Philosophical Speech Acts What is characteristic of the philosophical speech act? Here again I will divide the question into three parts corresponding to the locutionary, the illocutionary, and the perlocutionary.[1] First, what is the locutionary meaning of the philosophical speech act—what kind of proposition does it express? Is it a report of fact, a presentation […]
Scientific Speech Acts How do scientific acts of speech differ from other kinds, say political? In analyzing speech acts Austin distinguished “locutionary meaning”, “illocutionary force”, and “perlocutionary effect”: how do these categories manifest themselves in the speech of scientists? Locutionary meaning pertains to the propositional content of speech acts irrespective of the communicative intentions of […]
Science Philosophy How exactly should Scientific Language Philosophy proceed? First, it need not be the whole of philosophy: we can still discuss traditional philosophical problems that may have nothing to do with science or any discipline distinct from philosophy itself. Second, it is not the same as philosophy of science as this phrase is normally […]
Scientific Language Philosophy We are familiar with Ordinary Language Philosophy, an Oxford product of the 1950s (perhaps partly derived from Wittgenstein in Cambridge). This approach has been criticized for its neglect of science, as if common sense is sufficient for a modern style of philosophy. But what about a different kind of linguistic turn—towards scientific […]
I have just finished reading Mark Rowe’s Austin, a 660 page study of the eponymous philosopher. It is a superb book in every way: exhaustively researched, insightful, expert on both the Second World War and British philosophy, and exceptionally well written. I hope it is widely read both within philosophy and by outsiders.
I don’t know how many professional philosophers read this blog, and hence how widely read my writing of the last ten years is, but I expect the answer is “Not much”. I wish to put it on record that I think this is a grievous mistake. My exclusion from professional philosophy in America over the […]
Quantifiers Deconstructed How should we interpret the quantifiers of the predicate calculus? Here is one suggestion: “Ex(Fx)” should be read “There exists an individual, call it x, such that Fx”.[1] There is an obvious problem with this: it commits a use-mention fallacy. The first occurrence of “x” should be in quotation marks so that the […]
Truth, Lies, and the Internet Two things compete for control over our beliefs: facts and falsehoods. That is, people form beliefs sometimes as a result of facts—in which case their beliefs are true—and sometimes as a result of lies they have been told—in which case their beliefs are false. The factual falsehood of lies is […]
Is Logic Gibberish? We are familiar with the standard notation of predicate logic in which we have what is called variable binding. Thus we have a symbol for (say) existence followed by an “x” and then a formula in which a predicate and bound variable occur (“Ex(Fx)”). How should we read this? It is common […]
I went to see the film the other day. It is commendable in many ways. I liked the moment, surely lost on most viewers, when Einstein says to someone visiting the Institute in Princeton, “Have you met Dr Godel?”–who then disappears for the rest of the movie. But it irritated me that Oppenheimer was depicted […]