at all. What precisely is their semantics? Is a name short for “the person with body B”? Then the person would be referred to via a description of his or her body’s position in space. Or is it that the body is the object directly referred to by the name? Or is the reference that person—whatever a person is—associated with a particular body? These all seem like unattractive options, so a more radical theory suggests itself: the person is never actually referred to, only the body is. We can’t refer to the person because of the constraints imposed by the Strawsonian doctrine, so we don’t so refer; we only really refer to the body, it being easily singled out. We talk as if we refer to persons (selves, transcendental egos, immortal souls—take your pick), but we really don’t; proper names are actually labels for bodies—either by description or directly. These are close enough to persons proper to serve our pragmatic purposes, but strictly we never make referential contact with the self itself (whatever it may be). Maybe the self is a myth, as it is commonsensically conceived, but we still have a use for reference to bodies. Personal names are thus like names of mountains and cities, which simply name physical bodies. That way they have determinate intelligible reference; but if not, they inherit all the obscurities of the self, when viewed as separate from the body. For what is the relation between body and self, such that we refer to the self with proper names and not the body? A pragmatic eliminationist about selves will want to preserve the practice of using proper names, and bodies provide the natural surrogate; the whole linguistic institution revolves around bodies, and persons be hanged. Maybe I refer to my true self when say “I”, but when I speak of other people it is their bodies I primarily have before my mind. A community of zombies might be indistinguishable from us in their use of names. This is all by way of saying that if Strawson is right, material bodies are really the referential foundation—the rest is as-if reference or not really reference at all. At most we can say that personal proper names refer to persons only in a secondary or metaphorical sense, while reference to their bodies is the primary form that reference takes. This would be analogous to restricting the term “know” to direct observation of objects, while allowing a secondary use of the term for anything unobservable: true knowledge and true reference versus extended (so-called) knowledge and extended (so-called) reference. At the very least we would want to know whether proper names refer to persons in the basic sense or the non-basic sense. It is much the same with demonstratives: is “that person” a primary referential device or a secondary one, and what exactly does it refer to? The strong Strawsonian thesis (not held by Strawson himself) would be that it refers to a body or to nothing. For how is such reference supposed to work if all reference is necessarily grounded in bodily facts that are far removed from the entity allegedly referred to—like an immortal immaterial soul? Such a thing cannot be successfully picked out, granted the spatial foundations of our referential scheme. Personal names (grammatical) cannot really refer to persons (ontological) in the primary sense, given that all real reference is rooted in spatial individuation—rather as persons are not, strictly speaking, things seen. In our perceptual scheme we see only material objects in space, not hidden selves; so, we had better not have a theory of seeing that allows for (genuine) seeing of non-bodily persons.[1]

[1] Let me observe that at the time of writing Individuals (the 1950s) these were very live issues, following as they did on logical positivism and its scruples. Philosophers were not lax in their admission of key theoretical concepts, like the concept of reference. Maybe the promiscuous use of the term “reference” was just meaningless metaphysics; for what could verify its use in connection with imperceptible entities? Selves were under suspicion of not existing, so we don’t want to saddle our language with reference to such things. Strawson was trying to save common sense while acknowledging the force of the positivist critique. But the wholesale rejection of persons and reference to them was lurking in the shadows. Even the title to his book was a poke in the eye of adherents of sense-data as basic and persons as persona non grata. Even bodies were held in contempt! The idea that personal proper names name persons was regarded as anathema; names had to be analyzed in terms of the sensory and verifiable. And surely reference had to be subject to some restrictions, just like meaning and truth. The view that personal names don’t refer to (an ontology of) persons was not some wild unmotivated paradox, but a respectable philosophical position (if positivism was respectable). Oh, how things have changed!

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Book with Ken Levy

Book with Ken Levy

I am in the process of putting together a book to be edited by my good friend and ex-student Ken Levy compiling a collection of my essays originally published on this blog. Ken is doing most of the work (except for the writing, of course) and we envisage a book divided into five parts: Subjective and Objective, Consciousness, Knowledge, Causality, and Free Will. He will provide some commentary on the essays, and I will reply to him. It will be good knockabout stuff. Meanwhile my Turkish associate (and friend) Ugur Polat is proceeding apace with his Turkish translation of my work. If my zealous cancellers would like to prevent these things happening, I invite them to try.

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Nagel on Nagel

Nagel on Nagel

I would like to recommend Tom Nagel’s interview with Robert Kuhn on Closer to Truth, and not just because he is my close friend. You can easily find it on YouTube. He gives a clear, succinct, and convincing account of the thinking that led up to his beautiful work on subjective and objective. You will also be treated to his inimitable style of speech (I won’t attempt to characterize it—you should hear it for yourself). One of a kind. This is a historic piece of film and I applaud both parties for undertaking it.

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George and Me

George and Me

I was just talking to my good friend George Stephanopoulos about Los Angeles. He has recently been honored with a star on the Hollywood Walk of Fame for his contributions to broadcasting. I was a visiting professor at UCLA for two semesters in 1979 and at USC in 1983 and thoroughly enjoyed the experience. I seriously considered moving there when I received a job offer from USC (I was good friends with Hartry Field, Stephen Schiffer, and Brian Loar, and also with philosophers at UCLA). George and I were discussing the attractions of living in LA, of which I am still very fond, and he mentioned the downside of all the driving. I quite agreed but said how much I used to like driving down Sunset Boulevard. I recalled those carefree youthful days driving around the city, seeing friends, hanging out, and couldn’t help reflecting on how things have changed.

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Love Tennis

Love Tennis

Yesterday I went to Salvador tennis center to play with my good friends Eddie and Rob. It was 4pm and not too hot. We alternated hitting two against one (not points, just hitting). Then Claudio showed up unexpectedly (he had been very busy in his restaurant recently, so we hadn’t seen much of him). A Cuban chef, a Cuban cigar manufacturer, a retired Swiss banker, a retired English philosopher; age range from 54 (Claudio) to 76 (Colin). So, now four of us were hitting together in perfect harmony—encouraging each other, laughing, whacking the ball, all playing well. This went on for a solid hour with no breaks, because we were all enjoying it so much. I thought: this the way life should be; this is the way human relationships should be. Love tennis. No hate, no rivalry, no racket smashing (no American). It was a far cry from politics (national and academic), Trump, cancellation, crap.

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Hate Again

Hate Again

I hate Trump. I hate everything about him. I hate the people surrounding him. I despise, detest, and deplore these people. I hope they receive their proper comeuppance. I never thought I would feel this way about politicians in America, and therefore (some) Americans. I didn’t know the depths of my capacity for hatred. It isn’t a pleasant piece of knowledge—self-knowledge. I am a hater! I admit it. All you need is love, but all you feel is hate. Countless others feel the same way. How does one live with this degree of hate? How can it not corrupt one’s soul? It’s a daily battle. But, strangely enough, I was prepared for it—I had been schooled and tested in hate. Because I hate a lot of other people too—people I used to like, approve of, regard as friends. I won’t name them. They are mainly American, but not exclusively. I am steeped in hate and have been for over a decade. It isn’t fun. I had no idea that I was capable of this kind of hate or that people I trusted could elicit it. (This doesn’t mean I don’t like or love many other people, perhaps more so than before.) It gnaws at you, ruins your day, warps your suffering soul. As the saying goes, it sucks. You have to fight it, try to escape it, transcend it. But hate is not easily vanquished or even reduced. It is stubborn, persistent. I don’t expect to surmount it in this lifetime. Do you find this shocking? Because I do: I never imagined I would be subjected to this much hate. It makes a mockery of the Christian admonition to love universally. It’s just not possible, or even desirable. Every time I see Trump on TV (or his apologists) the hate wells up—the bitter, wrenching feeling of disgust, disapproval, disdain. The stupidity, cruelty, self-centeredness, lack of common decency, sheer nastiness—what else can you feel? So, to those out there nursing a similar set of feelings, you are not alone. I think we do well to own up to it, because otherwise it will consume us.

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