Empiricism Refashioned

Empiricism Refashioned

Historically, we can distinguish three theories of the origin of knowledge: empiricism, rationalism, and revelationism (as it may be called). The first locates the origin of knowledge in conscious sense experience, particularly vision; the second accords a significant role to innate endowment (instinct, genetics); the third regards true knowledge as emanating from an epistemic authority, God being the chosen authority. I am concerned with the first theory: I want to consider a certain kind of revision of this theory prompted by later intellectual developments, biological and psychological. I will begin with an imaginary case.

Suppose a planet populated by a species of being with the following characteristics: most of its knowledge results from subliminal perception, with consciousness playing only an ancillary role. Moreover, its conscious sensory experiences are riddled with error: illusions, hallucinations, distortions, projections, biases, limitations (they can only see objects bigger than a foot long and shorter than three feet). They don’t pick up much information this way. However, they are equipped with sophisticated mechanisms of perceptual processing operating subliminally: a great deal of information comes in by this route—let’s say 90 per cent. This is well known by all concerned, taken for granted, and not in dispute. Naturally, this species will trust their subliminal perception more than their conscious perception. There are two groups of scientists and philosophers on this planet with different views about the origins of knowledge: one group holds that all (true) knowledge derives from subliminal perception, it being so much more reliable and capacious than conscious perception; the other group contends that the only (true) knowledge derives from consciousness, because (a) the concept of knowledge logically requires conscious experience and (b) because God made things that way. These latter theorists hold that the subliminal kind of perception is fictitious or that it doesn’t produce anything deserving to be called knowledge. The former group calls itself objective empiricists while the latter group is willing to be labelled subjective empiricists. Among the objective empiricists we have weak and strong varieties: one sub-group thinks that conscious experience can produce some knowledge but not very much; the other sub-group denies that any knowledge can result from conscious experience (it is just too riddled with error). Now, without taking a stand on who is right (though it is clearly the objective empiricists), it is clear that both theories are available: given the empirical facts there is room for both sorts of theory—and the subjective kind is by no means mandatory. Objective empiricism is a perfectly intelligible, reasonable, and attractive theory.

Now consider planet Earth with all its species, varying in their knowledge and forms of consciousness (or lack thereof). Which is the better empiricist theory? It all depends on the facts. Yet the early empiricists took it for granted that information flows in consciously if at all; they didn’t consider the possibility that some knowledge is acquired by subliminal perception. In that case it could not be maintained that all human knowledge comes from conscious experiential causes. The empiricist will have to be a partial objective empiricist. Now consider a theorist who believes that all conscious perception is accompanied by unconscious perception, such that knowledge is produced by the unconscious stream of information. Suppose, indeed, that this theorist is convinced that knowledge is produced only by the subliminal component—the conscious component is epistemically epiphenomenal. In support of this hypothesis, he draws attention to simpler organisms that lack consciousness altogether or have only very primitive consciousness, yet they have knowledge (he does not balk at this description). Given all this, he subscribes to a version of objective empiricism. Now a philosopher comes along and argues that normal human perception is riddled with error: it does not depict the world accurately, what with the arbitrary projection of secondary qualities, the false impression of solidity, the misperception of space and time, the failures of perceptual constancy, etc. Consciousness is not a sound basis on which to erect human knowledge, he thinks; better to put your trust in subliminal perception in which such errors are absent (allegedly). Thus, a movement arises to replace subjective empiricism with objective empiricism. Now my point is not that this movement is correct; it is that this position exists in logical space and is not devoid of motivation. It is a kind of Darwinian cognitive science form of empiricism at home with the idea of the unconscious—which was not available at the time the classic empiricists fashioned their experiential theory. It should therefore be added to the menu of options available for evaluation, conceptually and empirically. It is really a generalization of the original empiricist outlook, and much in the spirit of that outlook—empiricism naturalized, as one might say. So, there are four possible theories of the origin of human and animal knowledge not three. The consciousness version of empiricism is not essential to the basic empiricist conception (right or wrong).

Notice that the same move is available to the rationalist: he need not claim that innate concepts or knowledge ever reaches consciousness; it could all exist subconsciously. That kind of view fits the contemporary picture in psycholinguistics, as conceived by Chomsky and others. There is theoretical room for objective nativism, i.e., subliminal or tacit knowledge (destined to stay subliminal or tacit). Maybe most of our inborn knowledge is unconscious, and will remain unconscious, guiding our behavior but never brought to consciousness. Consciousness is incidental to innate knowledge (and cognition generally)—as it may be to perceptual knowledge broadly construed. The conscious aspect of perception may be minimal in the light of the total phenomenon, in which case empiricism needs to take this in account. As science progresses, more of our knowledge (and that of other animals) is likely to be seen as arising from unconscious mechanisms, so that empiricism will need to break free from an obsession with conscious experience. One can imagine an empiricist tome in which consciousness is scarcely mentioned. I think myself that conscious experience itself owes its content to subconscious mechanisms and processes, both innate and acquired, but that is another story. The point I am making now is just that empiricism in its classic form may need to be refashioned in the light of current and future knowledge. It is only an accident of history that the theory became linked essentially to conscious experience.[1]

[1] We can envisage a debate between empiricists and nativists regarding the origin of brain states: the former claims they are invariably caused by environmental impingements; the latter ascribes their causation to innate factors, wholly or partly. This is the same old debate only now quite detached from conscious experience. And we need not get hung up on verbal questions about the word “know”: the whole debate can be reformulated using terms like “cognize” or “informational state” or “data structure”. The question is really about where our cognitive competence comes from—the environment or the genes. Animals have certain abilities that enable them to cope with their surroundings; the question is where these abilities originate. Empiricists will say they were learned by interactions with the world, whether these interactions involve conscious experience or not; nativists will insist that some have an endogenous origin.