Philosophy of Popularity

Philosophy of Popularity

Are there any concepts for which a skeptical theory (solution) is obviously correct? Consider popularity: what is it to be popular? Suppose someone thinks that popularity is defined by a specific observable quality of a person such as good looks (suitably defined). They might even think that popularity is defined by having blonde hair and blue eyes. Such a person is likely to be surprised when they come across someone who is popular but does not have good looks or blonde hair and blue eyes, or someone who has those characteristics but is not popular. It is obvious that they don’t have the concept of popularity, which is the property of being well liked by many people. They have mistaken an obviously social-relational concept for an individual intrinsic-essence concept. Who does that? The correct analysis of the concept of popularity is as stated, not as our eccentric individual believes. This is not a skeptical solution because it is not skeptical of widespread assumptions. There is really no instance of an obviously correct skeptical solution. If everyone bizarrely believed that popularity is defined by good looks or blonde hair and blue eyes, it might be reasonable to speak of a skeptical answer to the question by giving the correct definition—skeptical of a widespread belief, that is. But there are no serious cases of that: the idea of a genuinely “skeptically” defined concept that everyone thinks is a “straight” defined concept is unheard of. No one actually believes that popularity is definable by the kind of criterion I stipulated in the case of the eccentric individual. That would be bizarre to the point of impossible.

Why is this? Because we generally know what our words mean. So, someone who believes that we mistake skeptically defined concepts for the straight kind is supposing that we can make this kind of mistake about what their words mean. If “game” is really defined in the family resemblance manner, how could anyone think that the concept of a game is not so defined? How could you be under the illusion that games have a common essence if in fact they don’t as a matter of the meaning of “game”? No one even half rational could think that popularity is defined by some observable quality independent of being liked by many people. The proper conclusion, then, is that the whole idea of skeptically defined concepts that are mistaken for straight concepts is radically misguided. No one could think that “game” has an essentialist definition if it really has a family resemblance definition, on pain of not understanding the word “game”. This is a philosopher’s myth. How could it be the case that “game” has a family resemblance definition and yet for thousands of years no one recognized that fact? It would be like everyone throughout history mistakenly thinking that “popular” means “good looking” or “has blonde hair and blue eyes” when it actually means “liked by many people”. The idea is preposterous. Thus, the contention that family resemblance has any philosophical utility is an error. There could never be the kind of revision Wittgenstein envisages. The idea that “meaning” or “rule-following” really means a kind of skeptical definition, along the lines sketched by Kripke, verges on self-contradiction; if it meant that, we would know it, so we wouldn’t need any persuading. Imagine a philosophy book on popularity that earnestly argues that popularity is not definable by good looks but by being well liked; it would not sell a million.[1]

[1] Wittgenstein’s idea that “nothing is hidden” about meaning is in flat contradiction with his contention that the meaning of “game” is given by family resemblance: for it is clearly hidden from us that this is so. We think, according to him, that “game” is an essence concept but that it is no such thing—how could that be so if meaning is transparent? There can only be skeptical solutions if meaning is hidden.