Ethics, Epistemology, and Metaphysics Ethics, as currently conceived and taught, is divided into three parts: metaethics, ethical theory (normative ethics), and practical ethics. This seems like a sensible division. Metaethics deals with issues concerning the status of moral discourse, what values ultimately consist in, how ethics is known (if it is), whether values are subjective […]
Consciousness and the Origin of Philosophy What causes philosophy—the subject—to exist? I shall argue that consciousness is what causes philosophy to exist, or rather consciousness-in-the-world. The consciousness-world nexus is the origin of philosophy. It isn’t the world by itself or consciousness by itself; it’s the situation of consciousness in the world, or the situation of […]
Oliver Sacks’ Fabrications I have just come across an article by Rachel Aviv in the December 15 edition of the New Yorker about Oliver Sacks’ dubious case histories, especially in Awakenings and The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat. Apparently, Sacks acknowledged that he made things up in his private journals, to which […]
A Brief History of Knowledge I will continue here what I started earlier, dwelling on the later stages of the growth of human knowledge.[1]The overall sequence is as follows. First, we have bodily sensations such as pain, pleasure, hot and cold: these may be construed as themselves instances of knowledge of the body, or we […]
Are Space and Time Identical? I wish someone would get to the bottom of space and time, because for the life of me I can’t. They reduce me to tears, intellectually (personally, I find them congenial companions). But I think I can ask some intelligible questions about them (at least I think I can). On […]
Coyne on McGinn I will reply to Jerry Coyne’s comments (January 23rd, 2026) on my blog post “A (Really) Brief History of Knowledge”. I will keep this as brief and factual as possible without restating his criticisms. 1.I am not just a philosopher of mind but have written on many philosophical subjects. I was also […]
