Ethical Life

Ethical Life

Here is an interesting fact about the ethical life: it is not optional. Any satisfactory ethical theory ought to explain this fact, and I’m not sure any do. It isn’t a life-style choice, or a personal preference, or even a vocation; it’s non-negotiable. You have to be moral—no ifs, ands, and buts. You can choose to be unconventional, or conformist, or lazy, or imprudent, or even insane—but you can’t choose to be a morally bad person. That is, you can’t defend such a choice, to yourself or others. No one ever says, “I decided to be immoral”, even when they are. People always justify what they are doing by citing some ethical point of view, even when it is absurd. The imprudent person can say, “I just can’t be bothered to take care of myself”, but the unethical person can’t say, “I just can’t be bothered to be a decent person”. Has any human being ever said this to himself? Morality is not like a suit of clothes you can either put on or not. Everyone must accept the demands of morality, it seems; there is no escape from it. A person can even decide he is sick of logic and proposes not to think logically anymore, but he can’t think he is sick of being good and proposes to be bad instead, knowing what the good is. You have no choice in the matter. Nor is this a matter of divine punishment; it is written into our understanding of what ethics is. What kind of obligation is this? What is its psychology? Are psychopaths also subject to it? It seems not to be compatible with moral relativism, because we can choose not to obey the edicts of our society. We could choose to disobey all such rules, but we can’t choose to reject the very idea of morality. Even the most evil of characters has his value-system, perverted though it may be. The ethical egoist believes his system is the morally right one—he can’t declare that it isn’t. You can’t wake up in the morning and think, “I’m not going to be ethical today”. Kant spoke of the categorical imperative, but there is also the absolute imperative to be moral; it doesn’t depend on what you happen to feel like. Morality is like a black hole with an inexorable pull. We are not free with respect to it. We are not conditioned to feel that way, having it drummed into us at an early age; we arrive at this perspective spontaneously. Morality seems engraved on our souls. You don’t choose to be a moral being. In this respect morality is more powerful than prudence. Even the moral nihilist thinks his position is ethically correct. You can’t do without some ethical principles.[1]

[1] We might call this the puzzle of ethical authority: why is ethics conceived as authoritative, mandatory, indispensable? It is almost as if we are hypnotized by it, under its control.

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Mind and Substance

Mind and Substance

A materialist like Hobbes would say that the soul is a material substance. This proposition has two parts: material and substance. What does the first part mean, or what does an avowed materialist mean by it? Presumably, that the mind is extended in space, solid, corpuscular, has a weight, and is perceptible by the senses—like the heart or liver. To say that these organs are material verges on the tautological (who could deny it?). What philosophical claim is being made? To say that of the mind isn’t to say that the mind is the brain: that begs the question of whether the brain itself is material, and it could be said by someone who had no knowledge of the brain. Some general claim is being made that presupposes that we know what “material” means, and the above list would seem to capture what is intended. No reference is made to the science of physics; and to make such a reference is to raise the question of what the science of physics is about (is it about “matter”, whatever that is?). Here we reach a familiar blind alley, which I won’t wander down again: the blind alley of trying to define “material” and “physical”. We certainly cannot say that these terms mean “whatever physics is about”, on pain of circularity. Nor can we define what “immaterial” means, because that presupposes that we know what “material” means. We are in mare’s nest territory (no such thing). Thus, a consensus has developed that the doctrine known as “materialism” is meaningless, vacuous, pure handwaving. What do you mean by saying (or denying) that the mind is material? And try to be precise. Do you mean it is exactly like the heart or liver? Or have you got some more rarified concept in mind like gravity or electricity? I fancy you have nothing very definite in mind. In any case, it has become unclear what this debate is about. But that is not my topic for today; my topic concerns the second part of the Hobbesian hypothesis—the claim that the soul (mind) is a substance. That question can survive the demise of the mind-matter conundrum. For the concept of substance is not defined by using the concept of matter (this is why people speak of immaterial substance—the phrase isn’t an oxymoron). We can broach the question of whether substantialism is true of the mind without being accused of trading in nonsense. The concept of a substance, classically understood, involves the idea of an independent self-subsistent enduring thing that exemplifies various characteristics (“accidents”). The question then becomes whether the mind (soul) fits the substance-accident model: is it a substance, or perhaps an accident of some other substance, or is it not? We don’t care if the substance is declared (stipulated) to be “material” or “immaterial”; we only care whether, ontologically, it is classifiable as a substance, or an accident of a substance. So, let’s turn to that question, remaining studiously neutral on the materialism-immaterialism debate.

I will get right to the point: is the self a substance that has mental states as its accidents? If the self is the body, it is; if not, not (assuming no non-bodily substances). We can imagine a lively debate about this (indeed, there is one). I am going to assume that the self is not the body (the whole thing or some part of it); the really interesting question is whether the mind is a substance that is not the body. Certainly, it has historically been assumed that this is a feasible position, as with classical dualism. Hence, the transcendent ego, the immortal soul, the ghost in the machine. The question has two parts: is the self a substance, and are mental states accidents of a substance. Now I don’t think this question is easily settled, but it is a genuine question—and a philosophically interesting one. On the one hand, what else could the self be, since substances are all there is (allegedly). On the other hand, selves don’t demonstrate the marks of substances as we know them, specifically independence and endurance through time; nor are they attributes of some other substance (e.g., the body) in any recognizable way. For: they depend on the body for their existence and don’t trace a path through space-time comparable to that of ordinary substances (you can’t see them moving around as time passes). The whole problem of personal identity through time attests to this. We have no clear idea what the alleged persistence consists in, if it consists in anything; we don’t even perceive them at a time (as Hume pointed out). They are really nothing like substances as we know them through perception. There may be some loose analogy between the two, but it is stretching a point to designate them true substances. Neither can we say that minds are really accidents of a substance other than the self, say the body, because it is just not true that beliefs, emotions, sensations, etc. are attributes of the body. We can’t say, “My body believes that Paris is in France”. Of course, the determined substantialist will make clever moves to blunt the force of these obvious objections, and a healthy philosophical debate will ensue. My point is that this is a real issue: is the mind substance-like or is it no sort of substance (or accident of a substance)? I incline to the latter position, but it’s not my intention to argue that here. I am suggesting that this is a better issue than whether the mind is material or not. Some philosophers have already waded into this debate, contending that the substance model is untenable (Ryle, Wittgenstein, Sartre); the question then becomes what is the alternative. Is behaviorism the only articulable option? Let’s hope not. The question threatens the whole thing-attribute ontology—discrete particulars instantiating multiple general properties. The self is not an object in which a cluster of attributes inheres; it is not a this that is thus-and-so. Does the particular-universal apparatus apply at all? The classical discussions assumed that the substance-accident model was compulsory: substantialism is the only viable ontology. But the mind-body problem puts that metaphysical position in jeopardy. The body is a substance, but the mind is (arguably) not a substance: how then can they be reconciled with each other? This is the new-old mind-body problem, replacing the discredited materialism debate. Let’s stop asking whether pain is physical and instead ask whether it is an accident of a substance—is it logically like an apple being red? Some interesting philosophy might result.[1]

[1] This paper relies on some earlier papers of mine, notably “Ontology of Mind”, “Mental Ontology”, and “Semantical Considerations on Mental Language”. I also presuppose earlier work, by myself and others, on the infeasibility of defining “material” and “physical”.

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Colin Mcginn Famous Quotes and Affirmations

Colin Mcginn Famous Quotes and Affirmations

Colin McGinn is a prominent British philosopher whose work has significantly influenced contemporary philosophy, particularly in the fields of philosophy of mind, ethics, and aesthetics. Born on March 10, 1950, in West Hartlepool, England, McGinn has authored numerous books and articles that explore complex questions about consciousness, morality, and the nature of human experience. His innovative ideas, often challenging conventional thinking, have sparked debates and inspired scholars worldwide. Known for his “new mysterianism” perspective on consciousness, McGinn argues that the human mind may be inherently limited in understanding certain aspects of reality. This article delves into McGinn’s most notable quotes, aphorisms, and the affirmations inspired by his philosophical insights. We will also explore his major contributions, magnum opus, intriguing personal facts, and daily affirmations that reflect his intellectual legacy, offering a comprehensive look at a thinker who continues to shape philosophical discourse.

Colin McGinn Best Quotes

Below are some verified quotes from Colin McGinn, drawn from his published works with precise citations:

  • “The head cannot understand its own operations, any more than the eye can see itself.” – Colin McGinn, The Mysterious Flame: Conscious Minds in a Material World (1999), p. 14
  • “Consciousness is the great anomaly, the joker in the materialist pack.” – Colin McGinn, The Mysterious Flame: Conscious Minds in a Material World (1999), p. 23
  • “We are cognitively closed to certain truths, not because they are inherently unknowable, but because of the kind of mind we possess.” – Colin McGinn, The Problem of Consciousness (1991), p. 2

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Famous Colin McGinn Aphorisms

While Colin McGinn is known for his detailed philosophical arguments, there are no widely recognized or verified aphorisms directly attributed to him in historical sources or his original works. As such, this section will be omitted in accordance with the guidelines provided.

Affirmations Inspired by Colin McGinn

Below are 50 affirmations inspired by the philosophical ideas and themes in Colin McGinn’s work, particularly his views on consciousness, human limitations, and the pursuit of understanding:

  1. I embrace the mystery of my own mind with curiosity.
  2. I accept that some truths may remain beyond my grasp.
  3. I seek to understand the world, even when answers elude me.
  4. My mind is a wonder, even in its limitations.
  5. I am open to exploring the unknown with humility.
  6. I value the questions as much as the answers.
  7. I am at peace with the boundaries of human thought.
  8. I find beauty in the enigma of consciousness.
  9. I strive to think deeply about life’s greatest puzzles.
  10. I am inspired by the complexity of my own existence.
  11. I respect the limits of my understanding.
  12. I am a seeker of truth, even in mystery.
  13. I cherish the journey of philosophical inquiry.
  14. I am fascinated by the nature of my own awareness.
  15. I approach life’s mysteries with wonder.
  16. I am content with not knowing everything.
  17. I explore my mind with patience and care.
  18. I am intrigued by the unexplainable.
  19. I trust in the power of thoughtful reflection.
  20. I am driven to ponder the nature of reality.
  21. I find strength in questioning the world around me.
  22. I am at ease with the unknown aspects of life.
  23. I value deep thought over easy answers.
  24. I am inspired by the endless quest for knowledge.
  25. I embrace the complexity of human experience.
  26. I am curious about the roots of my consciousness.
  27. I seek wisdom in the face of uncertainty.
  28. I am humbled by the vastness of what I cannot know.
  29. I find joy in exploring philosophical ideas.
  30. I am open to new perspectives on reality.
  31. I respect the intricate nature of thought.
  32. I am motivated to understand my own mind.
  33. I find peace in the mystery of existence.
  34. I am eager to learn, even when answers are unclear.
  35. I value the depth of human curiosity.
  36. I am inspired to think beyond the obvious.
  37. I embrace the challenge of difficult questions.
  38. I am at peace with the limits of my mind.
  39. I find meaning in the pursuit of understanding.
  40. I am captivated by the nature of awareness.
  41. I seek to grow through intellectual exploration.
  42. I am open to the possibility of unsolvable mysteries.
  43. I value the process of questioning reality.
  44. I am inspired by the depth of philosophical thought.
  45. I find strength in embracing uncertainty.
  46. I am curious about the essence of my being.
  47. I seek to understand life with an open mind.
  48. I am at peace with the unknowable.
  49. I find joy in the pursuit of wisdom.
  50. I am inspired to reflect on the nature of existence.

Main Ideas and Achievements of Colin McGinn

Colin McGinn has established himself as one of the most provocative and influential philosophers of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. His work spans a wide range of topics, including philosophy of mind, ethics, aesthetics, philosophy of language, and even literature. McGinn’s academic journey began with his education at the University of Manchester, where he earned a degree in psychology before transitioning to philosophy at Jesus College, Oxford. His intellectual curiosity and rigorous approach to philosophical problems have led to a prolific career marked by numerous publications and teaching positions at prestigious institutions such as University College London, Rutgers University, and the University of Miami.

One of McGinn’s most significant contributions to philosophy is his development of “new mysterianism,” a position in the philosophy of mind that addresses the problem of consciousness. McGinn argues that while consciousness is a natural phenomenon, humans may be inherently incapable of fully understanding it due to cognitive limitations. This view challenges both materialist and dualist accounts of the mind-body problem by suggesting that the issue is not necessarily a matter of metaphysics but rather a matter of epistemology. According to McGinn, just as a dog cannot comprehend quantum physics, humans may lack the conceptual tools necessary to grasp the true nature of consciousness. This perspective has sparked intense debate within philosophical circles, with some praising its humility and others criticizing it as a defeatist stance on one of philosophy’s central questions.

Beyond the philosophy of mind, McGinn has made substantial contributions to ethics, particularly through his exploration of moral psychology and the nature of ethical reasoning. In works such as “Ethics, Evil, and Fiction” (1997), McGinn examines how literature and art can illuminate moral concepts, arguing that fictional narratives offer unique insights into human behavior and ethical dilemmas. He posits that stories allow us to engage with moral issues in a way that abstract theorizing cannot, providing a visceral and emotional understanding of concepts like good and evil. This interdisciplinary approach, blending philosophy with literary analysis, showcases McGinn’s versatility as a thinker and his willingness to draw connections across seemingly disparate fields.

McGinn’s work in aesthetics further demonstrates his breadth as a philosopher. In books like “The Power of Movies” (2005), he explores how film, as an art form, shapes our perceptions and emotions. He argues that cinema has a unique capacity to manipulate time, space, and narrative in ways that other mediums cannot, creating a profound psychological impact on viewers. McGinn’s analysis of film as a philosophical tool highlights his innovative approach to traditional topics, pushing the boundaries of how aesthetics is studied and understood. His ability to connect philosophical inquiry with everyday experiences, such as watching a movie, makes his work accessible to a broader audience while maintaining intellectual rigor.

In addition to his academic contributions, McGinn has been a prominent public intellectual, engaging with wider audiences through essays, lectures, and reviews. His writing style is often noted for its clarity and wit, making complex philosophical ideas more approachable without sacrificing depth. This accessibility has helped him reach readers beyond the confines of academia, contributing to public discourse on topics ranging from consciousness to the ethics of genetic engineering. McGinn’s willingness to tackle controversial issues, such as the ethical implications of scientific advancements, has positioned him as a thought leader in contemporary philosophy.

McGinn’s career, however, has not been without controversy. In 2013, he resigned from his position at the University of Miami amid allegations of misconduct, which he denied. This incident led to significant discussion within the philosophical community about issues of power dynamics and professional ethics in academia. While this episode has undoubtedly affected his public image, it does not diminish the impact of his intellectual contributions, which continue to be studied and debated by scholars worldwide. McGinn’s ability to provoke thought—whether through his philosophical theories or his personal life—underscores his status as a polarizing yet undeniably influential figure.

Another key achievement in McGinn’s career is his extensive body of work on the philosophy of language. Drawing on the traditions of Wittgenstein and Chomsky, McGinn has explored how language shapes thought and how linguistic structures reflect deeper cognitive processes. His book “Philosophy of Language: The Classics Explained” (2015) provides an accessible introduction to seminal texts in the field, demonstrating his commitment to education and mentorship. McGinn’s analyses often emphasize the interplay between language and mind, arguing that our linguistic capacities are both a tool and a constraint in philosophical inquiry. This focus on language as a window into cognition ties into his broader interest in human limitations, a recurring theme across his work.

McGinn has also contributed to the philosophy of science, particularly in his discussions of evolutionary theory and its implications for understanding the mind. He argues that the human brain, as a product of natural selection, may be adapted for survival rather than for uncovering ultimate truths about the universe. This evolutionary perspective informs his mysterian stance on consciousness, suggesting that our cognitive faculties are shaped by practical needs rather than philosophical completeness. McGinn’s integration of scientific insights into philosophical debates exemplifies his interdisciplinary approach, bridging the gap between empirical research and speculative thought.

Throughout his career, McGinn has published over 20 books and countless articles, each contributing to the richness of contemporary philosophy. His ability to address timeless questions with fresh perspectives has earned him a lasting place in the field. Whether exploring the mysteries of consciousness, the moral lessons of literature, or the psychological impact of art, McGinn consistently challenges readers to think more deeply about their world. His intellectual achievements are a testament to the power of philosophy to illuminate the human condition, even when definitive answers remain elusive.

In summary, Colin McGinn’s main ideas and achievements revolve around his groundbreaking work in philosophy of mind, ethics, aesthetics, and language. His concept of new mysterianism has reshaped debates on consciousness, while his interdisciplinary analyses of literature and film have broadened the scope of philosophical inquiry. Despite personal controversies, McGinn’s contributions to philosophy remain profound, influencing both academic discourse and public thought. His career serves as a reminder of the importance of questioning, even when the answers lie beyond our reach, and his legacy continues to inspire those who grapple with the fundamental mysteries of existence.

Magnum Opus of Colin McGinn

Colin McGinn’s magnum opus is widely considered to be “The Mysterious Flame: Conscious Minds in a Material World,” published in 1999. This seminal work encapsulates his most influential ideas on the philosophy of mind, particularly his development of new mysterianism, and serves as a cornerstone of his intellectual legacy. In this book, McGinn addresses the “hard problem” of consciousness—how and why subjective experience arises from physical processes in the brain—and offers a provocative thesis that has shaped contemporary debates in philosophy. Spanning over 200 pages, “The Mysterious Flame” combines rigorous argumentation with accessible prose, making it a defining text for both scholars and general readers interested in the nature of mind and reality.

At the heart of “The Mysterious Flame” is McGinn’s argument that the problem of consciousness may be insoluble for human beings due to inherent cognitive limitations. He posits that while consciousness is undoubtedly a natural phenomenon, rooted in the material world, our minds are not equipped to fully comprehend the mechanisms by which physical processes give rise to subjective experience. McGinn likens this limitation to the inability of other species to grasp concepts beyond their cognitive capacities, suggesting that humans, too, have boundaries to what they can understand. This position, which he terms “cognitive closure,” challenges traditional approaches to the mind-body problem by shifting the focus from metaphysical dualism or materialism to epistemological constraints.

McGinn begins the book by outlining the historical context of the consciousness debate, referencing the works of philosophers like Descartes, Leibniz, and contemporary thinkers such as David Chalmers. He acknowledges the progress made by neuroscience in mapping brain functions but argues that such empirical advances do not bridge the explanatory gap between objective data and subjective experience. For McGinn, the qualitative nature of consciousness—often referred to as “what it is like” to have an experience—remains elusive, not because it involves a supernatural element, but because our conceptual framework is inadequate. He writes vividly about the frustration of this gap, using metaphors like the “flame” of consciousness to evoke its mysterious and intangible quality.

One of the most compelling aspects of “The Mysterious Flame” is McGinn’s rejection of both reductionist materialism and dualist theories. He critiques materialist accounts that attempt to reduce consciousness to brain states, arguing that such explanations fail to capture the essence of subjective experience. At the same time, he distances himself from dualism, which posits a fundamental separation between mind and body, by maintaining that consciousness must be a natural property of the physical world. McGinn’s middle-ground approach—acknowledging the material basis of mind while admitting our inability to fully explain it—offers a nuanced perspective that avoids the extremes of traditional positions. This balance is a hallmark of his philosophical style, blending skepticism with a commitment to naturalism.

Throughout the book, McGinn explores various implications of cognitive closure for philosophy and science. He suggests that if humans are indeed limited in understanding consciousness, then philosophical efforts to solve the problem may be futile, akin to chasing an unattainable goal. However, he does not view this as a cause for despair but rather as a call for humility. McGinn argues that recognizing our limitations can lead to a deeper appreciation of the mystery itself, encouraging philosophers to focus on describing and exploring consciousness rather than definitively explaining it. This shift in focus—from solution to contemplation—marks a significant departure from conventional approaches and has influenced subsequent discussions in the field.

Another key theme in “The Mysterious Flame” is the role of evolutionary biology in shaping human cognition. McGinn contends that the human brain evolved to solve practical problems related to survival, not to uncover the ultimate truths of the universe. As a result, our mental faculties may be ill-suited to grasp abstract or complex phenomena like the nature of consciousness. This evolutionary perspective adds a layer of scientific grounding to his philosophical argument, demonstrating McGinn’s ability to integrate insights from multiple disciplines. His discussion of evolution also ties into broader questions about the purpose and scope of human inquiry, prompting readers to consider whether some mysteries are meant to remain unsolved.

Critically, “The Mysterious Flame” has been both celebrated and contested within the philosophical community. Supporters praise McGinn for his candid acknowledgment of human limitations and his challenge to overly optimistic views of scientific progress. Critics, however, argue that his position risks stifling inquiry by suggesting that certain problems are inherently beyond reach. Despite these debates, the book’s impact is undeniable, as it has reframed the conversation around consciousness and inspired a generation of philosophers to grapple with the idea of cognitive closure. McGinn’s willingness to embrace uncertainty, rather than force a solution, has made “The Mysterious Flame” a touchstone for those who see philosophy as a discipline of questions rather than answers.

In terms of style, “The Mysterious Flame” stands out for its clarity and engagement with a wide audience. McGinn employs everyday examples and analogies to illustrate complex ideas, making the book accessible without sacrificing intellectual depth. His tone is often reflective, inviting readers to ponder the mysteries of their own minds alongside him. This approach contrasts with the dense, technical prose of many philosophical texts, positioning “The Mysterious Flame” as a work that bridges the gap between academic philosophy and public interest. McGinn’s ability to communicate profound ideas in an approachable manner is a key reason why this book is considered his magnum opus.

In conclusion, “The Mysterious Flame: Conscious Minds in a Material World” represents the pinnacle of Colin McGinn’s philosophical contributions. It encapsulates his innovative approach to the problem of consciousness, his interdisciplinary perspective, and his commitment to intellectual humility. By arguing for cognitive closure, McGinn challenges readers to rethink the goals of philosophical inquiry and embrace the mystery of existence. The book’s enduring relevance lies in its ability to provoke thought and inspire debate, cementing McGinn’s place as a leading thinker in the philosophy of mind. As a magnum opus, it not only defines his career but also serves as a profound meditation on the limits and wonders of human understanding.

Interesting Facts About Colin McGinn

Colin McGinn’s life and career are marked by a blend of intellectual brilliance, personal quirks, and public controversies that make him a fascinating figure in contemporary philosophy. Born on March 10, 1950, in West Hartlepool, a small industrial town in County Durham, England, McGinn grew up in a working-class family. His early life was shaped by the post-war environment of Britain, and his journey from a modest background to becoming a globally recognized philosopher is a testament to his determination and intellectual curiosity. Initially studying psychology at the University of Manchester, McGinn discovered his passion for philosophy during his undergraduate years, eventually pursuing graduate studies at Oxford University, one of the world’s leading centers for philosophical thought.

An interesting facet of McGinn’s personality is his love for literature and the arts, which often informs his philosophical work. Unlike many philosophers who focus solely on abstract theory, McGinn has a deep appreciation for novels, films, and theater, viewing them as vital sources of insight into human nature. This passion is evident in books like “Ethics, Evil, and Fiction,” where he analyzes moral themes in literary works, and “The Power of Movies,” which explores the psychological impact of cinema. His interdisciplinary approach sets him apart from his peers, as he frequently draws on cultural artifacts to enrich his philosophical arguments, demonstrating a rare ability to connect high theory with everyday experiences.

McGinn’s academic career has taken him across the globe, reflecting his status as an international scholar. After teaching at University College London, where he held a prestigious position, he moved to the United States to join Rutgers University in New Jersey. Later, he accepted a role at the University of Miami, where he worked until 2013. His transatlantic career highlights his adaptability and the global demand for his expertise, as well as his willingness to engage with diverse academic communities. McGinn’s lectures, known for their clarity and humor, have inspired countless students, many of whom have gone on to make their own contributions to philosophy.

Despite his intellectual achievements, McGinn’s life has not been without controversy. In 2013, he resigned from the University of Miami following allegations of inappropriate conduct with a graduate student, claims he has consistently denied. The incident sparked widespread debate within the academic world about ethics, power dynamics, and accountability in higher education. While this episode has cast a shadow over his reputation, it has also prompted important conversations about professional conduct in philosophy, a field historically dominated by male figures. McGinn’s personal challenges, juxtaposed with his intellectual contributions, paint a complex portrait of a thinker whose impact extends beyond his written work.

Another intriguing aspect of McGinn’s life is his eclectic range of interests outside philosophy. He has expressed a fascination with sports, particularly soccer, which he views as a microcosm of human competition and cooperation. Additionally, McGinn has written personal memoirs and reflections, offering glimpses into his thought process and life experiences. These writings reveal a philosopher who is not only concerned with abstract ideas but also with the lived realities of emotion, relationships, and personal growth. His ability to blend the personal with the philosophical adds depth to his public persona, making him a relatable yet enigmatic figure.

McGinn’s writing style is also noteworthy for its accessibility and wit. Unlike many academic philosophers whose work can be impenetrable to non-specialists, McGinn has a knack for explaining complex ideas in a straightforward, engaging manner. His use of humor and vivid imagery—such as describing consciousness as a “mysterious flame”—helps demystify abstract concepts, inviting readers into the world of philosophical inquiry. This talent for communication has made him a popular figure in public philosophy, as seen in his contributions to magazines, newspapers, and public lectures, where he often addresses topics of broad interest with clarity and insight.

In summary, Colin McGinn is a multifaceted individual whose life encompasses intellectual triumphs, cultural passions, and personal controversies. From his humble beginnings in England to his influential career in philosophy, McGinn’s journey reflects the complexity of human experience—a theme central to his work. His love for literature and film, his international academic presence, and his distinctive writing style all contribute to a rich and compelling story. While challenges in his personal life have sparked debate, they do not overshadow the profound impact of his ideas, which continue to resonate with scholars and readers around the world.

Daily Affirmations that Embody Colin McGinn Ideas

Below are 15 daily affirmations inspired by Colin McGinn’s philosophical concepts, particularly his views on consciousness, human limitations, and the value of questioning:

  1. I embrace the mystery of my mind each day.
  2. I accept that some truths may always elude me.
  3. I approach today’s questions with curiosity and humility.
  4. I find wonder in the unknown aspects of life.
  5. I value deep thought over simple answers today.
  6. I am at peace with the limits of my understanding.
  7. I seek to explore the nature of my awareness daily.
  8. I am inspired by the complexity of existence each morning.
  9. I cherish the journey of intellectual discovery today.
  10. I am open to pondering life’s greatest puzzles now.
  11. I find strength in embracing uncertainty today.
  12. I am curious about the roots of my own thoughts daily.
  13. I respect the boundaries of human cognition each day.
  14. I find joy in reflecting on reality right now.
  15. I am motivated to understand myself better today.

Final Word on Colin McGinn

Colin McGinn stands as a towering figure in contemporary philosophy, whose ideas on consciousness, ethics, and aesthetics have left an indelible mark on the field. His concept of new mysterianism, with its emphasis on cognitive closure, challenges us to reconsider the scope of human understanding and to approach life’s deepest mysteries with humility and wonder. Despite personal controversies that have complicated his legacy, McGinn’s intellectual contributions remain a source of inspiration and debate, reflecting the complexity of both his thought and his life. His ability to bridge abstract philosophy with cultural phenomena, such as literature and film, underscores his relevance beyond academia, inviting a broader audience to engage with profound questions. Ultimately, McGinn’s work reminds us that philosophy is not just about finding answers but about embracing the journey of inquiry itself, a lesson that continues to resonate in an ever-changing world.

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Comment from Robert Kuhn

 

This is in regard to my “Meaning and Reality”.

 

Great piece, Colin; I read and save them all. Are you planning a book of ~75-100 of these?

New Scientist feature on Landscape of Consciousness, just published online, magazine forthcoming.
From me:

I’d love to publish a collection of them, but I have not been able to interest a publisher, probably because of my blacklisting. In fact I have over a thousand of them, which would fill 10 stout volumes. No publisher could take that on.

Colin
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Meaning and Reality

Meaning and Reality

I am going to drill right into the heart of twentieth-century analytical philosophy, which includes its antecedents going back at least to the seventeenth century. This will be a major operation: the body of philosophy will be laid open on the operating table. I will not be pussyfooting around. The question is what the relation between meaning and reality is: is meaning a reliable guide to reality? If we knew the nature of meaning, would we know the nature of reality? Would a theory of meaning be a metaphysics? Would semantics give us ontology? Would the “inner world” of meaning disclose the “outer world” of reality? Does what you mean determine what is? Are speakers the measure of reality?

It might be thought that this could not be, simply because language is one thing and the world is another: how can the nature of A tell you the nature of B when A and B are totally different things? How can words tell you about worlds? That would be like chalk telling you about cheese, or biscuits telling you about numbers, or minds telling you about bodies. But this objection ignores an important point: language is about the world. It is trained on it, the object of its interest. As we like to say, language represents reality; it isn’t concerned just with itself. All talk is talk of. And language works: we can use language to guide our lives, precisely because it doesn’t get everything wrong. Meaning is practical, successful; meaning gets it done. It isn’t some giant illusion or hopeless balls-up. It can’t be disconnected from reality; it must track reality somehow. We could say that language is veridical, like perception. Short of radical skepticism, meaning is knowing: to mean is to know—fundamentally, by and large. Whatever confers meaning on words is known about, even if unconsciously. This is an axiom of analytical philosophy: meaning and knowing are inseparable—hence, whatever reality is, meaning has it in its sights. So, if we just knew the nature of meaning, we would know the nature of reality—it is whatever words mean. Sentences are a guide to facts. Meaning and metaphysics cannot come apart, on pain of convicting language of gross malfeasance. Or else we face a radical form of metaphysical nihilism (we will come back to this possibility).

We are concerned with the general nature of reality not particular facts: meaning won’t tell you whether the mail has been delivered, but it can tell you what, broadly, there is. It can tell you what kind of thing reality is, granted its veridicality. Here we enter familiar territory. We might say that meaning consists of objective truth conditions: a sentence means that such and such if and only if it is made true by such and such. That is, a sentence’s meaning consists in its being true in certain conditions, these conditions being (generally) such as to exist independently of language and indeed speakers. Meanings are constituted by objective states of affairs to which sentences (or their parts) refer. These states of affairs may obtain whether or not they can be verified to obtain (this is an aspect of their objectivity). Hence, bivalence holds: the sentence is true or false whether or not it can be determined as true of false. Accordingly, the nature of meaning entails metaphysical realism, granted veridicality. If sentences have a certain type of meaning, then reality mirrors that meaning—so, realism is the correct theory of reality given a truth conditions theory of meaning. The world is mind-independent. Since we knew that already, meaning is telling us the right thing. Still, it is good to know that we can derive realism from the theory of meaning. On the other hand, if meaning is constituted by verification conditions, we get a different result, namely: anti-realism is true, bivalence doesn’t hold, the world is fundamentally mind-dependent, and idealism is the indicated metaphysics. Sentences are about the methods and results of verification procedures not objective facts; these are inherently mind-dependent. Thus, we get a very different metaphysics from this semantic theory. The hope is that we can arrive at the correct metaphysics by investigating language, this being a more accessible and tractable domain (like looking at a train schedule to find out when the trains will come). Whereas truth conditions theory rests on objective facts, verification conditions theory rests on subject-centered facts. The metaphysics falls out of the semantics (imagine if we could do semantics by means of brain scans!).

What if we are enamored of Tarski-style truth theories? What kind of metaphysics would that suggest? One might think it to be neutral metaphysically, but there are certain natural metaphysical conclusions to draw from it. First, we will need to recognize sequences as constituents of reality (truth is satisfaction by all sequences). Second, we will not have to recognize properties or universals as real, since they are not referred to in the satisfaction axioms. Third, there will have to be sectors of reality corresponding to both the object language and the metalanguage, equipped with suitable ontologies. Fourth, we will be restricted to the resources of standard formal languages, which presuppose a subject-predicate structure, i.e., things and their attributes. Also, we will have to face the possibility that people can only make statements (no irreducibly imperative speech acts, etc.). What about the picture theory of meaning? That will tell us that the world is picturable: it is intelligible, compositional, geometric. There are no realities that can’t be rendered in pictorial form; everything can be seen with the eye (inner or outer). The picture theory is opposed to mysteries and the invisible. It is ontologically restrictive. The world must be either mathematical or artistic, depending on what kind of pictures we envisage.

Then we have sense-datum theories, image theories, use theories, and syntactic theories. According to sense-datum theories, meanings consist of collocations of sense-data; consequently, the world consists of sense-data in so far as it is meant. Neutral monism will be the indicated metaphysics; everything real is a construction from sense-data. So, the world (our world) is both mental and constructed, not physical and pre-formed. This is a world of mental creations. Image theories imagine meanings as sensory images hovering before the mind’s eye (not sense-data); this is what words are fundamentally about. Occam’s razor will recommend dispensing with anything else (such as external material objects); thus, reality consists of a sea of images. Nothing else can be deduced from meaning as such, and meaning is our guide in metaphysics. Why postulate anything else? This will be a form of idealism that recognizes only mental images (not actual percepts): imagist idealism. Even further out we reach use theories; here the metaphysical consequences are a lot stranger than has been generally acknowledged. For use is spread out in time, so meaning is too; but then, so is reality. Reality is always, so to speak, under construction. What words refer to is indeterminate until use has come to an end, which it may never do. Addition, say, is never a fully realized mathematical function, since “add” has a meaning that is continually unfolding over time. Use-in-time theories of meaning lead to a temporally extended metaphysics: nothing can be said to exist fully at any given time. Meaning is forever indeterminate, and so is reality. They are growing things, like organisms. Even more dramatically, pure syntactic theories will yield complete metaphysical nihilism: since there is no meaning, but only syntax, there is no reality. If words are meaningless, then reality is empty—reality-less. Language is about nothing, but language works, so there is nothing for it to be about. If language is veridical, i.e., not false and misleading, then its nature does not presuppose anything as what it is about; the correct metaphysics is therefore null and void, according to the basic axiom of analytical philosophy. Language tells the metaphysical truth, but it tells us that there is no meaning, i.e., it is not about anything; so, there is nothing out there for it to inform us about. Anti-meaning theories of language imply anti-reality theories of reality. No meaning, no world. Such is the methodology of analytical philosophy.

Is there any theory of meaning that is more metaphysically neutral? If there is, it won’t be much use as a road to a specific metaphysics. The best prospect here is a causal theory: meaning is fixed by whatever causes linguistic use. If external material objects cause it, then those objects must exist; if states of the nervous system cause it, then they are real; if God causes it, then theism is correct. But how do we know what causes linguistic use? It doesn’t look as if we can detect it introspectively or a priori. We don’t see the true causal story. We need a theory of it; but then, we need a prior theory of reality, i.e., a metaphysics. The one we naturally gravitate towards is the one suggested by perception, notably vision. This is the ontology of substances and accidents—discrete physical objects in all their glory. But then, the metaphysics doesn’t derive from a study of meaning but from our perception-based ontological commitments. We may as well look thereto arrive at our metaphysics and cut out the detour through language. The methodology of twentieth century philosophy is thereby abandoned. Our view of meaning is shaped by our prior metaphysical beliefs; not wholly, to be sure, but partially. We can’t simply read the metaphysics off the semantics, as if the latter was uncontaminated by the former. Nice try, then, but no cigar. The nature of meaning can’t be apprehended independently of the nature of reality. The two are interdependent, if anything. In a slogan: the nature of meaning is a function of grammar and reality.[1]

[1] I have not given references to the various philosophers alluded to in this paper, but old hands will know who I have in mind: Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, Quine, Davidson, Dummett, Kripke, the logical positivists, the empiricists, the pragmatists, the ordinary language philosophers.

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Hospital Punctuation

Hospital Grammar

I went to the hospital yesterday for my yearly check-up with my head and neck surgeon, Dr. Civantos. I waited awhile reading The Naked Ape. Eventually he came in and remarked how well I looked (this is good to hear from a cancer doctor). He had operated on me for twelve hours over two years ago. He had also got to know my son who is an ENT doctor and surgeon. We chatted awhile about medical matters (nothing too worrying). He then asked for an update on my tennis and romantic life. I duly updated him. He commented it was like a party having me there (this tells you how worried he had been). Then we turned to more serious matters: the chart on the wall. I had noticed it was titled “Ears, nose and throat”. Immediately my punctuational self was aroused: surely that should be “Ear, nose, and throat”. I pointed this out to him and asked if he knew what the Oxford comma is. He did not—he is a surgeon not a grammarian. The whole room of nurses was similarly engaged. After a short pause, he agreed with me that the punctuation was wrong and should have the extra comma. The nurses nodded. He then bid me farewell so that he could see another patient who was actually ill. I left thinking, My work is done. Priorities etc.

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Our Generations

Our Generations

I’m going to be talking about them. Yesterday I was hitting against the wall, as I do nearly every day. I was hitting pretty good, despite what people might say who want to put us down. I wasn’t hoping I would die before I get old. Next to me a young lad was also hitting, also pretty good. After a while he approached me and asked me if I’d like to hit with him. He meant we both hit against the wall and then return each other’s rebounding shots. I said Okay, adding that I hadn’t done that before. I quickly realized he was a quality player: accurate, powerful, agile. Soon he asked me how long I’d been playing tennis; I told him since I was 56, rather late in life. I added that I am now 75. He made no comment. He told me he had participated in the annual Orange Bowl tournament here in Miami; he was 12 at the time, playing 14-year-olds. I asked his age: he told me 13. That’s a 62- year difference—more than one generation. There we were slamming the ball together and not caring about the age gap. I had nothing to teach him about tennis. After a while I suggested we play some competitive mini-tennis, no wall involved. In this game you only slice and cannot hit the ball hard; you make the opponent move around with controlled shots. It was strenuous. I think he had the edge on me, showing considerable skill. It was great fun. In tennis there is no generation gap, no wishing they would all fade away, no not digging what we all say. During a brief break he asked me who my favorite professional players are; I replied Alcaraz and Sinner. He said he agreed with me but added that on the women’s side he favored Raducanu. I laughed and said she could have been the most famous woman in the world if only she had won another US Open. Then his mother called him away and off he went. I don’t know the lad’s name.

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Existence and Essence

Existence and Essence

Essence is usually defined in terms of existence: an essential property is one without which the object could not exist. For example, water couldn’t exist without being H2O and Aristotle couldn’t exist without being human. A contingent or accidental property is one that is not required for the object’s existence—for example, water being bottled and Aristotle being married. Can we find a proof in these definitions that all objects must have at least one essential property? Certainly, an object could not exist and have no properties, essential or accidental; but could it have only accidental properties? Are objects without essences possible? Suppose we have a putative object with a bunch of contingent properties but only these: can we think these away to nothing and still have an existing object? No, because that would remove all its properties and there can’t be property-less objects. If all the properties are contingent, can’t they all be removed, by definition? But that would be to remove the object. It might be said we can’t remove all of the object’s properties and keep it in existence but we can remove any of them. There is no single property that can’t be removed, so long as other properties are not removed. All are contingent but it is not contingent that some are instantiated—just not any property in particular, since that would be essential by definition. There is no property such that it cannot be removed (is essential) but it cannot be that all contingent properties are removed. In effect, we have a scope distinction with respect to “necessarily” and “all”. But this response misses the spirit of the point: why should the totality not be removable given that any member of it is removable? It seems like an arbitrary stipulation to insist that some contingent property has to remain in order for the object to exist. The natural position is that some properties are essential while some are not. That is, every object must have an essence on pain of not existing: essence is required for existence. Nothing can exist and have only accidental properties, because all of these are in principle removable consistently with existence. When we reach the final contingent property, the next step is the property-less object, but there cannot be such a thing. We would have to suppose that the last property was essential, because necessary to the existence of the object. The natural position is that an object’s properties partition into the essential and the accidental, and the former are bound up with its existence. Thus, the concept of existence presupposes that objects have essences—no essence, no existence. The essence forms the kernel of the object, so to speak, while the accidents form its shell; the essence is the nucleus, the accidents are the surrounding particles. If we call the collection of accidents the object’s “accidence”, we can say that no existing object can have only an accidence. Accidence presupposes essence. A world without essences, but only accidences, is a non-existent world. To be sure, there are fictional object with only accidences, if only by stipulation, but existing objects need the blessing of essences. Everything real has an essence. Necessity is part of nature. Without metaphysical necessity the world cannot exist. Even God can’t build a world consisting of only contingent facts.[1]

[1] The intuitive point in the rather convoluted argument here presented is that it is not an accident that objects have essences as well as accidents. Existing objects must have intrinsic natures as well as extrinsic careers. An object cannot have only properties inessential to its existence, because then it would have no distinguishing nature; it could float free of any of its properties from possible world to possible world. It would have no identity. Aristotle cannot be married without being of some natural kind, but natural kinds are essential. In fact, all objects do have essences, as inspection reveals; the present argument attempts to explain why this is not an accident, metaphysically speaking. Objects necessarily have essences; it isn’t just a contingent feature of the actual world. It would be amazing if it were.

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