Naming and Contingency Let’s accept that names have no meaning, as a distinguished tradition contends.[1] They may have a reference or denotation but they have no sense or connotation. Names lack “descriptive content” and are not synonymous with definite descriptions. Predicates are alien to their semantic functioning. They belong to a different […]
[1] The concepts of particular and universal are theoretical concepts introduced to perform an explanatory role. They are not found fully formed in our ordinary conceptual scheme. They should therefore be evaluated in terms of their theoretical utility, which may trump any feeling of metaphysical repugnance they evoke. It is notable that they pull in […]
Universals in Thought We introduce the concept of the particular because we observe distinctness in the world. We introduce the concept of the universal because we observe similarity in the world. I see the cat as distinct from the computer and I conclude that particulars exist; if I didn’t I wouldn’t have […]
Big Mystery: Space and Time What is the most fundamental mystery in the universe? Mind and matter is big, but space and time might be bigger. Each individually is a mystery, as has long been recognized, but there is also the mystery of their connection. How are space and time connected? Are they […]
The same point applies to our knowledge of propositional content: we don’t have impressions of the content of belief (even if we have impressions of the belief attitude itself). Our senses are not geared to propositions. Thus our knowledge of folk psychology is not explicable in classic empiricist style.
Empiricism and Semantic Knowledge Empiricism tells us that all knowledge worthy of the name derives from the senses. In Hume’s formulation, every idea has its origin in an impression, such as an impression of red. This is a psychological theory to which empirical evidence is relevant (what if we came across a […]
[1] There is also a genetic question: if the original state of existence is nature-free, how does it ever acquire a nature? Where do the properties come from? If two bare existences interact with each other, what makes them become clothed? Natures can’t come from Nothingness.
Existentialism and Essentialism The existentialist credo is: Existence precedes essence.[1] This stands opposed to the dictum: Essence precedes existence. It’s Sartre versus the Scholastics, supposedly. Sartre’s existentialism, deriving from Kierkegaard and Heidegger, is said to invert traditional metaphysics, which takes the nature of a thing to be prior to its existence—or at […]
[1] This paper is a follow-up to my “Attributes of Mind”. I find it strange that people pay lip service to Brentano without making much effort to find out exactly what he held. And it is far more challenging and momentous than the usual anodyne versions of it suggest (of course the mind is about […]
Intentionality and Space Here is a famous passage from Brentano’s Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874): “Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction […]