Philosophy of Matter
Philosophy of Matter
There are two kinds of mental philosophy: philosophy of mind and philosophy of psychology. The former is a branch of metaphysics, carved out because of its weightiness; the latter is about the science of psychology. They overlap yet they are not the same. But we don’t find the same division of labor in physical philosophy: we don’t have a philosophy of matter alongside a philosophy of physics. Consequently, physical philosophy tends to be limited to philosophy of physical science; it doesn’t take in other sorts of knowledge such as commonsense understanding of the physical world or our grasp of physical concepts. Or if it does, it keeps physical philosophy as part of metaphysics. We don’t have an independent philosophical study of the nature of matter, as we have an independent philosophical study of the nature of mind. Thus, philosophy of matter limits itself to study of the science of physics. We don’t, for example, have attempts to analyze the concept of a physical object or inquiries into the form of physical explanation. It seems to me that we should have such a study, and I propose to outline it here, sticking to the model of the philosophy of mind.
First, the definitional question: what defines matter or material objects? In the philosophy of mind, we have such ideas as that mind is defined by consciousness or intentionality or privacy, but what is the analogy in the case of the philosophy of matter? What is “the criterion of the material”? Several suggestions may be mentioned: extension, solidity, mass, publicity. Or is it a family resemblance concept, as has been claimed for the concept of mind? This can make for a lively debate, not covered in the science of physics. Second, what is basic, mind or matter? Basic in what way—ontologically, epistemologically, referentially? Thus, we have metaphysical idealism, sense-data epistemology, and referential internalism. What came first ontologically, mind or matter? What kind of knowledge is foundational, inner or outer? What is the primary mode of reference in our conceptual and linguistic scheme, self or other? Third, what are the characteristic properties of the material world? In the case of the mind, we would mention sensations, beliefs, desires, acts of will, knowledge, emotions, imagination; but what is typical of a material thing? Obviously, shape and size, weight, temperature, motion, atomicity, hardness, divisibility, malleability, etc. Are any of these basic—say, the motion of atomic parts? Which of them is part of the essence of matter, as opposed to dispensable and contingent features? Fourth, how does matter contrive to generate life and mind, if indeed it does so? Is it just recombination? Does matter have a hidden mental essence? Fifth, is it better to think of matter in terms of substance or process? Is matter constituted by its substance or its behavior? Is it possible to be a behaviorist about matter—matter is what matter does? Sixth, is matter homogeneous—is it the same all the way through and down or does it harbor deep internal division? Is it a combination of stuff and form, these being dualistically defined? Does matter have teleological properties? Does it evolve or metamorphose or disappear? Are there any traces in it of the divine? Is there an argument from design for material objects (not just biological objects)? Could matter compose ghosts or is that metaphysically impossible? And so on.
Of special interest is the question of explanation. In the philosophy of mind, we have the question of the explanation of action; do we have an analogous question about the explanation of material motion? Is there an analogue of belief-desire psychology in respect of material action? I think such a view can be defended: desire is like a force and belief is like direction. Force derives from mass and acceleration (as Newton taught us), but mass and acceleration alone do not determine material effects—we also need the direction of travel. What caused the window to smash? It was the mass and acceleration of the pebble combined with its path through space; a lighter, slower projectile would not cause the smash, and a different direction would just cause a splash or dent (if the projectile hit water or earth). You need both things to get a particular result. Just so, desire without belief yields no determinate action as effect, and neither does a belief alone. In both cases we have two-factor causation and hence two-factor explanation. This is part of our commonsense physics, as it is our commonsense psychology. Direction guides mass, as belief guides desire. Then too, we have the question of whether physical causation is intelligible-mechanistic or occult-non-mechanistic (compare the causation of animal behavior). Is matter a machine or a ghost? Is it grinding gears or mysterious forces?
The general point is that the philosophy of matter is a genuinely distinct topic of inquiry that needs to be recognized for what it is. The philosophy of the physical world should not be confined to the philosophy of physics as it is currently practiced. I don’t know why it is, other than that practitioners of the latter tend to be trained in physics and are not always well-attuned to philosophical issues, whereas the same thing is not true of philosophers of psychology (who tend to be amateur psychologists). In any case, there is room for both types of physical philosophy, and I encourage those who teach philosophy of physics to enlarge their palette. Just as philosophy of mind should not be swallowed up by philosophy of psychology, so philosophy of matter should not be swallowed up by philosophy of physics. Both types of narrowing reek of shallow scientism. Philosophy of physics by itself does not make good physical philosophy, just as philosophy of psychology by itself does not make good mental philosophy. Philosophy is not science or commentary on science (as the term “science” is commonly understood). There is a philosophy of matter as well as a science of matter (ditto for mind).[1]
[1] Am I saying anything controversial here? I don’t think so, but the typical philosophy curriculum is not shaped in the way I am recommending. Some of the questions I raise are familiar enough, but they don’t get classified as belonging to a field called philosophy of matter.

The appearance of this paper should not be taken to signal a continuation of my philosophical output; it is part of ideas already formed before the current time. This isn’t just business as usual. I don’t expect much more along these lines. It is more of an epilogue than a new chapter.