Mysterian News
Mysterian News
I notice in today’s NY Times (May 10, 2026) that Ross Douthat mentions the word “mysterian” in his weekly column, expressing sympathy with the doctrine so named. He doesn’t say anything worth reading (as usual), but the article is indicative of the wider intellectual culture; the inset contains the words “The nature of consciousness is still a mystery”. Remind you of anyone? A bit of history: when I published my article “Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?” in 1989 in Mind I was well aware of its likely impact and my predictions have been borne out. First, I would be regarded as an eccentric who had lost his way after a promising early career (“Have you seen that weird article by Colin McGinn?”). After five years the thesis would become a mainstream position in philosophy, though not widely accepted, but it would be forgotten that I created it (with a little help from my friends and forerunners). This also happened. Next it would seep out into the broader intellectual culture, eventually shaping the entire debate. It would be supposed that I just latched onto a cultural trend. Finally, it would become a meme, helped along by Owen Flanagan’s catchy coinage “mysterianism”. This has all come to pass, but let me remind the world that I created it. I actually re-shaped intellectual culture, not just the philosophy of mind. Everything you read on this subject today has been influenced by my contributions. In the future, I predict, it will become the dominant and orthodox position (this will take from twenty to fifty years). And this blog will be the central text of the revolution. Just wait and see. I have been right up to now.
I’ve just downloaded the 1989 paper, and reading it now. Very interesting….
The mind body problem can’t be solve exempt if it is a false problem.
Do you mean it’s a pseudo problem?
In a way yes.
Due to the false properties we May be assign to our phenomenal sensations.
What sort of “false properties”?
1. The fact that they appear « in them selves » ( en elles même) in a non relationnel and absolute way ( that « red is red and there is nothing more to say »)
2. Ineffability (same idea)
The relationnal nature of phenomenal properties (for example with physical elementary properties) could be hiden to us.
In a sense, I agree (if I see through your French prose): the mind-brain relation is intrinsically and objectively transparent.
Sorry, no it wasn’t exactly what I wanted to say ( the fault to my bad level in english)
I wanted to say that the properties usualy given to phenomenality (ineffability and intrinsicness ) could be illusory.
And yet they belong to the appearances and are therefore part of reality.
Absolutly but it is compatible with the fact they appear in a deceiving way
True, but then they still have to be accounted for.