Ontology of Psychology

Ontology of Psychology

Every subject has its basic ontology—its preferred subject matter, the things it takes to exist, what it is committed to. In physics it is macroscopic bodies, particles, and fields (including forces); in astronomy it is stars, planets, and black holes; in chemistry it is molecules and chemical reactions; in biology it is organisms, cells, and genes; in mathematics it is numbers, figures, and functions. But what is it in psychology—what is psychology about? Here we don’t get a whole lot of consensus; instead we get strife. The field is ontologically contentious. There are deep differences about what we are (or should be) quantifying over, as Quine would say. Here is a list of possibilities: ideas, states of consciousness, reflexes, behavior, dispositions, brain states, mental representations, information, psychic energy. In principle, it could be all of the above, or a subset, or just one (usually that). I am going to give a commonsense answer, though an unorthodox one: mind and action. It is about both those things—the inner and the outer, the mentalistic and the behavioral. Thus, it consists equally of cognitive science and behavioral science: psychology is the science of mentation and action together. The psychologist is interested in why people and animals act as they do and in how their minds work. A psychology textbook should have two main sections: how minds work and how agents act. There is no opposition between these two, no claims of priority. Psychology has a mixed ontology; indeed, a mongrel ontology—essentially so. It covers mind and body—mental processes and physical performances (competence and performance). This applies across the board: the psychology of language, perception, memory, skill, emotion, learning, thought, prejudice, etc. Each has to be approached from two directions. Psychological ontology is Janus-faced. It isn’t cognitive science versus behavioral science, but cognitive science with behavioral science; if you like, private and public, subjective and objective, internal and external. As I say, commonsense.

How do we break these two subdivisions down? For they are not monolithic; they have their sub-ontologies. I would break the mental side down into knowledge and feeling: cognition and affection (with this latter divided into emotion and sensation). Knowledge will cover perception, memory, inference, problem solving, and creativity. On the behavioral side, I would distinguish learned behavior from instinctive behavior, planned from programmed. I would also distinguish verbal from non-verbal behavior. I would recommend a student in each specialism to be up on both sides of his subject—inner and outer. A psychologist of language, say, will know about the internal language faculty and about overt verbal behavior—because they are connected, though distinct. A student of prejudice would investigate the internal dynamics of prejudice and its expression in action. This is the way to conceive and structure the science of psychology. It gets the ontology right. I want to emphasize that the behavioral component is essential—it should not be neglected on account of the bad reputation of behaviorism. The psychologist is rightly concerned with human behavior, but not only with that. The old divide between the mentalists and the behaviorists has been vastly overblown and politicized. Nor should there be a pecking order here.

How does the ontology of brain science fit into this scheme? I think it operates as an adjunct ontology not a primary one (it doesn’t have tenure). Psychology is not directly concerned with the brain, but it can’t ignore it. For the brain is the very foundation of both mind and action: it underlies mind and causes action. The relationship is a bit like chemistry and particle physics, or biology and biochemistry. The psychologist should know about the brain but not be fixated on it, possibly to the point of outright reductionism. The proper subject is the mind as mentally conceived and behavior as volitionally conceived—not the prefrontal cortex and the motor areas of the brain. Neural ontology is not the same as psychological ontology. The psychologist is interested in how the mind works and how action is governed not in the underlying neurology. The brain is to psychology what the body is to history.[1]

[1] It is really quite amazing how much ideological fire has raged around the question of psychological ontology, compared to other subjects. The other scientists may disagree on many things, but not on their proper subject matter; the psychological scientists on the other hand have been sharply divided over what they are interested in. From Wundt to Watson, Chomsky to Skinner, phenomenology to neuroscience, Fodor to the connectionists—all out war. But acquaintance with a typical psychology curriculum will inform you that psychology is concerned with behavior and with internal psychological mechanisms and processes. Social psychology is largely about behavior, while the psychology of memory focuses on internal architecture; and similarly for the psychology of motor skills and the psychology of thinking. Psychology just is a divided subject. And the reason is that psychological subjects have two aspects to them: the inner mind and outer behavior. The ontology dictates the methodology.