Future Trump

Future Trump

Trump’s law is this: it is always much worse than you think it will be. I am constantly surprised at how bad it keeps getting. With this in mind let’s contemplate the likely future unless things radically change. First, Trump withdraws support to Ukraine and the Russians take over the country. Unimaginable horrors ensue. Europe is destabilized. This happens soon. Second, Trump loses the trade war with China, which escalates tensions with military overtones. China decides to take Taiwan. Asia is destabilized. Third, millions of deportations occur causing great suffering and injustice, as well as enormous damage to the US economy, which is already reeling under tariffs. Fourth, the legal system is undermined, especially the Supreme Court; dictatorship is thereby hastened. Fifth, the universities are gutted, destroying science and intellectual life in general (more destruction to the economy). Sixth, media owners capitulate to Trump’s demands, thereby muzzling the press. Seventh, a worldwide recession occurs, with much social unrest. The possibility of nuclear war looms in the chaos and despair; Iran is the first country attacked. Eighth, television becomes bland and supine; comedians are not allowed. Ninth, there is an exodus of the most mobile people from the country, leaving it bereft of talent. Tenth, America becomes a police state. This nightmare scenario is already much more probable than it was 100 days ago—indeed, it seems inevitable unless something drastic happens and soon.

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Bodily Identity

Bodily Identity

Suppose you are interested in the nature of bodily survival: under what conditions does a body survive into the future? Your initial theory is that identity through time is a necessary and sufficient condition: the body then must be numerically identical to the body now. This is generally how it is and you conjecture this is how it must be: for example, a cat’s body will only survive if some future body is identical to that body; if no future body is identical to the given body, it will not count as that body surviving into the future. But now you notice a curious fact: some bodies can be bisected and the parts go on living. Some organisms divide, or can be divided, in two and the results survive into the future. Is there an identity between the original body and the surviving results of bisection? No, because neither of the two bodies is identical to the original body, since they are not identical to each other; and they can’t be identical to the original as a composite because the composite consists of different functional bodies and the original was not such a pair (the two bodies have grown extra limbs where none existed before). Yet we would want to say that the original survives the operation—bisection isn’t the same as death by obliteration. That is, in fission cases we have survival without identity. Fission is a better fate than death, if you care about bodily survival. It seems, then, that your initial theory of bodily survival was wrong: survival of the body does not logically require identity through time.

It has been claimed that survival of the person follows the same logic: a person can survive an operation in which no future person is identical to the original. These are brain bisection cases: you cut the brain into two and place the halves in two bodies, thus producing two persons not identical with any past person. Personal survival does not require personal identity, as these fission cases show. The human brain is made of two hemispheres each capable of housing a person if bisection is performed. The person can be divided from himself, as it were, as the body can be divided from itself. The anatomy of the brain makes that possible, as the anatomy of our hypothetical organism makes a similar thing possible. What metaphysical conclusions can we draw from such fission cases? What we cannot conclude is that persons are distinctively capable of survival without identity. We cannot say that it is a defining property of persons that they are able to survive without identity holding between them and some future person. It isn’t as if persons differ from bodies in this respect. It just turns out that in viable bisection cases we get survival without identity, whether it is persons or bodies that are at issue. We have made no such discovery about persons and only persons. So, we have not laid the groundwork for the further conclusion that personal survival consists of psychological continuity and connectedness as opposed to simple identity—unlike other classes of entity. In fact, the cases are precisely parallel: there is nothing particularly tenuous and degree-like about the survival of persons over time, as a matter of metaphysical necessity. It isn’t that personal survival is uniquely non-identity-requiring. In fact, this is a quite banal truth about survival in general—a matter of simple logic and the possibility of dividing things into two. It isn’t that persons possess the remarkable property, alone in the universe, of being capable of surviving in the absence of identity.

Let’s add another thought experiment: consider a possible world in which brains are not divisible in the way they are in the actual world—if you cut them in two, both halves die on the instant. Then there will be no possible fission cases in that world: there cannot be survival without identity of persons in that world. And yet there may still be fission cases for bodies in this world. Then we will have survival without identity for bodies but no survival without identity for persons. We invert the usual thought experiment. Teachers of philosophy in this world will be able to provide convincing thought experiments of the former type (bodies) but not the latter type (persons). Students will be persuaded that bodies can survive in the absence of identity, but not that persons can. If the latter is suggested, they will retort that such a thing is impossible, because brains cannot be divided without causing death. Bodies can, though, as illustrated by the organisms that do survive under fission; but persons can’t, because brains can’t survive under fission. It will be possible to write books about bodies drawing attention to their loose survival conditions, but not write such books about persons—they can survive only under conditions of strict identity.

Is it, then, that the correct theory of personal survival depends on the kind of world you are living in? If you are living in a world in which brains are like current human brains, then the non-identity continuity-and-connectedness theory holds; but if you are living in a world in which brains are not like this, then the simple identity theory holds. That would mean that there is no metaphysical truth about persons as such—only a kind of relative truth. It is only human persons (or those anatomically like them) that allow survival without identity, and hence invite a continuity-and-connectedness theory of personal survival; other species might not permit of the kind of operation envisaged by defenders of that theory. Indeed, it might be that the universe contains many species of persons all but one of which cannot survive without identity. This is not what proponents of the non-identity theory of survival had in mind—they purported to speak of the nature of persons not of some specific biological type of person. You can’t make metaphysics out of biological contingency.[1]

[1] I am alluding, of course, to the influential views of Derek Parfit.

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The Eternal City

The Eternal City

Chapter 39 of Catch-22, “The Eternal City”, is the heart of the novel, though it stands out like an amputated thumb. It is stylistically quite unlike the rest of this five-hundred-page work. There is no humor in it. It is bleak to the point of pugilism: it pulverizes the reader. Yossarian is in Rome looking for Nately’s whore’s twelve-year-old kid sister. She has been forcibly ejected from the brothel in which her older sister worked and no one knows what has become of her. Milo, the cheerful entrepreneur, at first thinks Yossarian wants to have sex with a young virgin and offers to help. Early in the chapter, reference is made to little boys in Africa “stolen away by adult slave traders and sold for money to men who disemboweled them and ate them”. Yossarian first encounters a lone old woman left behind in the smashed apartment where the brothel used to be, the smashing and ejecting done by “tall soldiers with hard white hats and clubs”. She is obviously traumatized to the point of insanity. She keeps saying “Catch-22”. We then read: “He could picture the fiery and malicious exhilaration with which they had made their wreckage, and their sanctimonious, ruthless sense of right and dedication.” There is no one left to take care of the weeping old woman. Next Yossarian goes with Milo to meet the chief of police “who was fiddling with a stout woman with warts and two chins”. This man, Luigi, also thinks Yossarian is in search of a twelve-year-old sex partner and also offers to help. But this meeting comes to an inconclusive end, because Milo gets wind of a traffic in illegal tobacco, which distracts his businessman’s mind, “his twitching mouth slavering” with “epileptic lust”. The corrupt policeman then threatens to arrest Yossarian.

Now things get really unpleasant. Out on the street, in the cold and dark, Yossarian sees a solitary boy dressed in rags with bare feet, pale, poor, cold. He is moved by “intense pity for his poverty”, but does nothing. Immediately, a nursing mother passes “holding an infant in black rags”. He reflects on all the sadness and suffering in the world, about “how many good people were bad people”. Suddenly he is confronted by a young soldier having convulsions and being held down by six other soldiers. A jeep with two military policemen in it races by: one of them remarks, “That’s good. He’s under arrest”, “doubling over with raucous laughter at his jest” and then speeding off. Yossarian moves away and hears a female voice from above pleading, “Please don’t. Please don’t”. He then sees a drunken woman being sexually assaulted by three drunken soldiers, also saying “Pleeshe don’t”. One of them throws a bottle at Yossarian. Soon he comes across a man beating a dog: “The dog whimpered and squealed in brute, dumbfounded hysteria…and groveled and crawled on its belly”, but the man “beat it and beat it anyway”. He threatens to beat a woman who asks him to stop. At the next corner, “a man was beating a small boy brutally in the midst of an immobile crowd of adult spectators who made no effort to intervene”. The man kept knocking the boy down with “hard, resounding open-palm blows to the head, then jerking him up to his feet in order to knock him down again”. “Bright red blood was streaming from his ears”. No one interferes. Next a man with a smashed mouth waits for an ambulance that never comes, while another man is whisked away by police after having his books spilled (he cries ambiguously, “Help! Police!).  Yossarian then sees an eighty-year-old woman trying to keep up with a forty-year-old woman but being left behind alone in the night to fend for herself. “The nasty, small, gloating smile with which she glanced back at the laboring old woman was both wicked and apprehensive”. Yossarian does nothing to help. He then notices a gaunt man “with a star-shaped scar in his cheek and a glossy mutilated depression the size of an egg in one temple”, to be followed by a young woman with “her whole face disfigured by a God-awful pink and piebald burn that started on her neck and stretched in a raw, corrugated mass up both cheeks past her eyes!”. We next learn that Aarfy, a comrade of Yossarian, has raped and murdered a simple-minded servant-girl, Michaela, that very night, throwing her out of the window. Aarfy protests, “I only raped her once”, and feels convinced he will not be held accountable. Yossarian assures him he will be arrested for the rape and murder, and sure enough sirens sound. Two “large, tough, brawny M.P.s with icy eyes and firm, sinewy, unsmiling jaws” enter the room—and arrest Yossarian! He has committed the unpardonable crime of going to Rome in search of a lost girl without a pass (Aarfy is left to his own devices). So ends Yossarian’s visit to the eternal city.

I told you it was a bleak chapter. But what are we to make of it, artistically (the mutilated thumb twitching before us)? The chapter is clearly a litany of human (and animal) pain, suffering, poverty, neglect, violence, fear, malice, and indifference. It is crammed with injustice, corruption, callousness, maliciousness, brutality, and evil—all conscience-free. If there is any humor at all, it is of the blackest pitch. The rest of the book is overflowing with humor, albeit also black. This is Catch-22 at its most hard and unforgiving. I think it is intended in two ways. First, it reminds us of the horrors that lie behind the story told in the body of the book (a kind of gritty literary-realist Sergeant Bilko). One might say it points to the underlying politics of war—what we are fighting for, and against. But second, it functions as a kind of rebuke to the rest of the book—a kind of apology for it. All those laughs, the literary acclaim, the fame—but this is the reality: the human horror behind it all. We make art of it, but it isn’t art. Just to describe it, as Heller does and I repeat, is difficult, morally difficult. Really, it just makes you want to cry—to curl up in a ball and cry. And yet we admire the novel. Nately’s whore’s little sister is never found.

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Catch America

Catch America

The reaction to Catch-22 constitutes an interesting sequel to the book itself. Ostensibly about World War II, it took off during the Vietnam war. It inaugurates the Sixties in America. Among the more perceptive critics, we find Robert Brustein writing in the New Republic (a magazine for which I used to write). He sees at once that the novel “has much wider implications than a war novel” to encompass “the postwar American world”. He writes: “Through the agency of grotesque comedy, Heller has found a way to confront the humbug, hypocrisy, cruelty, and sheer stupidity of our mass society—qualities which have made the few other Americans who care almost speechless with baffled rage—and through some miracle of prestidigitation, Pianosa has become a satirical microcosm for many of the macrocosmic idiocies of our time”. Those words could describe our present moment—and I don’t just mean Trump’s terrible tenure. I also mean the universities of the last twenty or so years, including the professors. Humbug, hypocrisy, cruelty, and sheer stupidity—these are all too familiar traits. Even worthwhile causes are tainted with them. It is easy to sympathize with the Yossarians of today. It is a world of fiction, paranoia, nastiness, hysteria, conformity, and (yes) sheer stupidity. The world of Catch-22 is the world we are living in, only magnified and extended.

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Philosophy Naturalized

Philosophy Naturalized

Quine’s famous paper “Epistemology Naturalized” advocates handing epistemology over to the psychologists. No more traditional a priori epistemology; let’s have empirical science instead. Cognitive science replaces conceptual analysis—that sort of thing. This will put an end to endless irresoluble philosophical disputes and set epistemology on the path to academic respectability (you know the pitch). But Quine never wrote a paper called “Logic Naturalized” advocating abandoning traditional a priori logic in favor of the psychology of logic. That would have made his own logic books obsolete: burn Methods of Logic and replace it with Experimental Logic! Let’s have “ex-log”! We can conduct empirical studies of what subjects think about logic, how they reason, when logic takes hold of the infant mind. If that sounds like a bad idea to you, then ask yourself how you might justify abandoning traditional epistemology in favor of the new empirical epistemology withoutleaving open the similar naturalization of logic. And the point generalizes: if epistemology is ripe for scientific naturalization, why not the rest of philosophy? How can epistemology be the only branch of philosophy that should be handled by the psychologists and those who read them (and only them)? What about ethics, metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, aesthetics, political philosophy, philosophy of mathematics, etc.? If it’s good for epistemology, it must be good for the rest of philosophy. I won’t go into why this is a bad idea; my point is that consistency requires it. Naturalize one, naturalize all. This applies also to the philosophy of the sciences—of physics, biology, psychology, etc. We have to look at the psychological science of these subjects, i.e., the minds and behavior of scientists. The philosophy of physics will consist of psychological studies of physicists—e.g., the psychology of quantum theorists. Not the physical world but the mental world of the physicist. Likewise, for the philosophy of biology—this will become the study of the thought processes of biologists. That may be an interesting field of study, but is it the sole legitimate respectable form that the philosophy of biology should take? This wouldn’t be philosophy naturalized but philosophy destroyed. Naturalizing epistemology amounts to nothing short of eliminating philosophy altogether, once you think it through. You might want to do that, but let’s be clear about what you are doing. And if it is really what you want, why not take a degree in psychology to begin with?

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Catch 22

Catch 22

I have been reading Joseph Heller’s Catch 22, published in 1961, a book I have long wanted to read. It is better than I expected, less time worn, more trenchant (and funny). As it happens, I once met Heller at a party in New York, sometime in the 1990s. He was a likeable man, jovial, twinkly. I had read his Something Happened recently, so we had a nice conversation about it—a very astute book. Now I am acquainted with Yossarian, Colonel Cathcart, Nately, Nately’s whore, chaplain Tappman, nurse Duckett, Colonel Scheisskopf (“Shit-head”), and many others. The book is certainly anti-war (how could it not be?), but it is also anti-American—or rather anti-Americans-in-charge. The high-ups are the worst: the heedless brutal generals and colonels sending men on endless combat missions, concerned only with burnishing their own reputations. Here’s a snatch of dialogue: “That’s a very serious crime you’ve committed, Father,” said the major. “What crime?” “We don’t know yet,” said the colonel. “But we’re going to find out. And we sure know it’s very serious.” (380). And it isn’t that only the armed forces that are run by such men; they are depicted as typically American. It reminded me of nothing so much as American universities, in which administrators seem to think of themselves as commanding officers keeping their underlings in line, punishing them as they see fit, not necessarily for anything. They are obsessed with image, headlines, personal rivalries. Justice comes a distant second. Politics rules.     

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America and Americans

America and Americans

What do you get if you remove America (the idea) from America (the place]? What if you remove American values, enshrined in the Constitution, from American society? Equality, free speech, free belief, the rule of law—what if you take all that away? The obvious answer is Americans—those individual people. But what makes them Americans, establishes their identity as a unified people, not just as the inhabitants of a particular piece of land? Nothing. You destroy America as a distinct identifiable definable nation. That is what is happening now: the essence of America is being hollowed out, leaving nothing but free-ranging individuals. Do you think these deracinated people can form a coherent viable identity? I doubt it. We will have a kind of blind anarchy. Americans will no longer be Americans, but bleached-out wanderers, clueless, lost. What makes America America is the idea of America, but that idea is being undermined from within. The country will die. It will be true to say that America no longer exists.

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A Scary Thought

A Scary Thought

A scary thought crept into my head yesterday: What if MS-13 had supported Trump all along? What if they had praised and flattered him, called him their leader, wore MAGA hats? What if they had joined forces with the rioters on January 6th? What would be his attitude now? I really don’t know—and that is the scary thought. Would they now be described as “good people” who “love our country”? What if they agreed that the 2020 election had been “stolen”? How would that affect current deportation policy? I can’t escape the feeling that there is a non-zero probability that things would be different. I wonder what other people think.

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