Godless Matter
Godless Matter
Berkeley’s philosophy is built around the insight that the existence of matter and the existence of God are incompatible.[1] If God exists, then matter does not; if matter exists, then God does not. This incompatibility is not obvious: offhand it appears that matter and God are compatible entities—a world could contain both. Without rehearsing all of Berkeley’s reasoning, his basic points are as follows. First, the idea of matter leads to skepticism about both the ordinary perceptible world and about the existence of God. This is because matter is conceived as existing outside the mind and hence subject to doubt; and matter makes the existence of God look redundant in the running of the world, since matter is conceived as the cause of both mental and physical events. By contrast, according to Berkeley’s theocentric immaterialism, God is critical to the organization of the world, being not only its original author but also the cause of everything that happens in our minds. In Berkeley’s metaphysics God is the center of all reality, not a mere adjunct to matter, which is conceived as an active power. Second, we have no clear conception of matter, which leaves us ignorant of the world we think we know, whereas we do have a clear conception of mind (ideas, spirits). Why would God leave us in ignorance of the world? Why create a world that we neither know nor understand? God had the option of creating a completely immaterial world, built according to Berkeley’s specifications, so why would he create a world with matter in it? That would only lead to religious skepticism and the impossibility of human knowledge of the commonsense world. Why create a type of reality that leads inevitably to atheism? Surely God would create a world in which he plays a crucial metaphysical role, as he does in Berkeley’s idealism. A world of matter is not a world that any God worthy of the name would create. There is no sense in the idea of matter, according to Berkeley, so God would not create a world containing it; he would create an intelligible world. Hence, if we know that God created a certain world, then we know that that world contains no matter; and if a world contains matter, then we know it contains no God. But an immaterial world can certainly contain God, and God can intelligibly create a world containing only ideas and spirits. God and the immaterial go harmoniously together, but God and the material make an impossible pairing. For Berkeley, materialism in this sense is not part of common sense, though of course there are real objects of perception; it is a philosopher’s invention—an invention with impious consequences. He thinks he can dispense with it in favor of his own idealist ontology, and good riddance. We can thus save knowledge and religion from the dangers inherent in the metaphysics of material substance.
On this view of things, Descartes cannot consistently be a theist because he believes in matter defined to be non-mental in nature (i.e. extension). True, the mind is immaterial, but the objects of perception are taken to be material—he is a materialist about mountains, animal bodies, rocks, etc. This leads quickly to skepticism, since these things exist outside the mind (any mind); and it makes God causally redundant in the process of perception. God sits uncomfortably beside extended things twiddling his thumbs, in the Cartesian worldview. The cure is to give up the mythology of material things, according to Berkeley. He is quite clear that God exists, but God precludes matter, so there is no matter. Fortunately, we can construct an alternative metaphysics that is fully consistent with the existence of God. It is the idea of primary qualities that lies at the root of the anti-theist tendencies of materialism: for these are qualities that are instantiated independently of the mind, thus generating skepticism. Once we admit primary qualities we have allowed for realities that threaten to upset commonsense knowledge and are theologically unsound—remote causes of perception that are inconsistent with God’s beneficence. So Berkeley rejects the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, rating all qualities “in the mind”. Before Descartes based his physics on the materialist view of sensible objects it was possible to pursue a physics consistent with the existence of God, but once the concept of matter (mindless stuff) was introduced into the heart of physics God was eliminated from the picture—and no amount of immaterialism about the mind could find a rightful place for him. Instead we need a physics freed from the myth of materialism about the (so-called) physical world, such as Berkeley suggested. Of course it is logically open to us to reject God and make do with matter, instead of rejecting matter and making do with God: but the point is that such a decision has to be made. What we can’t do is combine theism with materialism about the physical (sic) world. That has been the standing position, more or less, since Descartes carved things up as he did; but Berkeley points out that such a position is unstable. It’s either matter and atheism or mind and theism.
[1] He says in the Dialogues (206): “there is not perhaps any one thing that has more favored and strengthened the depraved bent of the mind toward atheism, than the use of that general confused term [“matter”]. Also (202): “But allowing matter to exist, and allowing the notion of absolute existence to be as clear as light; yet was this ever known to make the Creation more credible? For has it not furnished the atheists and infidels of all ages, with the most plausible argument against a Creation?” In the Preface we read (118): “If the principles, which I here endeavor to propagate, are admitted for true; the consequences which, I think, evidently follow from thence, are, that atheism and skepticism will be utterly destroyed”. (I am using the Penguin edition, 1988).
Best At Doing Philosophy
Best At Doing Philosophy
I found myself wondering who is the best at actually doing philosophy—the activity, the skill. I mean as judged by such criteria as cleverness, ingenuity, argumentative power, intellectual penetration, insight, polemical punch, sheer philosophical IQ. This is independent of correctness or quantity of output. Here is my answer: Descartes, Hume, Berkeley, and Russell. These are the guys who really stand out for philosophical intelligence. I imagine my readers will nod in assent, though they may wish to add someone who has impressed them particularly. They are some pretty smart cookies all right. But it may surprise you to learn that I regard Berkeley as the clear champ: he is just so sharp, so intellectually resourceful, so outright brilliant (outrageously so). Not that I agree with his conclusions, but his cleverness is second to none. But what about more recent practitioners? Yes, there have been some impressively gifted philosophers in more recent times: Frege, Husserl, Kripke, Lewis, Strawson, Fodor, and many others. But none of these strikes me as preternaturally brilliant, inhumanly so. And where do I stand in this? Actually I think it takes one to know one, so I place myself next to the idealist bishop. I feel a certain kinship with our misguided theist; I feel we speak the same language. I’m not claiming to prove this here, but it is my considered opinion. I even think I need to curb my cleverness sometimes, as if it is leading me down the wrong path. No doubt others will vehemently disagree. It’s a question worth contemplating.
Psychologist
Psychologist
Here is an extra oddity: I was originally trained as a psychologist not a philosopher. And I don’t mean a philosophical psychologist but an experimental psychologist. I used to be a scientist. I got my B.A. in psychology from Manchester University in 1971 (first class) and went on to do an M.A. in psychology under Professor John Cohen. I studied very little philosophy in my undergraduate years, except some philosophy of science and phenomenology. Only when I went to Oxford as a postgraduate did I study any analytical philosophy or history of philosophy. I might easily have stayed a psychologist (it isn’t that I was no good at psychology). This makes it all the more surprising that I ended up where I did (see “Best Philosopher Ever”).[1] The whole thing seems like a complete fantasy, just wildly improbable. I can’t explain it. Since I retired the scientist in me has been asserting himself, presumably because I am no longer surrounded by philosophers and can give free rein to my natural inclinations. Of course, I believe that philosophy is a science in its own right (see “The Science of Philosophy”), but here I mean that the ordinary empirical scientist in me has been active. If it weren’t for that rash and risky decision in 1971 to try to become a philosopher, I would presumably have been a scientific psychologist—and what would that possible world have looked like? How strange life is!
[1] Psychologists don’t generally make good philosophers… Actually I originally applied to university to study economics and switched to psychology at the last minute. In close possible worlds I am an economist!
A Saturday Song
If I Tell You
If I tell you that I love you
Will you say you love me too?
If I tell you that I need you
Will you promise to be true?
Or will you walk away?
Will you break my day?
Will you leave me here to bleed?
And report me to the police?
If I hang around your place
Will you invite me to come in?
If I compliment your face
Will you thank me with a grin?
Or will you set the dogs on me?
And drop stones on my head?
Will you say bad things about me?
And tell me to drop dead?
I don’t know, I don’t know
I wish it wasn’t so
I wish it wasn’t so
Oh oh oh oh
I want to be your friend
I’d like to be your beau
Does that make you like me more?
Or treat me like your foe?
If I tell you that you scare me
Will you smile and shake your head?
Or will you point a gun at me
And shoot me good and dead?
I don’t know, I don’t know
I wish it wasn’t so
I wish it wasn’t so
Oh oh oh oh
If I tell you that I loved you
Many years ago
Will you say you loved me too?
Or kick me out the door?
I don’t know, I don’t know
I wish it wasn’t so
I wish it wasn’t so
Oh oh oh oh
Best Philosopher Ever
Best Philosopher Ever
Who is the best philosopher that ever lived? I am going to argue that I am. This claim may be met with some incredulity: surely I don’t believe I’m a better philosopher than Plato or Aristotle or Descartes or Kant or Russell! Actually I am claiming that, but the claim is not as outrageous as it may sound, because many contemporary philosophers are superior to the great figures of the past. The reason for this is that I (and many others) have absorbed the teachings of these great thinkers: we have learned from the philosophers who went before. Later philosophers add to the teachings of earlier philosophers (and sometimes subtract from them). Descartes had access to Plato, but Plato didn’t have access to Descartes—so Descartes is greater. The claim is not that Descartes is more original or creative than Plato; it is that he knew more, because of his knowledge of Plato and of later intellectual developments. Who is the greatest physicist of all time? Not Newton or Galileo, because they didn’t have access to later developments; in fact, most living physicists are superior to Newton, precisely because they are the beneficiaries of Newton and Einstein (et al). Not as original, to be sure, but better equipped, more knowledgeable. We may stand on the shoulders of giants and not ourselves be giants, but there is no disputing that we can see further than them—we are simply taller. Knowledge progresses. So we can ignore the question of whether any living or recently deceased philosopher is better than some great dead philosopher—which would be hard to decide anyway if we are intent on focusing on creativity. We can assume that many later philosophers are philosophically superior to those who came before—including me. The same is true for artists and novelists: they have absorbed the past and can go beyond it. Later practitioners are generally more accomplished than earlier ones, partly because of the earlier ones. Is Aristotle superior to Plato? Probably, but remember that he was taughtby Plato. Expertise is cumulative.
So the question should be whether I am superior to any more or less contemporary rival. Here is where things get interesting (but touchy). I will include here all philosophers from this century and the previous one—Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, Quine, etc. We need to establish some criteria: by what test can we measure philosophical superiority? I suggest four criteria: quality of writing, breadth, quantity, and rightness. First, quality of writing: who is the best writer? We can divide the question into two, concerning clarity and literary style. I venture to suggest that I am the clearest philosophical writer who has ever lived—in fact I have heard this said my whole professional life (“You are so clear!”). For the evidence take a look at my writing: it is clearer than Frege, Wittgenstein (!), and Quine, to mention a few. But aren’t there other philosophical writers who are just as clear as me—say, Russell and Kripke? Actually I think not, but I can’t hope to establish that here (I agree they are relativelyclear). There are obscurities in Russell, and Kripke is not without his puzzling passages. Still, there is the second question—literary style. Here I will cite the fact that I have written two novels (as well as short stories, poetry, and songs) and that I have an intensely literary consciousness. I doubt that any other philosopher has studied the writings of Nabokov as closely as I have, as well as other great stylists (Jane Austen, Martin Amis). Russell was a fine writer stylistically, but have you ever read his fiction? It is stilted at best. Even the best philosophical writers lack much in the way of literary flair; they don’t even make the effort (I’m not counting Sartre or Iris Murdoch). But even when they do, as with Quine, there is a lack of clarity at crucial points. It is the combination of clarity and style that sets me apart: I write like a scientist and a novelist, because I have trained myself in both (I was always good at both mathematics and English when I was at school). So by this criterion I am looking like a strong contender for the title of best philosopher ever. But it isn’t the only criterion: what about breadth? It is noteworthy that the other philosophers I have cited are not very broad: they made their mark in specific areas of the subject—language, logic, epistemology, metaphysics. But I have written in almost every area of philosophy, including ethics and even aesthetics (mainly philosophy of literature). I have two books in ethics and many articles (most written over the last several years). I have done a lot in philosophy of mind, covering virtually every topic there is, but also in epistemology, metaphysics, language, philosophical logic, philosophy of science, meta-philosophy, Wittgenstein, and even philosophy of sport. I think I am clearly the most versatile and wide-ranging philosopher on the planet: Russell doesn’t even come close let alone Quine or Kripke (or even Nagel). That is just a fact. As to quantity, again I come out ahead: about twenty books, hundreds of articles, innumerable book reviews (I am clearly the most prolific philosophical book reviewer living or dead). Since I retired ten years ago I have had time to indulge my appetite for writing; the result is about five hundred articles, mainly published on my blog, totaling over two thousand pages. I have too much material to publish! I have written approximately two papers a week for the last six or seven years—finished, polished pieces (though short). No one else comes close to that. So judging by the criteria of quality of writing, breadth, and quantity, I would appear to be the leading contender within the time frame we are considering.
But what about rightness—isn’t that the acid test? I agree that it is, but now we leave the realm of fact and enter the realm of opinion. Please don’t get me wrong: I don’t think there is any serious doubt that there is more truth in my philosophical work than in anyone else’s—so don’t accuse me of undue modesty! But the same is true of every other philosopher, justifiably or otherwise: everyone thinks his views are incontrovertibly true. Of course this is obviously false, but human nature etc. However, in my own case I think I have good grounds for my opinion, because I know the effort I put into developing my views and I am very careful in what I write (also smart people tend to agree with me). But I don’t want to rest my case on that personal conviction. What I would say is that nowadays very few people would subscribe to the doctrines of such historical luminaries as Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, Quine, and others. It is true that other potential rivals for the coveted title—Kripke, Strawson, Nagel, Fodor, Searle, and others–also contain a good deal of truth; but they don’t do as well on the other dimensions I have cited. It’s the whole package you have to look at. Neither should you be swayed by “impact”: that is notoriously fallible, historically conditioned, and audience-dependent. Quine had a large impact for a variety of reasons (his being at Harvard one of them), but he falls short in clarity, breadth, and quantity, let alone rightness. Popularity is not the measure of excellence. Indeed, one might even suspect that philosophical accomplishment is inversely proportional to impact (I personally think there is very little of lasting merit in Wittgenstein). I do well on the rightness criterion precisely because I don’t make outlandish meretricious claims; I tend to keep it boring, pedestrian even. I hate to be wrong, so I avoid it at all costs. That is why I don’t tend to change my mind much as far as my publications are concerned (family resemblance is about the only exception I can think of—I used to like the idea, now I don’t). Am I interesting? Yes, I think I’m pretty interesting, as reaction to my work suggests; but I don’t get that much published disagreement because it’s hard to find any holes in what I say (it’s too carefully considered). Not many people seem to agree with my mysterian leanings, but at least they find it interesting, to judge from audience response surveys. But I don’t try to be interesting for its own sake; I try to be right. Bear in mind, too, that I have written books on film and Shakespeare (as well as an intellectual autobiography and an athletic one); I don’t know of any other philosopher with my main academic interests who has done anything like that. And that is really the essence of the matter: I am not limited to a narrow range of professional interests within which I exclusively labor; I range much more freely and widely than other philosophers have done. This is why I am the best philosopher who has ever lived. Some have done good work within a relatively narrow domain, perhaps better than me (but let me beware of false modesty!), but none has ventured so far afield, or done it with such success. How good do I feel about this? Not all that much, strangely (one could always do better), but it does make me shake my head over my current situation.[1]
C
[1] This essay goes back to an amusing discussion I had with Ken Levy some months ago.
The Queen
When Elizabeth II died I thought: She wasn’t a bad old bird–these very words went through my mind. I remember singing God Save The Queen to her at Saturday morning pictures (movies for kids) back in the 1950s when I was 8 or 9. I am no royalist but at least she gave people something to hang onto. Her accent alone was worth the price of admission–surely even she could see that it was absolutely hilarious. Now we have dear old Charles, also hilarious, and a mere one year older than me. A rich vein of comedy will take Old Blighty into the future.
