Administrators

Administrators

University administrators are rapidly becoming the most reviled people in America, and with good reason. When was the last time you heard of one making a good decision? It has always been thus, you say. But it is getting worse: atrocious decisions abound, heavy handedness is the norm, authoritarian attitudes prevail, academic freedom is trampled. Clearly, these people are not up to the job (where were they taught, what kind of qualification do they have?). They don’t seem to understand the basic principles of fairness, proportionality, and common decency. They come across as thugs and fools, completely out of their depth. With this in mind, I would like to offer my professional services, for free: I am available to be consulted by any university administration struggling with its decision-making. I have had a lot of experience in this area, am a competent moral philosopher, and not a total idiot. You could do a lot worse than enlist my aid. In fact, I think I could save you from your worst blunders. So, call me, let’s talk.

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Age

Age

We have the wrong idea about age. We think too much in terms of bodily change and the passage of objective time. We can certainly talk about bodily age and temporal age, but we also need to recognize mental age—the age of a person’s mind. This may not correlate closely with the other two types of age: someone might be young psychologically but old physically and temporally, and vice versa. In particular, the growth and development of the body may not track the maturity of the mind. We tend to be fixated on the transition from pre-reproductive human to reproductive human—the period we call “adolescence”. This is a period of rapid growth and sexual maturation: the organism becomes capable of reproducing itself. This biologically important transition occurs close on the heels of what we call childhood: the mind of the child is not far behind, gradually transforming, as the body make a sudden leap to reproductive maturity (this is true for animals as well as humans). Reproductive age is not psychological age. In principle, a baby could attain reproductive maturity, with the mind of a baby. This kind of age is not indicative of the age of the human (or animal) mind: the mind lags behind the body as time moves on. Obviously, too, the mere passage of time has nothing essential to do with the mental age of the organism: you are not mentally old just by living a long time, or mentally young by living a short time. The aging of the mind (its evolution or maturation) is an autonomous process, largely independent of the body and objective time. It is less publicly accessible, less measurable, less evident to the senses: we see the body age, we experience the passage of time, but we don’t see or experience the aging of the mind. That is something hidden. Yet it happens: people do change psychologically over the years, especially in the early years of life. I would say, roughly, that the child is more adult than we tend to think, and the adult is more childlike than we tend to think: the physical facts belie the psychological facts. Being big and hairy is not the same as mental maturity. But our language and senses don’t register the dynamics of psychological aging; they give us a misleading picture of true psychological aging. What does it consist in exactly? What concepts capture it most accurately? What are its characteristic phases and triggers?

Psychologists have tried to map the processes of childhood mental development (Freud, Piaget), articulating stages and laws, but I am concerned with the whole life-cycle. Still, they were right to stress the purely mental aspects of the maturation process. A theme that appears in much thinking about child development is decentering: the child comes to see itself as one being among many, thus achieving a degree of objectivity. It is a kind of epistemic maturing—from subjective (egocentric) to objective (impartial). Clearly, this has a lot to do with moral development (see Kohlberg). I prefer to say that psychological aging has everything to do with knowledge: a person’s psychological age is a matter of his or her state of knowledge. How much knowledge does the individual possess? What kind of knowledge? How was the knowledge acquired? How well founded is it? These are the kinds of questions that determine an individual’s mental age. It is generally supposed that (temporally) older people know more than younger people, and that is surely statistically correct; I am saying that this is constitutive of mental age. I would hazard the conjecture that people reach mental maturity around the age of forty (certainly not sooner), long after reaching the age of sexual maturity; up to that point they are still mental children (of varying stages of maturation). We can call this “cognitive age”: a given individual might be sexually immature, temporally immature, and cognitively mature—or other combinations. A common type is well past the age of sexual maturity, and far on in years, and yet childlike cognitively (with “the mind of a child”). In principle, it would be possible to track the stages that precede the age of cognitive maturity, spelling out their internal features, their triggers and pathologies: that would be the task of the whole-life developmental psychologist. We know very little about this as things stand, save anecdotally, but empirical work could be undertaken to establish the natural history of the individual mind—the distinctive phases, underlying principles, and individual variations. We might even be able to measure cognitive maturity by suitable tests (analogous to IQ tests). Each of us may be assigned three ages: years since birth, bodily development, and cognitive state. Someone might be 70 calendar years old, 50 in bodily years, and 80 in cognitive years, i.e., pretty old in temporal terms, middle aged in terms of bodily condition, and advanced in mental terms. Age would be regarded in a more fine-grained and nuanced manner than it currently is. This would be fairer in all sorts of ways (it would make ageism a lot more difficult to sustain).

Let me put it intuitively and crudely: how old you are is determined by how much you know about the ways of the world. The idea is not that age is a matter of your amount of trivia knowledge, so that Jeopardy champions have the highest mental age. It’s about how much you know of relevance to your environment and life-style, including your social world. It will certainly include the capacity for sound judgment and careful thought (both essential even in jungle-dwelling tribes). This is not an elitist proposal in the pejorative sense. Knowledge can be practical as well as theoretical or book-learned. I also mean to include emotional maturity: this too will have a knowledge component. Mature emotions are regulated by rational thought, information, and openness to correction. So, a person cannot be fully mentally mature just by knowing a lot of facts while being emotionally juvenile; emotional age also matters to mental age. In fact, psychological maturity is largely about emotional maturity; the emotional and the cognitive are intimately connected. The point is that the mind grows and matures, reaching a sort of steady state (analogous to adult height); and this needs to be recognized in our thinking about aging. We should not be focused exclusively on merely corporeal or calendar considerations; indeed, mental age is really the central fact of aging. We should be as obsessed with it as we are with our calendar age or bodily age—more so. Have I reached mental maturity yet? Am I getting more juvenile mentally? How do I keep myself young in mind? Are there areas in which I am still mentally immature, or callow, or childish? Do I know too little about things that really matter? Am I sometimes hopelessly puerile in my judgments and opinions?[1]

[1] People look in the mirror to see how they have aged (I include children growing up as well as more senior people), but there is no mirror for mental age. We cannot immediately ascertain the impact of years on our mental age. But memory affords a way to gauge the effects of time on the mind and its propensities: how did I used to think and feel about things? And how does my mind differ from the minds of older and younger people? We are not completely closed off from knowledge of our mental age.

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Universities

Universities

I am reading Mary McCarthy’s 1951 novel The Groves of Academe. It is a marvelous satire on university politics and pretensions, centering on one Henry Mulcahy, unjustly fired from his post. What is astonishing is how little things have changed in the interim, except for the worse. There is the rogues’ gallery of credulous clowns (her phrase), arid deceptive administrators, callow students, creepy careerists, the constitutionally corrupt, nasty pieces of work, bookish buffoons, and ideological idiots. Mulcahy has done nothing wrong, but that makes very little difference once doubts have been sown. Friends flee, students turn, presidents politicize—the usual parade of human viciousness. No one seems immune from hysteria and dubitation (a word the author introduced me to). The book is startlingly well written, funny, gimlet-eyed, and generally spot on. There is even some philosophy in it. I haven’t reached the end yet, but I will be interested to hear the fate of this hapless and well-meaning (if eccentric) man. Of course, the story is steeped in American psychopathologies. A book for our time—perhaps for all time.

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Index

Index

I thought it might be useful to provide a list of words that could be searched on this blog, in case people wanted to look up specific subject areas.

Analysis, a priori, truth, meaning, knowledge, skepticism, reality, names, reference, fact, necessity, biology, psychology, physics, astronomy, science, philosophy, identity, existence, freedom, self, person, consciousness, intentionality, causation, subjective, objective, good, ethics, value, mathematics, logic, literature, Plato, Wittgenstein, Hume, Descartes, Berkeley, Locke, Kant, Strawson, Chomsky, Kripke, Quine, Davidson, predication, innateness, color, shape, space, time, animals, God, the big bang, life, language, thought, belief, desire, concepts, pain, evolution, music, sport, art, games, matter, mind, body, brain, food, disgust, hand, sex, vision, world, economics, metaphysics, linguistics, politics, mystery.

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Trumperica

Trumperica

I claim no originality in asserting Trump’s abysmal character; it stares us in the face every day. Nasty, stupid, witless, bigoted—you name it, he has it.  But, as is also ruefully noted, at least a third of the country thinks he is just fine. The point that is not observed, however, is that it can hardly be an accident that he is so widely approved. He is the average American writ large and ugly. Can it be that the non-Trump supporters are totally different from him and his followers? He is an amoral idiot, but he is not alone in that distinction. I have to admit that since his improbable (?) ascent I have been assailed by the thought that he is America’s not-so-hidden id: there is a bit of Trump in a lot of people. I won’t venture a percentage, but I swear I have glimpsed it in many people, some working in universities. Nasty, stupid, vindictive, amoral, humorless, uncompassionate, unthinking—you know the type. It’s the combination of the puerile and the violent that really sticks out. Their idea of virtue is destroying the people deemed “bad”, without worrying too much about fairness, due process, careful evaluation. Shoot first and don’t ask any questions later. Trump embodies all the pathologies of the American psyche. It really isn’t all that surprising that he is not summarily dismissed from civilized society; he is that society as it has come to exist. Where did he come from, this monster of the deep? He came from these United States, of course. There is nothing singular about him.

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Retirement

Retirement

I once heard Michael Dummett remark that he was looking forward to retirement so that he could get some work done. My sentiments exactly: work has never been so sweet as it has been post-employment. You work on what you want to work on and you don’t have to break off to fulfill your teaching (etc.) “duties”. I never retired from philosophy; I retired from teaching it (and allied occupations). I simply carried on doing what I’d been doing for forty years but without the bad bits. I don’t mean I hated teaching philosophy; on the contrary, I enjoyed it. But I didn’t enjoy the institutional framework of teaching: the formalization of it, the grading, the evaluating. Still less did I enjoy the hiring, promoting, letter writing, placement, recruitment, etc. I didn’t retire; I simply transitioned to the good stuff. I feel sorry for all the poor saps still chained to the industry we call education. I imagine Plato’s Academy was a pretty nice place to work, but the university as it has become is a miserable decline. Who does not hate university administrators these days? Who does not find half their colleagues a pain in the butt? Who loves every last one of their students? Who looks forward to a morning of writing letters of recommendation? No wonder most of the great philosophers didn’t work in universities—you can’t get any work done. Retirement (re-employment) is just a better state of mind to be in. But don’t leave it too late—don’t wait till you have nothing left to give. Retire while you can still work!

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Is Water Disgusting?

Is Water Disgusting?

Wet feces are more disgusting than dry ones. Suppurating wounds are more disgusting than non-suppurating wounds. Blood is disgusting, so is urine, so is saliva. The waterier something is the more disgusting it becomes. It is hard to think of dry things that are disgusting. Liquidity makes for disgustingness. One would think, then, that water is a disgust trigger, since it contributes to disgust. But it isn’t. True, stagnant or polluted water is disgusting, as is peculiar-tasting water, or muddy water; but water itself, pure water, is not generally found disgusting. Odd: oughtn’t it to be a potent source of disgust? Isn’t it the salient ingredient of objects of disgust? Remove water from the world and disgust is abolished, pretty much (even dry corpses are much less disgusting than moist ones). The slug, the fish, the slimy, the clammy—these are the animals most disgusting to us (not so the dry cat or elephant). Aren’t these things disgusting in virtue (partly) of their wateriness? And yet water itself is strangely non-disgusting—we even drink it! If water were not something we drink and bathe in, would we find it as non-disgusting as we do? Are we just habituated to its disgustingness? Compare fear: many people are aquaphobic and everyone knows the dangers of water. Hence, we are ambivalent about water: we like it and we are afraid of it (with good reason). Water can contain invisible microbes dangerous to health, so why don’t we exhibit a healthy ambivalence towards it—why isn’t it regarded as a potential disgust object? Disgust is close to fear (though not the same), but we don’t seem to have any disgust reaction to water as such. We fear rivers, lakes, and oceans, but we are not disgusted by them, even though the presence of water in other things occasions extreme disgust reactions (most liquids are made of water). A bowl of spit is regarded as highly disgusting, yet it is made mostly of water; if the water was distilled out, you could drink it (so long as you don’t know its salivary history). Dirty water is repellent; not so much the water in it, or even the dirt when dried out. This is puzzling, like so much about the emotion of disgust. What is going on?

As I say, habituation may be a factor, but it is hard to believe it is the whole truth. After all, we are intimately acquainted with feces, but their disgust value doesn’t diminish; we are not habituated to shit. The truth, I suspect, is that we are more disgusted by water than we think, but we need it to live, so we accept the bargain. Notice how temperature makes a difference: lukewarm water is often perceived as mildly disgusting, to drink or bathe in. Cold water is “refreshing”, while hot water is “cleansing”; body-temperature water is too close to blood and spit and urine. People don’t thirst for a nice glass of lukewarm water, or look forward to a tepid bath. If you are not thirsty at all, drinking lukewarm water is pretty unpleasant; in fact, it is rather disgusting. Apparently, pregnant women often develop a distaste for water, especially at body temperature. Children often hate pure water, craving more taste in their liquid intake. It wouldn’t take much conditioning to get people to be repelled by water—just dwell on microbes and dirty pipes and suchlike. Even bottled water could be propagandized: all the bacteria in the earth, recycled plastic bottles, etc. We are not far from a general repulsion towards water; many people already can’t drink it at room temperature, and an outbreak of water-borne disease could turn people against water (suppose no such disease could be carried by Coca Cola). We think water is good for us in its pure flavorless form, so we force it down, but we could become persuaded that it is somehow contaminated and not good for us, triggering widespread revulsion. Can’t we imagine aliens who find water repulsive to drink and won’t go near it? Disgustingness is in the eye of the beholder to some extent, so we could become more disgusted by water than we are now. In future centuries we might wonder how our primitive ancestors could bear to drink it or wash with the stuff. Even today no one really likes water—the taste, the texture; it is a cheap thirst quencher not something to enjoy for its own sake. It would not be difficult to develop an aversion to water, say by a near drowning or being waterboarded. Our attitudes towards water are complicated and ambivalent; the balance could easily be tipped against water. People today don’t want to drink blood, finding the very idea repellent, even though their ancestors did it from necessity, and even relished it. The seeds of disgust might already be present in water. It certainly has one property closely interwoven into human disgust reactions: it straddles the life and death divide.[1] Water is essential to life, manifest in living things; but it is in itself lifeless, a mere chemical combination found in places unconnected to life (e.g., asteroids). Water is intrinsically lifeless and yet integral to life; thus, it partakes of both, like the corpse or excrement or spilt blood or toenails. Warm water is especially close to life while being intrinsically dead, because of the temperature of the body, so it can occasion thoughts of creaturely mortality. The vampire drinks warm blood and absorbs life; we drink warm water and feel our own organic warmth. We are 60% warm water, so drinking the stuff is uncomfortably close to our mortal nature. Water stirs deep (if suppressed) emotions of a discomforting kind. So, is water disgusting? A little bit, a little bit. It is more disgusting than diamonds, say, or empty space. It has its own quantum of disgust.[2]

[1] I discuss this in The Meaning of Disgust (2011).

[2] Water is essential to life, but it has no nutritional value: it is not a result of photosynthesis, like food in general. Can you think of anything else of which this is true that you willingly consume? Not pills or medicines (salt, perhaps, but not in large quantities). It is tasteless in pure form, so does nothing for the taste buds, and tasteless food is generally found inedible. It is surprising that we don’t jib at it more. The whole bottled water industry is an attempt to reconcile us to water consumption. We keep ourselves “hydrated”, but we don’t really enjoy the experience. We need water, but we don’t really desire it. We are reconciled to water, but we don’t love it. It’s like air except that we have to take it into our stomach. And it makes us into chronic urinators, which has its own disgust profile.

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Action as Selection

Action as Selection

The causal theory of action maintains that reasons cause actions, reasons being combinations of beliefs and desires. This doctrine is supposed to provide a uniform account of the “because” relation: action is produced in the same way any event is produced—by means of causation. Cars cause bridges to collapse; reasons cause actions—it is all one. I think this misses an important distinction: actions are selections among alternatives, but regular causation is not. The agent envisages several possible courses of action and then selects one, e.g., he wonders what to have for dinner, reviews the possibilities, selects one of them, and acts on it. He choosesfrom among a set of options. But ordinary non-mental causation is not like that: there is no selection, no choice, no contemplation of alternatives. Causation is operative but it is not selective. When the agent chooses what to eat for dinner, he rejects all but one of the alternatives that occur to him: he chooses not to eat those things. So, his final desire has a negative component: in choosing to eat sushi, say, he chooses to reject pizza or curry or bananas. The intentionality of desire is complex: I want to do X and not Y or Z. It is this selective desire that causes the eventual action. Ordinary causes are not like that: they have no intentionality, let alone this kind of negative intentionality. But rational causes (reasons) have this kind of selectiveness built into them.

This has a bearing on the question of freedom. For an action to be free it must be the result of choice, but choice is only possible if there are alternatives to choose from, known to the agent. If reasons did not have the intentional structure I just specified, acting on them could not be considered free. The compatibilist says that an action is free if and only if it is caused by the agent’s desires, but that formulation doesn’t yet introduce the idea of alternatives. If the operative desire were not embedded in an array of alternatives, it could not count as generating a free action. But upon analysis we see that desire is always constituted by such an array, considered by the agent, so the compatibilist theory has what is needed to account for free action. It is in the nature of desire to be selective (accepting and rejecting); acting on a desire will thus always involve an array of alternatives. However, we need to make this explicit: free action is acting on one’s desires, viewed as selecting from among alternatives. It isn’t enough just to act so as to satisfy a desire for a certain thing; that thing has to be selected from an array of possible alternatives. Our agent selects sushi instead of pizza etc.: his desire includes rejecting the alternatives—he desires not to have those other things. Free action results only when this condition is satisfied. Reflex actions thus don’t count as free, since no alternative was considered and rejected. The causal theory of action thus needs to be supplemented and refined in order to make room for compatibilist freedom, but that seems perfectly feasible given the nature of desire. Desire is multi-pronged.[1]

[1] Is this a kind of holism? It does discern complex structure in human desire, but this is not a structure of separate desires. The desire for sushi for dinner is the desire not to have alternative things for dinner: the intentionality of the desire includes rejecting alternatives. This is not the same as having many desires operating together. That may or may not be true, but it is not the point I am making; I am making a point about the structure of each desire.

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