From Jennifer Hudin

This sums things up nicely (CMG):
Thank you and I’m more than ready to tell you.  I once told (I forget his name, but the guy who gossips all the time on the internet about Philosophy)
that I could probably name some unsavory fact about anyone he mentioned, because rumors are just that—rumors.  He had published an internet article about
Searle and I was mentioned.  I told him to be cautious because none of the things he wrote had actually happened.  His response was ”but there are rumors.”  Well, so what?
  It’s a nasty profession and I think it’s because it is growing tired.
 Thank you for your condolences for John.  I will indeed mention them on Wednesday.  We are still an international group of philosophers who hate the gossip and enjoy the old
fashioned spirit of the debate.
  By the way, one of the most disappointing aspects of John’s trial were the former female students who would not have gotten into grad school without John’s recommendation, who then
made Searle-trashing into their way of advancing through the philosophy ranks.  I’m sure you have had this experience.
  Best as always,
Jennifer
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John Searle

I have permission from the writer to post this. It was forwarded to me by Tom Nagel. Let me add that I have spoken at length to other philosophers accused of this and that in  the last twelve years: Peter Ludlow, Thomas Pogge, Jeff Ketland. My conclusion has been that none of these accusations has any merit (I say nothing of my case, on which I cannot comment for legal reasons). By my calculations that makes four cases of not guilty and zero of guilty. I wonder what the philosophy profession makes of that.

________________________________________
From: Jennifer Hudin [berkeleysocialontology@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, September 26, 2025 6:38 PM
Subject: John Searle

Dear Professor…
I am Jennifer Hudin, John Searle’s secretary of 40 years.  I am writing to tell you that John died last week on the 17th of September.  The last two years of his life were hellish. HIs daughter–in-law, Andrea (Tom’s wife) took him to Tampa in 2024 and put him in a nursing home from which he never returned.  She emptied his house in Berkeley and put it on the rental market.  And no one was allowed to contact John, even to send him a birthday card on his birthday.
It is for us, those who cared about John, deeply sad.
I know you are aware of his final months at U.C. Berkeley when a female accused him (and me) of Title IX violations.  This was extremely hard on John.  The news no one knows is that after an extensive and intrusive investigation, these allegations were never found to be true.  I was found 100% innocent of all allegations, and John’s emeritus status was removed because the Chancellor at the time, Carol Christ, found the not guilty verdict of the academic senate incorrect in her opinion. and reversed it herself.  The two judges in the case both quit and wished me luck in restoring my life.
John never recovered.
There will be no memorial on campus honoring John’s 60+ years of dedication and work at U.C. Berkeley.  The Dominican University of Philosophy and Theology  in Berkeley is trying to organize a memorial.

John was innocent and falsely accused. To the very end of his time on campus, he held his dignity intact.  I know you and he were friends, and I thought you might like to know more details about his life and death.  If you wish to know more, I am happy to oblige.

Best wishes,
Jennifer Hudin
Berkeley , CA

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Other Conceptions

Other Conceptions

I have a conception of the world, commonly called my conceptual scheme. It can be investigated, probed, criticized. I also have a conception of myself, specifically my mind. This tends to be more private and more subject to philosophical and scientific controversy. Still, it is quite well-formed and available to my cogitations: I know what I think of me. In addition, I have a conception of other minds, varying in its detail and depth; this I also have insight into. I know what I think of others. But do I have a conception of other people’s conception of me? To some degree, but it is apt to be patchy and incomplete. I really don’t know how other people see me much of the time, beyond the obvious. How am I conceived by others? And how do I know what I know about this subject? I observe how others react to me and I hear what they say about me, but this method is partial and unreliable. I am quite ignorant about how I am perceived and thought about. In the case of animals, I really have no idea how they conceive me, just the sketchiest of conceptions, mostly anthropocentric. Could I ever find out what my cat thinks of me? This is the problem, not of other minds, but of other conceptions of my mind—a sub-problem within that broader problem. I might have a pretty good idea of the other’s conception of the world, but I am comparatively clueless about his conception of my internal world. And do I have anyconception of his conception of my conception of him? Ignorance rapidly engulfs us. Does Spock have a decent conception of Kirk’s conception of him, given their psychological differences? Isn’t he puzzled about how Kirk sees him? Here we seem to have a potent source of ignorance, even mystery. We don’t have a clear conception of other people’s conception of us, beyond the superficial.  For example, I am ignorant of how people understand my motivations, unless they tell me—and even then, they may not tell me the truth. In the normal course of events, we don’t know how others see us, conceptualize us, understand us. If we don’t share the language of the other, we may be permanently in the dark about this. What does she think about me? Does she understand me at all?

This matters: it isn’t just an area of harmless vacuity. For I have to interact with others and that requires that I grasp how they see me. Accordingly, I try to convey myself to the other as well as I can, so as to give them an accurate conception—assuming I am not out to deceive. Or better: I try to convey as much of myself as is compatible with concealing stuff I don’t want the other to know, such as how much I dislike people who dress and speak the way they do. I try to shape their conception of me; then I know what it is. But I have little control over this and must accept that I don’t know what is in their mind concerning my mind (personality, motivations, etc.). Thus, social life is fraught with such ignorance: I really don’t know how I am conceived by others, and hence how my self-conception compares to their conception of me. Hence it is possible to come to the conclusion that so-and-so never understood me at all: their conception of me was all wrong. Maybe I tried to be transparent, but failed: I am tragically misperceived. People form their view of others on the basis of stereotypes, and these might give a completely false picture. Perhaps it would be a good idea to have explicit discussions about this: how the other sees you. It could be socially awkward, but it might avoid some of the traps we fall into. Of course, the other might not believe you when you try to correct his mis-apprehensions, but at least you tried. Far too often we go through life in ignorance of how others see us; we don’t know how we are understood. This is a pity.

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George Soros

George Soros

The attempt to indict George Soros on some Trumped-up charge is patently absurd, but will probably happen. I wish him well dealing with this nonsense. However, I have mixed feelings about the man, who I once considered a friend. I spent many hours reading his attempts at philosophy and discussing them with him (I remember a long session in St Barts). I saved him from many mistakes and spared him from public embarrassment. I introduced him with comments on “reflexivity” in Budapest (long trip). He never paid me for any of this work, though he paid for my transportation and put me up when we met (about a dozen times). We spoke on the phone often. I was friendly with his present wife and his butler Howie. I would describe us as close; I went to his wedding reception and his 80th birthday party event. And then he cut me off abruptly and without explanation. I still don’t know why, but I can guess. This strikes me as terrible behavior—not illegal but morally deplorable. He seems not to understand friendship or gratitude. It pains me to say this, but it’s true. You can be a great philanthropist, but an awful friend. There is something seriously wrong here.

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Baby Finger

Baby Finger

All guitarists struggle with their smallest fretting finger: it just isn’t very strong or agile. You have to work on it. Recently I decided to go all-out on it. I began playing all my familiar licks with only that finger: Day Tripper, Wipe Out, Pretty Woman, I’ll Take You There, Walk This Way, Satisfaction, and more. It was hard. Before I describe the results, a terminological point—what to call that feeble excuse for a finger. In the UK it is called the little finger; in the US the pinkie (ugh). I feel for it; it don’t get no respect. It needs a linguistic makeover. We could call it, unambitiously, the small finger or the edge finger or the runt finger or the refinement finger, but none of these really do the trick. So, I have decided to call it the baby finger; this is affectionate and not dismissive. We all love babies, especially the adults we call baby (as in “Baby, I Love You”). I want you all to join me in re-christening this delightful digit, this neglected prehensile gem, your baby finger. Now, doesn’t that feel better? Anyway, where was I going with fretting with the baby finger? The amazing thing is that, though difficult at first, it trains up remarkably well if you give it a chance; you soon find it confidently knocking out a fast complex lick all by itself. Respect! The baby matures quickly. This really helps with your four-fingered playing because there is no weak link anymore; your whole hand comes alive. Readers know how much I value the hand and the things it can do (tasks, jobs)[1]; well, this proves the point. And there is a final bonus: just by practicing with my baby finger this way I found that I had learned how to play slide guitar! Because the glass tube fits over that finger and requires it to become unusually dexterous. So, guitarist to guitarist, give your baby a chance to shine, to demonstrate its worth. You may come to love it.[2]

[1] Please, no adolescent sniggering at that mild piece of verbal humor. It’s time to grow up.

[2] I have become hyper-aware of that finger, solicitous for its well-being. I gaze at it in wonder. It has joined my other fingers in a happy brotherhood—a band of equals.

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Earth Philosophy

Earth Philosophy

The planet we call Earth has specific properties, physically and geologically. It is reasonable to suppose that all of life reflects these properties—physiologically and psychologically. It is also reasonable to suppose that human science is imbued with these properties; on other planets with intelligent life forms the science may be quite different. A totally liquid or gaseous planet might produce a different sort of science, there being no solid objects there (the scientists have liquid or gaseous brains).[1] There may be overlap with our science, but there won’t be identity. If these beings have evolved very differently, owing to the environmental difference, the departures from human science may be quite marked. Call this “planet-relativity” (it doesn’t imply relativism about scientific truth). The content of science is environment-dependent. But is the same thing true of philosophy? At first, I think the inclination is to say yes: philosophy too is planet-relative. Aliens will or may do philosophy differently from us. They have different problems and entertain different answers to those problems. They may not be so hung up on substance ontology and more receptive to ontological variety (their paradigm of the physical may be a volume of gas or a force field). But on reflection I think this is not so: philosophy will have a certain universality. For the problems of philosophy transcend environmental particularity. There will be an external world problem and a free will problem and a mind-body problem and an ethical realism problem. These problems employ highly abstract concepts that generalize across planets and habitats—mind-independence, determinism, subjective and objective, ethical variation across space and time. Philosophy is not concerned with this planet, or even this universe, in the way science is (“earth science”). Biology wants to know how life evolved here, but philosophy wants to know if free will is possible anywhere. It is concerned with possible worlds not local planets (or even galaxies). Philosophy is planet-independent. Thus, science is empirical in this sense, since it focuses on what is observable in this universe; but philosophy is super-empirical in that it tries to get beyond local phenomena. This is why it is so concerned with necessary truth—the kind that is not planet-relative (or even universe-relative). It seeks absolute generality; not just an absolute conception of this universe but of any universe. If philosophy were ever to solve the problem of mathematical truth, the solution would hold for all possible thinking beings in all possible worlds, no matter what planet these thinkers are from (it isn’t about the nature of mathematical truth here). The laws of gravitation may not hold in all sectors of our universe, still less all possible universes, but the laws of arithmetic do; they don’t vary with the physical environment. Nor is it possible for freedom to be compatible with determinism here but not elsewhere, or for the mind to be the body in Alpha Centauri but not in the Milky Way. Ethics is not objective on Earth but subjective on Mars. Philosophy is then different from the other sciences: it isn’t variable across planets and intelligent beings. Philosophical interests may vary, but not philosophical problems and truths. This makes it special. I don’t mean superior, though that may be argued; I just mean sui generis. It is a different kind of subject. A university science curriculum may be very different in another galaxy or possible world, but the philosophy curriculum will be much the same. You could get a job there in philosophy, but the science departments will never hire you (“All he knows is earth chemistry”).[2]

[1] You can find this question entertainingly discussed in Do Aliens Speak Physics? by Daniel Whiteson and Andy Warner (2025). I appear cartoon-like on page 228.

[2] I think this explains a lot about the experience of doing philosophy as opposed to science; it feels capacious, transcendent, nonlocal. It feels BIG.

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A Letter from Concerned Philosophers

A Letter from Concerned Philosophers

Twelve years ago, a slew of philosophy professors was persuaded to sign a letter denouncing me for alleged “retaliation”. I am offering a cash prize for anyone of this crowd to write to me and give me their reasons for so signing. I predict there will be no takers, but I will be delighted to be proved wrong. Note that “I wanted to show that I am a virtuous person” does not earn the prize.

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Is Necessity Good?

Is Necessity Good?

Is there any sense in the idea that necessity is good and contingency bad? Is it somehow better to be necessary than contingent? I think there is a feeling that this is so, but it is hard to articulate. We know that many contingent truths or facts are bad, but are any necessary truths bad? Is it bad for bachelors to be unmarried or 3 + 5 to equal 8 or this table to be made of wood? No, but it is bad for bachelors to be unhappy or for there to be only 3 tigers left or for this table to land on my foot. Some contingent truths are good, but some are not, whereas all necessary truths are, if not good, at least not bad. If we thought that God created necessary truths, while Satan had a hand in some of the contingent truths, then we would suppose the necessary to be better than the contingent. And isn’t contingency more chaotic than necessity, less written into the nature of things? Moreover, moral truth is surely necessary not contingent, so the two are joined at that point. Still, it is hard to see how necessity could be intrinsically good and contingency intrinsically bad: why is a world of necessary truths better than a world of contingent truths? Is it more intelligible, or more beautiful? Is the association between necessity and intellect what makes it better than contingency, which is associated with the senses? Is necessity more reliable? Plato would surely prefer it to contingency, being so close to universals and hence the Good; but independent of his theory is there any deep connection? Is it perhaps that when we know a necessary truth we know about all possible worlds, while knowledge of contingent truth concerns just this world—and knowledge is a good thing? That sounds on the right lines, but it is hard to express the point rigorously. It is true that some of us enjoy necessary truth more than contingent truth, but is that just an idiosyncrasy of some minds? Is it just nice to think that some things couldn’t have been otherwise, thus sparing us of any responsibility for changing them? The question needs further thought.

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