Expressions of Belief and Desire

Expressions of Belief and Desire

Darwin investigates the expression of emotion, leaving out thought. He also says nothing directly about belief and desire, but we can attempt to fill that gap. Are there characteristic expressions of belief, disbelief, desire, and lack of desire (antipathy)? We can think of emotional expressions as the extended psychological phenotype of an animal: not just what is internal to the animal but also its outward manifestation in the face and posture—the total emotional complex that is subjected to natural selection. The proper scientific name of this complex trait is the Extended Expressive Psychological Phenotype (EEPP)—external expression (particularly facial) plus internal state of mind. Darwin gave us several EEPPs for emotions—can we do the same for belief and desire? I don’t see why not, though hard empirical data are scanty. Then we would have two types of behavioral manifestation for belief and desire: expressions and goal-directed actions. Folk psychology would recognize two forms of externalization for these twin pillars of the mind. You act on your beliefs and desires to achieve your goals and you also express these mental states in your face (and possibly other bodily parts). There is a bodily duality. The same would be true of other animals, and the package would be inherited (genetically coded). Psychophysical laws could be formulated, predictions made. There may be a divergence in the two types of bodily manifestation. So, what does this mode of expression look like (literally)? How is the face configured during periods of belief and desire?

First, we need to recognize that belief and desire are dispositional and do not manifest themselves in the face and body at all times. We are searching for expressions that correspond to belief and desire occurrences—upsurges, conscious episodes. What does the face look like when someone is actively believing and desiring? From my preliminary researches, we can assemble the following picture. For belief we typically have an open-eyed gaze, slightly elevated or unmoved eyebrows, a relaxed mouth, a slight smile, nodding, and a forward lean of the body—a receptive, unsuspicious look. In extreme cases, such as a religious gathering, we might witness more spectacular expressions—shouts, dances, uplifted eyes, an attitude of general excitement and pleasure. The look of the faithful, or the deeply convinced. For disbelief we have a narrowing of the eyes, an averted gaze, a lowering of the eyebrows, a furrowing of the brow, pursed lips, a downturned mouth, a shaking of the head, a look of distaste bordering on fear in some cases. This is the look of someone resistant to persuasion—a rejecting negative look. There might be actual rolling of the eyes, wrinkling of the nose, eyelids fluttering. These are the signs of agreement and disagreement, respectively, more or less vehement. They tell you what the person really thinks about the subject at hand. They may be highly attenuated and scarcely perceptible; they may also be intentionally suppressed altogether, though liable to assert themselves when no one is looking (we sometimes have every reason to keep our beliefs and doubts to ourselves). We have a yes-face and a no-face, an assent-face and a dissent-face. These faces are widely shared and sometimes human universals (as Darwin suggested for emotional expressions). There will be the usual mixture of the innate and acquired, the involuntary and voluntary, the instinctive and culturally conditioned. They tend to be processed at a subconscious level and are not usually explicitly articulated by the observer. We might just say “You look skeptical” or merely note that the interlocutor looks to be onboard or in tune with the brotherhood (or suitably brainwashed). The look on the face tells us all we need to know and we are skilled at face-reading (we don’t need a verbal commitment or long-term observation of the person’s non-linguistic behavior). The facial expression is a kind of shorthand, useful for knowing where we stand. It is a quick and easy way for belief to show itself.

What about desire? Here the situation is even clearer, because desire is close to emotion. The animal’s face and body will tell you what it wants and doesn’t want. It wants food but it doesn’t want confinement. A dog will show its desire to go for a walk with its tail, barks, and eager eyes; and its lack of desire for a trip to the vet or a hot bath. The characteristic expression of human desire is a focused determined look, a look of anticipated (or actual) pleasure—open bright eyes, a salivating mouth (or some equivalent), a chomping at the bit (as when hungry and about to eat). An absence of desire (or actual antipathy) will show itself in a droopy listless posture, open distaste, a disgust face, a faraway look in the eyes. It is easy to decode such signs for even the moderately competent social observer. Desire efficiently reveals itself, though here again there may be reasons for concealment, which can be more less difficult. What a person says he wants may not fit what his body is signaling. We therefore have two epistemic routes to the mind–bodily expression and ordinary intentional action—and they may not tell the same story. But they usually do, so we have a kind of epistemic overdetermination. Thus, facial expressions can act as lie-detectors, because they can come apart from verbal declarations, especially in the case of children, who have not yet developed the skills of concealment. The best subjects for research are indeed children—we can examine (as Darwin did for emotion) the forms of expression children manifest when agreeing or disagreeing, desiring or not desiring. As adults, we tend to guard our beliefs for fear of interpersonal conflict, but young children are subject to no such inhibition—they let it all hang out (they are flagrant externalizers). Someone should make a study of Dissent Expression in Children—it might well follow a developmental schedule analogous to Piaget’s cognitive stages theory.

Philosophers have considered belief and desire from the point of view of the explanation of action. They constitute the reasons for action. But they have neglected the role of belief and desire in relation to expression—a quite different kind of bodily outpouring. People don’t (usually) raise their eyebrows for a reason; they just spontaneously do it (or their body does). This, too, is part of their nature—their nature in Nature, as it were. We might call it part of their animal nature, intending no disrespect—it is an aspect of their inherited biology. Even belief in elevated matters (morals, mathematics) has its bodily expression; the form of the face is part of what belief naturally is. The facial muscles, the eyebrows, the mouth—all play their part in broadcasting belief. Language is really a latecomer to the biology of belief; long before language the face was conveying someone’s state of belief. Where there is a face, there is belief, roughly speaking. Let’s not overintellectualize belief; let’s recognize its place in the biology of the organism. Darwin’s discussion of human emotion located it (partly) in the physiology of the organism, stressing its continuity with the emotions of other animals (thus producing incidentally a more enlightened attitude towards animals); I am doing the same thing with belief. The face, we might say, is the face of belief.[1]

[1] It is interesting how little the face has interested philosophers, given its centrality in human life. Even existentialists say little about it, let alone analytic philosophers. The brain, yes, but not the countenance, not the thing we gaze on every day, if only in the mirror, and try to interpret. The face fascinates but it doesn’t attract the attention of the typical philosopher. How does the content of belief (and desire) shape the facial expression? How much facial detail mirrors what lies within? What is meant by “expression” here? How would the lack of a face change our affective life? Would facial paralysis paralyze the affective mind? What is the function of expression? Would inversions of expression be possible (snarling in place of laughing, say)? Is the connection arbitrary or principled? How strong is the correlation between facial mobility and intelligence? What would it be like to have more than one face?