The Subjective Mind(-View) How subjective is our view of the mind, our own and other’s? How much are we skewed and limited by our given viewing faculties and conceptual resources? We have a view of the physical world—a picture, a conception—and we can ask how subjective it is, i.e., how dependent on our peculiar sensory […]
Ontology of Psychology Every subject has its basic ontology—its preferred subject matter, the things it takes to exist, what it is committed to. In physics it is macroscopic bodies, particles, and fields (including forces); in astronomy it is stars, planets, and black holes; in chemistry it is molecules and chemical reactions; in biology it is […]
Philosophy of Learning In philosophy we study perception, knowledge, belief, memory, and reasoning—but not so much learning. In psychology learning is central, but in philosophy it is peripheral at best (perhaps part of philosophy of education). I propose to make some programmatic remarks about learning as a philosophical topic (I happen to have a strong […]
Skeptical Solutions to the Mind Problem Early thinkers had a body problem: what is body? What is the stuff we call “matter”? The pre-Socratics had a go at answering this question: matter is water, or variations on the four elements (earth, fire, water, and air). More advanced thinkers proposed invisible atoms, or spatial extension, or […]
Do Animals Have an Inner Child? Nowadays it is commonly accepted that humans have an inner child. The idea is natural enough: the personality and experiences of the young child stick in the mind in later years, shaping later life. They don’t just disappear at an appointed age, discarded like clothes that no longer fit. […]
Philosophy of Popularity Are there any concepts for which a skeptical theory (solution) is obviously correct? Consider popularity: what is it to be popular? Suppose someone thinks that popularity is defined by a specific observable quality of a person such as good looks (suitably defined). They might even think that popularity is defined by having […]
Family Resemblances and Skeptical Solutions We all remember Wittgenstein’s famous sections on games and family resemblance; I won’t repeat them. The point I want to make is that they can be construed as providing a skeptical solution to a skeptical problem. Not that Wittgenstein saw them this way; on the contrary, he had no notion […]
