An Argument Against Panpsychism
An Argument Against Panpsychism
Panpsychism holds that elementary particles have mentality, attenuated perhaps, but capable of yielding consciousness as we know it. Yet particles don’t generally instantiate many properties—mass, charge, spin, motion, and that’s about it. So, if they also instantiate mental properties, these too must be few in number—say, three or four (or maybe just one). But how do we get the full range of mental properties out of such an exiguous basis? It looks impossible. Therefore, panpsychism is false as an explicative-reductive doctrine. We might decide to espouse it out of whimsical largesse, but it won’t work to explain the existence and nature of the conscious mind as it presents itself. The particle will be too mentally impoverished. To this argument it might be replied that physical objects display a similar variety of kinds at the macro level and yet the constituent particles also have a small number of basic properties. True, but we can bridge the gap mereologically by invoking an agglomeration relation: the particles combine to generate the full range of natural kinds (e.g., animal species). This is perfectly intelligible and indeed we have good theories of how it works (it’s like a jigsaw puzzle). But in the case of the mind this is precisely what is lacking: we don’t understand how a small number of primitives (mental or physical) can produce the full range of mental phenomena. Therefore, the original argument still holds. How could the elementary bits of mentality be arranged side by side so as to produce the manifold varieties of consciousness? We could, of course, declare it a mystery, but then we have abandoned all claim to explanatory adequacy; and that is really all that can be said in panpsychism’s favor, since it lacks any other independent warrant. Realistically, it is hard to see how there could be more than one proto-mental property of particles; but then, the task of generating all of consciousness from this scanty foundation looks impossible.[1]
[1] I think that panpsychism, seductive though it may be, provides only an illusion of understanding, even if true in some form. The same basic problem of emergence keeps cropping up. Still, it is an excellent theory to think about.
It is such a patently absurd doctrine that I have never paid it any attention.
True, but in consciousness studies all we have are absurd doctrines (except mine).
Remind me of your doctrine
Mysterianism.
Do you have a link to an article or title of a book pls.
Google says *The Mysterious Flame: Conscious Minds in a Material World*
Yes, among several others. There is a lot on this blog if you search under Mystery. I generally make people swear to join the cult of the Mysterians as a condition of coming on this blog.