Action Explanation

Action Explanation

The orthodox view of action explanation goes as follows: a desire combines with a belief to cause a bodily movement; citing these explains the action in question.[1] I desire a beer and I believe that moving my body into the kitchen will get me a beer, and these together cause me to act in a certain way, i.e., I go to the kitchen. The desire alone will not do the trick, and neither will the belief, but if we conjoin them the action is the causal upshot. This is belief-desire psychology. I will pour cold water on this idea: these conditions are neither necessary nor sufficient to bring about the action, though in certain circumstances they could. Possible agents could work this way (just about).

The reason they are not necessary is this: you could act without having either a belief or a desire. Some agents have no beliefs at all, others act without forming instrumental beliefs; and not all action is prompted by desire. It is too intellectualist to suppose that all action is backed by a belief about what bodily movements would lead to a certain outcome—consider animals, babies, and unreflective adults. Is it to be supposed that I consciously believe that putting my foot forward will lead me to get to the other room? I don’t even think about it, let alone form a belief to that effect—a rational, justified, true belief. Rather, my body is programmed to act that way; I don’t consider the various ways I can get to the other room and arrive at the belief that putting one foot in front of another will get the job done. Nor do I always desire to do what I do; I often desire not to do it. The concept of desire is being used in a highly promiscuous manner in these formulations (so sometimes people resort to “pro-attitude”). But even if we allow this dubious move, it is not true that people always act on their desires, even their carefully considered desires—because there is such a thing as weakness of will. People find themselves doing what they do not, and ought not, want to do. Desire is bypassed, bracketed. And the conditions are not sufficient because causation by belief and desire is not sufficient for intentional action, as in cases of deviant causal chains. Further, a desire is basically impotent without the consent of the will; I have a great many desires I don’t act on. I can desire a beer and believe I can get one from the kitchen but I don’t act on it, because I’m too lazy or am trying to drink less or because I get distracted. In order to act the will must be engaged—whatever that may be. The belief-desire story is intended as a substitute for direct appeal to the will, this being deemed mysterious. It is indeed a mystery, but the belief-desire story is a myth. The correct explanation of my action is that I willed it, but we can’t say what this amounts to. Beliefs and desires are lame substitutes, being neither necessary not sufficient for willed action.

The fact is that action can result from, and be explained by, almost anything. It can be explained by a moral judgement, or a momentary perception, or a vivid mental image, or a pang of hunger, or a fit of jealousy, or a creative breakthrough—so long as the will is engaged. But we don’t know what the will is and how it works; it seems like a sudden upsurge from the deep. It has unconscious roots and a peculiar kind of creativity. It seems to emerge from nowhere, inexplicably, miraculously. It is like consciousness in this respect—an emergent puzzling phenomenon. A mental impetus, a mysterious trigger. It is easily aroused and not always rational. It isn’t fussy about what triggers it. If I imagine myself jumping off a high building, I may find myself with an urge to do it, though nothing in my psyche recommends that rash move; my will is being tickled and aroused. I may spit or kick or scream just for the hell of it. The will is like a separate faculty with a mind of its own; it isn’t the obedient servant of belief and desire. The will looks askance at belief and desire—too passive, too leaden, too stuck in their ways. They are conservative and docile; it is bold and adventurous. The right view, then, is that we have no adequate theory of action explanation, beyond the truism that some bodily movements are the result of will and some are not. Why did I jump off the bridge or tap my finger? Because I willed it; that’s the basic psychological fact, though correlated with other such facts (beliefs and desires, moods and feelings). The action was unlike unwilled “acts” like accidentally tripping up or falling down. The will is influenced by belief and desire, but it isn’t identical to them—they are not what it consists in. The will is a mystery, as has long been recognized.[2]

[1] The locus classicus is Davidson’s “Actions, Reasons, and Causes” (1963).

[2] Take sleep-walking, for example: clearly an action, but where are the beliefs and desires supposed necessary for action? Or hypnotically induced action, or obsessive-compulsive action, or shifting in bed while asleep, or humming, or pursing one’s lips, or involuntarily mimicking someone else, or pulling one’s ear lobe, or swearing under one’s breath. The model of an antecedent desire coupled with an instrumental belief about how to satisfy it has no application in these cases—yet they are actively willed. It is another thing entirely.