Amatory Knowledge We have heard a lot about different kinds of knowledge in epistemology courses; I want to add a new kind of knowledge and explore its contours and characteristics. I call it “amatory knowledge”, which belongs to the family including carnal knowledge, erotic knowledge, sexual knowledge, sensual knowledge, libidinal knowledge, romantic knowledge, and marital […]
Consciousness and Mental Representation There is a language of thought, or so they say (and think).[1] When you think you are speaking inwardly (or perhaps hearing inwardly): there is a code with symbols, a syntax, a semantics. The words in this code combine like words in spoken languages. To think is to say in the […]
Edward St Aubyn and Me I met Edward St Aubyn, author of the Patrick Melrose Trilogy, at a conference on consciousness in Tucson about twenty years ago. He was writing a book centering on the problem of consciousness. Tall, handsome, witty, refined—I took to him immediately. We became friends. I came to know him as […]
Astronomical Perception I don’t think anyone would seriously argue that we see stars just as they are. They look to us like small pinpoints of light not massive physical bodies, and they were conceived as such in earlier times. If there were a dome over the earth with apertures in it and a conflagration behind, […]
False Knowledge Is it true that all knowledge is knowledge of truths? Does the concept of knowledge entail that the proposition known is a true proposition? Certainly, we have been schooled to think so; and the idea is far from preposterous. But is the propositional content of the knowledge literally, universally, and necessarily true? We […]
Experience and Naïve Realism Is there anything in sense experience that indicates the falsity of naive realism? For example, is there anything in sense experience that informs us that objects are not objectively colored? Or is it a matter of science and conceptual reflection? Do we know that naïve realism is false just by being […]
Descriptions and Names The distinction between names and descriptions is not as sharp as we tend to suppose. We are prone to think that names are purely denotative (tags, labels) and descriptions are purely connotative (attributional, predicational), but actually the two overlap. If you favor a description theory of names, you are still up to […]
