On Imagination, Belief, and Action

On Imagination, Belief, and Action

I was reminded recently of the importance of my book Mindsight (2004), because it brings the imagination into the center of the philosophy of mind.[1] In that book I make the point that belief presupposes imagination (chapter 10): for you can’t believe something without entertaining it first—imagining the state of affairs that makes it true. Imagination is thus prior to cognition: the cognitive step of belief formation builds on the antecedent formation of an imagined state of affairs. Imagination thus precedes and conditions reason. It isn’t somehow independent of reason and possibly at odds with it, as the rationalist tradition supposes; it is foundational to reason. The theory of belief (and hence reasoning) must include a theory of imagination. In the beginning was the image (in a broad sense). Representing a possibility precedes accepting an actuality.

The point I want to add to this is that imagination is also vital to agency: you can’t act (in the full sense) unless you envisage possibilities, because that’s what choice is—selecting from among imagined possibilities.[2]Action, like belief, is imagination-dependent. The will presupposes imagination, as does the ability to believe (and hence reason). Conation and cognition are thus up to their neck in imagination. The old opposition between rational action and rational belief, on the one hand, and imagination, on the other, is mistaken. Imagination is foundational in both areas. Thus, romanticism is true, after all. The human mind is fundamentally an imagining mind; it uses the same faculty as art and literature. We choose and believe because we imagine.

In addition, imagination is indispensable to freedom, since freedom is choice among possibilities; no imagination, no freedom.[3] True, a creature can be free of constraints hampering its free expression of desire; but unless it can imagine, it cannot choose from among alternatives. Many animals presumably lack an imagination capable of generating alternative possibilities, so they are not free in the way we are (though they can still be free to do what they want). Thus, freedom presupposes imagination. We can conclude that three of our most precious attributes—willed action, rational belief, and freedom—are predicated on the existence of imagination. We would do well to explore imagination further.[4]

[1] I happened upon a talk by Dr. Richard Ogle at the Bath Royal in 2005 (I had not seen it before), which celebrates the publication of Mindsight as reintroducing the imagination into the study of mind. It used to be regarded with suspicion (Plato, Christianity, etc.).

[2] See my “Agency and Imagination”.

[3] See my “Imagination and Free Will”.

[4] The higher flights of imagination, in art and science and philosophy, are based on a faculty universal in our species—presumably one that is biologically grounded. Language itself is made possible by the imagination, because meaning is a matter of grasping possibilities (see chapter 12 of Mindsight).