Asleep and Awake

Asleep and Awake

Listen, do you want to know a secret? The government has been withholding it from us. When we are asleep, we are awake, and when we are awake, we are asleep. We have been bamboozled into thinking that in sleep we are not awake and when awake not asleep. Sheer propaganda and lazy ordinary language (ordinary language propaganda). The best way to describe our mental state when in the condition we call “sleep” is that we are partially asleep and partially awake (very awake actually); and similarly, for being awake (we are partially asleep). This is not hard to demonstrate and requires no sleep science or fanciful hypotheses; it is common knowledge. We are always both asleep and awake. The OED defines “sleep” thus: “a regularly occurring condition of body and mind in which the nervous system is inactive, the eyes closed, the postural muscles relaxed, and consciousness practically suspended”. This definition leaves a lot to be desired: people don’t always have the luxury of sleeping regularly, the nervous system is not inactive in sleep, the eyes are not invariably closed (you might not even have eyelids), the postural muscles are no more relaxed than they are when lying down awake, and what does it mean to say that consciousness is “practically suspended”? Clearly, the editors are having trouble defining the word (and the state itself). The basic idea is that the sleeping person (or animal) is (largely) unaware of his surroundings: he is not awake to his immediate environment. He is not tuned into what is going on around him, not conscious of it, oblivious to it. His mind is blank relative to his environment; his senses are cut from their usual perceptual function. He is selectively “blind”.

But let’s notice two things about this state of oblivion: it is not complete, and the sleeper is normally conscious of other things. Outside stimuli are still getting in to some degree, as experiments have shown; and, of course, he is often dreaming. He is quite well aware of his dreams—they are occurring in his sleeping consciousness. In dreaming we are aware of our dream objects—the intentional objects of our dreams (people and things). We are awake to these. We are not detached from our dreams; we know about them perfectly well, as our subsequent memory shows. We are not awake (much) to our environment, but we are awake to our dream world. We are not perceptually awake, but we are introspectively awake. Our perceptual consciousness is blank, but our dream consciousness is brimming with content—just as our day-dreaming consciousness is. We are not asleep relative to this, i.e., unresponsive to it, inactive with respect to it. Psychologically, we are very much awake: aware, conscious, affected, emotionally moved. We are not in an unconscious coma. Our nervous system is firing on all cylinders. Thus, we are partially awake during sleep (unless sleeping dreamlessly).

And there is a further point: we are also aware of the condition of our body—our posture, temperature, the state of our bladder, etc. We are awake where they are concerned. To be asleep is really best understood as being unaware perceptually (though even this is not total). Our senses are asleep, but not the rest of us. But we lazily describe this as if the whole conscious mind has shut down, which is far from the truth. Our normal concept of sleep disguises the psychological facts from us. Ordinary language misleads us. It was never designed to be pedantically correct psychologically. It isn’t meant to be scientific psychology. We can imagine speakers who say things like, “I was wide awake all night, dreaming of my mother-in-law”.  Might it not also turn out that our so-called dreams are really reality, so we never had them while asleep? It is epistemically possible that you are really awake when you think you are asleep dreaming. Qualitatively, dreams are like waking experience. The OED gives the phrase “awake to” the definition “aware of”, and we are certainly aware of our dreams (not to mention the state of our bladder). In short, you are awake when you are asleep—awake to.

The next claim is less obvious: that we are asleep when awake. But the reasoning is much the same: we are unaware of certain things that we are aware of during sleep. Here it is convenient to invoke Freud, at least as a thought experiment: in Freud’s psychology we are closed off in waking life to our unconscious, but we are aware of it in dreams—for example, you might dream of having sex with your mother. Suppose there exists some sorry species that actually has a mind as Freud described our mind: they dream at night of acting on their repressed sexual desires, but during waking hours no such content enters their heads. Then they are not aware of (awake to) the facts of their own mind, as revealed in their dreams; they are asleep relative to those facts. They are unconscious of their inner (psychological) environment when awake. They are awake to it at night, but not awake to it during the day—it’s as if they are asleep where that is concerned. They are in a detached sleep-like state when it comes to their unconscious desires. They have no consciousness of these while awake. They know them by night, but not in the light of day. Sometimes people are described as sleep-walking through life, meaning that they are oblivious to obvious facts, closed off to reality. It’s as they are asleep cognitively. The question then becomes whether we partake of any of this: are we at least somewhat Freudian? I think this is not an unreasonable conjecture: our dreams are tuned into facts about ourselves that never reach the surface in our waking life, except perhaps in a crisis situation. We gleefully go through life thinking we are decent intelligent human beings, say, while all along we are stupid bastards. We are asleep relative to the truth about ourselves, while awake relative to other things—unaware, incognizant. We are in a state like that of not seeing or hearing what is going on around us when asleep. The same natural psychological kind occurs in both cases.

We need a word for what we do typically at night when we close our eyes and don’t want to be disturbed, and we call that “sleep”. We also need a word that signifies that we are up and about and ready to face the day, and we call this being “awake”. We then think these are mutually exclusive, so it sounds funny to speak of sleeping wakefulness and waking sleep. But the psychological facts underlying these phases of human (and animal) existence are more complex than the simple binary distinction recognizes; the two states are more intertwined than we suppose. The fact is that we are in both states nearly all the time—blind to this but not to that, awake to this but not to that. A sleeping man might be extremely awake to certain things, and a waking man might be fast asleep with respect to his own self. Your dreaming life may be more awake than your waking life, and your waking life may be sleepier than your dreaming life, strange as it sounds. So much for the ordinary language of sleep and wakefulness.[1]

[1] Is it a matter of conversational implicature? If I say of a sleeping man “He is awake”, do I speak the literal truth, though the implicature that he is in perceptual touch with his surroundings is clearly false? If so, that would be a striking example of Grice’s invaluable distinction. Try it with “He is conscious” said of a sleeping (but dreaming) man; surely that statement is quite true, given that dreaming is a state of consciousness—implicatures notwithstanding. Is sleep, in reality, one kind of wakefulness and wakefulness one kind of sleep, though we don’t talk that way for implicature reasons? The human mind is asleep-awake all the time.

Share

Two-Handed Tennis

Two-handed Tennis

There I was on the court, as usual. Nothing out of the ordinary. Then I noticed that the guy on the next court was playing two-handed, as I do. It turned out that the guy I was playing with, Robert, knew the guy and introduced me. We belonged to a rare breed, on the brink of extinction and never populous—the two-handers. I started playing with two hands only a couple of years ago because of an injury; he, Matthew, had been doing it since he was a kid. He said it just came naturally to him; he had tried with one hand but just didn’t like it. I sat and watched him play. He was clearly an excellent player, forehand and backhand. The forehand was solid as a rock and highly effective. We then had a talk about why more people don’t used that technique, expressing bafflement. It’s easier for kids for whom a single arm is often not strong enough; you get a lot of control; almost everyone accepts that a two-handed backhand is preferable. I myself don’t think it should be a binary choice; here I seem to be in a minority of one. Why not play both ways depending on the situation? I can play one-handed and two-handed on both sides—it’s not that hard. But no one ever does. No one. Professional or amateur. You get the best of both worlds and it startles the opponent. I intend to play with Matthew one day and do a scientific study of his stroke, comparing notes. Maybe we can spread the gospel of two hands.

Monica Seles used to play with both hands, and then there is the great Fabrice Santoro of France, now retired (aged 53). I revisited some old videos of him on YouTube (I did see him play once in Miami about eighteen years ago). They called him The Magician. He seems almost superhuman technically, with an enormous variety of shots, some of them trick shots. He had a long successful career, though never reached the top ten. I don’t think anyone supposes that he would have done better if he had played one-handed; indeed, he would have done worse. I feel like I play better two-handed than I used to one-handed, though I did the latter for many more years (and had a healthy right arm then). Two-handed players like playing two-handed; they don’t do it for the novelty effect or because they can’t swing a racket with one hand. I do both depending on how I want to hit the ball and its distance from my body. This raises an obvious question: why don’t more players adopt the two-handed lifestyle? Why are there so few of us? No one ever claims that it has been scientifically proven that one hand is better than two—and the two-handed backhand is clearly the dominant stroke these days. Why don’t people, players and coaches, at least give it a try? Maybe it’s not for everyone, but surely many more players would prefer it if given the chance. I find it makes the game more fun, and I win more points that way.

Share

John Lennon and Me

John Lennon and Me

John Lennon was assassinated near where I used to live. I used to live at West End Avenue and 73rd Street in Manhattan. The Dakota is on 72nd Street and Central Park West. I would walk by it all the time and always thought of him. The memorial to him is right there. I always felt that America had done that to him not just an isolated lunatic. And there is another close connection: when I won the English prize at my school (I came top) I chose two books by John Lennon as my reward, A Spaniard in the Works and In His Own Write. I well remember the look on the English teacher’s face as he handed me the books at the prize-giving ceremony (“You cheeky bugger”). I had won the prize in the English language and I chose two books by a pop star—written in gibberish! All true, but I loved those books; they are hilarious and very clever. Of course, Lennon was part of my life from 13 on: I know all his music and have read a lot about him. I never met the man and set eyes on him only once, at an airport in the distance. I sing a lot of John Lennon songs and think about him almost every day (I just learned to sing “Mother”).

But there is a deeper, though tenuous, connection, which I find hard to put into words: his death and my destruction. He was murdered by a madman in a mob, and before that had death threats for his comment about the Beatles and Jesus Christ. American hysteria, American violence. I had my career and reputation destroyed by a similar mob. Believe me, I felt the violence, the lust to destroy. I can’t name individuals, though every crowd is made of them. The reality of the evil was somehow ignored by its practitioners (I am thinking of ex-colleagues and so-called friends). Of course, John was physically killed and I wasn’t. But you fool yourself if you don’t see an analogy. I think the other Beatles are lucky not to have been killed by some other American lunatic (there are plenty of them). Somehow adulation turns to homicide, success breeds annihilation. There are many forms of murder and America is good at all of them.

We are lucky that we still have his music and spirit (and books)—killing him couldn’t destroy that. I still have my books and other writings. You tried to destroy that too, with your self-righteous attempts at academic cancelation, but it is harder to destroy than a life. If only John had survived that bullet. We could have had an interesting conversation.

Share

Truth as Consistency

Truth as Consistency

I will present a new theory of truth. It can be stated thus: for a proposition to be true is for it to be consistent with reality.[1] For “snow is white” to be true is for it to be consistent with the fact that snow is white; “snow is black” is not consistent with snow being white, so it is false. It can’t be that “snow is black” is true and yet snow is white; but “snow is white” being true is eminently consistent with snow being white. The part of reality referred to by “snow is white” is the state of affairs of snow actually being white, but “snow is black” refers to no actual state of affairs. The latter sentence is not consistent with reality, but the former is. If someone asserted that snow is black, we could reply that that statement is not consistent with reality, thereby stating that the proposition in question is not true. It will be noticed that this relation of consistency holds between propositions and parts of reality; so, it isn’t the same as consistency between propositions. Some may find this objectionable, but it really isn’t. It is a perfectly natural way to talk. States of affairs can be consistent or inconsistent with each other, as well as propositions; we are simply extending the concept to a relation between propositions and facts (constituents of reality). There is consistency between propositions, consistency between states of affairs, and consistency between propositions and states of affairs. There is nothing incoherent about any of this; logic straddles these domains.  The theory is thus intuitively appealing and logically kosher.

What is nice about this theory is that it dispenses with the old notion of correspondence, which was never terribly clear. Doesn’t “snow is black” correspond with the fact that snow is white in the sense that it maps onto that fact via the falsehood relation? To rule this out we have to say, “truth-making correspondence”, but that is circular. The word “correspondence” merely gestures at a relation we haven’t yet articulated; it trades on reading truth into it. It doesn’t provide a concept that has an independent use—a prior meaning. But the word “consistency” does just that; it uses a concept we are familiar with from logic, not some ill-defined newfangled word. We know what consistency is already; we just have to extend its use to a new domain, viz. proposition-reality consistency. Thus, we can say that the sentence “’snow is white’ is true and snow is not white” expresses a logical contradiction, since the first conjunct entails that snow is white—it entails that reality is a certain way. Truth is simply consistency with the fact a sentence states: the proposition that snow is white is consistent with the fact that snow is white.

It might be said that the proposition that snow is white is consistent with many facts (infinitely many), but doesn’t it have just one truth-maker, viz. the fact that snow is white? Don’t we need to be more specific? All right, we can do that: we avail ourselves of the concept of entailment. Proposition and fact are not just consistent; the former entails the latter. That seems right: you can deduce, from “’snow is white’ is true”, that snow is white—but not that grass is green. We therefore obtain the entailment theory of truth: for a proposition to be true is for it to entail a (specific) fact—the fact it states. And the entailment cuts both ways: if it is a fact that snow is white, then it must be the case that “snow is white” is true. Then we have a conjunctive theory: for a proposition to be true is for it to be consistent with reality and such as to entail a specific fact of (or in) reality. The proposition that snow is white is consistent with reality and it entails the specific fact that snow is white. But the initial formulation was fine as it stands: to be true is to be consistent with the facts or with reality (compare “to be true is to correspond to the facts or to reality”). Truth, we feel, is a relation, and so it is under the consistency theory—not a correspondence relation, whatever exactly that is. Truth is a logical relation, familiar to us from logic. Thus, truth is a logical concept; indeed, the most basic of logical concepts. It needs no further enrichment. It may not be redundant, but it is extremely slender (rail-thin).[2]

[1] The idea for this paper came, improbably enough, from an Iranian comment on President Donald Trump: “His statement is not consistent with reality”. Is this a diplomatic way of saying that Trump’s statement was a lie, or at least false? Maybe in Iran the theory I am proposing is a commonplace.

[2] This is a minimalist theory of truth in that it invokes no heavy machinery in its analysis of the concept of truth; it relies solely upon the logical notion of consistency. But it is relational and is not just a redundancy theory. We do need a concept not contained in the proposition itself to capture the concept of truth, viz. consistency. By my count, this is the fifth theory of truth I have invented (see this blog), more than all the usual theories combined; it seems just a bit too easy to define truth. My theories are not incompatible but can be combined to form a composite picture of the nature of truth. Concepts don’t have just one analysis; they are more complex than that.

Share

Beatle Genius

Beatle Genius

Big news: I have changed my opinion of the genius of the Beatles. I used to think that John and Paul were the true geniuses, with George and Ringo excellent but not at the same genius level. I now think that is wrong: George and Ringo were geniuses too! We need to distinguish genius from excellence or technical prowess. No one ever thought that John and Paul were genius-level musicians—either as instrumentalists or singers; what people thought was that they were creative geniuses, artistic geniuses. They had it. That indefinable magic. The look, the sound, the charisma. But so did the other two if you pay attention. George was a fantastic guitarist in his style, tone, and creativity; and he rocked. He could also sing great harmonies and stirring leads (e.g., Roll Over Beethoven, not to mention later classics). He also became a genius songwriter, as everyone now acknowledges. He looked and sounded great beside the other two. The three of them were incredible performers, in a class of their own. I don’t think anyone in the Stones or the Who were quite at George’s level, excellent as they are, let alone John and Paul. But what about Ringo—a genius? Now I speak as a drummer: I hereby assert that Ringo was also a creative genius as a drummer. He didn’t have the chops of Ginger Baker and many others, but I don’t think anyone thinks Ginger was a percussive genius—merely technically brilliant. Ringo, however, really gave a song what it needed; he hit the drums just right. His drumming in Twist and Shout is stupendous, but so it was in everything; I don’t know of a single weak drum part in a Beatles song (except those few played by Paul). Ringo was also a genius in his image: physically shorter, not as handsome, more modest and agreeable. He was the most loved Beatle. He sang With a Little Help from my Friends perfectly. So, the Beatles had four geniuses in the band, and I’m not sure any other band had any. Brian Wilson had some, so did Pete Townsend, maybe Steve Winwood—but no one shone as brightly as those four young men from Liverpool. They were incapable of junk and jointly revolutionized pop music. Their personalities alone lit up the world at a dreary time. And I say this as one who didn’t really love their middle period stuff (Rubber Soul, Revolver)—too experimental, not raw enough.

Share

More on Skateboarding

More on Skateboarding

Yesterday’s New York Times carried an article about skateboarding, in the business section of all places. I read it with interest. It was all about skateboarding in middle age. The author passionately described his sessions in a Costco parking lot. The emphasis was on bonding with his middle-aged buddies, learning tricks and filming it. These wild and free heroes of the concrete and tarmac had learned to skateboard as teenagers and were still doing it! Imagine that: in your forties and fifties (and in rare cases your sixties) and still able to skateboard, even quite competently! I thought: I started skateboarding when I was 74 (no exclamation point). It wasn’t that hard—hardly heroic at all. I was doing it (sans buddies) yesterday afternoon on my prized Magneto long-board, with helmet and wrist guards, gliding along the local byways (the next street over). Looking dashing, no doubt. No tricks, no fancy stuff, just solid no-nonsense cruising. What is it with the tricks? Not if you want to avoid body-road collisions. Let’s not get all American-macho about it, with age-group rivalry and what-not. I like to glide and cruise, gaze at the scenery, feel the air rushing past. I did it after my usual Sunday afternoon tennis practice and motorcycle riding. None of this is in the slightest bit miraculous (though I suppose my medical history makes it statistically improbable). Remember, I started playing the guitar at 60, singing at 70, knife throwing at 75. It doesn’t really warrant an article in the business section of the New York Times. If I can do it, you can. The thing is you don’t really want to: you are afraid you will look foolish, do it incompetently, fail to do it at all. Be honest now. You think you are past all that and prefer the comfort of the sofa. Think again, I say.

Share

Counterfactuals

Counterfactuals

In a world with less gravity, the birds would be huge. In a world with more gravity, only insects would fly. In a world with more light and plant predators, plants would have consciousness and advanced intelligence. In a world with greater water resistance, whales would be small. In a colder world, there would be no cold-blooded animals. In a hotter world, all animals would be cold-blooded. In a wetter world, we would have gills. In a drier world, life would begin on the land, if it begins at all. In a world without tool-forming materials, we would still be walking on four legs. In a world with only predators, there would be no life. In a world without predators, life would be simple and boring. In a world without a sun, life would be primitive, unless there was another power source. In a world with available nuclear power, life would be much more abundant than now. In a world without consciousness, there would be no war. In a world without emotion, there would be no suicide. In a world with no psychology, there would be no madness. In a world without motion, there world be no progress and no death. In a world without causation, there would be only chaos. In a world without necessity, there would be only randomness. In a world without events, everything would be eternal. In a world without the infinite, there would be no finite. In a world without relations, there would be no facts. In a world without facts, there would be nothing. In a world without reality, there would be no unreality. In a world without nothingness, there would be no being.

Counterfactuals are inherently surprising, which is why we are fascinated by them. They tell us how different things could be under small changes. There are many kinds of counterfactual. We live in their shadow. They are always controversial, sometimes paradoxical. They give us a sense of intellectual freedom. They scare us. They are also funny. We wouldn’t know what to do without them. In a world without counterfactuals, there would be no thought worthy of the name.

Share

Fodor on Concept Possession

Fodor on Concept Possession

Jerry Fodor holds that to possess a concept is to be able to think about its referent—and that’s all. He asks, rhetorically, “So what’s wrong with identifying having a concept C with being able to think about Cs as such?” (21: italics all his, for some reason.) Later we read: “To have the concept TABLE is to be able to think about tables as such; to have the concept PRIME NUMBER is to be able to think about prime numbers as such; and so on, with perfect generality, for predicative concepts at large.” (75)[1] He opposes this theory to what he calls pragmatist theories that identify concept possession with dispositions to accept conceptual entailments and suchlike matters. He calls his theory a Cartesian theory of concept possession. He regards it as minimalist and intuitively correct—a piece of non-theoretical common sense. He thinks it is anti-pragmatist. I am going to argue that it is not correct at all, and, in fact, another form of pragmatism (and not Cartesian). Concepts are not abilities and not abilities to think. They are more primitive and neutral than that. The objections are really quite obvious and widely rehearsed.

Are Fodor’s conditions necessary and sufficient for concept possession? Must anyone who has the concept Cbe able to think about its referent, and must everyone with the ability to think about the referent of C have the concept C? As to necessity: must anyone with legs be able to walk? No, because they may be paralyzed. So, it would be wrong to analyze leg possession as having the ability to walk. Having a trait does not always entail being able to act on it. Is pain analyzable as an ability to avoid the painful stimulus? No—paralysis again. Is having a memory the same as being able to remember? No, because the memory, though present, may not be retrievable—now or ever. Is having a concept the same as being able to think about its referent? No, because you might have a splitting headache, or are being tortured with loud noises, or have brain damage to your thinking area (but not your concept-storing area). What about innate concepts (which Fodor believes in)—can’t they exist without the ability to think, now or ever? Being able to think of X goes beyond merely having the concept X. The former is not a necessary condition of the latter. And how much is built into thinking—does it require reasoning? But surely you can have a concept and not be able to reason with it for any number of reasons (drugs, head trauma, etc.). Does Fodor mean able think like a normal human or will an animal do; the former may not be a necessary condition for concept possession. The ability to think of X is a typical consequence of having the concept X not its very essence. What then is its essence? Simple: a concept is a mental representation of something (with certain combinatorial properties)[2]—not the ability to employ this representation in thought. That is an additional fact. Knowing the meaning of a word is not an ability to use it, since you may be unable to speak, or even engage in inner vocal acts. Concepts are not actions. That’s a pragmatist prejudice, as Fodor would be the first to insist. Descartes doesn’t hold that ideas are practical abilities to think any more than perceptions are practical abilities to act. They may be the basis of such abilities, but they don’t reduce to them. Thinking is an action, an intentional action, but concepts aren’t actions—any more than eyes and ears are. Anatomy isn’t ability but structure. Would Fodor say that concepts are dispositions to think about their referents? Presumably not, given that a person may not be disposed to think in that way, even though in possession of the relevant concepts—he may not feel like thinking and be disposed rather to go to sleep. Or he may find thinking of X painful and prefer to avoid thinking of X—he is disposed notto think of X. And is a very circumscribed thinker (he thinks only about football), with a minimal ability to think complex thoughts, less in possession of his concepts than a brilliant polymathic thinker? There are degrees of the ability to think, but not degrees of concept possession correlated with this. Possessing a concept is not a skill (more like a state). You can get better at thinking but not at concept possessing.

None of this is to deny that a concept may be defined as a way of thinking (a mode of presentation, a Fregean sense), but that is not the same as an ability to think; ways aren’t abilities. A way of walking isn’t an ability to walk. It is interesting that Fodor never says that having a concept is the same as an ability to form beliefsabout its referent, and one can see why: a person may possess concepts and yet have no ability (or inclination) to form beliefs involving those concepts. He may be a convinced skeptic who never forms beliefs about anything and is quite unable to (though he thinks about things), or he may suffer from brain damage to his belief-forming areas. Conceptualizing is not believing, and it’s not thinking either. These are different capacities, faculties, mental systems. Having a concept is not the same as being able to describe its referent either; that requires a different piece of mental apparatus. What if someone claimed that having a concept is definable as being able to dream about its referent? Wouldn’t that be a clear case of confusing the intrinsic with the extrinsic? Dreaming isn’t internal to concept possession; it is just one thing you might do with a concept. Isn’t it just a dogma of pragmatism to suppose that all facts are really reducible to corollaries of those facts, or consequences of them? Pragmatists think that being always consists in acting, but it doesn’t. Thinking is no doubt correlated with concept possession, though not invariably and analytically, but the latter doesn’t reduce to the former. Fodor is more of a pragmatist than he realizes; he thinks that in the beginning concepts are deeds—deeds of thinking. He thinks you can construct concepts out of episodes of thinking (expressions of a thinking ability). But no, concepts come first in generating abilities to think; he has put the pragmatic cart before the ontological horse, ironically. He is not really a realist about concepts. Concepts are not definable by their more visible effects.

What about sufficiency? Here I detect two problems. The first is one of those clever counterexamples that infuriate the true believer but which are difficult to rebut. What if you lacked a given concept but had the ability to buy a medical procedure to install that concept in your head—wouldn’t you have the ability (the wherewithal) to think about the referent of the concept (you can afford to buy it)? You don’t have the ability to think actively about X this instant—you would have to press a button to get the concept installed in a second or less. But you are able to think about X in the sense that you are able to bring this condition about—though not by virtue of having the concept in question. You now have the ability to think about X in the immediate future. If so, the ability is not sufficient for possessing the concept. Or what if God kept giving you the ability to think about X, but declined to give you the concept? The ability is caused by God’s intervention not by the concept that normally gives rise to it. There is conceptual daylight here. And you had better not stipulate that a person must think of X by possessing the concept X, as in “ability to think of X by having the concept X”, because that is blatantly circular as a definition. Secondly, how much are we packing into the word “think” in Fodor’s definition? What about an animal that possesses only non-conceptual content but can cognize a certain X—is it thinkingof X? It has X in mind, but only non-conceptually. If it is non-conceptually “thinking of” (cognizing) X, then the definition is not sufficient for concept possession, by hypothesis. But if we have to add “conceptually” to “think of”, then circularity again rears its ugly head: “to have a concept is to think of its referent conceptually”. The word “think” is carrying too much weight in this attempt at definition. The plain fact is that “John has the concept X” and “John has the ability to think of the referent of X” report different facts—indeed, facts of a different kind. Fodor’s theory is a kind of category mistake. The truth is that concepts are the de factocategorical basis of abilities to think about things, but are not strictly identical to such abilities; for the two can be pulled apart.[3]

[1] These quotations are from Fodor’s Hume Variations (2003).

[2] I don’t intend this as a formal definition of concepts, still less a theory of their nature; it merely sketches the general shape of a theory distinct from Fodor’s. What I am arguing is consistent with an avowed mysterianism about concepts, wholly or partially (shared by Fodor, as it happens).

[3] Why did Fodor subscribe to this theory, given its pragmatic flavor? He was always a staunch anti-pragmatist. I don’t know. Perhaps he was more steeped in Ryle-Wittgenstein philosophy of mind than he realized, though his rhetoric always repudiated such a philosophy. I suspect it was because of the need to say something about the nature of concepts; it was an abreaction to a felt mystery. He didn’t want to have nothing to say as an alternative to the theories of those detested pragmatists, so he came up with his cheeky formula. It is noticeable how little he had positively to say about concepts, openly admitting that they are a hard problem. My own stab at a definition is scarcely watertight and illuminating; it is indeed difficult to say what a concept is. But that shouldn’t drive us to accept wacky theories about what concepts are. We can at least say what they are not. It’s like rejecting behaviorism about consciousness while having no positive theory to offer.

Share