The Word “Is” The standard view is that “is” is ambiguous between the “is” of predication and the “is” of identity (we might also add the “is” of composition, as in “this statue is bronze”). Thus we have, “the cup is red” and “Hesperus is Phosphorus”, where the two occurrences of […]
Is Language Necessarily Fregean? Frege’s distinction between sense and reference gains much of its intuitive plausibility from certain often-rehearsed examples. Thus we have the cases of Hesperus and Phosphorus (the planet), Afla and Ateb (the mountain), Superman and Clark Kent (the person). Citing this type of example Frege invokes the notion […]
Is Reference a Pseudo Relation? Talk of reference is part of ordinary language, but to talk of a reference relation is to go beyond ordinary language. Is it to go too far? Does it embody a misconception about the nature of reference or the meaning of “refers”? Let us consider some relations in […]
Intentionality and the Inner The mind is directed outward onto something other than itself. This intentional object might be a particular or a universal, mental or physical, existent or non-existent. It is not identical to the mental state that takes it as object. Moreover, the outer object is essential to the […]
Insight and Analysis Can conceptual analysis provide genuine insight? Can it increase our knowledge of the world? Consider the concept of breathing: how should it be analyzed? Not as absorbing oxygen by means of the lungs—that would rule out organisms that absorb some other gas and don’t have lungs (unless we define […]
Inscrutable Mental Causation It is a matter of common observation that the sun causes plants to grow. Our ancestors will have noticed this long ago and wondered why it is. The answer is by no means obvious. Maybe it’s because the sun is a god and he commands plants to grow; maybe […]
Implicit Quotation In ordinary writing people are not fussy about quotation marks. A printed sentence may read, “The word red has three letters”. Logicians and philosophers of language may shudder at such violations of the rules of use and mention, but most people take them in stride. It […]
Immaterial Darwinism Consider the following imaginary world (I say “imaginary” not “possible” because I doubt this world is really metaphysically possible). There is a range of disembodied minds divided into different kinds in this world, analogous to animal species, numbering in the millions. There are also differences among the individuals […]
Identity and Difference Identity has been found problematic; difference, not so much. Identity has been judged a pseudo relation, but no one doubts that difference is a genuine relation between things. We can observe that one thing is different from another, but can we observe that a thing is identical […]
I’m Free Philosophy has saddled itself with the phrase “free will”, asking such questions as whether free will is possible, whether it is compatible with determinism (and indeterminism), and what its nature is. Is it conceivable that the phrase itself is responsible for the seeming intractability of the problem? Consider the […]