On Imagination, Belief, and Action
On Imagination, Belief, and Action
I was reminded recently of the importance of my book Mindsight (2004), because it brings the imagination into the center of the philosophy of mind.[1] In that book I make the point that belief presupposes imagination (chapter 10): for you can’t believe something without entertaining it first—imagining the state of affairs that makes it true. Imagination is thus prior to cognition: the cognitive step of belief formation builds on the antecedent formation of an imagined state of affairs. Imagination thus precedes and conditions reason. It isn’t somehow independent of reason and possibly at odds with it, as the rationalist tradition supposes; it is foundational to reason. The theory of belief (and hence reasoning) must include a theory of imagination. In the beginning was the image (in a broad sense). Representing a possibility precedes accepting an actuality.
The point I want to add to this is that imagination is also vital to agency: you can’t act (in the full sense) unless you envisage possibilities, because that’s what choice is—selecting from among imagined possibilities.[2]Action, like belief, is imagination-dependent. The will presupposes imagination, as does the ability to believe (and hence reason). Conation and cognition are thus up to their neck in imagination. The old opposition between rational action and rational belief, on the one hand, and imagination, on the other, is mistaken. Imagination is foundational in both areas. Thus, romanticism is true, after all. The human mind is fundamentally an imagining mind; it uses the same faculty as art and literature. We choose and believe because we imagine.
In addition, imagination is indispensable to freedom, since freedom is choice among possibilities; no imagination, no freedom.[3] True, a creature can be free of constraints hampering its free expression of desire; but unless it can imagine, it cannot choose from among alternatives. Many animals presumably lack an imagination capable of generating alternative possibilities, so they are not free in the way we are (though they can still be free to do what they want). Thus, freedom presupposes imagination. We can conclude that three of our most precious attributes—willed action, rational belief, and freedom—are predicated on the existence of imagination. We would do well to explore imagination further.[4]
[1] I happened upon a talk by Dr. Richard Ogle at the Bath Royal in 2005 (I had not seen it before), which celebrates the publication of Mindsight as reintroducing the imagination into the study of mind. It used to be regarded with suspicion (Plato, Christianity, etc.).
[2] See my “Agency and Imagination”.
[3] See my “Imagination and Free Will”.
[4] The higher flights of imagination, in art and science and philosophy, are based on a faculty universal in our species—presumably one that is biologically grounded. Language itself is made possible by the imagination, because meaning is a matter of grasping possibilities (see chapter 12 of Mindsight).
I have not read through Mindsight in some time. It might be ripe for another go round. I enjoyed what I remember of it.
Regarding the conceiving of a proposition to assess it, I think this is quite right. Not sure if this is your view (possibly in your book and I cannot recall) but I think this is because our minds (and language) are additive. It has to have a thing to behold even if just conceptually. So at least existence has to be posited for consideration.
I am a big fan of imagination in philosophy. Even if it produces bonkers ideas.
I have a question for you. I have noticed that you consistently, even since not doing it anymore, have the behavior of a teacher that wants to imbue philosophical inquiry into every mind you touch. I think this is very admirable and honorable.
Assuming this is true, is it because you think that untrained minds (non-philosophers) may be unencumbered by “proper” philosophy and produce novel ideas?
Yes, that is in the book, chapter 10.
I agree about bonkers ideas, except that they are not really bonkers in a philosophical context.
I am a natural-born teacher; I plead guilty to pedagogical harassment and failure to report teacherly relations. But it’s not for the reason you mention, but pure generosity of spirit (or egotism). I am the same with sports and music: I will teach them to anyone who wants to learn, free of charge. Tennis, table tennis, knife throwing, frisbee, paddle boarding, skateboarding, ten pin bowling, kayak surfing, etc. etc. Drums, guitar, singing.
Then I need to place it back at the top of the read-again pile. 😀
I think the world is better to have your generous spirit. Especially in a society where every interest has to be conmodified. Thanks, Colin.
Yes, but the idiots of the world seem intent on suppressing it.
Maybe it is time for “Fuck You, Crusader: A Defiant Philosophy”by Colin McGinn??? Or something equally confrontational.
It is past time for that; I have been plenty confrontational. Cowards don’t like confrontation.
Imagination-based philosophy is my kind of philosophy. The idea excites my romantic nature. I would love to contribute to placing imagination at the center of attention. Imagination exalts human life infinitely above its otherwise poor level. A human life devoid of imagination is not worth living. The flourishing of a society can be measured by the degree to which imagination is incorporated in the lives of its members.
I just had a thought. Imagination is the benchmark of value. Valuable objects engage the imagination while objects devoid of value leave the imagination cold and flaccid. Value is what the mind takes pleasure in contemplating and necessarily causes the imagination to expand. That which is devoid of value has no effect on the imagination.
I’m liking these sentiments. Imagination has had a bad rap; it’s the root of all that is good and beautiful.
Contra: we Aristotelians say that (1) we can believe the proposition “it is not the case that the earth is flat” without believing that the earth is flat. Then (2) to grasp the sense of that whole proposition, we must grasp the sense of the proposition which it contains, namely “the earth is flat”. But (3) grasping the sense of that contained proposition clearly does not involve any act of imagination.
I am using ‘proposition’ in its scholastic sense, namely a sentence (a set of words) capable of truth and falsity, and not in some Fregean Platonic sense.
But it does involve imagining that the earth is flat, i.e., that possible state of affairs.
Can I not understand “the earth is flat” without imagining that the earth is flat?
No, because you have to grasp that possibility, i.e., the truth conditions, and possibilities are the domain of the imagination.
This could be a long discussion. What about ‘it is not the case that 1+1=0’? What are the imaginative truth conditions of 1+1=0?
Yes, very. That would require going into the philosophy of mathematics. A Platonist would say you have to imagine an impossible situation involving abstract objects, a formalist would give another kind of answer involving symbols, an intuitionist another involving mental acts, a fictionalist another involving non-existent entities, etc.
To be fair, in Aristotle’s framework, phantasia (imagination) is absolutely essential to understanding and entertaining propositions. This is because Aristotle maintains that human thought cannot occur without a mental image, or phantasma. Aristotle famously asserts in De Anima that “the soul never thinks without an image”.
Clearly I am not an orthodox Aristotelian.
Another problem “It is not the case that black is white”. Given that imagination is closely connected with visual imagery (see the etymology) how do I imagine that black is white?
This is why the positivists and others declare such sentences meaningless. I think you make an imaginative attempt, give up, and declare it impossible. I distinguish imagination from images in my book.
I could not reply directly to the math example, so here goes.
For 1+1=0, I am of two ideas.
First, I try to imagine it and it is not hard to do. I imagine having an apple, adding an apple, and then not having any apples as a result. It seems trivial to do so.
Second involves symbol manipulation and just is what is displayed.
However, if following the normalized axioms of math, it becomes incoherent.
Not sure if any of this explored your thoughts usefully.