Biology and Physics Biology and physics are very different types of science, but why is this—and is it remediable? Are they essentially different, or is it just a historical contingency? Physics as we have it is highly mathematical, consisting of strict mathematically formulated fundamental laws, expressed as equations; biology is not very mathematical, employs loose […]
Rigidity and Necessity The idea of rigid designation was one of Kripke’s best ideas in Naming and Necessity, but he didn’t explore it in much depth. I will rectify that omission, putting rigidity in its proper place. It will turn out to be both more familiar and less well understood than we have been led […]
The Subjective Mind(-View) How subjective is our view of the mind, our own and other’s? How much are we skewed and limited by our given viewing faculties and conceptual resources? We have a view of the physical world—a picture, a conception—and we can ask how subjective it is, i.e., how dependent on our peculiar sensory […]
Ontology of Psychology Every subject has its basic ontology—its preferred subject matter, the things it takes to exist, what it is committed to. In physics it is macroscopic bodies, particles, and fields (including forces); in astronomy it is stars, planets, and black holes; in chemistry it is molecules and chemical reactions; in biology it is […]
Philosophy of Learning In philosophy we study perception, knowledge, belief, memory, and reasoning—but not so much learning. In psychology learning is central, but in philosophy it is peripheral at best (perhaps part of philosophy of education). I propose to make some programmatic remarks about learning as a philosophical topic (I happen to have a strong […]
Ana Navarro and Me Last Saturday, I by chance ran into Ana Navarro in Milams supermarket in Miami. She doesn’t know me from Adam. I said hello to her and we had a pleasant conversation in the aisles there. She was as charming and delightful as you would expect. It turns out she lives near […]
Skeptical Solutions to the Mind Problem Early thinkers had a body problem: what is body? What is the stuff we call “matter”? The pre-Socratics had a go at answering this question: matter is water, or variations on the four elements (earth, fire, water, and air). More advanced thinkers proposed invisible atoms, or spatial extension, or […]
Do Animals Have an Inner Child? Nowadays it is commonly accepted that humans have an inner child. The idea is natural enough: the personality and experiences of the young child stick in the mind in later years, shaping later life. They don’t just disappear at an appointed age, discarded like clothes that no longer fit. […]
Philosophy of Popularity Are there any concepts for which a skeptical theory (solution) is obviously correct? Consider popularity: what is it to be popular? Suppose someone thinks that popularity is defined by a specific observable quality of a person such as good looks (suitably defined). They might even think that popularity is defined by having […]
Family Resemblances and Skeptical Solutions We all remember Wittgenstein’s famous sections on games and family resemblance; I won’t repeat them. The point I want to make is that they can be construed as providing a skeptical solution to a skeptical problem. Not that Wittgenstein saw them this way; on the contrary, he had no notion […]