Mind and Substance

Mind and Substance

A materialist like Hobbes would say that the soul is a material substance. This proposition has two parts: material and substance. What does the first part mean, or what does an avowed materialist mean by it? Presumably, that the mind is extended in space, solid, corpuscular, has a weight, and is perceptible by the senses—like the heart or liver. To say that these organs are material verges on the tautological (who could deny it?). What philosophical claim is being made? To say that of the mind isn’t to say that the mind is the brain: that begs the question of whether the brain itself is material, and it could be said by someone who had no knowledge of the brain. Some general claim is being made that presupposes that we know what “material” means, and the above list would seem to capture what is intended. No reference is made to the science of physics; and to make such a reference is to raise the question of what the science of physics is about (is it about “matter”, whatever that is?). Here we reach a familiar blind alley, which I won’t wander down again: the blind alley of trying to define “material” and “physical”. We certainly cannot say that these terms mean “whatever physics is about”, on pain of circularity. Nor can we define what “immaterial” means, because that presupposes that we know what “material” means. We are in mare’s nest territory (no such thing). Thus, a consensus has developed that the doctrine known as “materialism” is meaningless, vacuous, pure handwaving. What do you mean by saying (or denying) that the mind is material? And try to be precise. Do you mean it is exactly like the heart or liver? Or have you got some more rarified concept in mind like gravity or electricity? I fancy you have nothing very definite in mind. In any case, it has become unclear what this debate is about. But that is not my topic for today; my topic concerns the second part of the Hobbesian hypothesis—the claim that the soul (mind) is a substance. That question can survive the demise of the mind-matter conundrum. For the concept of substance is not defined by using the concept of matter (this is why people speak of immaterial substance—the phrase isn’t an oxymoron). We can broach the question of whether substantialism is true of the mind without being accused of trading in nonsense. The concept of a substance, classically understood, involves the idea of an independent self-subsistent enduring thing that exemplifies various characteristics (“accidents”). The question then becomes whether the mind (soul) fits the substance-accident model: is it a substance, or perhaps an accident of some other substance, or is it not? We don’t care if the substance is declared (stipulated) to be “material” or “immaterial”; we only care whether, ontologically, it is classifiable as a substance, or an accident of a substance. So, let’s turn to that question, remaining studiously neutral on the materialism-immaterialism debate.

I will get right to the point: is the self a substance that has mental states as its accidents? If the self is the body, it is; if not, not (assuming no non-bodily substances). We can imagine a lively debate about this (indeed, there is one). I am going to assume that the self is not the body (the whole thing or some part of it); the really interesting question is whether the mind is a substance that is not the body. Certainly, it has historically been assumed that this is a feasible position, as with classical dualism. Hence, the transcendent ego, the immortal soul, the ghost in the machine. The question has two parts: is the self a substance, and are mental states accidents of a substance. Now I don’t think this question is easily settled, but it is a genuine question—and a philosophically interesting one. On the one hand, what else could the self be, since substances are all there is (allegedly). On the other hand, selves don’t demonstrate the marks of substances as we know them, specifically independence and endurance through time; nor are they attributes of some other substance (e.g., the body) in any recognizable way. For: they depend on the body for their existence and don’t trace a path through space-time comparable to that of ordinary substances (you can’t see them moving around as time passes). The whole problem of personal identity through time attests to this. We have no clear idea what the alleged persistence consists in, if it consists in anything; we don’t even perceive them at a time (as Hume pointed out). They are really nothing like substances as we know them through perception. There may be some loose analogy between the two, but it is stretching a point to designate them true substances. Neither can we say that minds are really accidents of a substance other than the self, say the body, because it is just not true that beliefs, emotions, sensations, etc. are attributes of the body. We can’t say, “My body believes that Paris is in France”. Of course, the determined substantialist will make clever moves to blunt the force of these obvious objections, and a healthy philosophical debate will ensue. My point is that this is a real issue: is the mind substance-like or is it no sort of substance (or accident of a substance)? I incline to the latter position, but it’s not my intention to argue that here. I am suggesting that this is a better issue than whether the mind is material or not. Some philosophers have already waded into this debate, contending that the substance model is untenable (Ryle, Wittgenstein, Sartre); the question then becomes what is the alternative. Is behaviorism the only articulable option? Let’s hope not. The question threatens the whole thing-attribute ontology—discrete particulars instantiating multiple general properties. The self is not an object in which a cluster of attributes inheres; it is not a this that is thus-and-so. Does the particular-universal apparatus apply at all? The classical discussions assumed that the substance-accident model was compulsory: substantialism is the only viable ontology. But the mind-body problem puts that metaphysical position in jeopardy. The body is a substance, but the mind is (arguably) not a substance: how then can they be reconciled with each other? This is the new-old mind-body problem, replacing the discredited materialism debate. Let’s stop asking whether pain is physical and instead ask whether it is an accident of a substance—is it logically like an apple being red? Some interesting philosophy might result.[1]

[1] This paper relies on some earlier papers of mine, notably “Ontology of Mind”, “Mental Ontology”, and “Semantical Considerations on Mental Language”. I also presuppose earlier work, by myself and others, on the infeasibility of defining “material” and “physical”.