Gricean Belief and Desire Grice argues that speaker meaning is a certain kind of complex intention: the speaker intends to produce in her audience the belief that p by means of the audience’s recognition of that intention—so the act of speaker meaning involves an intention that refers to an intention. [1] I […]
Consciousness and Language If the mind is computational, then there must be a language of thought. This is because computations are operations defined over symbols: thought processes must be symbolic processes. The original conception of a Turing machine makes this very clear, since the operation of writing and erasing marks on […]
Existence and Logical Form There have been two main theories about the logical form of existence statements: the first-order predicate theory and the second-order predicate theory. One theory maintains that “exists” expresses a property that objects have; the other theory maintains that “exists” serves to make a statement about […]
Fixed and Variable Semantic Value The orthodox view is that names are rigid designators and descriptions are (typically anyway) non-rigid designators: denotation varies from world to world in the latter case, but not in the former. What about connotation? The connotation of a description is fixed, even as it […]
The Language of Physics Physics employs four denoting terms to cover what are usually referred to as forces: “gravity”, “electromagnetism”, “the weak force”, and “the strong force”. What is the semantics of these terms? Are they names, descriptions, or demonstratives? Do they function like standard natural kind terms? It is […]
Language and Reality Consider the following thesis: objects are essentially nameable and properties are essentially predicable. That is, objects can only be named not predicated, while properties can only be predicated not named. To put it differently, objects can only be denoted from subject position, while properties can only […]
The Fidelity Theory of Truth We are accustomed to deflationary accounts of truth according to which there isn’t much of interest to say about the concept—it’s just a way to avoid repetition, a convenient shorthand, and strictly redundant. We are also accustomed to rigorous technical definitions, geared to formal languages, in […]
Blushing, Sneezing, Coughing, and Spitting Blushing is involuntary: you can’t blush intentionally or intentionally suppress a blush (though you can of course undertake a course of action that will have such results). Blushing is not an action, as philosophers say; it is not “subject to the will”. Sneezing is similar in that […]
Concepts of Natural Kinds According to the standard model, concepts like water and heat are natural kind concepts subject to Twin Earth cases: they are not “in the head”, they have an “indexical component”, they function as mere “labels”. Alongside these concepts we have another range of “theoretical” concepts, such as […]
Meaning and Consciousness Is it possible to mean something unconsciously? Grice’s bus conductor rings the bell three times, meaning that the bus is full: could he do this unconsciously? [1] That would mean, presumably, that he intentionally rang the bell three times as a result of having an unconscious intention to cause in […]